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INDIAN SOCIAL CONTRACT AND ITS DISSOLUTION

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Introduction

So far there have been many attempts at understanding "Purusarthas" or "Human Goals" of Indian Philosophy. Unfortunately, the slide has been towards critique of it rather than to create a constructive logical map of it. It is quite evident that when we look into any thought process that spans over many generations it is but natural to miss so many logical links; especially so when there is a clear break in tradition as in the case of modern India. It is with this background, I have tried in this article to map the entire gamut of puruṣārthas in a logical canvass.

To begin with all that any human needs are sustaining means and quenching of his aesthetic (instinctual/cultured) desires. It is with the realization of the fruitlessness of conflicts and their negative role in realizing these goals that the dharma or rules/duties were conceived. The same took the shape of universal or sāmānya dharmas and viśeṣa dharmas. But then violations have to be tackled and, better if we could prevent violations at all. Legal 'ought' within the realm of dharma would be to tackle the violations, and moral 'ought' would be preventive of violations. In pursuance of the understanding of moral ought and its limitations, moksasastras are born in India. Mokṣa would be not only the vantage point for all actions, but also would be the final dissolver of the contract that every human has entered into in order to form a society to optimize his happiness. "Outside' view and 'inside' views of puruṣārthas are the puruṣārthas as necessitated and explained by the human community life and the desire to go out of it, and the contents afforded to the same by an explicit statement of the content of mokṣa as in moksasastras. Every mokṣaśāstra is expected to do justice to both trivarga puruṣārthas and the happiness derivable though mokṣa. It is in this vein āśramadharmas and varṇadharmas were conceived in order to optimize the happiness. The article has thus attempted to bring out the logic of the matter. And I hope that historical materials would be placed in their proper logical slots in the days to come.

Caturvarga Makes A Logical Whole

Dharma, artha, kāma, and mokṣa constitute caturvarga. Dharma restricts/facilitates artha and kāma. Dharma treats the individual as a member in the society. Dharma endeavors to give a sort of viśvadr̥ṣṭi, which is predominantly social. Dharma, within trivarga puruṣārthas, necessarily binds the man, as a man has to perform his duty both general and specific. Dharma gets happiness to an individual by way of an optimal-fragment of total social happiness. However, Dharma does not succeed in its objective entirely. Dharma gives up. Mokṣa endeavors to perform the task that the dharma has given up. However, in so doing mokṣa removes the puruṣa from his original social setting in an extremely gradual manner without disturbing the social set-up, and endeavors to take him away from the glare of the society, even while the puruṣa is expected to perform his duties (dharma) as a member of the society. Looking at the above characterization, it is clear that both the number and the essence of puruṣārthas fuse (continuity) together—historically and logically, retaining their distinctness. However, one could hold that the 'viśvadr̥ṣṭi' angle makes greater sense as a development from a mere social angle to a comprehensive all-inclusive view, since it can accommodate within it all else. For example, the dharma while being enhanced to act as mokṣa may get a greater ought-force in social order and through it greater happiness in society, which invariably leads to greater happiness to an individual. Totality of social happiness alone can ensure optimal happiness to an individual within trivarga. Yet in order to realize this goal, each individual has to opt for an extension of dharma in the form of mokṣa, even though trivarga (bondage) and mokṣa (freedom)-which are mutually negating. Thus, even though bondage and freedom make an exactly opposite pair here, and are categorially different, nevertheless both of them form a logical continuity, because of incorporation of a theoretical view of mokṣa in one's life without actual realization of mokṣa while in the society.

Caturvarga Exhausts All Human Goals

The human goals (puruṣārthas) are essential and indispensable for all human beings.¹ A sort of exception to this is to abstain from some of them willfully, like artha/kāma, which in a way implies being away from dharma too. Such abstinence, however, entails the acceptance of the fourth, logically. Thus, when we look at the totality of caturvarga we come to know that in a way the universe of discourse for human goals would exhaust between trivarga puruṣārthas and mokṣa, and that all human beings have to choose either of these two categories. That is, either someone is in the society (trivarga), or outside (mokṣa) of it. One cannot be both inside and outside of it simultaneously.² A very important feature is the 'attainment' of mokṣa (in its generic sense) is to simply go out of trivarga that has kept him in bonds. Being inside trivarga one

may certainly keep the 'object' of going out of it before him for attainment of the concerned specific mokṣāic object, even though he may not be entirely in the know of the meaning of the term 'going out of trivarga' and 'attaining the mokṣaic object' as yet. In this way, logically no one can avoid puruṣārthas in their entirety. Hence, at any given time, a person will pursue the puruṣārthas consciously or otherwise. The class of instinctual goals of artha and kāma (which get refined later) will lead to necessary acceptance of dharma, and hence become conditional, in order to ensure a qualitative maximum of happiness (within the society). Where the selection is of the fourth puruṣārtha- the mokṣa (outside of society), it is unconditional in order to help one move out and realize mokṣa, but not 'unconditional' in the sense of freedom to violate dharma. The 'outside' of society knows no dharma- hence both compliance and violation of the same do not make sense. Therefore, since even a jijñāsu has to be 'inside' (the society), in order to commence his journey to go 'outside', he has to follow the dharma to the extent he interacts with the society. Therefore, when a person wishes to negate trivarga- where a voluntary acceptance of a logically and sociologically necessary dharma had occurred previously, logically there has to be a separate goal of 'going outside' of trivarga, as a puruṣārtha. It is in this sense a special desire (mumukṣā) to 'cease all desires' (outside view of puruṣārthas) can be there, and in such a desire the object would be to know the ultimate reality, as for example, in Advaita, 'to know the identity of oneself with the ultimate' is mokṣa- which is an 'inside view' of mokṣa. The final understanding of the puruṣārthas then would be that no individual could remain outside the ambit of all four puruṣārthas at any given time. In other words, at any given time a person would be hankering after an 'object' that necessarily falls within one or the other puruṣārtha. One can, however, directly opt for the fourth puruṣārtha- the mokṣa- instead of trivarga. Mokṣa is a logical consequence of trivarga. Those who opt for trivarga have to have an option of mokṣa, as a theoretical necessity. Dhārmic life is always fraught with such difficulties, as the person would hanker after getting rid of the suffering. Dhārmic life begets suffering not because there is anything intrinsically wrong with the dharma; rather, the humans practice the dharma almost invariably only partially in a society. To rid the man of dhārmic suffering, which arises due to this partial practice, there are two alternatives (i) one must be in trivarga and take a mokṣaic outlook in all that he does, as mokṣa, from the apex (as in an 'inside' view), is expected to guide all human actions henceforth. The specific mokṣaśāstra imparts the needed mokṣāic outlook. Eventually the person will get rid of his trivarga bondage and with it all the suffering. Positive bliss may be a bonus as in an 'inside' view, in addition to the elimination of suffering; (ii) to resign to trivarga in its entirety in order to escape from dhārmic-suffering, and to opt for mokṣa, in an exclusive manner. It is in fact to ensure maximum social cumulative

happiness that the dharma was considered to be the most 'pure object' truly worthy of human pursuit, where the dharma-object is simply to perform all the requisite duties.

'Bliss' in Mokṣaśāstra

All these goals are to yield happiness/bliss- where first three yield finite bliss and the last (mokṣa) one infinite without a trace of any kind of suffering. Dharma would yield only finite bliss due to its close involvement with the artha and kāma. Because of its the impure factors involved with dharma, dharma itself becomes impure. As a result, violation of dharma occurs as a commonplace occurrence. Further because of this impurity of violations, mokṣa is introduced as fourth puruṣārtha, with a view to provide a vantage point for trivarga. Therefore, only if not a single violation of dharma is found in a society that one could say that there would be no need of a separate mokṣa as a fourth puruṣārtha. But if trivarga provides happiness, mokṣa should be doing so in a better manner. Mokṣa has to be a state of complete bliss. An overtly non-bliss mokṣa, like nirvāṇa of Buddhism for example, need not deter us because the thrust of mokṣa as found in the generic 'outside' view of puruṣārthas is to impel one to 'perform' actions and beget happiness within trivarga without being bound to/by it as a consequence of such actions. Action-to-happiness is an indomitable theorem of trivarga, and is the life-blood of all social dealings. Can such a theorem continue within the domain of mokṣa as well, as 'outside' view may like to have it? If the definition of mokṣa, as outside view would have it, were 'non-bondage from trivarga', then in mokṣa there would be the negation of both 'trivarga' and with it the theorem of action-to-happiness. The only way one could attain mokṣa then is to stop actions. But this would lead to the contingency that is not only detrimental to the performance of trivarga but also to itself. In other words, there would be no good reason for the performance of trivarga-action other than itself, and on the other hand the so-called mokṣa-bliss would become a categorically different sort of happiness, which is not only unknown to the humans, but also which, in all probability, cannot be known. This would then lead to the destruction of trivarga by inaction or actions that are impelled by trivarga itself without any tangible impact from mokṣa.

Gītā Karmayoga- Twilight Zone of 'Inside'—'Outside' Views of Mokṣa

Precisely to avoid this contingency of non-action or inaction or destructive action, and the consequent destruction of trivarga in society, the Gītā expounded the doctrine of desireless action—niṣkāmakarma. This doctrine, if materialized, would ensure both trivarga theorem and simultaneously avoid its binding effect, making way for the individual to get mokṣa without postulating a separate mokṣāic object. If karma leads to happiness, the niṣkāmakarma has to lead to niṣkāma-happiness. One has attained mokṣa already in his detached

work itself. However, this karmayoga view of mokṣa seems incapable of fighting the Advaitic worldview wherein the Self is ānandasvarūpa, signifying a sort of positive happiness, more solid object than the niṣkāmakarma happiness, which has no separate object involved with it. As such, this karma-mokṣa seems to be a clear case of an outside view of mokṣa-puruṣārtha, when we take it without entangling with any Weltanschauung. In addition, precisely because no Weltanschauung is connected to it at its beginning it could not specify a way to perform niṣkāmakarma. Since there is no separate object for mokṣa and there is no way to perform niṣkāmakarma such karma-mokṣa marks the twilight zone of mokṣa-puruṣārtha, where a sort of coupling of outside and inside views takes place. The moment we add the viśvadr̥ṣṭi to the niṣkāmakarma, it would turn out to be an 'inside' view of the puruṣārthas, especially of mokṣa. A mokṣasāstra would be born in that case out of the Gītā.

Advaitic, Buddhistic and Dvaitic Mokṣa: Successive Corrections in Ontic-Logic

Where a specific mokṣasāstra-school expressly disagrees with 'actions' as an ontological reality, the resulting world-view would surely negate actions as the cause of happiness (or sorrow). Therefore, there would be no real question of de-linking the bond at all to attain mokṣa. Thus, where 'actions' are absent, 'happiness' would also be necessarily absent in mokṣa, unless someone like an Advaitin, for example, explicitly holds that 'happiness' is possible without actions as in its mokṣa, by holding that the svarūpa (essential nature) of Ātman is 'ānanda', or bliss. Obviously, the Advaitic view, and the Buddhistic view of mokṣa, which are apparently contrary to each other, and being 'inside-view', cannot both be representing generic puruṣārthas, since, we cannot easily assimilate both these weltanschauung with the 'outside-view' of 'actions' to 'happiness' of puruṣārthas. However, fortunately, various viśvadr̥ṣṭis such as Buddhistic, which negate 'action-to-happiness' theorem, overtly also contained in them some or the other unsubstantiated or unacceptable logical presuppositions. For example, the logical proof of Absolute nothingness is an impossible task. This is because; anyone wishing to assert such Nothingness would have to deny the existence of everything including the existence of the very proposition that asserts it. This would contradict what is purported for assertion. Using this logical flaw, the Advaitin, as is well-known, demolishes the Buddhistic worldview, and on its mortal remains asserts that there is at least one thing (also at the most one thing) that exists and that is Brahman. However, this Advaita too, with all its fanfare, contained within it an 'inconceivable existence of happiness'. The conceivability of bliss of the svarūpa of the ātman involves some sort of action. However, the Advaita negates all action as unreal. So, if the bliss is asserted forgoing the action-to-happiness theorem then all that

* (G. B. ...) ... what it is and its content.

