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THE PORTUGUESE CASADOS AND THE INTRA-ASIAN TRADE: 1500-1663

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The *casados* (meaning family-men especially the Portuguese citizens married to native women) formed an important segment of the merchant communities in Portuguese Asia and their emergence as a bourgeoisie class in the Indian Ocean region played a vital role in re-shaping the commercial strategy of the Portuguese. It was actually the *casado* traders who brought fabulous wealth and prosperity to the Portuguese settlements including Goa and Cochin. And its credit should go primarily to the exclusive Asian dimension given by the *casados* to their commerce, a policy by which the wealth accrued from trade was made to concentrate in their own centres, without letting it flow to mother country. From the role of petty traders and shopkeepers of the Albuquerquean times, they emerged as a powerful mercantile group by joining hands with the native traders, a rapport which was made possible through their marriage relations with native women. Eventually the economic stature of the *casados* grew rapidly with their entry into the vacuum created by the relative ousting of the traditional Muslim merchants from trade opportunities.

The shaping of a mercantile community

It was Afonso Albuquerque (as early as 1510), the protagonist of the policy of mixed marriages, who encouraged the Portuguese who married native women to take up local trade as a means of livelihood. He also encouraged them to start petty shops and small businesses.¹ The taste of profits generated by this trade induced in them a desire to participate in wider commercial network. Eventually the *casados* began to claim the right to conduct commerce by virtue of their Portuguese origin and marital status. They wanted less state interference and an atmosphere of free trade. This made the Portuguese with private interests get organized into a lobbying group in Cochin, known as the "Cochin group", with a view to staging organised opposition to state intervention, which Afonso Albuquerque had implemented by an elaborate system of fortresses.² The king of Cochin, whose eyes were more on the customs revenue from the private trade of the *casados*, also joined hands with them in setting up a commercial empire, where their private interests were protected.³ In fact the nomination of Lopo Soares de Albergaria, who was a representative of the "Cochin group",

as the successor to Afonso Albuquerque in 1515, was a victory of the private enterprisers among the *casados*. This new governor eventually demarcated for the *casado* entrepreneurs a space east of Cape Comorin, which was relatively free of state interference.⁴

The *casados* made use of this liberal atmosphere of private trade to the maximum by establishing commercial contacts with Bengal, Malacca and South East Asia. In fact with the voyage of Fernao Peres de Andrade, who was appointed in 1515 as the "captain for discovering the Bay of Bengal and China",⁵ Bengal and other eastern parts of Indian Ocean, along with Malacca, entered the commercial geography of the Portuguese. D. Joao da Silveira, who sailed from Cochin to Bengal in 1518, explored further commercial prospects of the Gangetic delta for the emerging *casado* traders.⁶ In 1522-23, Diogo Pereira, who was greatly associated with the private trade of Cochin, was moving about in Bengal and Pegu trying to open the doors for the commerce of pepper from Cochin and procuring wares in exchange.⁷ On another occasion, he took from Cochin pepper, along with copper and silk, to Cambay and Chaul and on sale, got 16,000 *pardaos* in gold.⁸ Followed by the initial explorative attempts, the *casados* were seen focussing more on the eastern parts of Indian Ocean; but trade with the ports of the western coast was also keenly maintained.

By 1520 the *casado's* involvement in Asian trade became more active and vibrant. Consequently, they began to make use of large quantities of timber for the construction of ships to serve their purposes. As private trade of the *casados* increased, the need for the timber to build ships equally increased. This began to affect adversely the royal ship-building centre of Cochin. In 1523, it was reported that wood for ship-building was scarce in Cochin as it was all purchased by the *casados*, who had opted to live in India and conduct their own trade.⁹ Once the private *casado* traders started bringing wealth by way of their trade, the king of Cochin wanted to have a share of it as port dues. He had every right to claim customs revenue, as the port of Cochin was situated in his kingdom. But the Portuguese authorities were not prepared to share with the native king the customs taxes which they collected. In 1529, the king of Cochin wrote to King John III of Portugal repeating his claim to the duties on all the ships of the *casados* that came from Malacca and Bengal.¹⁰ The governor, Lopo Vaz de Sempayo, who was firm against the sharing of customs duties with the native ruler, reacted by interning the king of Cochin in his own palace, on this issue.¹¹ Finally, on 24th February 1530, King John III explicitly renounced all rights to customs duties collected at Cochin and gave over this right to the native ruler, considering the fact that

the latter was the owner of the port of Cochin.¹²

How could the sudden rise of the *casados* in intra-Asian trade be accounted for? Most of the historians do not explain the reasons and factors that favoured the abrupt emergence of the *casados* and the replacement of the traditional Muslim merchants of Cochin by them from the pre-eminent position the latter held in intra-Asian commerce. In fact, the actual transition began with the frequent attacks and confiscation of Muslim ships in the name of *cartazes* by the Portuguese authorities, who favoured the private initiatives of the *casados* of Cochin. During the early days of Portuguese arrival the Muslim merchants of Cochin were their greatest allies and suppliers (especially Cherina Marakkar, Mamale Marakkar, Mitos Marakkar, Nino Marakkar, Coje Mappila, Abraham Mappila, etc.) and this continued till the death of Afonso de Albuquerque.¹³ By 1520's, the Portuguese attitude towards them changed and the *Estado* officials began to use frequently the *cartazes*, which authorized them to check and confiscate any vessel, as a convenient tool to weaken the commercial strength of these traditional Muslim traders (if not to destroy them) and to create out of their weakness a space for the emerging *casados*.¹⁴ Many of them became prey to the torture-tactics, to which Zaynuddin refers.¹⁵ Kuti Ali turned out to be a corsair, when the Portuguese governor, who previously joined hands with him to send pepper to Red Sea ports, himself confiscated the whole cargo as contraband and appropriated the vessel.¹⁶ By 1524, being fed up with the confiscation of the ships and the Portuguese oppression, the leading Muslim merchants of Cochin like Kunjali Marakkar, his brother Ahmad Marakkar, their uncle Muhammadali Marakkar and other dependents left Cochin and settled down in Calicut, with a staunch resolution to fight the Portuguese.¹⁷ It is significant here to note that among these offended Muslim merchants of Cochin was the first Kunjali, who was driven to organize guerrilla warfare and corsair activities against the Portuguese.¹⁸ Another important Muslim trader of Cochin to become a corsair, when the Portuguese captured two ships sent by him to Cambay, was Pate Marakkar, who had been a great friend and collaborator of the Portuguese in the early days of their arrival. On the confiscation of his vessels, he went to Calicut and joined his nephew, Kunjali Marakkar as a corsair.¹⁹ It is to be specially noted that the *casados* emerged as the principal traders of the Asian waters only with the estrangement of the traditional Muslim merchant magnates from Cochin. With the transfer of residence to Calicut by prominent Muslim traders, the second-rate merchants of this group, who remained in Cochin were reduced to peddling traders or petty shop-keepers. Those Muslim

merchants, who were alienated from Cochin as well as the Portuguese system and moved to Calicut, had to resort to corsair activities as an alternative trade.²⁰

Meanwhile, some *casados* of Cochin also collaborated with these corsairs and Muslim merchants to expand their commercial horizons. Their marriage relationship with Muslim women facilitated such a rapport, which otherwise would have been unthinkable. Thus we find references to the Portuguese *casados*, who were living almost five or six leagues away from Cochin in places like Culimute(?), making amaments for Kunjali's men and trading with them on contraband commodities. They also built ships for the Muslim pirates and helped the latter to enlarge their fleet.²¹ These *casados* with the help of Muslim corsairs even attacked the fleet of the *Estado*, an act which committed out of common economic interests. The reason for the association of the *casados* with the Muslim corsairs was explained by one Diogo Fernandes as due to the Muslim origin of the wives of the *casados*. In 1537, he wrote to the King John III that these Portuguese *casados* were married to native women, whose parents were Muslims.²² By 1530s the *casados* had begun to wield a great amount of economic power, extending their commercial network all over Indian Ocean.

