Analysis in Śaṅkara Vedānta: 
The Philosophy of Ganeswar Misra

Editor
Bijayananda Kar

INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH
NEW DELHI
Introduction

I distinctly remember my helplessness as a Research Scholar in writing a thesis on some or the other aspect of Indian philosophy while working towards a Ph.D. degree at the Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur (IIT-K) during the first half of 1980s. As a non-official pre-requisite I had to first understand the subject well. But I was drawing a blank in all my attempts to understand the subject, especially the Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya (BSB) of Śaṅkara, despite both my sincere repeated readings of it and the official coursework. Often, I used to get stuck at the very preamble to Śaṅkara’s commentary on Brahma-Sūtras (BS) itself. (The preamble is also known as Adhyāsa Bhāṣya.) As for the future course of action, apparently three alternatives were available to me. One: Change the Field/ Topic of my research; Two: Quit the Ph.D. programme; Three: Write a ‘profound thesis’ (read ‘jargon’).

*I thank Professor Bijayananda Kar for his kind invitation to write this article for the ICPR volume on Professor Ganeswar Misra.
Sometimes I felt that there was nothing wrong in opting for the third alternative mentioned above since I believed that a significant number of contemporary works on classical Indian philosophy, more or less, belonged to that category. It is work of this category that mostly drew adverse comments from modern authors in the Analytic Tradition like Ganeswar Misra, Daya Krishna, Matilal, Rajendra Prasad, Karl H. Potter, R.C. Zaehner, etc. The gist of their observations regarding the state of affairs seem to have been succinctly summed up in Zaehner's following statement:

... Numerous modern publications are remarkable for the sheer obscurity and inanity of their presentation.... The intelligent layman... seems to be swallowing book after book of this kind. And this only lends support to the well-known maxim of Tertullian: Credo quia absur-dum, I believe it because it is absurd.¹

The fact that I did not opt for any one of the three alternatives mentioned earlier and I submitted a fairly intelligible thesis in Indian philosophy, without changing the field/topic marks a crucial turning point in my attempts to understand Indian philosophy. My journey in the new approach began with the logico-analytical method adopted in Professor Rajendra Prasad and Professor Ganeswar Misra's works on Indian philosophy. Professor Prasad—perhaps after sensing my frustration with the existing inane works—asked me to meet him in his chamber. He handed over a monograph to me entitled 'The Advaita Conception of Philosophy: Its Method, Scope and Limits' authored by Professor Ganeswar Misra. Initially unsure, about the book, I soon realized however that it was an extremely interesting work as it was primarily cogent and written in the logico-analytical style. When I had read it through I was indeed in a different world. For the first ever time, I felt I could make some
sense out of Śaṅkara’s very first statement in his pre­amble to his BSB albeit indirectly—

yuṣmādamadpratyaayagocarayarviṣayaviṣayinoṁstamaḥpra
kāśavadviruddhasvabhāvayoritaretarabhavānupapattau...²

(See reference 23 below for second half of the Sanskrit sentence of Śaṅkara)

I was no more drawing blank in Indian philosophy—thanks to Professors Prasad and Misra.

Over the years, I can confidently say, my appreciation of Misra’s works has not diminished at all for I believe it is only with the aid of works of this kind that one can make any progress in meaningful research in Indian philosophy. In fact the value of western analytical philosophy for such research cannot be over estimated at all. Professor J.N. Mohanty, in this context, notes the novelty of Misra’s approach by saying:

(Ganeswar) Misra may well have been the first philosopher to use the techniques of analytical philosophy for the interpretation and criticism of Indian philosophy.³

Earlier, my liking for Misra’s work grew so intense that it had made me long to meet him personally and to know from him more about his way of understanding Śaṅkara. But, unfortunately, the Almighty had different plans.⁴

The vast sweep of Misra’s writings makes it almost impossible for one to be both comprehensive and incisive at the same time, in a short article such as the present one. Therefore, I have chosen what I consider as the cornerstone of Advaita—the doctrine of adhyāsa—for my own observations on both Misra’s approach to it, and Śaṅkara’s original explication.

I have divided this article into four sections. The first one is devoted to Misra’s interpretation of the doctrine of adhyāsa in brief. This, I believe, gives us a proper orien-
tation just as it did to me at the initial stage of my thesis writing at IIT-Kanpur. I have said in this section that Misra leaves out at least one important concept of Śaṅkara, which I have tried to identify as aparokṣa. After thus orienting ourselves with Misra's interpretation of adhyyāsa, in the next two sections, i.e. Sections II and III, we have dealt with Śaṅkara's adhyyāsa proper as put forward by him in his BSB, and the application part of it is explained, respectively. These sections can be considered as very important sections since they attempt to explain the psychologism and also later set it aside. Further, these sections help us juxtapose the thoughts of Śaṅkara and Misra to give a first-hand comparison and contrast. As such, Section II states the two types of adhyyāsa, the object- and I-adhyyāsa. This section elaborates on object-adhyyāsa and claims to Misra's concentrating on it at the cost of the other adhyyāsa, i.e. I-adhyyāsa. In Section III we have explained Śaṅkara's idea of I-adhyyāsa. In Section IV, an attempt at a short comparative estimate is made.

I. Misra's Interpretation of Adhyyāsa

It is said that the doctrine of adhyyāsa is the cornerstone of Advaita. If adhyyāsa is demolished, Advaita gets demolished. Similarly, if adhyyāsa is not understood properly then Advaita cannot be understood. In that case there is every possibility of one being misled into any other doctrine except Advaita. Chances are that one lands up in a theory, which is diametrically opposite to that of Advaita.