* As such an 'outside view' consists on dharma/karma ...

can be said of it is that the 'bliss' of ātman is a categorially different sort of happiness as compared to action-to-happiness theorem's bliss, and may not be worth pursuing after all, since I may never know that I am happy. The next is the Dvaitin's turn, with a brief space for the Viśiṣṭādvaitin in between. The Dvaitin claims to have solved the difficulty of assimilating the theorem of action-to-happiness of trivarga with the inside view of puruṣārtha of mokṣa without forgoing the initial theorem, and without at the same time forgoing the comprehensiveness of the Advaitic worldview. An infinite ātman cannot conceive of happiness since the ātman cannot objectify itself, as he is an eternal subject. Such an objectification with infinite happiness is available only with an infinite personal God. Thus, through his concept of bhakti, the Dvaitin protects the action-to-happiness theorem even at the level of mokṣa, and by according positive content to such happiness. This is the way the philosophers have corrected the weltanschauungs that contained 'flaws' at each successive stage, and provided us with new ones. In this way, the 'inside-view' of the mokṣa-puruṣārtha constantly developed to satisfy the common-sense view of actions leading to happiness, taking at every stage a corrective measure for the perceived logical flaws within the viśvadr̥ṣṭis, and giving positive content to the mokṣaic happiness. Whether or not new logical flaws have occurred in this process, it is up to us to point out and analyze. In sum, it can be said that the tug-of-war between the theorem of 'action-to-happiness' and 'happiness-without-actions'—both as found within mokṣa-works—has done a great deal of good to the development of viśvadr̥ṣṭi—each one vying to be more comprehensive than the other. However, the Dvaitic Weltanschauung seems to overtake the Advaita on all the three counts of action-to-happiness, hardcore realism, and mokṣa-happiness at/tending to infinity with positive content. We can represent the bear generic nature of the puruṣārthas as stated above in the form of a pyramid by allocating the base of the pyramid for the member human beings of the society, and the four sides as representing the four puruṣārthas each one culminating in the apex as happiness. We shall examine a little later the logical bond between various puruṣārthas—trivarga and caturvarga—as what constitutes the outside view that gives us the generic features of puruṣārthas.

Pyramid for Puruṣārthas

As opposed to, and/or different from, the generic puruṣārthas, there are contentful puruṣārthas ('inside view'). This 'contentful puruṣārthas' is a result of the view taken in a particular mokṣa-school concerning the ultimate that explains the mokṣa in its entirety. It is in such a context the trivarga is modified as and when necessary in order that the same could make a cogent and continuous totality. In this way the puruṣārthas in their 'inside' form could be conceived as a pyramid. However, from the viewpoint of the pyramid

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constituted by the 'outside' *puruṣārthas*, the member-human-beings, without definiteness of particularity, occupy the base of the pyramid; the four sides represent the four *puruṣārthas*. Every individual who pursues a *puruṣārtha* would find himself in the centre of the base. While the apex would be the *mokṣaic* bliss, it is considered as the last stage of one's life. This means that the perpendicular height dropped from the apex to the center of the base would represent the temporal movement of the individual. Accordingly, one could divide the life-span into required number of stages, and assign appropriate one-or more *puruṣārthas* to be pursued more prominently than the rest. The generic features of rest of the *puruṣārthas* are at the background. Although the pyramid is same in its form in both 'outside' and 'inside' views the logical relation between various concepts would be different, as generic and specific; and also there would be difference in the very conception of the object of *mokṣa*. Similarly, among the various 'inside' views there would be further difference in the logical relations of the concepts, even while they try their best to satisfy the generic nature of the *puruṣārthas*. In some works of *mokṣasāstra*, one could perceive an attempt at effecting reconciliation between the *trivarga* and *mokṣa*, where 'reconciliation' means elimination as well, of the either. For example, Buddhism tries to eliminate -or at any rate tries to minimize the importance of- *trivarga*. As opposed to this, the *Cārvāka* philosophy eliminates *mokṣa* in its entirety. The *Advaita* covertly eliminates *trivarga* and overtly asserts *mokṣa*, etc. Accordingly, the pyramidal representation of *puruṣārthas* in the *mokṣasāstras* would vary as found in the contentful *puruṣārthas*. The author would treat his focal theme in greater elaboration and would try to envelop the rest of the *puruṣārthas* within its fold. There is another way to understand the apex of the pyramid. Suppose the *puruṣārtha* or set of *puruṣārthas* that is accorded prominence is made to constitute the pyramid. This logically implies that the entire inside space of the pyramid is occupied by a conceptually homogeneous life-stage. Logically then the bliss derivable through the said *puruṣārtha/s* would, if maximum- invariably touch the apex. This bliss could be termed as 'mokṣaic' even though the bliss derivable from *mokṣa* per se is/could be categorially different.³ The characterization of generic pyramid of *puruṣārthas* as opposed to specific pyramid can be understood as sociological, since it is primarily a baby of social necessity. To that extent it would remain a general view so long as we do not bring in the specificities of any particular *mokṣa*-work. The aim of every *mokṣa* school seems to be to convert the generic pyramid of *puruṣārthas* into a cone. A cone has no sharp edges, hence, representative of smooth movement to different sides in the context of *puruṣārthas*. However, what has to soften the sharp edges is not anything but the *mokṣa*-viewpoint, as that alone could present a meaningful totality. Thus, when the lone *puruṣārtha* of *mokṣa* is taken to form a 'pyramid' it would invariably result in a cone.

Generic Pyramid

A further analysis of the generic pyramid of puruṣārthas would at once prompt us to have a pyramid for an individual human-being who is a member of the society because it is (single) puruṣa's arthas (objects) that he wants in a society. This primarily involves an individual's life. To get a pyramid then, we have to contextualize the already stated generic pyramid of puruṣārthas to a **Definite Individual (DI) in the sense of a particular**. We shall see a little later how exactly a DI as a category/particular is described, and the reasons that prompt us to have a DI etc. The base of the pyramid would be, as always, the society. In the pyramid's center of the base is located the DI. The height of the pyramid, from the middle of the base reaching the apex is the lifetime-span of the DI. The four⁴ sides of the pyramid constitute puruṣārthas and these sides taper to the apex where the life of DI culminates in bliss in each case of puruṣārtha separately at the levels of instinct (artha and kāma), society (dharma), and mokṣa. The degree of assimilation between these three categories of puruṣārthas determines the types of bliss, instinctual (purely individualistic), dhārmic (socialized individualistic), or mokṣāic (transcendentally individualistic). The DI has to move appropriately in his life time-span horizontally to reach the side(s) of pyramid (through inner horizontal space denoting the other members of the society) that denote puruṣārtha(s) that/those is/are conducive for his life so that in the last leg of his life-journey he is solely on the mokṣa-side of the pyramid. This has to happen even while mokṣa has to pull him all through from the above. However, the puruṣa has to make the choice.⁵ In this sense, ideally speaking, every puruṣa's life is a unique and distinct pyramid, and is at variance in its height with others. To convert the pyramid into a cone would be a better ideal still, since through it we can visualize a smooth movement on its surface without sharp edges or turns, so that the whole life becomes a mokṣāic-life as in a cone. The first step towards this cone-formation will be to ensure that the pair of dharma and mokṣa exists on opposite sides and so do artha and kāma. This would at once make dharma and mokṣa guard each of artha and kāma and thus show an individual the permissible artha and kāma, so that he can pursue only those that are so permitted. If an individual constructs a pyramid for each instance of his projected goal-achievement in the above manner then the matter would become ideal in different respects including the bliss at the apex and the permissibility of actions to attain the goal in a society without conflict etc. Thus, to create such an individual pairs of desire and action in every individual's life-pyramid would be a proper step in the direction to eliminate opposition and conflict in the society.

Dharma: The Social Contract Begins: Sāmānya and Viśeṣa-Dharmas,⁶ and Dharma

Let us take the latter, *puruṣa's arthas* as in generic pyramid for our analysis. In a manner of speaking, anything that a human being consciously does must serve him well that is, the alleged action must beget him something he has desired for as a goal. In getting him the goal, of course, the action has also to bring bliss for him along with the goal.⁷ Only then, it seems, the goal or the object desired for can fall under the *puruṣārthas*. Alternatively, no one would perform an act without the promise of happiness whether here or hereafter. However, strictly speaking, a mere single individual's desiring for an 'object' of the above sort cannot make it a *puruṣārtha*. Rather, such an *artha*- an individual *puruṣa's artha* (object, or goal in general)—must also be capable of generalization to each individual in any society. It should be not only desirable but also should be actually desired for⁸ in the society as the same is indispensable⁹ for the *puruṣa's comprehensive and optimal well-being* within or outside the in order for it to be called as a *puruṣārtha* of *trivarga* sort or *mokṣa*. The fact that sometimes *dharma* or *artha* may not be actually desired for does not falsify our claim because of the 'longing for the optimality of bliss in *trivarga*', which logically necessarily involves the 'comprehensive well-being', hence even *dharma* and *artha* are indispensable. Thus, it is because of this intimate relation of *dharma* with the 'optimization of bliss' through societal comprehensive well-being (in which the *puruṣa's well-being* is embedded), the *dharma* has to be pursued as an independent *puruṣārtha*. Due to this fact, it could be said that they too are actually longed for, but only sub-consciously. Thus, the logical meaning of *puruṣārtha* at its most generic sense would be that there is a set of generally distinct classes of goals, each of which is consciously desirable/desired-for/indispensable for all normal human beings in (including an 'outside' of) any society for the comprehensive well-being of the individual in it with optimum happiness. There is a logically binding relation between the *puruṣārthas*, and we shall elaborate the same in the course of our discussion. Action is involved in attaining any specific object of the *puruṣārthas*. Such an action is an instrument or *sādhana*, whereas striving for the attainment of a *puruṣārtha* is *puruṣārtha-sādhanā*, and the striving could be successful or unsuccessful. However, the two connotations of action as 'instrument', and as 'striving' are coalesced here, and we shall take it as such. Now, let us look at the society as a lay-but-rational man does as it was in the initial stages of its formation. If we presume the above idea of *puruṣārtha*, we could think of stolen money (*artha*- anything that helps sustain and nourish one's being; wealth; cattle etc. were wealth in the beginning) as a *puruṣārtha*. This is because money in itself is indeed desirable/desired for, or even indispensable,