Flow from Portugal and the Move towards a Parallel Commercial Empire

By 1530, we find a radical change in the demographic structure and composition of the Portuguese settlements in India. Though Lazarus Nurnburger saw in Cochin in 1517 a total of 300 houses,²³ we do not know for sure how many of them were occupied by married Portuguese citizens. On 12th July 1527, Luis Martins from Portalegre wrote that there were 1000 men (including the unmarried soldiers) in Cochin and the number of married people was 160.²⁴ Later with the flow of people from the mother country, the number of married people living in Cochin increased considerably. The exodus of people from Portugal began with the recurring famines and frequent outbreak of pestilence. The famines of 1521, 1522 and the pestilence of 1524 that broke out in Portugal made many to look to Indian colonies as better centres for safe living.²⁵ The outbreak of the great pestilence of 1530-31 in Lisbon made many flee the capital and the royal city was completely deserted.²⁶ These famines and pestilences were followed by successive waves of migration to India.²⁷ Most of them came first as soldiers; later they married and settled down in the prospective trade centres like Cochin and Goa, raising the number of the *casado* residents of these cities. Meanwhile, from 1533 onwards, many new Christians also began to

flee from Portugal as their life there had become precarious and came to India, especially to Cochin in search of greater security and tolerance as well as to take advantage of the new opportunities for trade and commerce.²⁸ By 1542, there were altogether 15,000 Christians in Cochin (area) of whom more than 300 were *casados*, married and settled down in the city of Santa Cruz of Cochin.²⁹ In 1546, there were 570 Portuguese men residing in Cochin out of whom 343 were married settlers.³⁰ The number of the married Portuguese settlers rose to 500 by 1551.³¹ It is to be specially remembered that with the transfer of the political headquarters of the Portuguese *Estado da India* and the allied men and machinery from Cochin to Goa in 1530, the number of the *casados* in Cochin did not go down, but on the contrary went on increasing. The transfer of administrative machinery to Goa did not affect the *casados*, as the latter were living primarily on commerce.

These newcomers began to take up trade as a means of livelihood and to cooperate with the first generation of *casados*, who had already established a vast commercial network. The Portuguese authorities had to accommodate themselves to this situation and adopt a policy in which sufficient space was carved out for the commercial enterprise of these people. Chances for decent livelihood and opportunities for private initiatives were offered to them through the system of licences, voyages and other trade concessions. It is highly probable that their participation in the diversion of pepper was also tacitly allowed, to a certain extent.³² The governor Jorge Cabral (1549-1550) wrote that over half of the Portuguese in Asia refused to obey his mobilization orders for the Diu campaign, implicitly meaning that they were least interested in royal service; but only in private trade.³³

The crown seems to have encouraged these traders not only because commerce provided a livelihood to them; but also because they were slowly emerging as a substitute to the traditional Muslim merchants. Some sort of relaxation in the royal monopoly was allowed in such a way that their private initiatives might get better results. On the other hand, with regard to the *quintaladas*, the voyages, licences and other trade concessions, the Portuguese had created a system in which the king was required only to pay less while the individuals had to earn the rest by his personal initiatives. When the crown itself faced a financial crisis at home, this arrangement saved the king from paying for expenses and at the same time it secured for him an extra income by way of customs duty.³⁴

Meanwhile, the royal monopoly over the spice trade in Malacca and Moluccas ceased to exist in 1533 and 1537 respectively.³⁵ This made the *casados* bag huge profits by actively involving themselves

in the Bengal-Malacca-Coromandel-Malacca and Cochin-Malacca routes. In 1539, the trade in cloves and nutmegs was announced as free and everyone was allowed to get the species in the Moluccas; but one third of the transported amount had to be sold to the crown at the buying price.³⁶ This attracted the *casados* to go to the sources of spices in South East Asia. The diverse commodities like cloves from the Moluccas, nutmeg and mace from Banda, pepper from Sumatra and Sunda, sandalwood from Timor, camphor from Borneo, benzoin from Sumatra, aloes from Sumatra and Cochin-China were brought to Malacca. Along with these plant products these were also Malacca musk, sealing wax and precious stones from Burma and North Siam, exported through Pegu, tin from the Malay peninsula and some gold from Sumatra. From Malacca, though one part of these commodities went to China and Japan, a strong stream moved through the *casado* traders to Cochin. Some were also taken to Portugal and the rest to Cambay and Ormuz for distribution in West Asia.³⁷ After the establishment of Macao in 1557, merchandise from China, especially finished goods like porcelain, silk, lacs, jewellery and minted brass began to be taken to Cochin and Goa with the help of the *casados*.³⁸

Indian textiles were taken in large volume for exchange in the Archipelago, as the spices of South East Asia were to be paid in textiles rather than in money.³⁹ The three main weaving places in India were Gujarat, Coromandel coast and the kingdom of Bengal. The *casados* took from Cochin pepper, ginger, coir, coconuts and other wares from China and Malacca to Diu, Surat and Chaul to collect raw cotton and textiles.⁴⁰ They were also exchanging pepper for rice Coromandel. Meanwhile, the Coromandel-Malacca trade carrying textiles from Nagapattinam and Mylapore to the entrepots of Archipelago for the spices also went on uninterruptedly.⁴¹ The *casados* who used to take pepper (sometimes with proper licences; but very often smuggled the pepper) from Cochin to Bengal played a crucial role in the textile trade of Bengal. Though some were taken to Malacca, Cochin was the major outlet for the textiles of Bengal that came through the ports of Pipli, Chittagong, Satgon and Dianga. By 1540s pepper smuggling to Bengal, Pegu and China, carried out with the help of the *casados* of Cochin and *Estado* officials, became so frequent that the European trade began to dwindle.⁴²