Therefore, a proper grasp of adhyyāsa is essential for the understanding of Advaita. The main objective of adhyyāsa is to demonstrate that all entities, excepting one, are not accessible to knowledge in a fundamental manner of aparokṣa, unlike the Self, which is immediately appre-
handed. This exalted status to the Self in the hierarchy of knowledge is bound to result in a theory of Advaita if the rest of the hierarchy itself is demolished. Therefore, the parallel objective of adhyāsa is to initiate the said task through a demonstration of the subservient nature of the non-Self entities and their dependence on the Self for their existence and sustenance. The adhyāsa demonstrates the two-fold confusion of both the Self and the non-Self because of their apparent and beginningless interaction. Śaṅkara intends that the ‘illusion’ or ‘falsity’ be proved without seeking the help of memory as in arthādhyāsa, lest the purported illusoriness of the jagat would become diluted due to the intervention of memory. Hence, jñānādhyāsa as the main sub-concept under adhyāsa is made to logically simultaneously distinguish the Self from the non-Self, with the help of temporal simultaneity of the two cognitions involved as for e.g., in the double-moon illusion, to erect a firm foundation for Advaita. Further, Śaṅkara’s doctrine of adhyāsa attempts to expose innumerable false identities.

Misra, being averse to psychologism and also covertly so towards ontology, and further, being influenced by the logico-linguistic approach, commits the mistake of a partial reading and interpretation of Śaṅkara. It is because of this reason, that the logical part alone is touched upon while the ontological side is almost entirely neglected by him, ultimately making his logical interpretation prone to serious errors.

Misra rejects the psychologism of adhyāsa. This rejection can certainly be regarded as a welcome development since psychologism reduces the empirical reality into illusion. However, Misra’s own construal of the doctrine of adhyāsa seems to miss the kernel of Śaṅkara’s thoughts, since Misra is seen to miss at least one important concept of Śaṅkara. For example, to the best of my knowledge, Misra, nowhere refers to the apprehension of ‘I’ (aparokṣa)
in his interpretation of *adhyāsa*, which rather in Śaṅkara’s consideration is an essential precondition for *adhyāsa* to take place. However, it is a fact that Misra does try to reduce the apprehension of ‘I’ to a non-conceptual knowl-
edge in his construal of a specific class of philosophers who wish to extend the word ‘knowledge’ so as to in-
clude mere awareness. He says,

Those philosophers who wish to say that knowledge is non-conceptual are not putting forward a factual claim. They do not wish to maintain that introspectively they look inside and discover that some cases of knowledge are non-propositional and non-conceptual. They wish to point out that mere awareness of the presence of anything is non-judgemental and, therefore, non-con-
ceptual in character. In other words, these philosophers wish to point out that since ‘awareness’ is also a cog-
nitive term and since ‘awareness’ does not mean knowing any proposition or judgement there is, ac-
cording to these philosophers, non-judgemental knowledge. It means that these philosophers wish to extend the word ‘knowledge’ so as to include mere awareness....

This elliptical ‘reference’ to *aparokṣa* by Misra is obvi-
ously aimed at forcibly accommodating his own notion of *adhyāsa* without considering it (*aparokṣa*) as an essential precondi-
tion for *adhyāsa* to take place. Consequently, one starts feeling that Misra’s interpretation of *adhyāsa* is partial or even erroneous and requires modifications so as to be inclusive of all relevant sub-concepts of Śaṅkara’s *adhyāsa* *per se*. In fact, Misra is led to pluralism rather than non-dualism (Advaita) because of his partial and/or erro-
neous interpretation of Śaṅkara.

To understand in detail the above claim, let us first briefly sketch Misra’s interpretation of *adhyāsa*. For Misra, the doctrine of *adhyāsa* is not a psychological one but logi-
cal in nature. For him, adhyāsa exposes the ‘logical error of coupling of two elements of thought with categorial differences of fundamental type... [(wherein)] all predication involving an inscription of either a sortal or a characterizing universal to a particular which is its locus [(takes place)]’.⁶ In his construal even the right judgements like ‘The animal before me is cow’ become a case of logical error. This is because, according to him, the stated logical error condemns equally the correct and the incorrect judgements. Further, Misra is of the opinion that there is a fundamental difference between the logical categories of the logical subject and logical predicate—the particular and the universal. For Misra, a particular is ‘saturated’ the way the universal is not; particular is ‘complete’ and the universal is ‘incomplete’; particular carries with it an existential implication; a universal does not. Furthermore, a logical error can take place even involving imperceptible particulars like for e.g., the Self (pratyagātman).⁷ From the fact that Misra rejects the proper names like ‘Devadatta’ as suitable expressions for introducing a particular, and that ‘unmistakability’ is the hallmark of a true particular, we can safely assume that Misra construes the indexicals ‘this’ and ‘I’ to be true representatives of the particulars. The logical error is due to the fact that ‘In saying I am brahmin, I am attributing the sortal universal of being a brahmin to a particular designated by the expression “I”. In this act of mine I am ascribing a universal to a particular, a principle of collection to what is collected, an incomplete entity to a self-complete one’.⁸

In establishing that the indexicals ‘this’ and ‘I’ are the true representatives of particulars, and every ‘this’ and ‘I’ is attributed with distinct existence, there arises an irreducible pluralism in Misra’s thesis, rather than non-dualism which he professes to interpret from Śaṅkara’s perspective.
II. Two Adhyāsas in Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

While explaining the virodha (‘contradiction’ or more aptly ‘opposition’) that arises due to the coupling of viśaya and viśayī that are contents of the concepts ‘you’ and ‘I’, Śāṅkara puts forward the following propositions:

'I am this' (Ahāmidam)
'This (x) is mine'

or

'Mine is this (x)' (Mamedam)

In both the above propositions, the word ‘this’ refers to the attributes (and the objects to which they belong) that can meaningfully go along with ‘I’, and normal objects (and their attributes) that are possessible by an individual in a propositional symbolism. The distinction between these so-called ‘objects’ becomes clearer a little later below. These propositions, in their instantiated form can be rewritten as follows:

'I am body.' (3)
'I am tall.' (4)
'This house is mine.' (5)

In (3), the term ‘body’ may be considered as referring to an ‘object’, while in (4) the term ‘tall’ can be considered as an attribute (of the object). In (5) ‘house’ refers to an object owned by the individual. Despite the possible radical difference between one’s own physical body and the house that he owns, in terms of externality of these objects, Śāṅkara, nonetheless, considers them to be external to one’s own self. Thus the distinction between the predicates that go along with ‘I’ and those that go along with the ‘mine’ or ‘I have’ seems to be based, in turn, on the distinction between ‘body’ of an individual and what are ‘external’ to it.
However, under the broad category of 'objects' which are external to the Self, Śaṅkara conceives four distinct classes of objects. To exemplify these four classes of 'objects' and their identification with the 'I', Śaṅkara puts forward the following four categories of propositions his *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya*:

(i) Objects external to one's physical body, and their properties:

**External objects:**

'She is my wife.' 'She is mine.' (6)

'He is my child.' 'He is mine.' (7)

**Properties of external objects:**

'Ve move wife is enjoying good health.' (8)

'My child is intelligent.' (9)

In (8) and (9), the terms 'good health' and 'intelligent' refer to the properties of the external objects. These properties are not identified with the Self in an immediate fashion as the properties of one's own body. But if the object to which these properties belong is identified with the Self, then, by implication these properties can be superimposed on the Self. In these cases of ownership/possessiveness of external objects, the grammatical 'I' undergoes a change to the sixth case (genitive) singular termination 'mine' (mama) just as a corresponding ontological vikṛti (distortion) can be said to occur in the I-consciousness. However, an individual need not necessarily prepare an exhaustive list of such properties which are identified or identifiable with the 'I' via an external object.

(ii) Properties of one's own physical body:

'I am fat.' (10)

'I am lean.' (11)

'I am fair.' (12)

'I am standing.' (13)
‘I am walking.’ (14)
‘I am jumping.’ (15)

(iii) Properties of one’s own sense organs: (or motor organs):

‘I am dumb.’ (16)
‘I am one-eyed.’ (17)
‘I am eunuch.’ (18)
‘I am deaf.’ (19)
‘I am blind.’ (20)

(iv) Properties of one’s own mind (antahkaraṇa):

‘I want x.’ (21)
‘I will y.’ (22)
‘I doubt z.’ (23)
‘I decide a.’ (24)

These four categories of propositions clearly display the characterization of the ‘objects’ as extremely external to extremely internal type in a hierarchical manner. However, the virodha between these ‘objects’ and the ‘I’ being supposedly common in all these propositions we must understand how Śaṅkara initiates the demonstration of this virodha or contradiction. The contradiction must be distinctly noted both at the grammatical level and at the ontological level.

‘I’ in its first case (nominative), or sixth case (genitive), singular termination, and the concept ‘you’, at the propositional level constitute the two opposing elements of the contradiction at the language level. The opposition between the contents of these opposing concepts constitutes contradiction at the ontological level. And the explication of adhyāsa by Śaṅkara, as we have said, envisages the initiation of the demonstration of contradiction (virodha) between the concepts/entities involved in it at both the levels of language and ontology. It is to realize this end that Śaṅkara puts forward a linguistically infelicitous
proposition 'I am you' implicitly, and later gives a metaphorical illustration for *adhyāśa* (*I-adhyāśa*). And goes on to highlight the subtle points involved in them such as for example the necessity of apprehension of the entities involved in *adhyāśa*, and *aparokṣa*. In fact, it is only when a stark impossibility of a parallel between the main *adhyāśa* and its metaphorical illustration in its aspects of apprehension is perceived, Śaṅkara speaks of *aparokṣa* (immediacy) as unique to the Self, the 'I'. Further, we should note that the process of explication of *adhyāśa* is simultaneous in its aspects of language and ontology. But, then, for our purposes of analysis we should rather steer clear of the possible pitfalls arising out of confusion between the two levels of discourse.

In order to show the false identification of the external objects with the Self, Śaṅkara puts forward the proposition (1) and (2), as further modified by us in (3), (4) and (5). The objects that are external to one's own Self are mentioned in the four classes of propositions mentioned above.

A close reading of Śaṅkara would further reveal that he does not speak of *adhyāśa*, in this context, as involving two external objects. However, only in a metaphorical illustration (for e.g., Nacre-Silver illusion or illusion of NS type), Śaṅkara seems to have attributed externality to both the objects involved in *adhyāśa*. As such NS type of illusion is put forward by him as an illustration for the *adhyāśa* in which 'I' is necessarily involved as one of the entities, where 'I' is certainly not an external entity. The NS-type illustration from illusion is essentially extracted from 'Lokānubhava'12. Therefore, we can safely assume that Śaṅkara intends to illustrate the primary *adhyāśa* i.e., the *adhyāśa* where 'I' is involved as one of the entities.

In an NS type illusion 'a thing appears to be of the property of a different thing.'13 Śaṅkara identifies this
fact as the running theme of various theories of error, which generally have an important bearing on the respective theory of Self. The general role of a theory of error in a theory of Self, which is the broad canvas, is simply that the former shows the way to understand the latter. Theories of error also act as metaphors to illustrate the hard stuff, which the theorist wants to establish in connection with the Self. Not always a given metaphor matches with its original in all its aspects. But the minimum that a theorist expects from a metaphor is its ability to drive home the essential points of similarity between the illustration and what is to be explained in the first instance. However, in Śaṅkara’s case, perhaps the metaphor has overwhelmed the theory of Self.

For the purpose of our analysis we shall represent the primary adhyāsa, i.e. that which involves the ‘I’, as I-adhyāsa, and its objectual illustration as object—adhyāsa.

Object-Adhyāsa

We shall now explain the object-adhyāsa in this section while I-adhyāsa shall be explained in Section III below. Before we proceed further, we shall note that Śaṅkara does not locate the cause of the illusion/error/adhyāsa, in both the above classes of adhyāsa, either in the ‘I’, or in the ‘object’ of the object-adhyāsa. This fact becomes clear from the following definitions extracted from the Adhyāsa Bhāsyā of Śaṅkara because these definitions are neutral to the cause, whereas the cause of adhyāsa is located separately as avidyā, by Śaṅkara.

_Smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrva drṣṭāvabhāsa_14

[‘Adhyāsa is the appearance of an object (of past experience) in another in the form of memory’ (tr. mine)]

_D-1_

_Anyasya anyadharmāvabhāsatā_15

[‘One thing appearing as of the property of another’ (tr. mine)]

_D-2_
Adhyāso nāma atasmin tadbuddhiḥ⁷⁶ D-3

[‘Adhyāsa means the knowledge of that which it is not’
(tr. mine)]

All the above three definitions, D-1 to D-3, refer to jñānādhyāsa.¹⁷ This fact of reference to jñānādhyāsa is clearly reflected in D-3 itself by its allusion to knowledge (buddhiḥ). This point, if not grasped, has the potentiality to lead one into psychologism easily. In fact, one can easily be led into psychologism by making a conjoining of the ‘memory’ of D-1 with ‘one thing appearing as of the property of another’ of D-2 because the recollected memory can be understood as directly dependent on one’s own likings and dislikings. Further, the examples of the type of object-adhyāsa such as ‘nacre-silver illusion’ or the ‘single moon appearing as two’ have spicy potential for fertile psychologistic imaginations. Obviously, such an understanding in terms of psychologism does not account for other important concepts of Śaṅkara such as for example, aparokṣa.

In contrast, Misra seems to steer clear of the ‘psychologism’ in toto. Even then the consequence of not accounting for other important concepts of Śaṅkara could not be avoided by him. This is mainly because, Misra in his enthusiasm to avoid psychologism concentrates on object-adhyāsa of NS type alone and forgets some crucial points concerning the I-adhyāsa. Furthermore, while concentrating on object-adhyāsa, he focuses on the arthā aspect ensuing from arthādhyāsa, whereas he ought to have focussed on the jñāna aspect flowing from jñānādhyāsa in order to facilitate a proper understanding of adhyāsa in its entirety. It is because of this unintentional, but extreme, shift in thought from ‘psychologism’ to ‘propositional analysis’, arthā, there arises the contingency of partial or erroneous interpretation by Misra.

In these lines of propositional analysis, Misra refers to propositions (25) and (26) given below:
"This is rope."
"This is strong."  

(25)
(26)

Modern literature on adhyāsa contains the propositions concerning illusion as—

"This is silver."
"This is snake."

(27)
(28)

The corrected subsequent cognitions as referred to in the aforesaid literature are given in the following propositions, respectively.

"This is nacre."
"This is rope."

(29)
(30)

In this context, before proceeding further, let us first note two things. One: we hardly come across an analysis of the double-moon illustration given by Śaṅkara, in this literature. Two: as for Śaṅkara, he does not give out the illustrations from the object-adhyāsa in the propositional form in much the same way as he does not give the propositions (6) to (9) and (21) to (24) in an explicit manner unlike the propositions (10) to (20). Hence, the proposition—

"Ekaścandrah sadvitiyavat"  

[‘Same moon, i.e., the single, self-same moon, appears to be with another’ (tr. mine)]

has been almost entirely kept out of both psychologistic and logical analyses. The reasons for their omission will become clear later.

Although the propositions of both logical and psychologistic analyses, as stated in (25) to (30), are along the right lines, they nonetheless fail to pin-point the ‘error’. Logical analysis locates the error inside the proposition by way of categorizing the subject and the predicate. Whereas the psychologistic analysis locates the error outside the proposition but inside our psyche as if
an empirically true proposition is reflecting a hallucination! Out of these two analyses, surely logical analysis comes closer to what Śaṅkara really intends to convey. For, the error or virodha is necessarily to be located inside the proposition itself even for Śaṅkara. Had the logical analysis encompassed all the essential points of Śaṅkara regarding adhyāsa, then it would have surely helped us understand the ‘I-adhyāsa’ clearly. So, in order to facilitate an understanding of the parallel between an I-adhyāsa and an object-adhyāsa, we need to first understand the object—adhyāsa as it constitutes a metaphorical illustration for I-adhyāsa in Śaṅkara’s scheme of things. To enable this, we shall further resolve the NS type (or rope-serpent) illusion into its constituent propositional elements besides (27) to (30). We shall begin to do this by understanding the reason(s) for the postulation of the term ‘this’ in these propositions.

In the object-adhyāsa of the NS type, continuity of the same basic object must be posited and proved. Otherwise, each successive cognition being unique, having no relation to another, there would result no illusion of the NS type. In such a case one and the same thing may not be said to appear as another. This highlights the fact that for the illusion to occur not only the appearance, but also what appeared as another should be known. The conceptual necessity, therefore, makes us postulate a basic object bereft of all attribution of property to it. Such a basic object may be designated by the term ‘this’.²⁰ This basic object may be comparable to the Lockean substratum in all but one aspect of apprehension. For any reason if one does not postulate a basic object then an absurdity of the following form will arise in cognition:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{‘Nacre is silver’} & \quad \text{‘Silver is nacre’} \quad (32) \\
\text{‘Rope is snake’} & \quad \text{‘Snake is rope’} \quad (33)
\end{align*}
\]

The term ‘this’, therefore, is expected to designate an object (a basic object) in a rigid manner, and the object
itself will persist through time without the slightest change a sort of kūtasthanityatā. Hence, the basic object is expected to provide the continuity to relate and connect relevant cognitions to understand illusion—in this case the object-adhyāsa of NS type, in a propositional symbolism.

On the cognitive side, however, the term ‘this’ denotes an object invariably along with its properties, illusory or real. This being so, two successive cognitions of the ‘this’, being in opposition with regard to their spheres of properties, a proposition of the form of (32) or (33) becomes absurd, or intrinsically oppositionary. The very fact of succession of two cognitions point to the time-element involved in these cognitions. Hence the term ‘this’ as specifying spatial locus, and the time-element derived from the succession of cognitions which specify the property-locus have to be incorporated into the propositions (27) and (29). Therefore, by incorporating this necessity, we may rewrite the propositions (27) and (29) as:

‘This is silver as cognized at time $t_1$’

‘This is nacre as cognized at time $t_2$’

Both the space and time specifications that we have marked above may still fall short in confirming the illusion logically. Many reasons can be cited in support of this contention. We shall, however, state a few among them. The logical subject ‘this’ in its cognitive aspect lacks content for its denotation except as ‘it’ appears with some or the other properties. This fact makes a so-called particular ‘this’ prone to be confused with many other ‘this’s’. Also the problem of mutual dependence of ‘empty space’ and ‘this’ emerges. Finally, the cognitive predicate counter correlate that was present, which now stands negated, has a present existence merely in memory. This means that a conclusive confirmation of the illusion by way of juxtaposition in direct perception is ruled out ex-hypothesi.
It is only when the cognizer is absolutely sure of both the cognitions at $t_1$ and $t_2$ as belonging to the same ‘this’ that an illusion can be said to arise. In fact, an assurance of the continuity of ‘this’, in principle, can lead to an infinite series of cognitions at $\{t_1, t_2, ..., t_n\}$ where $n = 1, 2, 3, ..., \infty$. In this case each successive cognition negates all or some past cognitions. Hence we may have a further successive cognitive stage even beyond (34) and (35) as,