and apparently, it satisfies all conditions that go with anything in order for it to call as a puruṣārtha. Then there is a problem with it. It does not satisfy dharma. What is this dharma- the duty-, one of the supposed puruṣārthas? Why artha (money) in order that it (money) becomes a puruṣārtha, should satisfy the dharma at all? What does it mean to say, "satisfy' dharma"? It seems to be a fact that not all members- in fact nobody- in the society would accept such stolen-money as desirable. If nobody calls 'stolen-money' desirable or even that stealing money is undesirable then why did the thief desire to steal money? Since a thief did/would desire to steal, logically one cannot say that all members in a society really endorse the idea of non-stealing as a virtue. (Or, shall we hold that it is possible for a thief to steal even while holding that stealing is bad? Yet, shall we say the thief does not properly form a part of the society, and he should be expelled-sort? One could find the seeds of ex-communication or bahiṣkāra or out-casting here in order to protect the society, and to create deterrence simultaneously, if possible.) Thief's existence being a contingent fact the former universal proposition remains challenged always. So one could ask a fresh question: How many of the members of the society have to agree in order that stealing is acceptable or otherwise, so that it can be decided this way or the other way- hence a puruṣārtha or not- once, and for all? But even here there cannot be a fixed criterion to decide the goodness or badness of stealing money, since any number would be the result of an arbitrary decision, including the number 100%, since this 100% is a time-bound number; so also thief's existence—no one can be 100% sure of thief's non-existence at all times, either. Sometimes a majority may decide a thing, which may be not good for the society. So, finally, we shall ask a logical question: Is there anything in 'stealing' that makes it inherently repulsive to the society, such that the term 'all' referring to human-beings becomes an unrestricted universal, transcending all time and space to refer to all human-beings? Although money, considered in-itself, is surely a desirable object (artha) and apparently contains nothing repulsive about it, nevertheless it ceases to be so the moment one obtains it through stealing. This means that repulsiveness resides not with the money per se but with the way (means), one obtains it (money). Therefore, the undesirability of the 'way' of earning it makes the 'money' undesirable. Then, by virtue of such money's association with a supposed undesirable means (stealing), such money is not acceptable as a puruṣārtha. With respect to money (artha) as a true puruṣārtha, then, one has to ensure the avoidance of all forbidden means, including stealing. 'Stealing' is one of the generally forbidden means as opposed to particularly forbidden means such as cheating by a trader. Since all agree that we should ensure the performance of 'not-stealing', the 'non-stealing' becomes a dharma. We have not yet addressed the question about the inherent repulsiveness of 'stealing', which, if answered effectively, would tell us why all

ought to accept it (stealing) as repulsive, and hence not to be performed. In short, why should 'stealing' be repulsive, consequently why everyone should agree on the non-performance of stealing? Let us, for the moment, assume that all agree that stealing is not a correct way to beget artha. At this stage then the dharma of 'not-stealing' acts mainly as a constrictor. It restrains. It restrains all from doing a specific act. It is an injunction (prohibition of stealing). If the thief argues contrary to this that it is his dharma to steal, then naturally the Rājā would argue that it is his dharma to catch and punish him. Thus, coradharna (thief's dharma) and Rājadharna (RD) (king's dharma) would stand in an antithetic relation: both cannot stand on the same plane simultaneously. Either one has to be negated. Then, we cannot negate Rājadharna. For, negating Rājadharna is equivalent to negating the society. Now, what is this new thing called 'rājadharna' in addition to the initial dharma of 'not-stealing'? Whatever it is, one thing is certain about them- they- these two dharmas- belong to two distinct categories. Let us assign the categories to them; the first one belongs to *sāmānya dharmas*, and the latter belongs to *viśeṣa-dharmas*. Yet the initial question of 'inherent repulsiveness of stealing' remains. We have to understand 'not-stealing' as *sāmānyadharna*. 'Negation of an SD' is not- and cannot subsume under any type of dharma, so negating an SD will be *adharna* of the highest order. Add to this, we have to explain the rationale for *viśeṣa-dharmas*. We, in speaking of the antithetic nature above, have alluded to the possibility of negating of the society as a whole if we negate *rājadharna*. Now this idea of society is crucial to the discussion that follows.

The First Term of the Social Contract and Society

There is this society, which is what enables the man to satisfy his desires of artha and kāma. If there is complete co-operation among all to arrive at a collective optimum happiness through fair means of dharma, then there has to be, of necessity, optimum bliss for each individual within the said society. Both desires of artha and kāma logically involve at least one 'other' individual for their satiation.¹⁰ In fact, the very origination of an individual presupposes at least two more entities viz., two parents. This leads us to postulate at least three persons- a family. Such a unitary threesome family in multiples would create a society, which is like a parent. It is the source of an individual's existence and sustenance. Moreover, it creates, sustains, and nourishes him. Without such a society, man in general can never hope to optimize his bliss, and minimize his suffering. Without such a society, there would be the rule of jungle. Such a society has to be accorded a primary consideration over an individual; what causes harm -or has the potentiality to do so -to the society should be necessarily curbed by a higher order of dharma, which takes precedence over the individual and his dharma when in conflict with that of the society's. No one can ask the

question: 'why should the society sustain?' No one can say 'let me have bliss even at the cost of the society' either, because, ultimately this would become a self-negating stance- one would be negating oneself in the process of negating the society, since he is an integral part of the society. Hence, Rājadharmā, being a higher order of dharma aimed at preserving the society, would take precedence over coradharmā, if at all there were a thing called coradharmā (here 'dharma' of the thief at best could mean the thief's 'psychological disposition'. In addition, since I think that coradharmā has no real existence the 'conflict' alluded to also cannot be a real conflict.) When this is so, if someone still indulges in thievery, then, the net result of violating the initial dharma that says 'do-not-steal', would be bliss (initially) + sorrow where sorrow may in all likelihood exceed bliss. Bliss may be had by having (stolen) money. However, sorrow will follow. It will follow by the effective use of Rājādanda. While 'not-stealing' constitutes a negative action, a Rājā's dharma to catch and punish the thief would constitute a positive action. 'Catch the thief and punish him' is therefore a dharma of a Rājā, the King alone. It is not universal. It is a viśeṣadharmā. By doing this act in accordance with the Rājadharmā, the King is entitled for the bliss of a king. There is no time—and cannot be a time- the society can give assent to the coradharmā as a dharma, because of its self-negating nature. If so, stealing cannot become a dharma of/for anybody including the thief. However, the question is when did people come together and accept dharma of 'not stealing'? Moreover, how many such dharmas the people have accepted? To make sense out of the answer, that we provide below, we must first keep in mind, that the whole argumentation is a conceptual construct and not a historical explanation. Dharma, which is born out of the first contract that the individuals entered upon, is a 'reason for doing or not doing certain fundamental action(s) such that the purpose for which initially people came together does not get defeated. In other words, no one should perform any action if the said action is self-negating via society. [Examples: Not-killing; non-stealing etc.]¹¹ I should not hit myself and meet with disaster voluntarily. One may question this and hold that masochism can have a valid place; but let me not get into it since it involves an inexplicit 'inside view'. In other words, the reason for not-doing/doing¹² an action being the sustenance of society along with one's own well-being, performing the required action, for e.g., 'not-stealing', becomes the dharma of all persons. One should /ought to honor this 'reason' by performing the required 'action', the dharma. In fact, the dharma is the first contract. One could hold that the dharma exists prior to the human society or that the human society and dharma are co-terminus and co-extensive. Alternatively, one could hold that if there were no pre-existent dharma, people would not have come together in the first place. In any case the human society will have a status of primordial entity. The primordial dharma-

whatever it may mean- is still more fundamental than the SD. The tradition has conceived more than one such action—dharma. These actions, individually and severally, constitute one whole term of social contract for sustaining the 'society-with-oneself-in-it'. These basic actions or dharmas, whose observance is called for, are *sāmānya-dharma(s)* [SD(s)], basic, because without them no one could conceive of a society; because society is a systematic and organic unity. What creates this cohesive unity is the observance of SDs. By virtue of the initial contract, everyone (both who entered into contract and those who are born after it, if historical idea makes sense at all!) ought to follow for the reason of sustaining the society. Violation of any SD is the negation of the basic purpose for which all have come together, that is violation is nothing but an action that negates and defeats the goal of the collective will. A well-performed Dharma (the SD) alone sustains the society.¹³ No one, therefore, being inside society, or being born into society, has any right to do those acts that destroy/hurt the society, not merely as an object, but as subject itself, since he is a part of it. Moreover, being 'outside' (of society) mainly in the *mokṣa*-sense, one cannot negate society. Social destruction is possible only by elements that are within the society, and no one can destroy the society from being outside of it. Thus, the SD is the first term of the social contract. 'Not stealing' is an SD, and is 'sāmānya' (universal) in the sense that it is common to all human beings in any society including a community that wants to destroy another community. Violation of such an SD would bring sorrow to at least two individuals- the violator and the affected individual- and may lead to sorrow of many more or eventually to all in the society. Therefore, all members of a society should always shun violating an SD. Moreover, when any violation goes uncurbed the potentiality of the destruction of the society increases manifold. More importantly, violation of an SD is equivalent to the destruction- or potential destruction- of the very foundation upon which the present undesirable action seeks to stand since the violator and his action are both seeking to stand 'within' the purview of the SD. The violator and/or his action is/are like a *cuscuta*—the parasitic plant that kills the host plant and in the process kills itself, for without the host it cannot survive. So if something- some action such as violation of an SD- does not or cannot serve any individualized *puruṣa*¹⁴ well including the violator, in this sense of part-whole relation (or whole-to-whole relation, when the individual completely identifies himself with the society), then it cannot be called as a *puruṣārtha*-oriented action. Consequently, 'not pursuing' such a banished object becomes an SD for all. [Pursuing all SDs is itself an SD¹⁵] Non-stealing is such an (first layer) SD. Alternatively, pursuing an object that is not banished by SD becomes a *puruṣārtha*-oriented action, and thus, thus only, the objects of such action whose pursuance is not banished becomes a *puruṣārtha*. The SDs as first term of the social contract recognize in the main- as we have

implied, a plurality of selves in the Society. One can understand such a society as a collection of numerically distinct units or as a homogeneous unity. We can understand the Puruṣa Sūkta's 'Puruṣa'¹⁶ as this latter unity. We find both these understandings of the society frequently.