The *casados* were also importing horses from Ormuz to Cochin. Though Goa was the main Indian port for the import of horses from Arabia (an average of 2000 horses a year),⁴³ the *casados* of Cochin also attempted to try their luck by importing horses to Cochin. In 1533, D. Jao da Cruz with due permission imported horses to Cochin to be

taken to the Pearl Fishery coast, Travancore and to the kingdoms of Chymbechenaque (Tumbhichi Nayak) and Beteperemal (Vettum Perumal).⁴⁴ In 1546 Henrique de Souza Chichorro says that the horses taken to Cape Comorin from Ormuz via Cochin did not yield much profit. So he was asking permission to take sugar, rice and lac from Satgon (*Porto Pequeno* of Bengal) to Cochin.⁴⁵ But in 1547, we find the *Ouvidor* of Cochin remarking that many *casados* of the city were taking horses to Cape Comorin from Cochin for trade.⁴⁶ This trade appeared to be so lucrative that even the new Christian traders like Luis Rodrigues also began to take horses to Cape Comorin for sale.⁴⁷ The crown wanted to stop the import of horses to Cochin for distribution in South India as it adversely affected the revenues of Goa. However, the *casados* continued with this commerce ignoring the royal orders.⁴⁸

Meanwhile the king of Cochin, who got the customs right from the Portuguese in 1530, eventually reduced the rate of customs duty charged at his port from 6 per cent (which was equivalent to that of Goa and other Portuguese customs houses) to a concessional rate of 3.5 per cent for the *casado* merchants. This was a part of the strategy of the ruler to attract more and more *casado* traders to this port. As this customs revenue went into the coffer of the native king of Cochin, all other non-*casados* carrying commodities for Cochin, were asked by the Portuguese authorities to go first to Goa and pay 6 per cent duties there. Then only they were allowed to unload their cargo in Cochin. However, the *casados* could take commodities directly to the port of Cochin and clear the customs there.

But the traditional merchants of India including the Gujaratis evaded the Portuguese customs house of Goa by entering into deals with the *casados* of Cochin, who used to bring the goods of non-Portuguese traders through the customs house of Cochin claiming ownership. The *casados* thus helped their Indian commercial partners from making extra-travel to Goa and from paying high duties there. This led to a wider and deeper nexus, on the one hand, between the *casados* and the traditional merchants of Asia and on the other hand between the *casados* and the king of Cochin, an operational arrangement, which almost created a parallel commercial network sidelining the *Estado*.⁴⁹

Eventually there arose a conflict between the *casados* and the mother-country born *fidalgos*, whom the crown preferred in distributing concessions and public charges.⁵⁰ As Diogo de Couto says in *Soldado Practico*, the kingdom of Portugal "could maintain only one more child"⁵¹ and all members of the Portuguese nobles class, except the

first-born who only inherited the family property, looked at India as a country where they could set up life and make wealth if they got the captaincy of some of its fortresses.⁵² The *casados* and the ecclesiastical dignitaries like Dom Jorge Temudo, the first bishop of Cochin, strongly opposed the mass reservation given to the *fidalgos*. He wrote that India needed only two dozens of good *fidalgos* to be appointed as governors and the captains. For the rest, the *casados* could manage by themselves.⁵³ With the help of the ecclesiastical dignitaries, *casados* opposed the hegemony of the *fidalgos*, which the latter exercised in politics as governors and captains as well as in commerce which they used to enjoy as the grantees of frequent voyages. The *casados* had even developed a system almost parallel to and relatively independent of the official arrangements. By 1559, even a rumour spread that the *Estado da India*, taking advantage of the presence of Dom Constantino de Braganza, a noble of royal blood as viceroy, had cut the ties with Lisbon. The move against the *fidalgo*-dominated *Estado* by the *casados*, who had acquired sufficient financial basis and had established trade networks all over Indian Ocean regions independent of *Estado* control, alarmed Lisbon. The crown felt it necessary to appease this group and attempts were made to protect the *casado* trade from competition and to reserve some navigational lines of regional trade for them.⁵⁴

The heyday of Private Trade

With liberalisation of Indo-European commerce in 1570, the *casados* got more freedom and opportunity to extend their private trade.⁵⁵ In fact the period from 1570 to 1600, when private trade flourished unprecedentedly, witnessed the most prosperous phase in Portuguese India, making its city-centres the most fabulous and the richest in Asia. Bengal textiles including the *khasas*, *malmals* and silks continued to be brought to Cochin by its *casado* traders in considerable volume.⁵⁶ The vessels that carried pepper and other spices from Malabar used to take back rice from Bengal and Pegu also as a return cargo. On 17th May 1590, the *casados* brought to the city of Santa Cruz about 900 candis of rice from Bengal and 500 candis from Pegu.⁵⁷ All through the period between 1592 and 1597, for which we have ample documentary evidence,⁵⁸ the rice ports of Bengal were frequently contacted by the *casados* to take foodstuffs for Kerala.

It was almost with the same frequency that the ports of Coromandel coast were visited by the *casado* traders of Cochin, in the last three decades of the sixteenth century for collecting foodstuffs. Thus, for example, on 17th May 1590, the *casados* brought to Cochin from

Nagapattinam 400 *candis* of rice for which four *candis* were given to Thome Roiz, the collector of "one per cent", as share for the city of Cochin.⁵⁹ Besides rice, textiles formed a great portion of the commodities taken from the ports of Coromandel (among which Mylapore and Nagapattinam were the prominent ones) to Cochin. In 1605, the crown asked the Viceroy to see to it that the textiles brought from Coromandel ports were sold only in exchange for spices and drugs.⁶⁰ This royal direction was supposed to have been given to attract more spices from the hinterland to Cochin.

With the liberalisation of spice trade in 1570, Malacca was proclaimed a free port and it was decreed that the spices bought there should not pay duties or fees on being taken to Goa and Cochin.⁶¹ The *casados* of Cochin took a better advantage of this trade-concession than their counterparts in Goa, as they were required to pay only less tax to the native ruler upon their arrival. During the last decades of the sixteenth century, many *casado* traders from Cochin used to conduct frequent commercial trips to Malacca, where they, as in 1598 for example, through their trade tactics controlled the price of the market to their advantage.⁶² Some of them also used to take commodities from Malacca and South East Asia to Coromandel ports in exchange for textiles and were bagging considerable profit. However, the crown often desired that this trade be conducted directly with Cochin or Goa so that the *Estado* also might profit out of it by extracting the customs. In 1591, a royal order was issued notifying that no commercial embarkation from Malacca should be made to Santhome (Mylapore), Nagapattinam or any other ports except to Cochin or Goa under the penalty of losing their merchandise. This notice was affixed in the various public places of the city of Malacca.⁶³

China, into which penetration was made possible after 1560 via Macao and Malacca, was always a prospective market for the *casados*.⁶⁴ A large volume of silk and porcelain was brought to Cochin from Chinese production centres by the *casados*. It is also believed that the settlers of Cochin had involvement in the trade of copper which was taken to India in bulk from China. There were instances when the individual traders were given licences to bring 12 quintals of copper per year. Further, there were many cases, as for example in 1597, when ships from China were stopped at Cochin to unload copper there.⁶⁵ The hands of the *casado* traders behind this deal became more evident as the frequency, with which the Chinese ships destined to Goa were stopped at Cochin for unloading merchandise under the pretext of bad monsoon, increased.⁶⁶ This metal was in high demand in Kerala as the flow of copper from Europe ceased by the end of the sixteenth century.