‘This is platinum as cognized at $t_3$’ \hspace{0.5cm} (36)

Proposition (35) implies, in this construal, a negation of (34), and all non-nacre propositions. Proposition (36) implies the negation of both (35) and (34) and all non-platinum propositions. Or alternatively, we may have,

‘This is silver as cognized at time $t_3$’ \hspace{0.5cm} (37)

Proposition (37) negates (35) but not (34). Thus what is negated becomes unreal on the ontological plane. Proposition (35) may be made to imply ‘This is not nacre’.

A pure ‘this’ being a cognitively contentless entity, and further, the pure ‘this’ being conjoined with some or the other properties, Śaṅkara had to speak of both non-sensory perception ($\text{apratyakṣa}$) (of a pure ‘this’) and sensory perception. The aspect of sensory perception apparently does not present serious difficulty at this stage. So the former, i.e. non-sensory perception had to be in some way or the other referred to by Śaṅkara because of Śaṅkara’s keen awareness of making a metaphor essentially potent enough to explain what is basically aimed at explication. He does exactly this in the following manner, in his $\text{Adhyāsa Bhāṣya}$ since he posits that the apprehension of all the entities involved in an $\text{adhyāsa}$ as an essential condition for $\text{adhyāsa}$ to take place.

\[ \text{na cāyamasti niyamaḥ puros vasthita eva viṣaye viṣayāntaram adhyasitavyamiti apratyakṣes pi hi ākāše bālāh talamalinatādi adhyasyanti...}^{22} \]
The proposition (31) which illustrates a non-NS type illusion, seems to have been conceived by Śaṅkara precisely to avoid the difficulties faced in the illusions of NS type which arise due to space-time specifications. These difficulties have been referred to already. However, in a non-NS type illusion the spatial locus is expected to be fixed and unchanging, and the temporal successivity is supposed to be eliminated. Therefore, the double-moon illusion which is of non-NS type may be represented diagrammatically as follows:

![Diagram (A)]

However, this illustration has its own set of drawbacks such as for example ‘extended spatial locus’ and ‘reduced temporal vision-locus’, etc. The former means that the locus pervades both the real and the illusory moons. If the common overlapping portion is taken as the locus then there cannot be any illusion since differentiating of the two moons is impossible. The latter, that is the second problem, entails the difficulty of the very apprehension of the two moons in a simultaneous manner, even if apparently there appears a kind of simultaneity of apprehension. Secondly, temporal duration is necessarily required as a pre-condition to distinguish between the real and the illusory moons. The simultaneity of the real and the illusory perception, for these reasons, does not seem to be forcefully and conclusively convincing.

Psychologist analysts have not touched upon the proposition (31) because they could not distinguish and fit the two illustrations of the NS type and non-NS type as given by Śaṅkara in their analysis with regard to the possible mental construction of space and time loci. On
the other hand logical analysts could not even formulate a proposition concerning the double-moon illusion which is a non-NS type, to represent the same, in a subject-predicate form.

From the above facts it can be inferred with reasonable certainty that Śaṅkara was aware of the logical difficulties involved in the NS type illusion. This, in turn, clearly indicates that the object-adhyāsa cannot ignore the cognitive aspects involved in it even while subjecting it to a rigorous logical analysis.

Śaṅkara's idea in not putting forward the propositions with regard to wife and child, etc. as in (6) & (7) was to prove the object-adhyāsa first, so that these would follow logically as a matter of course without distraction. Once an object-adhyāsa is understood, the I-adhyāsā even in its subtle aspects of antahkarana would not be difficult to understand according to Śaṅkara.

III. I-Adhyāsa of Śaṅkara

Having thus attempted to understand the object-adhyāsa, which is a metaphorical illustration to explain the I-adhyāsa, in the previous section, we shall now try to explain the primary adhyāsa, i.e. the I-adhyāsa itself, in this section.

In I-adhyāsa, the terms involved are 'I' and the 'object'. śaṅkara makes his very first statement in the Adhyāsa Bhāṣya demarcating the two spheres of these concepts.

'What object and subject are understood by the awareness from the concepts 'you' ((and)) 'I', are like darkness and light, which are of opposite nature, ((and hence)) is evident that the one cannot be of the essential nature of the other, much less so are their properties'²³ (tr. mine).

In Sanskrit 'yuṣmat' constitutes a base term for the second person singular, dual and plural termination in
all the seven grammatical cases. Likewise, 'aṣmat' is for the first person. Some authors seem to have taken plural termination in the first case (nominative) as the translation of 'yuṣmat', i.e., 'you' plural in English, and plural termination in the first case (nominative) as the translation of 'aṣmat', i.e., 'we' in English. Some others have opted for singular terminations in both cases.

However, both translations seem to be partial representation in that the provisions for sixth case singular (genitive) termination for 'I' (or 'we') is lacking. Sri Saccidanandendra Swāmī chooses the singular terminations and implicitly includes the required relevant grammatical cases. Following the Swāmīji, we shall say that the 'you' and the 'I', being opposite to each other like darkness and light, they cannot be brought together in a propositional symbolism by saying,

'I am you.'

'You are myself.'