Dharma, the Limiter and the Facilitator

A society where only SDs have just come into force can be said to be still in its infancy in terms of the perception of theoretical possibilities concerning human action. However, SDs are the foundations of the society and they sustain it as they are essential for performance of any social action. The infant society certainly recognizes an individual as a member in a group, of course, without the required identity or identifying marks. Such a society can be equated with the Puruṣa of the Puruṣa-sūkta, where the Puruṣa is attributed with the features that are true of a society. The society at the infant stage is an enormous huge undifferentiated entity. The units of the society are still in an un-manifest condition. This non-differentiatedness of the society is incapable of taking care of any possible violation of SDs. Such a society eventually has to grow into recognizing the possibility of the violation of SDs as the possibility of violation of SDs is real. This is a realization on the part of the society that a mere fact of accepting SDs as contract does not -and can not- guarantee their non-violation. Therefore, one has to do something that will put a check on the possible/actual violation of SDs. The "Society-Puruṣa"- the giver of all happiness- ought not to be put into extinction, or subjected to any harmful effects that has a potential to destroy, because all human actions in a society presuppose the society in an analogical relation of a mother and the child. Now one may raise some questions: How does the violation of an SD bring about sorrow to the violator? In addition, how does the society propose to check actual/possible violations of SDs? The affected party's sorrow is of course understandable. However, how does a violator meet with disaster if he violates SDs? If there is a violation of an SD then there is/should-be—an antidote in the form of specific dharma called viśeṣadharmā to curb such violation.¹⁷ Rājadharmā, which is one of the viśeṣadharmās, is an antidote.¹⁸ The society has conceived and devised the viśeṣadharmā to counter the actual/possible violation of SDs. This viśeṣadharmā 'puts down' the errant puruṣa in the larger interest of the collectivity- the Society- since an unbridled violation of SD(s) has the potentiality to lead to the destruction of the society as a whole. Question of violation of an SD, and the consequent antidote action forms a logical extension of the initial term of Social contract, the SD itself. Thus, the effective administration of this antidote to the violator would ensure punishment, and a punishment will always impart sorrow to the violator, the guilty. Thus the dharma (SDs and corresponding RD), which has emerged out of 'plurality of selves' (the Society) is both a (primitive) facilitator and a limiter

of the individual's actions pertaining to artha and kāma. Facilitating and limiting the individual's actions are the two fundamental self-imposed functions of the dharma of infant-society that issue from the first term of the social contract. Facilitation in this context of trivarga is the facilitation of artha and kāma. In addition, limitation refers to the limiting of the individual's actions in that very domain of artha and kāma, so as to enable a comprehensive facilitation by prescribing dos and don'ts to each and every individual member of the society. Initially, the SD was to perform both these functions of facilitation and limitation. Soon, it was realized that the SDs in themselves would not—neither individually nor collectively- perform both these functions, unless a concrete moral-consciousness is built into the individual consciousness. While the SD-state of society could be a happy state, it does not explain the growth or decadence of society, where elaborate general principles of action are evolved. From this viewpoint, the SDs have merely provided a 'platform' for the society to stand. Of course, just one small initial step of erecting viśeṣadharmas (VDs) has taken place. The VD here is only with respect to the violation of SD(s). Therefore, the VDs of 'punishment' by a Rājā are a logical extension of the SDs. To that extent then the society can be said to have done its bit. It has- by way of creating SDs and VDs- created a platform for standing and has created a devise to push those people out of the platform who stomp or rock the platform or to bring them back on the right track. Here the term 'right track' has the limited connotation of 'adherence to SDs'. In this sense- a not so positive one, of course, the Society has emerged, which is neither a full-fledged facilitator nor a full-fledged limiter, yet. Moreover, the idea of 'limiter' or 'constrictor', and 'facilitator' merely refer to VDs of violations and SDs respectively. With a too generalized VDs, such as 'if there is a violation of an SD, then X- penal action would follow, which will be executed by an agent A', can the society hope to implement the same in the absence of concrete/definite individual? In short, the question is, 'punishing whom?' To answer this, one must have the conception of the violator as a DI, and also the conception of a range of 'wrong actions' ordered in ascending or descending manner. Thus, the proposed penal action has to take into account a 'definite' individual, and his 'wrong action' that attracts penal action. There also has to be a specified 'agent' of the society to execute it. In this way, the general VD of punishing the violator of an SD grows in to VDs that are more specific. The interesting thing is that growth of general VDs also supports a positive facilitation (of artha and kāma). From a logical perspective, one could start from the general VDs (i.e. VD issuing from violation of an SD minus idea of action and DI) and develop in to specific VDs for facilitation, or vice versa. In either case, one will notice that almost every 'facilitation-VD' will have one or more limiting-VD(s) specified, and vice versa. And in this way the sphere of dharmas keeps growing. To continue in this

direction, therefore, we shall now ask, what other dharmas, then, the society will devise. And, how? And, what specific logical rationale the society would provide to what it does for facilitation and limitation apart from those very functions? As we have seen, in itself the SDs cannot move an inch further. The SDs cannot perform the function of limiting/restricting the individual's actions or facilitating the attainment of puruṣārthas in a positive manner. All that the SD says is (one or more) proposition(s) of the form 'Do not do.....'. So, what will happen, if someone actually violates one or more SD(s)? Can SD initiate action against a violator meaningfully? In addition, what action does it propose against the violator? How does (one or more) SD ensure the positive attainment of the artha and kāma, if it can so ensure at all? All that the SD vaguely ensures us so far with regard to artha and kāma is: "Let us not break the SD(s) because breaking the SD would eventually lead to negating the very objective for which the humans have come together, for, otherwise there would be disintegration of our comity". True. Nothing that is born out of something should be able to destroy that something who is the parent. The 'plurality of selves'—'the society' in a way is both a source and a product of the contract, the dharma. Since violation of an SD is a step in that direction of destruction, we have to firmly deal with an actual case of violation of an SD. Further, how do we conceive greater facilitation of artha and kāma, and its entailing limitation than what we find in a mere SD-state? The SD-state of the society presupposes a conglomerate of SD-abiding citizens. But, time falsifies such an ontological presupposition. In the SD-state of society, it is conceived that everyone would follow all the SDs without exception, and go for satisfying their artha and kāma without conflict. One visualizes this process of facilitation of artha and kama in a vague manner in the SD-state of society. The SD, in fact, already incorporates into it an 'ought'. Yet there is only a subdued tone for it, not because there is anything intrinsically anomalous within the 'ought'. Rather the low tone is because there are yet no ways devised to tackle violations. It is an 'external' weakness of the 'ought' at SD. To call it 'external' is to admit both the possible violation of an 'ought', and the absence of ways and means to punish the violator in order to bring the guilty into right track of an 'ought', mainly. Imparting sorrow through punishment is only a secondary goal. So then, the SD acts as only the first term of the 'social contract' at this stage, the basis of which is an unconditional mutual trust. This stage of SD makes use of a pick-and-choose principle almost in all its dealings in the society without explicit general principles of action with respect to differentiating individuals. One could implement this type of principle of pick-n-choose only when the group is really small and manageable. That is when the SDs are strictly followed, and when mutual compromise is possible during a conflict-situation. Rebuking/eliminating the defiant- the violator of the dharma etc.—could also be resorted

to, without articulating- hence invoking- any VD such as Rājadharmā. Obviously, it will be a way to deal with violations that has no dhārmic sanction. Moral consciousness of the 'ought' of the highest order has yet to emerge. In this way the first term of Social Contract, the SDs, would grow to include VDs that articulate general principles, to become a comprehensive dharma. Such a material growth presupposes the breach of trust or its perception with regard to the SDs. Thus, one could say that rest of the dharmas would be merely footnotes to the SDs. It is a different matter that in the absence of a 'code' (as the same is unarticulated as yet), wielding kingly powers and executing them, would be really not dhārmic, hence illegal or without locus. Under such circumstances, the so-called kingly action has per se no locus standi. However, we cannot call such 'kingly' actions adhārmic either, since there is no dharma (RD) yet. Such 'kingly' actions could be, accordingly, termed as barbaric or pre-societal and uncivilized even if the action may do good to the society in general. In the absence of an articulate Rājadharmā, the thief has a right to question the 'kingly actions' by asking for the source of his authority. The source of authority within the sphere of dharma has to be an articulated/assented law for the reasons of rational agreement through Social Contract. However, the thief's action, on the contrary, would be certainly adhārmic, since it has indeed violated an existing SD of non-stealing. This we have noted already. Any harmful action (even to a single individual (indivisible part of 'I'—the society) that issues from an unspelt dharma is, therefore, pre-societal and barbaric, and hence worse than adharma, even when the same may do well to the society in general. In order to deal with pre-societalistic actions too, in addition to violations of the spelt dharmas, we need to have elaborate viśeṣadharmas. SD is a Dharma. Violation of it is an adharma. At no point of time, dharma can counter the adharma born out of its (said dharma's) own violation/negation. This is because the adharma has already negated the dharma in question. For example, 'speak the truth', which is a dharma, is negated when one speaks falsehood. The dharma of 'speaking the truth' cannot, by no amount of preaching it, can correct the situation of spoken falsehood. To say this is not to point out the temporal passage of time or irreversibility of the phenomemon of speaking falsehood. Rather it points at the logical impossibility to bring about a change in the moral consciousness of the liar by the self-same dharma that has been negated. The locus of adharma cannot be the locus for the dharma of whose negation the adharma is. This means that the moral agents of adharma and dharma, i.e. violator(consciousness) and the Punisher/Teacher(consciousness) respectively, have also to be different. The changing-agent (P/T-consciousness) will always be on a higher pedestal. Therefore, we have to call in a higher order dharma- in this case Rājadharmā (RD)—in order to resolve the issue. Thus, if constriction by an SD, and a subsequent violation of SD entail a higher order dharma, then,

facilitation of realization of the initial purpose of artha and kāma, and prevention of violation also will have some thing higher¹⁹ to facilitate the avowed purpose and prevent violations. Facilitation and prevention may coincide in many cases. Thus, one has to come out from merely imaginary trust, and look at the factual reality. No society can sustain—let alone flourish- on a fanciful trust.²⁰ Now, there can be no doubt that the dharma (SD) at this stage is purely born out of a give-and-take scenario based on biological necessity of kāma and artha.²¹ To say that the trio—dharma, artha, and kāma- is general in its nature is to say that they are non-contextualized. Let us couple artha and kāma, and call it as preyas (instinctual). Let us call the dharma as śreyas (socialized). While preyas are positive goals- in the sense that there are positive and tangible contents for them, there is no such content found in the dharma (SD). In addition, in a way SDs owe their entire existence to preyas, and in a way are entirely dependent on preyas—that is, if all members of a society agree to forgo preyas then the SDs vanish into thin air without any trace/reason to perpetuate. Hence, one may construe the dharma—the SD- as not a positive goal yet. Simply put, all that we have in hand is the vague proposition the “means of attaining preyas is śreyas that is the SD”. Can śreyas (SD) really satisfy me by giving me preyas? Can śreyas itself be a positive goal on par with preyas?

- (i) My not-stealing, and following such other SDs, does not and cannot beget for me what I want, the artha and kāma, in a positive manner, except, if at all, in a vague sense of getting ‘something...(artha/ kāma)...somewhere...sometime...and may or may-not’(Facilitation)
- (ii) Even, one could violate the SDs with impunity. There is no deterrence yet. The ‘ought’ of an SD cannot ensure its complete non-violation. (Limitation)

Alternatively, even if there is this deterrence, the VD of RD, it has no capacity to enforce itself on an individual- the violator, in case there is violation of an SD by him in conformity with dharma because there is no individual yet. The violator is an unknown, abstract entity.

Put simply: there is no strong moral ought yet. We should note that ‘strong moral ought’ is *not* equivalent to or identical with the ‘moral ought of the highest order’. Rather a ‘strong moral ought’ would specify certain conditions of what not to do or what to do, and what would be necessarily (ought) the consequence of a violation with an in-built mechanism to calculate the probability of violation and the consequent quantum of punishment for violation by a specific individual who is a violator or a potential violator. A specific thief (the violator) shall be (‘ought’) caught and dealt with appropriately. There is no escape for the thief- the violator. The thief, therefore, would have to be a DI. In fact, all members have to be DI, because, at this stage, all are potential thieves. So, who is a DI?