Copper was required not only for the minting of coins, but also for the manufacturing of household-utensils of the aristocratic families in South India, particularly in Kerala.

One of the important and interesting feature of this period (particularly from 1570 to 1600) was that the *armada* of the south, instituted initially to prevent the diversion of the spices, began to be used increasingly for protecting the private trade of the *casados* whose commercial empire stretched into the eastern space of the Indian Ocean. It was because of the constant threat from the corsairs that the vessels of the *casados* were required to travel in caravans or in small groups, which were given fleet-protection from Cape Comorin to Cochin. (Later with the increase of Dutch menace, the *cafila-armada* system turned out to be a necessary protective factor for the commerce of the *casados*). The duty of conducting the coastal-patrolling upto Cape Comorin fell upon the shoulders of the city of Cochin and for maintaining this *armada*, the city extracted "one per cent" duty from every trader of this port.⁶⁷ Even the ships from China destined to Goa were also asked to enter the port of Cochin,⁶⁸ so that the city might get "one per cent share" towards the expense of the *armada*. With the conversion of the southern *armada* into a military arrangement to protect the private trade of the *casados* of Cochin, the municipality of this city was given the right to appoint the captain-in-chief of these *armadas*. In 1589, for example, the Viceroy D. Duarte de Menezes issued orders to the same effect.⁶⁹ During the period between 1587 and 1598, the amount which the city of Santa Cruz paid for conducting the patrolling upto Cape Comorin was 25,078 *pardaos*, and it was collected as "one per cent" from the traders.⁷⁰ Some of these fleets that were used for patrol consisted of many ships, as in the case of the fleet of Fernando Lobo, whose patrolling vessels were thirteen in number.⁷¹ The transformation of the southern *armada* from a mechanism to safeguard the royal trade into one to protect the private trade of the *casados* was a typical example of how the various *Estado* institutions during this period, were made to serve and safeguard the private interests of the *casados*.⁷²

Corresponding to the maritime movements linking Cochin with the ports in the eastern space of the Indian Ocean, the *casados* developed trade-relations with the Maldives as a supplementary commercial activity. The *casados* brought to Cochin coir, which was in high demand for the various purposes of the private ships as well as those of the *Carreira*, and cowries, which were again taken from Cochin as a monetary medium for buying slaves from western African ports, indigo and textiles from Gujarat, food materials and cloth from Bengal and

Pegu.⁷³ The king of the Maldives, who had fled to Cochin in 1552 and had become a Christian, was residing in the city of Santa Cruz, during this period, under the name of D. Manuel. The Portuguese forces conquered the islands of Maldives in 1554 and defeating the new king Hassan, they built a fortress in Male and compelled the islands to pay annual tribute to their old sovereign, now resident in Cochin. D. Manuel in Cochin used to sell annual voyages to Maldives, which made available coir and cowries for the *casados* of Cochin, to be taken to Bengal and Gujarat. Even after the acceptance of the sovereignty of the native Muslim king in 1567, the Portuguese continued to take a large quantity of coir and cowries from Maldives to Cochin, by way of trade-rights enjoyed by and the tribute given to the royal family in exile in Cochin.⁷⁴

Coastal Malabar used to depend greatly on the rice-ports of Canara, and for obtaining the necessary food-stuffs. During the great drought and famine of 1587, to which Ferdinand Cron refers,⁷⁵ the demand for food materials was unprecedentedly on the increase. The *casados* used to import great volume of rice to Cochin during the period immediately after 1587 (till 1598) from the ports of Canara (especially from Mangalore), Bengal and Coromandel.⁷⁶ The *casados* played a considerable role in the distribution trade of food materials. Rice was taken from Cochin occasionally to feed Malacca as well as Ceylon and taken to the Maldives for the exchange of commodities.⁷⁷

The ports of Gujarat, from where commodities were taken to Persia, Arabia, East Africa and Europe via West Asia, were the leading and long-standing commercial targets of the *casados* of Cochin. Though the old Sultanate of Gujarat was incorporated into the Mughal territory in 1573, the settlers of Cochin procured the wares through the Portuguese bases in Chaul, Bassein, Damam and Diu. The *casados* took to Gujarat spices from Cochin, wares from China and Malacca, coir and cowries from Maldives in exchange for textiles, indigo as well as opium.⁷⁸ The *casado* trade between Cochin and the ports of Gujarat was always a controversial one, as the *bania* merchants, who were the partners of the *casado* traders of Cochin, continued to send textiles and other commodities to the port of Cochin in the name of the latter, with a view to avoiding the Portuguese customs at Goa (where the customs rate was six per cent). The benefit of this commercial rapport was that the native partners of the *casados* were required to pay only a concessional rate of three and a half per cent to the king of Cochin as against six per cent in Portuguese customs houses. The loss thus incurred to the Portuguese Exchequer was an annual amount of 20,000 *pardaos*, by an estimate made in 1612.⁷⁹

Ormuz in Persian Gulf provided an attractive exchange centre for the *casados*. Very often the commercial links of the residents of Cochin with Ormuz seemed to have been maintained through the ports of Gujarat and occasionally through Goa. However, the *casados* continued to make frequent direct-trips to this port of Persian Gulf to bring horses to Cochin, whose distribution in south India still continued to give them attractive trade prospects even after the disintegration of the Vijayanagara kingdom. These horses on which were paid 40 *ducats* as customs to the Portuguese authorities in Ormuz, were sold in South India for a value varying from 300 to 1000 *ducats*.⁸⁰ The crown issued royal orders in 1594, for stopping the import of horses from Ormuz to Cochin and Canara, as it affected negatively the customs revenue of Goa. This order specially stipulated that the horses should be taken only to Goa. But it remained a dead letter, as the *casado* trade in horses continued in Cochin, as we see in the letter of king Philip I, dated 2nd January, 1596, for instance.⁸¹

Phase of Strain and Stress and the Exodus of Casados from Cochin

From 1600 began a very crucial period for the *casados*. On the one hand, there was the external problem which appeared with the severe and increasing threats raised to their navigational and commercial endeavours by the Dutch as well as the English. On the other hand there was the internal escalation which began when a good majority of the St. Thomas Christians, who formed the majority of spice-cultivators and had been active collaborators of the Portuguese, turned against the Portuguese after the Synod of Diamper convened in 1599. In fact, the Synod was convened at Diamper as a continuation of the policy to implement the decisions of Trent council (1545-1563) and to ensure uniform Latin liturgical practices and customs (as a precaution against possible heresy) among the native Christians, who had so far been following Syrian traditions.⁸² The powerful and wealthy section among the St. Thomas Christians under their leader the Archdeacon naturally opposed this move against their age old customs and traditions. Eventually the religious tensions in the hinterland were transferred to the economic activities of Cochin and the supply of spices from the hinterland to the port of Cochin for European trade began to show drastic downward trends. The agitated cultivators and merchants among the St. Thomas Christians were reluctant to co-operate with the Portuguese trade in Cochin; instead, they began to divert commodities over the ghat-route to Coromandel ports. This ghat-route, which was in operation for centuries, turned out to be a new symbol of resistance against the Portuguese for the estranged native Christians.