Now, if we recall the propositions of I-adhyāsa, (1) to (24), we come to know that the form of the proposition (38) is what is attempted to be located in them such that the same virodha that is there in (38) may be derived or located in the propositions (1) to (24). In making the propositions (1) to (24) or those that are similar to them, people, in their daily life commit an adhyāsa, according to Śaṅkara. The 'why' of this action is certainly extremely difficult to explain except that it is said to be beginninglessly commenced. But the 'how' of this action is explicated by Śaṅkara. In fact our attempt has been to explain the 'how' of an object-adhyāsa. This attempt is found in the previous section. To facilitate a comparison/application of this adhyāsa with/on-adhyāsa, we shall write down a proposition each for the I-adhyāsa and the object-adhyāsa.
'I am body.' (40)  
'This is snake.' (41)  

In (40) and (41) 'I' corresponds to 'this', and 'body' corresponds to 'snake'. As the covert thumb rule of Śaṅkara says both the 'entities' involved in an adhyāsa must be apprehended in order that there be adhyāsa at all, it follows that they must be apprehended. This thumb rule comes to the fore in an analysis of the answer given by Śaṅkara to the 'how' question of primary adhyāsa. The metaphorical illustration of adhyāsa, of the NS type, makes it clear that the apprehension of the entities involved in adhyāsa are 'sensory' or non-sensory as the case may be. In Śaṅkara’s explanation of I-adhyāsa we find an example for non-sensory apprehension within the realm of object-adhyāsa.25 Within the realm of I-adhyāsa there is an apprehension of the ‘I’ which apprehension is non-sensory and immediate (aparokṣa). If one goes along with the object-adhyāsa of the NS type, then an entity ‘this’ emerges to the fore. This we have already seen in the previous section. What is not clear from Śaṅkara’s writings is that whether the ‘this’, here, is apprehended in a non-sensory immediate manner or non-sensory mediate manner. If it is the former, Advaita remains intact since in that case the ‘I’ and ‘this’ merge together. If the ‘this’ is a non-sensory mediate then Advaita seems to come closer to Dvaita, in which case the non-sensory apprehension of the sky (ether) itself is construed as non-sensory but mediate apprehension.

In his insistence on ‘apprehension’ as a pre-condition for adhyāsa Śaṅkara avoids the problems faced by Locke and Hume. Although an object-adhyāsa seems to be easy enough to grasp, a closer analysis has revealed that there is an entity, the ‘this’ involved in it, which needs to be apprehended for the commission of adhyāsa. Like the Lockean substratum, the ‘this’, in its pure form is not apprehensible nor is apprehended sensorily even in
Sāṅkara’s scheme. This, if not taken care of, is sure to lead one to the Lockean contingency of I-know-not-what. Precisely to avoid this difficulty, ‘Sāṅkara, in the context of the apprehension of the ‘I’, brings in the parallel matters of object-adhyāsa. So he says that upon the non-sensorily perceptible (apprehensible) (apratyakṣa) sky (ether) are superimposed ‘dirt’, ‘space’, etc.

‘Sky is dirty.’ (42)

Sāṅkara’s ingenious insistence on apprehension of the superimpose along with that of the superimposed as an important pre-condition for adhyāsa to take place not only avoids the Lockean absurdity but also saves the whole scheme from sceptical Humean conclusion of no-soul. This implies that both the you-awareness, and I-awareness become object to an awareness of a higher or deeper level. But apprehension takes place only when the superimposee also becomes an object. If so, a proposition of the form (3) also requires that the subject ‘I’ to be an object of apprehension.26 Sāṅkara, no doubt, accepts this point without hesitation. He says,

na tāvat ayam ekāntena avisayah/asmatpratyaya viṣayatvāt, aparokṣatvāccha pratyagātmā prasiddheḥ

‘This (ātman) is not a non-object by rule. Because he (the ‘I’) is object to the concept ‘I’. (Further) being non-indirect the pratyagātman is well-known’27 (tr. mine).

Although the mode of apprehension of both the basic object (the ‘This’) and the ‘I’ can be non-sensory still they do not belong to the same category of apprehension. Thus, while the basic object of object-adhyāsa may be non-sensorily (apratyakṣa) apprehended for the purpose of adhyāsa, it (the basic object) is not stated to be immediately (aparokṣa) apprehensible. The immediacy is strictly reserved for the apprehension of the ‘I’ alone. In other words, pratyagātman, who is an inward entity has to be
known from immediate apprehension (aparokṣa) alone,\(^2\) as opposed to the possible apprehension of the basic object in a non-immediate non-sensory manner such as that of for example, sky (ether). ‘Pratyakṣa’ in pratyagātman means ‘that which is inward’.

### IV. Conclusion

Misra in his interpretation of Śaṅkara construes the ‘rope’, ‘brahmin’, ‘strong’, etc. as capable of occurring as a predicate in object-adhyāsa or I-adhyāsa, in the form of universals—sortal or characterizing type. For example, ‘rope’ in (25) illustrates a sortal universal, and ‘strong’ in (26) illustrates a characterizing universal. These examples at (25) and (26) in reality belong to the category of object-adhyāsa, whereas ‘brahmin’ a sortal universal in the proposition—

‘I am brahmin.’ (43)

belongs to the category of I-adhyāsa. If we keep in mind the necessity of apprehension of the entities involved in an adhyāsa, then, at once we realize that both the superimpose, the locus, and the superimposed object/attribute are to be necessarily apprehended by way of aparokṣa or pratyakṣa or apratyakṣa as the case may be. If this is true, then it follows that the attribute brahminhood caste (varṇa) is necessarily apprehended—not as a universal, but as concretely existing property in the superimposee (locus), whose dharma (guna) brahminhood is. That such an attribute may probably have a participation in its universal counterpart is a different story. What is most important to note is the actual apprehension of the attribute as it is first superimposed on an object, then the object being superimposed on the ‘I’.

In an object-adhyāsa since the ‘This’ is not explicitly stated to be apprehended through aparokṣa, and also
sometimes may not be an *indriyaviśaya* without its attribute, the ‘This’ gets clouded with attributes. This fact, if accepted, explains why the term ‘this’ is made to go outside the purview of language by Misra. In fact, there seems to be no pure ‘this’ apart from pure ‘I’ in Śaṅkara’s scheme. So also, in I-*adhyāsa*, the pure-I—despite the *aparokṣa* and the ensuing *prasiddhi*—gets clouded with the attributions to become *jīva*, due to the force of *indriyaviśayas*.