Facilitation and Limitation Require DI

Dharma (SDs), so far, has been only an indirect way to avoiding conflict that could lead to sorrow. SD fancies a strict adherence to actions in accordance with it. Even with strict adherence, can SD really help every individual attain directly the preyas that each one deserves to get? Answer to this seems to be a firm 'no'. This is because the SD has no idea of an individual, and more particularly an individual 'I'. To any SD-society, an individual-'I' is either non-existent or emerges into existence as a 'you' of the lowest order under violation of an SD, because then the society as whole occupies the place of an 'I' of a higher order. Such a societal 'I' commands an individual 'I' into absolute subservience through the power of SD as contract terms without realizing its own limitations of enforcement of penalty. In such a lopsided interaction, the individual 'I' loses his identity. Under such a circumstance, an individual 'I' (as I am an 'I' always) feels that he has nothing to achieve/gain separately by following SD over and above artha and kāma while he pursues them, nor his following the SD ensures him of attaining artha and kāma in a concrete manner to his heart's content. In fact, since there is nothing to gain in a positive manner by following the dharma (SD), one may be completely dispirited to follow SD. It could be rather conceived many a time that by following the SD an individual gets lesser quantum of bliss from the artha and kāma due to the reduced quantities of them mainly, than what it would have been otherwise. Also, there would be no generally acceptable parameters available to decide the case either way, which is, whether an individual has obtained a proper quantum of objects of desire and consequent happiness. Moreover, those who commit adharma (the intelligent adharmis)—that is those who violate SDs- not only do get to have more bliss because of the enhanced quantity of the artha and kāma they obtain, but also do not get caught for their misdemeanors. This would be factually so even if there were no parameters to decide upon the quantum of artha and kāma involved. As we have seen already, even if the VD of RD has come into existence, in order to take care of violations of SDs, it requires concrete individuals for its enforcement. Therefore, we must cull out concrete or Definite Individual (DI) from the general abstract totality called 'Society'. Similarly, artha and kāma, being social objects, the society can bestow and an individual can be bestowed upon those objects, which clearly implies the recognition of concrete individual(s) who are giver(s) (society), and taker(s)(individual) of 'objects' of desire- the puruṣārthas of artha and kāma. It is in this context, we have to assign landmarks to the individuals so that a VD of RD upon violation of an SD can be enforced, or artha and kāma can be effectively and positively facilitated, and limitation-dharmas ensuing from both SDs, and artha-and-kāma-dharmas can be implemented. Prior to such assignment of landmarks to the individuals, the puruṣa is yet an abstract entity in the society. He does not

have an individual identity. He is everyone and no one; though, of course, an individual is an 'I' unto himself always, he is not a concrete 'you' to the rest of the individuals. He would be treated as a lower order 'you' only if he violates an SD. Lower 'you' is a subjective notion reflective of the enormous king-size Ego-I of the society. But in a developed society there is no room for such an ego of the society. The rest of the members of the society collectively should be able to identify the individual as a 'you' in a manner that is not negative in its connotation. Therefore, an individual 'I' has to be identified as 'so-and-so with such-and-such profession,' etc. Only then, the establishment of an individual's identity in an objective manner takes place. In other words, the *puruṣārthas*²² prior to such recognition are merely general, as they are non-contextualized²³ to an individual- a definite/concrete human. At that stage, it would be more apt to call the *artha* and *kāma* as *samājārthas* (goals or objects before the society) rather than *puruṣārthas*. There, at the most, one could say by SD, 'X ought not or ought to do Y for attaining Z'. Neither one could meaningfully substitute the subject-variable 'X', nor the object-variable (of action) 'Z' at such a stage of the *puruṣārthas*, with concrete entities. Action-variable Y alone is supreme with a collective-substitution possible for it at the SD stage. However, Y is a collective action variable of negative sort at this stage. Hence, without an individual subject/agent such an action variable remains eternally unsubstantiated. Just as violation requires individuals, practice of non-stealing requires individuals. While detection of violation requires DI, practice of SD does not require DI. Perhaps even *artha* and *kāma* as 'objects' of desire may not have been clearly distinguishable mutually at this stage of SD.

* Under such circumstances, if someone says that *kāma* or sexual gratification is worthy of (an individual) human pursuit makes little sense, even though everyone would agree that they are generally the objects of desire. No one knows the ways and means of such pursuance without hurting the society, because no one knows what actions in pursuance of *artha* and *kāma* hurt/ do not hurt others. Therefore, if pressed, it may mean that everyone should pursue them, or it may mean the other way round as well, i.e., no one should pursue them. Both are equally valid or invalid. No compartmentalization can be there by the term 'some' by saying "(DI) {Shri/Smt/Kum..... (Surname)} ought to (ought not to) pursue sex", since the term 'some' presupposes the very landmarks of the DI that we have stated above. Then, since *artha* and *kāma* are physical needs common to all, there has to be some way out of this situation. The 'society' must devise a way- without stopping at SD, or its *viśeṣadharmas*- that will facilitate and constrain all members of the society so that everyone will obtain only *dharma*-facilitated and *dharma*-constrained *artha* and *kāma* without cutting short the optimal bliss one is capable of achieving under his physical and emotional circumstances vis-à-vis his societal surroundings.

Radical Change in Dharma

Surely, then the stage is set for a 'strong moral ought'. As agreed, (any) prescription would make sense only when it is specified as to Who is that to whom the prescription is made, and what prescription is made (that is the 'How' of action), and regarding What object (puruṣa + artha), and the consequence of non-compliance (violation) with the prescription. The concrete context may be called as WHW/V. A 'moral ought' becomes 'strong' when an exhaustive list of conditions of action is furnished. The 'who' can be specified at two levels, i.e., one at the level of segment/group a Definite Individual as a member of a segment (DI), and two, at the last stage, the complete Definite Identity of Particularity (DIP). However, both these levels are within the societal domain. The term 'who'- when specified- will give us both the probability of violation, and the appropriate quantum of punishment to be awarded in case of violation. It would also give us the facilitating marks of the DI for the realization of the purpose of puruṣārthas with respect, and in relation to the type of the object of prescription, and the prescription of action to realize the same. Thus, specification of the individual, particular object, and the prescription of the way ('ought' and/or 'ought not', as the case may be) would fall within the realm of application. An application of a moral-prescription always presupposes a concrete context, and hence it logically entails the identified agent, the identified act, and the identified object. Violation is extraneous to the context. However, to say that SD does/may not need such an identity of DI is not to say that its application in violation does not require it. Rather it is to hold that as long as no violation of SD takes place, there is no need of DI. Then an application of dharma- SD or any dharma- SD for that matter- presupposes the possibility of '(right) performance' and 'absence of performance' and 'wrong performance'. In the case of SD, 'absence and wrong performance' merge. Application is practical in its essence. Although a concrete individual need not be identified as the doer of non-stealing, a concrete individual (DI) is definitely required as a doer of stealing, a forbidden action. Further, for a particular individual's offence of stealing, neither some one else can be held responsible nor can one hold the entire society responsible, just as a small bodily wound will be treated as such without applying medicine at a healthy place or without exterminating the whole body. Thus, the implementation of the VD of RD in case of violations requires a DI. However, before RD is evolved in its entirety, an education in facilitation is essential, since the 'conditions of action' have to be supplied to the agent. Therefore, facilitation of preyas also implies concrete individuals or DIs.²⁴ In this way both violation/limitation, and facilitation point at the necessity of DI. Now we shall get down to the task of sketching the individual's identity (along with the object and the way of obtaining it). To be conscious of the assigned space and time in which one finds himself—and thereby others'

(by comparison/contrast) -in the pursuit of identified puruṣārthas marks the beginning of contextualized puruṣārthas. Contextualization involves identification of the individual (puruṣa) [who], the puruṣārtha-object [what], and the social-way, the dharma [how]. Specification of the consequence of non-compliance almost exhausts the list of conditions of action.

Contextualized Puruṣārthas: 'Life-stage' (āśrama) and 'Social-space' (varṇa)²⁵ and DI-Criterion

We shall skip over the 'what' aspect, since what-aspect has not raised much dust mainly with respect to artha and kāma, as also the same is available in the relevant treatises such as Kāmasūtras and Arthaśāstras, (or Dharmaśāstras) even though they, or some part of them, may be construed as 'inside' views.²⁶ Further, the specific objects of what-aspect, excepting certain essential ones, mostly, are time-dependant. Thus, what was wealth in its specific instantiation in the ancient times being cattle etc. no more constitute wealth in a general sense as of today. Even then, it would be certainly interesting to look for the underlying governing principles of the way ancients adopted to optimize the bliss from trivarga in a society with the then adopted 'objects'. Nevertheless, the enquiry in that direction would be a digression for us as the same has historical dimensions. Then, we shall deal with the 'Who', the puruṣa and the social-way of actions, the dharma 'How'. Since both violation of SD (limitation function) on the one hand, and positive facilitation of artha and kāma and its entailing limitation function on the other, require Definite Individuals (DIs)—we have to devise a way to describe a Definite Individual.

Such a description would amount to the identification of a substance to its prescribed duty, the social reality. If so, the dharma (duty) of a Brāhmaṇa would be the same as a dharma (guṇa, property, attribute) of a Brāhmaṇa, the Substance, where Brāhmaṇa becomes a DI by virtue of the description. The description of any DI resolves itself into the description of the substance-attribute in this way. Strictly speaking, every case of partial or whole non-correspondence between a substance-attribute (guṇa), and the prescribed duty (or 'How of actions') would be an inaccurate description of a DI. However, what is a 'substance' here? Is there a substance apart from the guṇa at all? Within the realm of trivarga, when the duty is to be identified as an attribute or guṇa of an individual, the duty or guṇa would occupy the entire space of the substance. The DI, in the realm of trivarga, would be simply a totality of 'duties' identified as his guṇas. Such a totality itself would be the 'sociological substance'. The sociological substance that a DI is, one may construe as ontologically real; but it would lead to a permanent bondage to the society, since a DI is identical to his duties as his guṇas. If it was so, then there would no 'mokṣa' in the sense of 'going out of trivarga' that is liberation from

the bondage caused in this way by trivarga. This is because dharma/duty has to perpetuate in a society, and since dharma (guṇa) is identified as the substance, and the substance is an individual, the individual is perennially tied to trivarga. Dharma (guṇa) would bind a person finally into trivarga as there would be an inseparable identity between, for example, the Brāhmaṇa-dharma (duty-action) with that of the brāhmaṇa-guṇa (property), and the substance 'Brāhmaṇa'. Is there an ontological substance apart from the fancied sociological one? Why should I be tied to the society in the way mentioned above at all? On the one hand we have to make an 'ought' a compulsory item to protect the society, and on the other, we have to enable liberation for a DI from the bondage of trivarga. The major challenge is: whether we have to identify the sociological substance with a possible ontological substance. Obviously, mokṣaśāstra works would have this challenge before them as the logical focus. The Advaita, for example, would consider the sociological DI as not ontologically real. However, some others, like the Dvaitins, would consider sociological DI as ontologically real-not necessarily in the sense of the actual sociological practice, but as ordained by the God in his creation. Thus, in their scheme our actual identification of a Brāhmaṇa, or other DIs for that matter, might in fact be wrong individually or even segmentally.²⁷ The strategy of liberation in Advaita is by the very ontology all are free; and in Dvaitic strategy, all would have to hanker after becoming 'Brahminical' to attain liberation. Hence, the possibility of liberation exists for all, in the sense that each one has to strive and identify himself as a brāhmaṇa, irrespective of social-substancehood of the same in the Dvaita. However, within the trivarga, the DI description as 'collectivity of duties' is sociologically real even though there is no separate sociological substance apart from the 'duties' identified as guṇas or attributes. All true mokṣaśāstra works (schools) strive to provide for liberation from the bondage from trivarga without forbidding trivarga and its dhārmic actions. (See I.vii.2 below) But to do that these works will have to construct a bridge between the ontological substance of their conception and the DI of the society. If this is done successfully then it would also remove the absurdity of holding 'collectivity of attributes' as the sociological substance. Now to come back: the dharma (collectivity of duty-actions) is identified as the substance- 'social space'. From a sociological point of view, such an identity is most welcome. However, it is because the individual's craving for breaking the bondage created by trivarga the 'identity' is not a happy thing.²⁸ Generally, breaking the bondage could take place if the dharma (guṇa), which is a sociologically real substance, is not an ontological reality. However, if this difference in DI-substance and ontological-substance is made known to people they would surely show laxity in discharging social functions, since they would think that they are not real DI-substance, hence there is no need to perform the functions a DI is expected to, sociologically.