In January 1601, two royal letters were sent to Aires de Saldanha, the viceroy, asking him to favour specially the St. Thomas Christians and to win their good-will.⁸³ From 1603 on, the pepper supply to the Portuguese factory in Cochin became scanty and no ships with spices departed from Cochin to Portugal during the period from 1605 to 1609.⁸⁴ So attempts were made to placate the members of this community by giving special gifts like sandal wood and knives to their merchants and priests (for example Tharaka of Kanjoor and Alexander Kattannar) and even by giving one *xerafin* extra for each *bhar* of pepper brought by the members of the St. Thomas Christians. Moreover, the Archbishop of Cranganore, under whose jurisdiction the St. Thomas Christians were put, was given a special gift-money of 534 *xerafins*, so that his subjects might loyally supply spices only to the Portuguese,⁸⁵ but only very few seems to have co-operated with the Portuguese after this turn of events. With the diminishing supply of pepper in Cochin and with the increasing flow of spices from the hinterland to Coromandel coast through the ghat-route, there commenced a mass exodus of *casados* from 1612, from Cochin to Nagapattinam, Mylapore and other parts of eastern coast to take advantage of the changed situation. Some of them even moved to Bengal, Pegu and Ceylon.⁸⁶ These *casados*, with the new base in Coromandel, made higher profit by distributing the pepper coming through the ghat-route to Bengal, Pegu and China. Even the Dutch in Masulipatanam and Pulicate began to buy pepper increasingly from the traders of the ghat-route.⁸⁷

Added to this, the increasing presence of the Dutch and the English began to be felt in the Indian Ocean region. Often Cochin was the first target of the Dutch attacks in Malabar carried out in the first decade of the seventeenth century. The peaceful atmosphere in Cochin was eventually destroyed and the Portuguese did not get enough merchandise for their Lisbon-bound vessels. As a result the *naos* of *Carreira da India* stopped coming to Cochin to take pepper directly from there from 1612 onwards.⁸⁸ Though the Truce of Antwerp gave some interim relief from the Dutch attacks during the period between 1609 and 1621, all these developments together created an atmosphere, where the enterprising *casados* naturally opted for migration to a better places, where their commercial initiatives would be properly safeguarded. The flow of spices from the production centres to the Coromandel ports through the ghat-route, that became very active after the estrangement of the pepper-producing community of the St. Thomas Christians from the Portuguese, made them concentrate more on the coastal belt of Coromandel. Dom Diogo Coutinho mentions about the depopulation of the city and the decline of trade as early as January 1615.⁸⁹ On 6th February 1616, King Philip II refers to the problem of

depopulation experienced in Cochin and the slackening of trade.⁹⁰ The viceroy D. Jeronimo de Azevedo also refers to the reduction of the city-population of Cochin to one-third, as a result of the mass exodus to prospective destinations in the eastern areas of Indian Ocean.⁹¹ By 1640 about half of the inhabitants of Cochin had left the city and most of its residential areas were depopulated.⁹² With the arrival of the *casados* from Cochin the population of the Portuguese settlements in Coromandel coast swelled and their economic condition began to improve. Thus, in 1644, for example, there were 800 Portuguese citizens with more than 20 *fidalgas* in Nagapattinam.⁹³

The less fortunate among the *casados* seems to have pioneered the migration moves, to make use of the changed situation for commercial explorations. However, the bourgeois group or the upper strata of the *casados* with substantial mercantile capital, who, though, were only a few in number, continued to play a vital role in the affairs of the *Estado*, as they were not that severely hit by these developments. The second decade of the seventeenth century presents an ironical situation: while many of the middle class and lower middle class trading settlers of the city of Cochin shifted their commercial bases to Nagapattinam, Mylapore, Pegu Ceylon and even the Gujarat ports for better commercial prospects, the rich *casados* of Cochin like Manuel da Fonseca, Isabel Freire and Francisco Barbosa were supporting the structure of the *Estado* by providing huge loans for conducting pepper-trade.⁹⁴ Eventually by 1616, the loan given by them increased to 60,000 *cruzados*, an amount which the Portuguese Exchequer could not repay in the future.⁹⁵ This in fact virtually drained the commercial resources of the surviving traders of Cochin. The sudden withdrawal of a huge amount of 60,000 *cruzados* at a time when trade opportunities were minimum, put these entrepreneurs in a precarious position. Still at this stage of financial crisis, some *casados*, as Sanjay Subramanyam says, continued commercial and navigational contacts vibrantly with Bengal.⁹⁶ Their networks in Malacca, Ceylon, Maldives, Gujarat and Ormuz were also relatively active till the termination of Antwerp Truce in 1621. In 1616, Manuel da Fonseca, a citizen of Cochin from whom the *Estado* often borrowed money for pepper purchase, was found to be engaged in the pepper trade of Malacca. He used to buy pepper from Malacca with his own personal money and bring it to Cochin.⁹⁷

The Decline

Nevertheless, with the fall of Ormuz in 1622 (into the hands of the English and the Shah of Persia), the links of Cochin's *casados* with the caravan-route trade were cut off, which had tremendous effect on

the economic life of Cochin. As the *casado* networks in the western space of Indian Ocean were intimately linked with commerce of Ormuz, its loss caused a general slackening of trade, which consequently worsened further the commercial position of the city of Santa Cruz.⁹⁸ When Ormuz, the western terminal point of *casado* trade was sealed off, Bengal in the east acted as an alternative commercial outlet. The Bengal-Cochin trade during 1630s was worth the value of 40,000 xerafins a year.⁹⁹ However, after 1632, with the capture of Hughli from the Portuguese by the Mughal general Qasim Khan, one of the most profitable commercial links, which the *casados* of Cochin had enviously maintained for such a long period, was almost cut off.