If it were an actual universal that was intended in (25) or (43) then there would have resulted the propositions—

\[
\text{‘This is ropeness’} \quad \text{(44)} \\
\text{OR} \\
\text{‘I am brahminhood’} \quad \text{(45)}
\]

which is patently absurd. This absurdity would remain even if the alleged ‘sortal’ nature of the universal is taken into account, since either a member of the class is a particular, or the alleged member of the class is not a member of the class after all. And, having superimposed these ideas on Śaṅkara’s *adhyāsa*, Misra goes on to say that the ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘I’ are—

no part of language ((after all)), they are mere substitutes for the physical act of gesticulating, ((and because of this fact)) in merely pointing at ‘I’ cannot mistakenly point at. ‘True’ or ‘false’, ‘mistaken’ or ‘non-mistaken’ occur at the level of language and not at the level of physical gesticulation....

In Misra’s conclusion, the three terms ‘this’, ‘that’ and ‘I’ belong to the same category of concepts since they are ‘purely referring expressions’ and are ‘mere pointers since they have no descriptive content at all.’ Misra does not tell us how he proposes to retain their distinctness if they have no descriptive content at all. If they are meaningless words in toto, they cannot be expected to
acquire meaning all of a sudden. Even if they acquire meaning it will be erroneous on Misra’s own admission. But, whereas for adhyāsa to occur in Śaṅkara’s scheme, as we have seen, the ‘I’ and ‘this’ are the ones that must be misidentifiable, and misidentified in reality. Further, the ‘I’ and the ‘This’ belong to two distinct and opposite categories in their adhyāsic form. However, when the ‘I’ is apprehended without error, the ‘this’ vanishes into thin air in Śaṅkara’s scheme, hence leaves no room for proper identification of it (‘this’), whereas in Misra’s scheme the apprehension, if any, of pure ‘I’ and pure ‘this’ leads to the apprehension of infinite particulars.

Notes and References

Note: All my translations are from Kannada, unless specified otherwise.

4. In 1985, when I was a hostelite in Hall-5 at IIT-Kanpur, on a particular day, I was explaining to my colleagues (who hailed from Orissa) the interesting points of Professor Misra’s interpretation of Advaita. In the process I also told them of my intense desire to meet Professor Misra. My colleague (Dr.) B.P. Patra and (Dr.) A.C. Nayak, at once introduced me to Professor Misra’s son who was a Research Scholar in Physics at IIT-Kanpur at that time. Further, they conveyed to me the sad demise of Professor Misra a few days ago. It was extremely distressing to learn this since a few more similar desires of mine could not be fulfilled in the past due to similar circumstances.
6. Misra (1976), p. 69. ‘Rope’ in ‘This is rope’ or ‘Brahmin’ in ‘I am a Brahmin’ illustrates a sortal universal, whereas ‘strong’ in ‘This is strong’ illustrates a characterizing universal according to Misra.
7. Pratīca ātmanah prasiddhiḥ prathā, tasya aparokṣātvaḥ. (Bhamati) Sastri (1933), pp. 42-43. ‘Prathā is the realization of the inner Self, because of the immediacy thereof’.


In its extremity, the adhyāsa is made even on the antahkarana by superimposing the pratyagatman Himself. ‘I am the Self where the I stands for antahkarana. This happens when there is no realization of the actual apprehension of the pratyagatman.

11. Bhamati explains this class of superimposition as a sort of two successive events. ‘Superimposing identity with the body on the Self, and superimposing thereon the bodily attribute of the ownership ((emphasis mine)) of son, wife, etc., in the same way as leanness etc., one says ‘I am myself unsound or sound’. “Dehatādīmya-mātmanyadh-asya dehadhar-mam putrakalatrudi svāmyam ca kṛṣatvādīmāḥ- ròpyāha-ahameva vikalah, sakalah iti” Sastri (1933), p. 57.

12. Swāmī (1998), p. 3 ‘tathā ca loke anubhavaḥ... iti’


15. Swāmī (1998), p. 3. Tr. is in Ref. 7 Supra.


17. The definition of adhyāsa D-3 is upheld by Swāmī Saccidānandendra as an important indicator to the jñāṇadhyāṣa tenor of other two definitions of adhyāsa as given by Śaṅkara. Jñāṇadhyāṣa is upheld because a doubt may arise due to D-1 that the adhyāsa of Śaṅkara is speaking of arthādhyāṣa.
We shall give here Vidyāraṇya’s view on the two types of adhyāsa, for a clearer picture:

‘Dvidhā hi adhyāso jñānaviśiṣṭo rthosraviśiṣṭam jñānam ca iti | Tatra arthasya tāvat smaryamāṇa sadṛśosnyātmanā svabhāṣya mānosnyo arthodhyāsa iti lakṣaṇam | Jñānasya tu smṛti samānosnasyānyātmatāva bhāṣosdhyāsa iti |’ (Vivarāṇa Prameya Saṁgraha) (VPS) I.1.

‘There are two types of adhyāsa. The first one is jñānaviśiṣṭa artha and the second one is arthaviśiṣṭa jñāna | ...Let us first explain arthadhyāsa... The memory-object’s similarity (to what is in front), and its (the memory-object’s) appearance as a different object’s (i.e. the object-in front’s) meaning is called as arthadhyāsa. And the second one, i.e. jñānadhyāsa is, similar to memory. But, which consists in non-proximate object (unlike the memory-object of arthadhyāsa which is proximate to the mind alone), and a different object (other than the memory-like object) appearing in a different form is called as jñānadhyāsa’ (tr. from a Hindi version).

The two adhyāsas mentioned above clearly fall under the category of object-adhyāsa. These adhyāsas may be explained and elaborated as follows:

Silver is remembered when in reality nacre is presented before the person, although the person himself is unaware of the anomaly. That is a case of arthadhyāsa because the artha which flashes to the mind (i.e., the memory-object, in this case ‘silver’) is identified with the object in front in conformity with the memory-object itself rather than the artha of the actual object which is in front. It is because of the discrepancy between the artha (of the memory-object) and the artha of the actual-object, there arises arthadhyāsa.

The person does not know the fact that the object presented before him is similar to the memory-object. Hence the said fact becomes an outsider view. Whereas the insider view of the arthadhyāsa is that ‘the (memory) object’s artha in the mind is the actual artha which reflects the object in front’. It is only in a later ‘correct’ cognition that the outsider view gets converted into an insider view.