The Dvaita, in this sense has been the most satisfactory philosophy in ensuring/reconciling both trivarga and liberation. The only undesirable effect it seems to have is the possible wrong identification of DIs socially. That is the superiority attributed to the DI-category of Brāhmaṇa for the purpose of liberation may lead inappropriate social identification of a Brāhmaṇa -DI. In other words, a person may be construed as a Brāhmaṇa even when he has really not identified completely with the Brāhmaṇa-dharmas, and yet could claim that he is a real ontological Brāhmaṇa substance.

In fact, the debate pertaining to the reality of sociological substance (DI) and ontological substance (Mokṣa substance, Individual= MI) as ontologically real or not is intrinsic to the mokṣasāstra rather than to sociology. Within trivarga-general description, the DI description has been taken to be real sociologically. Sometimes, the 'sociological' nature of the substance is taken as reflective of ontological reality, as in caste. In any case, within the 'outside' view of puruṣārthas we may uphold the trivarga's need of description and classification of DIs. While the general description of puruṣārthas through trivarga makes it mandatory to conceive the sociological DI as an ontological reality in order to ensure the 'ought' of SDs and VDs in the society, the addition of mokṣasāstra and the consequent interplay between this sociological general description of DI and the MI is the real gateway to understand Indian Sociology.²⁹ Thus, it will be seen a little later that DI is really a middle-order description as it characterizes members of a segment/group within a society. Such a characterization in no way mars the possibility of concrete-individual's freedom to ask for liberation from trivarga. While sociology needs to conceive real social categories and cannot afford to work with unreal categories, it cannot blindly internalize the categories of social substance (DI) presented to it by trivarga, whether as given by and in mokṣasāstras or elsewhere. Therefore, sociology has to take into account the actual practice in the society. The actual practice given in any region may depend upon factors pertaining to the relation between DI and MI and which are given through mokṣasāstras.

DI and MI Reconciliation

How/why, did the problem of reconciling between social DI-substance and MI-substance arise at all? To understand this point we will have to look into the problem of 'ought' and the problem of liberation from bondage caused by trivarga. An 'ought' with respect to SDs or VDs is an essential component for the sustenance of society. However, this 'ought' when wholly implemented leads to the actualization of an ideal state. This means that 'ought' is itself an ideal. However, an 'ought' surely curtails the freedom of an individual. This is because the 'ought' is societal in its origin, though the same may percolate down to individuals as collectivity. Since 'dharmas' or attributes can not be

conceived to hang in the air without a substance, the conception of substance becomes logically necessary. Then there could be only two alternatives with respect to such a substance viz., either the substance is different from the society and stands outside of it; or that it is a part of the society and the man can never shake off its shackles as he himself is that substance. In the former, man, being essentially different from the society, 'ought' would become extraneous to him. Or, the other alternative is to accept that man is essentially one with the society, and hence 'ought' is intrinsic to him. The former, if accepted, would eventually take one to the negation of trivarga, and the latter would result in a permanent bondage to trivarga. To say that man is essentially different from the society is not necessarily to commit ourselves to an ontological substance or its absence (Advaita and Buddhism, respectively). In this case, the individual and the society (trivarga), therefore, will always stand in a non-relation. On the other hand, the 'ought' of the SDs and VDs seek to posit an ontologically real substance within the society in a bid to implement themselves thoroughly well within the society. However, this leads to the problem of permanent bondage to trivarga. In this way, the reconciliation between DI and MI becomes necessary.

'Ought': Legal and Moral:

One has to carry out the Dharma, the duty, necessarily, irrespective of the ontological status of individual's substancehood as being outside society or within society. 'Ought' issuing from SDs to VDs would be the life-blood of the trivarga. A pure 'legalistic ought' could come into picture only after the violations take place, or at any rate, not before sufficient causes come into being to apprehend the possibility of violations. This VD of RD, therefore, cannot ensure prevention of violations. Prevention can occur only with an education in 'moral ought of the highest order', and seems to be a sort of Categorical Imperative. However, a 'moral ought' will/need not be complied with easily. Why should anyone comply with a 'moral ought', if the same can be tactfully circumvented? Societal necessity is not my necessity. Then, the proponents have to devise methods other than legal ought to intellectually thrust upon the idea of 'moral ought' on me, an individual, DIP. The dharma (SD mainly)- the initial Categorical Imperative, we shall call this as 'action-as-an-end-in-itself', cannot be forgone at all, because it is upon this that the whole society is built. However, by merely speaking of categorical imperative as a 'moral ought', one cannot ensure the performance of the desired actions by the DIs. For the reason of thrusting the dharma on the DIs, in the outside view, the action for its own sake—the Categorical Imperative (CI)—was conceived. This action-for-its-own-sake was supposed to be construed as 'individualistic' rather than societal. However, it can be easily seen that this is actually a case of equivocation.

Question: Why should (ought) I do x-action? **Answer:** I should (ought) do x-action, for-its-own-sake. It is here the 'outside' view of puruṣārthas had failed in that it could not provide an answer to the 'why' of action from an individual's point of view apart from the societal answer. Nor did it provide content to the answer given, if any, such as in niṣkāmakarma. This means that the dharma failed in its function, as the 'ought' had no answer from an individual's point of view.³⁰ To satisfy this aspect, some or the other 'inside view' of puruṣārthas had to be expounded. A 'world-view', the viśvadṛṣṭi—the Weltanschauung, had to come forth. Within such a Weltanschauung: there could be some incentives for the performance of the dharma, (as svarga in the Mīmāṃsaka theory). Or that, one could demonstrate the logic of action as necessarily flowing from the Highest without common causality, (Dvaita), or that the trivarga action is ensured via creation of vairāgya through the knowledge or anticipated knowledge of the Highest, since the already commenced action has to fructify etc. (Advaita).

- (i) By making the 'moral ought' transcendental, in the sense that there is a 'consequence' waiting to happen in this, or the other world. Good consequence will accrue for good deed, and bad for bad. This is the psychological incentive. Causality is involved here. (Karma)
- (ii) The Highest is such that all actions follow from It and to It are dedicated. (Bhakti)
- (iii) Knowledge of the Highest will lead to detachment, and the already commenced actions in trivarga will causally fructify. (Jñāna)

Mokṣaśāstra wants to ensure prevention of violation of dharma by an individual with respect to trivarga. Mokṣaśāstra attempts to explain the 'ought' of trivarga by taking him outside of trivarga. Conversion of the 'moral ought' into a 'legal-ought', would be the kingly ways to ensure compliance through deterrence in the society, where the consequence of violation would be punishment, and it would be awarded by the state (King, a by-product of the society). This can happen, as said already, only after the violation takes place. But then education has to precede all else.

Social DI Categorization

Now coming back to our outside view of puruṣārthas, who is the puruṣa who did/did not do, or should or should not do X? Who is the puruṣa who needs Y? These questions pertain to the 'identification' of an individual qua individual in the broad canvass of a society that has just emerged after the SD³¹ being agreed upon for the purpose of facilitating and limiting the individual in the society. Both facilitation and limitation can effectively take place only after such an identification of the individual. It should be clear that the intention of this identification is not to create predisposition or bias about the person with respect to facilitation/violation. However, a question may be raised here: if the

'duties' are to be the attributes of an individual, and if these attributes collectively constitute an individual, then do we fit the 'duties' into the individual or vice versa? This question is surely reminiscent of 'oak and acorn' paradox. If one takes the normal outside view of puruṣārthas into account, one will have look at the matter realistically. Thus, while 'duties' and the corresponding DI categories could be conceived independently, their identification with a given individual will have to be based on two factors of suitability of the individual for the identification with a particular DI category and the individual's own willingness to be so identified. It is also possible to conceive 'duties' and 'DI categories' with an explicit understanding of the individual's nature as well. Thus, one way for creating a DI could be to prepare each individual's profile. But that was not to be, because there are innumerable constraints—large number of individuals, and maintaining records of their almost endless actions, psychological dispositions, etc. and movement of people etc. Moreover such records, even if possible in principle would still require that a logical picture of the individuals belonging to different categories be drawn from them, because there cannot be prescription of particularized actions, as in the case when the wind is blowing 'now, shut the windows'. So, actions (duties) are to be categorized; so also the individuals. Categorization would also help in prescription of punishment and facilitation of artha and kārma. This is the first glimpse of the creation of middle order description of DI of the society. In the final analysis of reward or punishment, the particularized individual as "so and so has done such and such action—and what punishment/reward ought to be awarded to him?" etc. is required. However, that is the final actualization. Now, in the context of a newly emerged society, the best conceptual thing would be to create categories of individuals, and categories of duties simultaneously, by taking into account both the needs of the society and of the individuals. Such a categorization must have complete one-to-one correspondence conceptually. And in to it fit the individuals as per their own freewill and/or available disposition, empirically. This aspect need not bother us here. Psychological dispositions would logically entail accounting for a vertical movement of a single mind (puruṣa) in life-stage along with a possible categorization in social space. In other words, although DI categorization appears to be basically a social-space (varṇa) division, it actually takes into account the temporal aspect or life-stage movements as well. This would impel one to look at the linear progression of life of a single individual as well. Such linear progression should be divisible into life-stages since the psychological disposition of an individual shows marked changes in the form as distinct stages in life. Hence, the psychological dispositions lend themselves to two distinct treatments: socialspace-treatment (space) and lifestage-treatment (time). The former is known as social-space or varṇa, and the latter is life-stage or āśrama. Now, if