Meanwhile, the crown was thinking of instituting alternative arrangements for reviving the Indo-European commerce. On the model of English and Dutch commercial companies, crown also started a trading company known as "The Portuguese India Company" (PIC) in 1629 to conduct Portugal's trade with India. But because of heavy financial burdens, this company was liquidated in 1633.¹⁰⁰ Even when the Portuguese authorities nurtured the idea of a commercial company, attempts were made to ensure the co-operation of the *casados* of Cochin to supply pepper in Lisbon. It was on 9th January 1627 that the Portugal authorities in Goa made a contract with Andre Simoes, a *casado* of Cochin to send one *naveta* every year to Portugal. This *naveta* was supposed to carry at least 2000 quintals of pepper.¹⁰¹ The first *naveta* reached Lisbon in 1628 and the second in 1630. We find the *casados* of Cochin despatching *navetas* regularly to Portugal till 1638.¹⁰²

When the relatively better off *casados* were trying their luck by taking part in the European commerce, the lower middle class among the inhabitants were finding it extremely difficult to find a means of livelihood in Cochin against the general background of trade-decline and frequent attacks from the Dutch and the English. Migration to Nagapattinam and other Portuguese bases in the Coromandel increased, making them rich and prosperous centres. The flight of the middle class traders from Cochin, who had chiefly been responsible for the opulence of the city, had worsened the economic position of Santa Cruz as well as of those who stayed over in the city and made the number of the poor people increase unprecedentedly. The miserable situation, which arose as a result of the lack of trade, struck hard the members of the upper middle-class and, as Agostinho da Almeida observed in 1640s, "those who were brought up luxuriously in the midst of prosperity". Many resorted even to begging and prostitution.¹⁰³

With the capture of Malacca in 1641 by the Dutch, Cochin's commercial link with this traditional port of South East Asia was totally

cut off. As almost all the profitable navigational lines were severed one by one, the commercial horizon of the *casados* had shrunk and what was left as the last resort was trade with the Gujarat ports. However, this too did not seem to have lasted long. The obligation that all *casados* of Cochin trading with the ports of Gujarat should pay customs at Goa (six per cent as against the concessional rate of three and a half at Cochin) ruined even this branch of commerce. In a letter dated 7th October 1644, the city of Cochin says that the decline of the commerce of Santa Cruz was because of the compulsory customs duties, which the *casados* of Cochin were obliged to pay at Goa, each time they moved to the north (evidently the ports of Gujarat). The city narrated the state of its poverty and suffering and it was hopefully requesting the crown for the permission to conduct trade with the ports of Gujarat without paying customs at Goa, a concession which the early kings of Portugal had granted to the *casados* before.¹⁰⁴ But the *Estada*, itself being in acute financial crisis, could not think of leaving the customs-share of *casado* commerce to the king of Cochin, even though the rate there was considerably low and hence very much advantageous to individual traders.

Thus the mercantile group of *casados* of Cochin, which had grown up and spread over to the entire Indian Ocean region with its prosperous branches of commerce, was the most powerful agent of Intra-Asian trade for more than a century. With their marriage to native women and establishment of commercial networks all over Asia with the help of the native traders, they found a strong basis for an Asia-wide economic activity. Their entrepreneurial acumen supported by the policy of coercion from the Portuguese authorities ousted the powerful Muslim merchants from the main stream of commerce and confined the latter to the realms of peddling trade or piracy. The newly emerging bourgeois group of *casados*, with their increasing economic and political power, was viewed by the *Estado* authorities as a strong base to rely on in case of financial and political difficulties. But the *casados*, who developed a parallel network independent of the arrangements of the mother country, preferred to be more Indian or Asian than European and this pro-Asian identity they maintained even when they extended helping hand to the sinking *Estado* structures. Cochin's prosperity was intimately linked with the prosperity of these *casados*. The decay of this once fabulous city began when the flourishing branches of the *casado* commerce began to be severed. With the prosperous branches being cut, what remained was only the hollow trunk of the city, which easily fell before the Dutch in 1663.

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1. R.S. Sharma, *The Rise of Portuguese Power in India*, New Delhi, 1989, pp.176-177.
2. For details see Vitor Luis Gaspar Rodrigues, "O Grupo de Cochim e a Oposicao a Afonso de Albuquerque", in *Studia*, 51, Lisboa, 1992, pp.119-144; Luis Filipe Thomaz, "Diogo Pereira, O Malabar", *Mare Liberum*, 5, 1993, pp.49-64; Genevieve Bouchon and Luis Filipe Thomaz (ed.), *Voyage dans Les Deltas du Gange et de l'Irraouaddy 1521*, Paris, 1988, pp.58-68.3. Besides the commercial reasons, there were political reasons as well. The king of Cochim strongly protested against the peace treaty which Afonso de Albuquerque concluded with the Zamorin in 1513, as such a move would adversely affect Cochim's source of income. For details see, ANTT, *Chancelaria de D. Manuel*, I, liv.ii, fol.83; ANTT, *Cartas dos Vice-Reis da India*, doc.89.
4. Sanjay Subramanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500-1700: A Political and Economic History*, London, 1993, p.97.
5. Document dated 26th March 1515 summarised in Luciano Ribeiro, *Registo da Casa da India*, vol.I, Lisboa, 1954.
6. Genevieve Bouchon and Luis Filipe Thomaz (ed.), *Voyage dans Les Deltas du Gange*, pp.58-68; See also Ujjayan Bhattacharya "The Portuguese Maritime Strategies and Options in Eastern Indian Ocean Region", *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 57th session, Madras, December 27-29, 1996, Calcutta, 1997, pp.265-268.
7. Luis Filipe Thomaz, "Diogo Pereira, O Malabar", pp.50-64.
8. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhao Pato (ed.), *Cartas de Afonso de Albuquerque segundas de documentos que as elucidam*, tom., I, Lisboa, 1884.
9. M.N. Pearson, *merchants and Rulers in Gujarat*, New Delhi, 1976, pp.37-39.
10. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maco 52, doc.23.
11. K.M. Panikar, *Malbar and the Portuguese* Bombay, 1929, pp.111-113.
12. K.S. Mathew and Afzal Ahmad (ed.), *Emergence of Cochim in the Pre-Industrial Era: A Study of Portuguese Cochim*, Pondicherry, 1990, doc.53, pp.73-76.
13. For details about the co-operation of the Muslim traders see K.S. Mathew, *Portuguese Trade with India in the Sixteenth Century*, Delhi, 1983, pp.100-106, Genevieve Bouchon, *Les Musulmans du Kerala a L'Epoque de la Decouverte Portugaise*, *Mare Luso-Indicum*, II, Paris, 1973, pp.52-53.
14. Though *cartazes* were introduced right from 1502 on, the Muslim traders became the constant victims of raid and torture, conducted in the name of this safe-conduct, only after the death of Afonso Albuquerque. It was partly because of the change in the policy of king Manuel which explicitly demanded the officers to favour merchant groups other than Muslims. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhao Pato (ed.), *Cartas.....*, tom. I, p.306. But the moves against the Muslim merchants became more evident and organised with the assumption of offices by those who supported the private entrepreneurial class among the Portuguese in Cochim.
15. Zaynuddin Shaykh, *Tuhfat-ul-Mujahidin*, tran. by S. Muhammad Husain Nainar, Madras, 1942, pp.89-91.
16. R.S. Whiteway, op.cit., p.196.
17. Zaynuddin Shaykh, op.cit., p.66; Faria y Sousa, *Asia Portuguesa: The History of the Discovery and Conquest of India by the Portuguese*, tran. by John Stevens,

vol. I, London, 1696, p.284.