In jñānadhyāsa, the process is similar to memory. In this case, the false object of perception is not proximate to the
mind but is spatially non-proximate just as the memory-object of arthādhyāśa, identifies with the object in front. This happens even when the memory of the actual object in front prompts that there is a certain amount of deformity in the perception of it. This is purely an insider view of the error. Jñānādhyāśa aims at proving the illusion here and now by positing the possibility of apprehension of the real and the illusory simultaneously. That there is only one moon is known already and the memory of which is recalled now. At the same time a second moon is surely ‘perceived’, but then, which must be illusory since the second moon is known to be not existing. However, the appearance of the second moon thus adds to the deformation of the first. So the first moon acts as the pure-object, the ‘this’ of the object-adhyāśa, and is the parallel concept for the ‘I’ of the I-adhyāśa. The memory-knowledge of the first moon acts also as the analogous parallel to the apprehension of ‘I’ (of course, not as aparokṣa). The second moon being a partial deforming agent of the first, can be said to form a parallel to the ‘body’ (etc.) which deform the ‘I’.

It is the ingenious concoction of the NS type illusion and the double-moon illusion that Śaṅkara wants us to prepare in order to understand the adhyāśa or error committed in knowing the ‘I’ as ‘body’ (etc.). From NS-type illusion, Śaṅkara wants us to derive the pure ‘this’ and its apprehension, and from the double-moon type to derive the simultaneity of two apprehensions (of the two entities involved in adhyāśa) such that the mistake (error/adhyāśa) is known as committed at the time of perception itself. This ingenious mixture, if materialized, then such a mixture would come closest to what he wants to illustrate as I-adhyāśa, barring only the aparokṣa of ‘I’.

In passing, we may note that Misra is certainly right to the extent that he has tried to locate the error by positing it inside a proposition, since the same is the endeavour of Śaṅkara also, as in jñānādhyāśa.

The fact is that arthādhyāśa makes memory central to the adhyāśa whereas the jñānādhyāśa focuses on the necessity to discriminate between the real and the unreal without taking a direct recourse to memory. Further, as clear from
our analysis of object-\textit{adhyāsa}, more than NS type illusion, the non-NS type illusion comes closer to illustrate the \textit{l-adhyāsa}, which we believe, is the central meaning of \textit{jñānādhyāsa}. Whereas NS type illusion is the most elementary type which is purported to illustrate the pure object of \textit{arthādhyāsa}. However, Misra interprets \textit{arthādhyāsa} to mean propositional analysis.

18. See Ref. 6 above. We may note that the word ‘that’ may be considered as more appropriate since the ‘silver’ is non-proximate spatially. Accordingly, one may say ‘That, is silver’ instead of ‘This is silver’. But surely silver is proximate mentally in its \textit{artha} aspect, as is clear from the definition of \textit{arthādhyāsa} given by VPS. However, the words ‘this’ or ‘that’ are presumed to be interchangeable without change in the meaning as they are expected to refer to the same pure-object or what may be called as the basic-object. See Ref. 17 above.

19. The double-moon illusion will occur in a focus by depressing, for example, one eyeball. The two moons may be distinct and separate, or overlapping, as the case may be, as this is dependent on the extent to which the depression of the eyeball is made. This ‘illusion’ can also occur when the person is shortsighted. In this case depressing the eyeball is not required.

20. The term ‘This’ is used for proximate object, and ‘that’ for non-proximate object. In Sanskrit, \textit{etad} (Neuter gender) is used for ‘this’. The illusion of double-moon seeks to do away with the necessity of the ‘this’ (or ‘that’ which is its non-proximate counterpart) altogether (in space) and the two successive cognitions (in time) by positing the self-same moon as acting both as the ‘this’ and its illusory duplicate simultaneously. The propositional analysis, as in the NS type illusion, highlights the necessity of positing a pure-object to be denoted by either ‘this’ or ‘that’ or both.

21. The ‘silver’ here is said to be an indescribable silver by some Vedāntins. But Swāmi Saccidānandendra is of the opinion that the attribution of such indescribability to illusory silver is not acceptable to Śaṅkara. See BSB, p. 4, fn. 3.

22. ‘There is no such rule as an \textit{adhyāsa} of an object has to take place on another object in front alone. Even when the sky
is non-sensory, will not stupid persons (childish) superimpose dirt, etc. (properties) on the surface of the sky?...' (tr. mine).

'...bhāvānapapattih siddhāyam taddharmānāmapi sutarām itaretara bhāvānapapattih...' See Ref. 2 above for the first half of the Sanskrit sentence of Śaṅkara.

24. Sastri (1933), 'The usage "You are myself" does exist, but it is very rare'. Bhāmatī, p. 249.
'Where the words of the spheres of the two concepts “this” and “I” should have been used, the word “thou” is used (in the place of “this”) to indicate the absolute difference (between the contrasted aspect of experience). The counter-correlate of the word “I” is not the word “this”, so much as the word “thou” since there is seen extensive usage of expressions like “We are this, We are that.”’ Bhāmatī, p. 5.

25. See Ref. 22 above.

26. Bhāmatī tries to avoid ‘infinite regress’ arising out of the ‘objecthood’ being attributed to the Self, by referring to jīva and the appearance of the Ātman as non-Self. See Kumar (1988), pp. 214–215. See also Warrier (1983), pp. 402–464 (BhagavatGītā Bhāṣya, chapter XIII) for how the subject ‘I’ becomes object of its own apprehension i.e., how can the ‘known’ (jñeya) be superimposed on the knower.


28. The prasiddhatva of the Ātman which is the adhiṣṭhāna (the locus of superimposition i.e., superimposee), and the viṣayatva of the āropita (that which is superimposed) are two different things. This is extremely important in the context of the apprehension of the Ātman. The former is a kind of self-evident truism in the sense that the non-existence of it cannot be shown because of self-refutation involved in the making of the proposition ‘I do not exist’. For a logical reconstruction of these ideas see Kumar (2000). Further, Bhāmatī says ‘grhita eva tu kalpitena bhedena na vivecitā | iti agrhita iśvabhānti|’ ‘Not that consciousness is not apprehended, but that it is not realized’.

30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
Bibliography