the description of DI succeeds in the two dimensions just stated above then we would have achieved two things in terms of 'moral ought' (limiting function) when we apply it to a particular individual. (i) Knowing the probability of the DI's inclination to stick to the relevant dharma, and (ii) Quantum of punishment that is to be awarded in case of violation. All the while the basic guiding force is to reduce the probability of violation to its minimum if not eliminate it. In this, the DI would simultaneously facilitate artha and kāma, because they are individual's needs, which is also the society's need when individuals are conceived of in a collective manner. Presuming that the application of a DI category to an individual is nearly accurate, if not wholly so, knowledge of the individual's category would enable us to know the probability of adherence to/violation of the duties. This is possible because the jobs that he/she is expected to be proficient in because of the pre-known DI-category, acts as a hypothesis, and this hypothesis would be tested against the immediate actual appearance of doings by the individual. Such an empirical test would tell us the probability of adherence to/violation of the duties. The conceptual DI-category are already incorporated with the factors that facilitate artha and kāma. Hence identifying female life-partner(s) and aptitude for certain jobs for earning wealth are already taken into account in the conception of duties, hence in the DI-category itself. When DI-categories and their application to concrete individuals are conceived and implemented meticulously they would lead to zero-conflict situation- both intra-individualistic and socialistic.³² The question 'whether or not this division and differentiation is, causally speaking, a product of satkārya or asatkārya' is an ill-conceived one. This is because it seems to confuse between ideal-type division and the actual application of it to concrete individuals, and brings in some or the other 'inside view' of a mokṣaśāstra into the generic understanding of the puruṣārthas. As such, a conceptual DI-category neither fixes the substantive individual nor fixes the dharma/guṇa for a particular individual. All that the DI-categorization does is it gives out a list of guṇas or duties in a classified manner. Hence, DI-categorization merely enumerates the categories of duties or guṇas as per the requirements of the society and individuals with a balanced view as far as possible. It is up to the concrete particular individuals to pick up the DI-category they want to belong to. No one can create the DI categorization to include distinct category to every individual. One can adduce innumerable reasons for this. But the most prominent is the logical one: if distinct category for every individual, then we do not need categorization at all because we have already a concrete individual in its stead, which is most accurate and incorrigible. In other words, middle-order DI description is a logical necessity emerging from the social togetherness. Hence, the definiteness of the individual that is called for is not the bear particular, although we need a bear social-particular in the final implementation of

facilitation and limitation functions of the dharma. In fact, the prescription of dharma for the purpose of facilitation and limitation, socially speaking, also cannot afford to be bear-particular-prescriptions for each individual. This is because the time-factor relating to all future events bars one from prescribing, as also there could be the charge of bias and so forth. VDs and their prescription, in this way, take the form of category. Just as the SD 'Do not steal' for example, converts itself in to an unrestricted universalized command "No one ought to steal", or vice versa, every non-SD being a VD, has to take the form of a (restricted) universal. The only difference, as noted, is, an SD is an unrestricted universal of the form "All...." or "No one....", and in the VD the form of the proposition would be -"All in the category B ought/ought not to do X", which incorporates the social-space and/or life-stage in the subject-place. So then, the description of definiteness of an individual is confined to his being identifiable in a category. The number of categories actually required will have to be necessarily more than one, or else a VD will lapse into becoming an SD-sort, and society would remain in a primitive state without tools to tackle the violations appropriately, even if there is just one VD of RD, a step ahead of SD. For example, let us assume that there is no social space (*varṇa*) or life-stage (*āśrama*) distinction; and a Rājā has to catch some thieves, and he does. In three different cases of theft, we have three persons: one, a small boy of eight years; two, a pregnant woman, and three; a well-built young-man. Should the Rājā apply his VD of punishing the guilty without consideration to the nature of the accused? In fact, if we watch carefully the above example, we would at once know that we have already categorized the individuals in a particular way, such as 'young children', 'pregnant women', and 'well-built young-men', and of course, the Rājā himself as a category in himself. Just as SDs do not prompt us for creating DI directly, but their violation or possibility of violations does, facilitation of artha and kāma prompts one to take into account varying potentialities of individuals along with their usefulness for the welfare of society in general. Not all violators belong to the same type, nor can the facilitation of artha and kāma can afford to formulate an unrestricted universal category of individuals as in the SD-state of society. Therefore, there has to be DI-categories (duties identified as *gunas* of the individual categories), and VD-categories (duties) for the purpose of facilitation and limitation. Society is uniform when SDs are complied with by all, or at least it is conceived to be so. Society differentiates when violation of SDs takes place. If there were to be no violation of SDs, perhaps there would be no need of VDs even, for facilitation also, since all problems would be resolved in a moment as SDs are fully operative and complied with. Perhaps, happiness also would be optimum both in the society, and individually. Sociology as a science would not have any room in such a state of society, or else there could be at the most what may be called as 'welfare Sociology'.

There cannot be a VD such as 'all persons ought to catch the thief' although there could be a statement, 'all persons ought to help the state to catch a thief'. VD, by its essence, refers to a positive action. Moreover, only an individual of the same type could perform such actions. Life of every individual requires positive action, not merely negative action such as complying with SDs. The decision-criterion for the number of categories of individuals required in a society is in a way the society's need of the approximate number of types of professionals. However, in such a decision-making the more crucial aspect is striking a balance between artha earned by all, and the possibility of attainment of kāma, both without conflict, or at least with minimum conflict. A conflict-situation arises, as for example, when two individuals desire the same object simultaneously. Any attempt to diffuse the conflict will have to effect a change in 'time-factor' or in the 'object-factor'. In the former, two persons can have the same object at different times if logically possible and acceptable to the warring parties. In the latter, in view of insistence on a specific object by both individuals, a compromise term is struck by creating a similar-looking object for one of the two persons. There is a number of ways to resolve the conflict, just as there are a number of ways the same crop up. However, the principle that an Indian Sociologist will have to bear in mind is the ideal conception of 'least-conflict situation' or the 'optimal harmony situation', as far as possible without forgoing optimal bliss. It is by keeping these parameters/principles- logical and practical- in view that our ancient ṛṣis devised the varṇa (social-space) and āśrama (life-stage) dharmas. Once the social-spaces and āśrama stages are conceived the matter became easy for people either to decide by themselves, or to be advised, as to the space to which they should move and belong. Provided are the co-ordinates; it is up to the people who had to march on them and decide a segment where they wanted to be. There is the freedom of choice. To say this is not to say that an identity once chosen will or should remain forever. In fact, such an identity need not remain the same even in one's own lifetime. The term 'hierarchy' in a value-sense, therefore, does not fit into the scheme of varṇa at all.³³ Conceptually, there cannot be an unconditionally advantaged or disadvantaged person or group of persons in an ideal conception of the society. Each person is an integral part of it, and hence equal, in spite of the space they occupy may vary. The equity flows neither from the space nor from the time, but from the conceived outcome of bliss one gets from the performance of duties he has volunteered to perform. Just as one has the freedom to switch varṇas, one must have the option to go out of this contract of trivarga as a whole. One may find the illustration in mokṣa. Generally, mokṣa is to be pursued in sanyāsāśrama. To be able to move out of the social contract is the outside view of mokṣa as a puruṣārtha. This is liberation from bondage to trivarga. Later life-stage of sanyāsāśrama explicitly provides for such a goal. Moving into a

different Religion, of course, signifies yet another type of freedom of movement, when done voluntarily. It signifies a sort of resignation to one type of social contract and joining another type, as the new religion would have its own set of dos and don'ts viz., SDs and VD's. No one can opt out of social contract being within and part of it. So long as one is an integral member, he has to abide by the dos and don'ts of the concerned social contract. This constitutes the 'outside' view of trivarga. The freedom to switch varnas, or switch religions, or to move out of social contract as a whole in pursuit of mokṣa is possible only if there is the recognition of 'substance' distinct from the 'duties' as guṇas that bind the man to a particular trivarga. And there begins the mokṣaśāstra, the 'inside view' of puruṣārthas. Āśrama takes care of the different stations that one crosses in his life while the varṇa takes care of his identity in a category of individuals amongst other categories of individuals in the society. Āśrama would answer the question 'When to do what?' That is, when am I to get a particular puruṣārtha- a preyas; or when am I to opt for exclusive śreyas, if any? "Am I an adhikāri—have I reached the competent personhood for a particular object of preyas? Etc." Varṇa or the social-space based on the principle of guṇakarmavibhāgaśah would address the question: 'Who to do what?'

Freedom of Movement

If the foregoing account of varṇa and āśrama is correct then every puruṣa-concrete individual must have the freedom not only to move from one social-space to another but also from one life-stage to another. The latter movement presumes not the real time but the psychological time. In addition, such freedom must be effective, though not practicable or advisable always. Moving from one life-stage to another means skipping of the āśramas and does not mean skipping over the objective time in one's life. However, since this movement is intended to be unidirectional, skipping over a āśrama without appropriate preparation is not advisable.³⁴ Similarly, every puruṣa has the freedom to choose the social-space (varṇa) to which one would like to belong. Along with it, one was supposed to have the freedom to switch the varṇas as well. Again, this may be neither practicable nor advisable always. In any case, the existence of freedom and also rigidity- at least in the initial stages of society-formation—seems to be undeniable.³⁵ Rigidity follows from the conception of 'duties' as attributes and constitutive of the individual. Freedom to switch varṇas, in the 'outside view' flows from the recognition of flexibility in human constitution, and not due to recognition of any mokṣaic substance. There are the unintended higher/lower, superiority/inferiority ideas of hierarchy in DI-categorization. The superiority or inferiority are extraneous to the ideal division. This extraneous factor has encroached in practice and not in theory.³⁶ Thus, what was conceived as varṇa to avoid or at least to fine-tune the resolution of possible conflicts via skills/

nature/labor-division came to degenerate into jāti. As noted already, if varṇa, which is a DI-categorization with express purpose of facilitation and limitation, comes to be wrongly applied, or that if a substance for DI-category is posited rigidly where none exists, then that marks the beginning of degeneration of DIs into superior and inferior entities. The same may be denoted by the term 'jāti' rather than varṇa. Jāti implies the identification of collectivity of duties as constituting an ontological substance, and then again bring it back to the social arena of trivarga. Thus, 'Brāhmaṇa', which is a DI-category, would be identified as an ontological substance, and then import it as a sociological substance. Once the sociologically garbed DI-category percolates down to the society, the identification of real DI category would be done henceforth through birth rather than merits of such identification. Daya Krishna [1992:288] informs us that jāti, as different from varṇa, has been in existence as far back as Yajurveda times. There is nothing surprising about it. Such a claim or fact, does not prove that varṇa is a division fraught with value hierarchy that is in-built into the theoretical division of it. Jāti, as should be clear to us, is a factual category. That is, it is based not on any conceptual demarcation of duties or guṇas; rather, jāti is based on what one actually does. If some already existing jātis were brought under the varṇas, and if there was confusion in doing so, then what does it prove? To my mind, it only proves that the theoretical enterprise of the leading intellectuals of the time had taken note of the undesirable practice of branding an individual through jāti, and tried to do away with it by supporting their idea of inclusion of them within the theoretical DI-categorization.³⁷ It is up to the Sociologists dealing with classical times to advance a logical account of the prevalent social situation with respect to the relation between such social substances of jāti and the prevalent ontological substances (as in mokṣaśāstra) that were devised for the elimination of inequality and upliftment of them to attain the higher substancehood ontologically. This thesis, seem to hold true so long as we are ready to grant the existence of the SD "No one is high, no one is low" and such other relevant SDs.