18. For details see A.P. Ibrahim Kunju, *Studies in Medieval Kerala*, Trivandrum, 1975, p.60.
19. *As Gavetas da Torre do Tombo*, vol.X, Lisboa, 1975, p.577; Genevieve Bouchon, "Les Musulmans du Kerala...", pp.52-53; See also Diogo Couto, *Da Asia dos feitos que os Portuguezes fizeram na conquista e descobrimento das terras e mares do Oriente*, Decada V, parte 2, p.4.
20. Besides corsair activities we also find that some Muslim merchants were putting up small shops in Cochin for their livelihood. K.S. Mathew and Afzal Ahmad, *Emergence of Cochin*, doc.14, pp.27-28.
21. Gaspar Correia, *Lendas da India*, tom.II, Lisboa, 1921, p.830; tom.III, p.712. The exact geographical location of Culimute could not be identified. It could be Calmutao which Georg Schurhammer identified as Muttamura in Travancore. See Georg Schurhammer, *Die Zeit genoischen Quellen zur Geschichte Portugiesisch-Asiens und seiner Nachbarlander zur Zeit des Hl.Franz Xaver 1538-1552*, Leipzig, 1962, n.6147, pp.461 and 540.
22. The letter of Diogo Fernandes to D. John III dated 1st June 1537 ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, II, Maco 211.doc.65., fols.5-6.
23. Miloslav Krasa, Joseph Polisensky and Peter Ratos (ed.), *European Expansion 1494-1519: The Voyages of Discovery in the Bratislava Manuscript*, Lye 515/8, Prague, 1986, p.106.
24. ANTT, Gavetas, 15, Maco 17, doc.19.
25. For details of the famine and pestilence, see Joaquim Verissimo Serrao. *Historia de Portugal*, vol.III, Lisboa, 1978, p.31. See below n.27.
26. The German eye-witness says that the Portuguese king and the royal family fled to Palmada, while the inhabitants left the city. See for details Albert Haemmerle (ed.), *Stetten-Jahrbuch, MCML*, vol.II; "Deren von Steten Geschlechterbuch MDXXXVIII, pp.52ff. Hermann Kelenbenz, "Os Mercadores Almas de Lisboa por volta de 1530", *Separata da Revista Portuguesa de Historia*, vol.IX, Coimbra, 1961, pp.12-13.
27. For the migration of Portuguese citizens to India, see Antonio Sergio, *Obras Completas de Antonio Sergio Introducao Geografico-Sociologica a Historia de Portugal*, Critical Edition guided by Castelo Branco Chaves, Vitorino Magalhaes Godinho, Rui Gracio and Joel Serrao, Lisboa, 1976, p.191.
28. For details, see Jose Alberto Rodrigues da Silva Tavim, "Outras gentes em outras rotas: Judeus e Cristaos-novos do Cochim-entre Santa Cruz de Cochim de Cochim e Mattancherry, entre o Imperio Portugues e o Medio Oriente", A paper presented in VIII Seminario Internacional de Historia Indo-Portuguesa-Angra de Heroisomo, 7-11 de Junho de 1996, pp.4-9.
29. Mathias Mundadan, *History of Christianity*, Vol.I, Bangalore, 1984, p.359.
30. The letter of Henrique de Sousa written to the governor dated 15-5-1546, in Elaine Sanceau, *Colecao de Sao Lourenco*, vol.II, p.323.
31. The letter of the viceroy written to the king dated 16-1-1551. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, II, Maco 242, doc.44.
32. Plus Malekandathil, *Portuguese Cochin and the Maritime Trade of India: 1500-1663*, Ph.D. thesis submitted at the Central University of Pondicherry (It would soon be published as a volume in the South Asian Study series of Heidelberg University, Germany), 1998, pp.282-283.

33. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maco 76, doc.8.
34. Pius Malekandathil, *Portuguese Cochin and the Maritime Trade of India*, pp.283-284.
35. See the treatise on the drugs and spices of Malacca dated 23rd September 1533, ANTT, *Cartas dos Vice-Reis*, doc.21; Luis Filipe Thomaz, *Os Portugueses em Malacca (1511-1580)*, vol.II, *Mestrado* thesis submitted at the Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, 1964, doc.98, p.278; Luis Filipe Thomaz, "The Portuguese in the Seas of the Archipelago during the 16th Century", *Archipel*, 18 (1979) SPAFA Consultation Workshop on Research in Maritime Shipping and Trade Networks in South East Asia, Cisarua, West Java, Nov.20-27, 1984, p.76.
36. Luis Filipe Thomaz, "The Portuguese in the Seas of the Archipelago", p.76.
37. *Ibid.*, pp.82-83; Adelino de Almeida Calado, *Livro que trata das cousas da India e do Japao*, pp.52-53.
38. Luis Filipe Thomaz, "The Portuguese in the Seas of the Archipelago", p.83. From 1522 onwards (till the temporary closing of China gate), the Portuguese had regular *carreira* from Cochin to China. There were usually three ships or junks in this annual Chinese expedition. Vitorino Magalhaes Godinho, "Os Portugueses e o Oriente", *Ensaios*, vol.11, Lisboa, 1968, pp.243-244.
39. See the details of the negotiations connected with the establishment of the Portuguese protectorate at the Java ports of Gresik and Panarukan ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maco 18, doc. 17; See also the letter of Antonio de Brim, the captain of Ternate sent to the king dated 11-2-1523. Basilio de Sa, *Documentacao para a Historia das Missoes do Padroado Portugues do Oriente-Insulindia*, vol.1, Lisboa, 1954, doc.20, p.132.
40. Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Decline in Cochin, 1600-1650; Myth and Manipulation in the *Estado da India*", in Roderich Ptak (ed.), *Portuguese Asia Aspects in History and Economic History*, Stuttgart, 1987, pp.62-63; Roderich Ptak (ed.), *Portuguese Asia: Aspects in History and Economic History*, Stuttgart, 1987, pp.62-63; Adelino de Almeida Calado, *Livro que trata das cousas da India e do Japao*, pp.54-59.
41. Vitorino Magalhaes Godinho, "Os Portugueses e o Oriente", pp.240-241.
42. Right from 1526, we have evidence of Bengalese clothes being brought to Cochin for sale. Even the captain of Coromandel, Manuel da Gama, used to take textiles from Bengal to Cochin. ANTT, *Nucleo Antigo*, No.808, fols.5-6. Bengal was the chief destination the pepper smuggled out from Cochin because of the high price that prevailed there. The net profit to the *casados* from each quintal was 950 *reis*. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, II, Maco 240, doc.60.
43. These 2000 horses imported yearly from Arabia to Goa brought an annual income of 1,00,000 xeraffins by way customs duties ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maco 87, doc.2.
44. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maco 52, doc.25.
45. Elaine Sanceau, *op.cit.*, vol.II, p.275.
46. *Ibid.*, p.391. See also Vitorino Magalhaes Godinho, "Os Portugueses e o Oriente", p.212.
47. Antonio Ferreira gave witness before the Inquisition court of Lisbon that Luis Rodrigues used to take horses beyond Cape Comorin to sell them in Bembur (Bembar in the Pearl Fishery Coast) ANTT, *Inquisicao de Lisboa*, Proc. 12392, fol.82.
48. J.H. da Cunha Rivara, *Arquivo Portuguez Oriental*, Fasciculo 3, New Delhi, 1992, p.14.

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53. This comment was made when he was in the office of Archbishop of Goa in 1569. See Joseph Wicki, "Duas relacoes sobre a situacao da India Portuguesa nos anos de 1568 e 1569", *Studia*, No.8, Lisboa, 1961, pp.200-201.
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56. Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Cochin in Decline", p.65; See the table of export given for the period between 1587 and 1609 by Niels Steensgaard, *Carracks, Caravans and Companies: The Structural Crisis in the European-Asian Trade in the early Seventeenth Century*, Kopenhagen, 1973, p.166.
57. BNL, *Fundo Geral*, 1980, "Livro das despesas de hum por cento", fol.25.
58. *Ibid.*, fols.12; 40.
59. *Ibid.*, fol.25.
60. IAG, *Livro das Moncoes*, no.6-B (1605), fols.39-40.
61. Francisco P. Mendes da Luz, *O Conselho da India*, Lisboa, 1952, pp.73-74; Vicente Almeida d'Eca, *Normas Economicas na Colonizacao Protuguesa ate 1808*, Coimbra, 1921, chapter II; Maria Antoinette Petronella Meilink-Roelofsz, *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630*, Nijhoff, 1962, 166; 171.
62. J.H. da Cunha Rivara, *Arquivo Portuguez Oriental*, Fasciculo, III, p.123; HAG, *Livro das Moncoes*, no.3-A (1585-1589), fols.308-311.
63. J.H. da Cunha Rivara, *Arquivo Portuguez Oriental*, Fasciculo III, pp.328-329.
64. According to Vitorino Magalhaes Godinho, about 75000 quintals of pepper worth one and a half million cruzados of gold were consumed in China. Almost 1/4 of the production of South East Asia and 1/4 of Malabar pepper were taken to Chinese markets. Vitorino Magalhaes Godinho, *Ensaio*, vol.II, p.233.
65. J.H. da Cunha Rivara, *Arquivo Portuguez Oriental*, Fasciculo III, pp.211; 750; 761.
66. *Ibid.*, Fasciculo 1, Parte 2, p.229.
67. For details, see BNL, *Fundo Geral*, Codice No.1980, "Livro das despesas de hum por cento", fols. 19-26.
68. HAG, *Livro das Moncoes* no.3-B (1589-1593), the royal letter sent to the viceroy Matias de Albuquerque dated January 1591, fols.430-437 and another letter dated 27th February 1595, fols.605-608.
69. K.S. Mathew and Afzal Ahmad, *Emergence of Cochin*, doc.51, p.70.

70. BNL, *Fundo Geral*, Codice No.1980, "Livro das despesas de hum por cento", fol.3.
71. *Ibid.*, fols.24; 26.
72. Pius Malekandathil, *Portuguese Cochin and the Maritime Trade of India*, pp.374-375.
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77. *Ibid.*, fols.11-26; BNL, *Fundo Geral*, Codice No.1975, fol.310. Letter of Rui Lourenço de Tavora sent to Conde da Vidigueira (1609-1610).
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80. Karl H. Darmenfeldt, *Leonhard Rauwolf, Sixteenth Century Physician, Botanist and Traveller*, Massachusetts, 1968, p.121.
81. J.H. da Cunha Rivara, *Arquivo Portuguez Oriental*, Fasciculo III, p.301; HAG, *Livro das Moncoes*, no.1 (1595-1598), fols.672-678, the royal instruction given to the viceroy Conde de Vidigueira, dated 12-1-1596.
82. For a critical study of the Diamper Synod from the side of the St. Thomas Christians, see Jonas Thaliath, *The Synod of Diamper*, Rome, 1958.
83. HAG, *Livro das Moncoes*, no.7 (1601-1603), royal letter sent to the Viceroy Aires de Saldanha dated 2-1-1601, fols.21-24; another letter dated 22-1-1601, fols.27-30.
84. See for details Pius Malekandathil, *Portuguese Cochin and the Maritime Trade of India*, pp.361, 432; see also J.H.da Cunha Rivara, *Arquivo Portuguez Oriental*, Fasciculo I, parte 2, pp.128; ANTT, MSS S. Vicente, doc.14, fols.163-163v, letter of Philip II (of Portugal) to the bishop of Cochin, dated 15-5-1605; AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 1, doc.101, dated 25-2-1611. However, this document says that in 1606 a cargo of 8918 quintals of pepper was bought from Cochin, Quilon and Cannanore. But it was transhipped to Portugal only in 1610. See document 101, fol.1.
85. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 2, doc.89, fol.12, dated 27-1-1613.
86. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 2, doc.107. The letter of the city council of Cochin sent to Philip II (Philip III of Spain) giving account of the economic condition of Cochin, dated 21-12-1613.
87. BNL, *Fundo Geral*, Codice No.1815, fols.78-78v. The letter of Philip II sent to Conde de Vidigueira, dated 26-3-1625; AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 8, doc.38, dated 29-10-1624.
88. Pius Malekandathil, *Portuguese Cochin and the Maritime Trade of India*, pp.442-443.

89. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 3, doc. 29, dated 25-1-1615; See also Caixa 3, doc. 31, dated 25-1-1615.
90. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhao Pato (ed.), *Documentos da India ou Livro das Moncoes*, vol. III, Lisboa, 1884, pp. 373, 388....
91. HAG, *Livro das Moncoes*, no. 12 (1613-1617), fols. 254-280, dated March 1617.
92. Biblioteca Publica de Evora, MSS, Codice No. CXVI/1, 23, fols. 2-4.
93. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 16, doc. 34, dated 12-2-1644.
94. For detailed list of the casados of Cochin with considerable capital, who used to lend money to the Portuguese commercial endeavours, see AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 2, doc. 89, fols. 1-4; 11; 15 dated 27-1-1613.
95. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 3, doc. 174, dated 2-1-1616; Caixa, doc. 133.
96. Sanajy Subrahmanyam, "Cochin in Decline", pp. 65-79.
97. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 4, doc. 107.
98. For a deeper study, see Maria Manuela Sobral Blanco, *O Estado Portuges da India da Rendicao de Ormuz a Perda de Cochim: 1622-1663*, vol. I, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis submitted at the Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Lisboa, 1992.
99. Antonio Bocarro, *Livro das Plantas de todas as fortalezas, cidades e povoações do Estado da India Oriental*, transcription by Isabel, Lisboa, 1992, p. 353.
100. For details, see A.R. Disney, *Twilight of Pepper Empire: Portuguese Trade in Southwest India in the Early seventeenth Century*, London, 1978, pp. 84-167.
101. BNL, Cod. No. 11410, fols. 173-178. Contract to send *navelus* to Lisbon from Cochin.
102. Pius Malekandathil, *Portuguese Cochin and the Maritime Trade of India*, pp. 462-466.
103. Biblioteca Publica de Evora, MSS Codice No. CXVI/1-23, fol. 2-4.
104. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 17, doc. 13, dated 7-10-1644.