March from General Dharma (SD) to Positive, Substantial Dharma

The dharma came to perform a more proactive role in the contextualized puruṣārthas, unlike the previous one where dharma was more of a negative nature. Such a stage would not ensure a conflict-free society since no positive guidelines to achieve the basic objective of artha and kāma were provided, nor were ways to correct the wayward with respect to SDs indicated. The dharma at the SD level therefore had to perform a merely restraining type of a function. If so, surely, the dharma has no ontological goal-hood within it as a puruṣārtha, and consequently one had nothing to gain positively. Obviously, then, men would not choose for an active pursuit of the same, since violating

such a non-ontological dharma—an ontological vacuity- would not entail anything unearthly. At the most, some man-inflicted sorrow might come to the wrongdoer, that too, only if he (the wrongdoer) is sufficiently stupid as to get caught in the act. Or else, he would surely escape the sorrow- even while enjoying the (forbidden) preyas at the cost of others in the society. The outcome would be that the Dharma would cease to be a puruṣārtha in the sense as artha and kāma are. In the next stage of contextualized puruṣārthas, even though DI was described—and dharmas prescribed- nevertheless, there was no way to enforce it except as a 'legal ought', in the sense of inculcating a 'logical necessity' from an individual's point of view to perform the actions that are ordained by the prescribed dharma. In other words, we must have a fundamental 'moral ought of the highest order'.

Autonomous Will as the 'ought' Enforcer: Extended CI in 'outside view'

Now, one could call upon the autonomous will into action as issuing from dharma. This indeed is a 'moral ought' in a positive sense of 'doing' a contentful action, which is unlike the SD-sense of 'doing' or 'not-doing', where no content for action could be found. In other words, all dhārmic/adhārmic actions here would involve some 'fruit' that is transcendental- and not mangiven- as consequence. Hence, there would be 'goalhood' attributed to dharma, which is very much like the goalhood of artha and kāma. Yet, it appears to be a case of mere 'ought to do' (the contentful actions), and seem to have not stood up to the expected level, in the contextualized puruṣārthas. This is because unlike the artha and kāma, where the fruits are immediate and tangible, the fruits of dharma are not available immediately but only in a deferred manner, i.e. transcendently. Let us examine the 'moral ought' in a little more detail in order to search in it for some elements that may lend enduring strength to it. To begin with: a 'moral-ought' (or 'ought-not'; 'vidhi' and 'niṣedha') has important presuppositions, such as for example, 'man is different from machine', since he has freedom of action with respect to actions. He can make a choice from among a host of alternatives of actions. Such a state of affairs presupposes a uniform, unitary, homogeneous consciousness that is capable of searching for an action to be performed by it. In itself, such a consciousness finds the command of 'ought' extraneous to its constitution. At this level, logically speaking, the term 'ought' presupposes a 'second' consciousness—a consciousness that invades the individual's consciousness. A kind of 'opposition' is presented by this second consciousness to the first. Where no opposition occurs between the two, the second gets assimilated into the first, and a moral command of 'ought' is carried out as if it flows from the first consciousness itself. Where opposition occurs, the moral command 'ought' will be certainly defied.³⁸ Defiance would alienate the individual from the accepted trivarga in greater or lesser degrees. If there

was no opposition to do an ought-action, and if one was to do it of his own free-will, then all that would be actually happening was a smooth movement from one 'is-situation' to another 'is-situation'. The former 'is-situation' would be the 'reasons' or 'causes' for the latter. If the agent had no opposition to such an imposition of an 'ought', then it would cease to be an imposition at all for the agent, since he would internalize the 'ought' and convert it into an 'is'. This 'second' consciousness has to be in the form of a 'you'—as addressable in the form of a grammatical second person in order to express the 'opposition' and also the eventual reconciliation. If the opposition were final and irreconcilable, then there could only be alienation of the individual. In Searle's derivation, the 'ought-conclusion' already exists in a disguised manner within the premise of 'social obligation'. It does not take into individual's opposition to an imposition of an 'ought' from outside of his conscious locus. If one has the freedom to act in accordance with 'ought', he has equally the freedom not to act in accordance with the 'ought', social obligation notwithstanding. As a sort of an 'inside' view may have it, the Mīmāṃsakas upheld the 'Moral command' as an objective principle. Personally, however, I would like to characterize the Mīmāṃsaka theory as standing between 'outside' and 'inside' views of puruṣārthas. This is because, retaining the trivarga and dharma through karma at a sort of 'level of mokṣa' is the last ditch attempt made by the Mīmāṃsakas to explain the 'desire to go outside trivarga' with the help of dharma. In doing this, on the one hand they appeared to retain the same sociological substance of DI, and on the other attributed to it the nature of an MI by making it an enduring substance to enjoy/suffer the same artha and kāma that are the focus of trivarga, but at a later date. However, Śaṅkara rejects the whole scheme of the Mīmāṃsakas, since the result of an 'ought-action' of the Mīmāṃsakas is attained at an unknown future, and in a finite manner, with a glaring possibility of falling back into the bondage of trivarga. Śaṅkara makes a complete shift from the 'outside' to 'inside' view of puruṣārthas, unlike the Mīmāṃsakas, by providing the nature of 'I' as an MI having nothing to do with trivarga artha and kāma. However, this entailed the negation of all actions at trivarga, overtly or covertly. Seeing the pitfalls of Śaṅkara, Madhvācārya attempted to resurrect actions, and identified MI substances as completely and rigidly fixed by the Lord, who is Himself the ultimate dharma. Of course, as hinted already, within the Dvaita of Madhva, there could be difference in DI-substance and MI-substance as identified by the humans at the societal level.

Positive Dharma: Puruṣārtha Inside Views begin with Mīmāṃsaka Theory

In the above context of 'two opposing consciousnesses', one finds an attempt to convert dharma into a positive ontological entity³⁹ for the purpose of higher

efficacy of conflict-resolution. Not merely there is the fruit for individual's actions but there is also a collective 'fruit' for the society as determined by the objective principle of Dharma. Obviously, the idea is to present some sort of independent 'fruit'—apparently other than artha and kāma- as an outcome for one's dhārmic actions. An individual may resist this lure in many ways. For example, he may be averse to the 'deference' of fruit. Alternatively, he may entirely reject all his longing for a 'social fruit', irrespective of bad consequences that he may have to face for the non-dhārmic actions. Thus, even this attempt at formulating dharma as a higher and objective principle has not been successful, since the dichotomy between two consciousnesses would continue. Suppose, an agent internalizes the 'ought'. Then, whether the conflict is resolved? The answer is 'yes'. However, there is the question of liberation from trivarga. Since every action has a 'reaction', the agent (individual/society) would get the benefit of this reaction; he would get good 'reactions' for good deeds, and bad ones for bad deeds, 'puṇya' and 'pāpa' respectively. If actions (dharmas) are contentful (substantial)—which they are, according to the Mīmāṃsakas- then so are the reactions. This means that the 'ought' would initiate an unending cycle of action-reactions, without a real break from the bondage to trivarga. Put in different words, this would lead the agent to get irrevocably chained to this dharma. Svarga, for example, is only a temporary solace and only a happier side of trivarga itself, rather than 'the liberation from the bondage caused by trivarga'. One does not get the liberation from trivarga, which liberation, as we have seen, is only the meaning of 'mokṣa' as an outside view of puruṣārthas may have it. Since Mīmāṃsakas arrive at the twilight zone between trivarga and mokṣa, we can call them as the initiators of "inside view of puruṣārthas, and mokṣa in particular". However, the Gītā type of niṣkāmakarma (without worldview) may claim for liberation due to the detached action. And hence it may claim for initiating "inside view" of puruṣārthas. Nevertheless, that would raise the question of the 'liberation of who?' because of the absence of substance within such a view of niṣkāmakarma per se. That is, it would raise the question of ontological MI. And also, it does not specify the mechanism of implementing 'niṣkāmakarma'.

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Notes and References

1. Then what is the logic of essentiality of these puruṣārthas as human goals for all human beings? To ask this question is to ask how the puruṣārthas are generically related. The question is not about whether or not all human beings actually keep all these goals before them, nor whether or not everyone ought to keep these goals before them. In other words, the term 'logic of essentiality', does refer to the logical composite nature of the goals as in a theory. Rather it means that the acceptance of something logically compels one to accept some other thing. Acceptance of what (instinctual goals) compels the acceptance of other goals (facilitators & limiters) is the subject matter of this article. Thus, an explication of the generic relation of the puruṣārthas is the main subject of the present paper. It constitutes an examination of the concept of puruṣārthas from outside as it were. We shall see that the term 'all' (human beings) refers to the 'social' dimension of the humans through social contract. As opposed to this, an internal examination of puruṣārthas involves specific and separate contents of each puruṣārtha as the same are found in different substantial works on puruṣārthas. Therefore, an author of a particular mokṣa for example, may try to encompass within his work on mokṣa 'all' including sociology or the 'outside-view'. Professor Prasad's (1980) conclusion with respect to mokṣa as a puruṣārtha that is capable of being included within the kārma seems to be due to the non-discrimination between this kind of generic relation between the sub-concepts of puruṣārthas and the 'contentful' puruṣārthas, and also due to the non-assignment of clear-cut 'objects' to be attained as the meaning of puruṣārthas.

2. Since mokṣa is 'going out' of trivarga, the 'object' of mokṣa calls for gradual or sudden movement, as the case may be. When it is gradual, the vānaprasthāśrama seems to prepare an individual to move 'outside' the (trivarga) society by keeping him at the threshold between the society and its outside. Hence, the person would be 'with his wife' and be 'in the forest'- special 'inside' and 'outside' of the society respectively. When it is sudden, one can say that the person has attained the mokṣa 'object' or is on the path of obtaining it, without traversing the social (inside) path. A third way as akin to that of the Cārvakas is that the person may be completely immersed in 'dvivarga of artha and kāma'. But this seems to be logically impossible; or even if it is possible it could be purely instinctual. Thus, one may be pursuing dvivarga at the instinctual level, or trivarga at the social level, or caturvarga at the viśvadr̥ṣṭi level.
3. In spite of this exclusive view of mokṣaic bliss from other puruṣārthas it is possible to think that each of the trivarga puruṣārtha actually required a world-view, in order that the putative puruṣārtha could really present 'mokṣaic' bliss. This would, I think, explain in more clear terms why each puruṣārtha is claimed to yield 'mokṣaic' bliss.
4. There has been a sort of debate/controversy over the exact number of puruṣārthas. Daya Krishna mentions about the Śramaṇa tradition under whose influence the fourth puruṣārtha- mokṣa was introduced into the scheme of puruṣārthas. "...as is well-known, only three puruṣārthas were accepted in the beginning and the fourth puruṣārtha.mokṣa came to be added only later under the influence of the śramaṇa tradition." [Krishna 1997: 43] Irrespective of the historicity, there has to be a logical reason for the addition of mokṣa, and exposing such a reason is what constitutes one of our main objectives in this paper.
5. Ācārya Rajanīśā had apparently spoken of attaining mokṣa- or mokṣaic-bliss- through kāma. Our pyramid-analogy seems to permit this possibility. If so even artha, and dharma should permit such mokṣaic-bliss at the end. However, the traditional philosophical account, I am afraid, does not permit this. In fact, artha and kāma being the first ever instinctual goals, themselves later got a secondary treatment due to the intervention of dharma and society. Thus, kāma—which was initially an 'instinctual sex'—came to be modified as a 'reason' for sustaining the society through reproduction on the one hand, and an art for optimizing the bliss, on the other. If so, the traditionalists would summarily dismiss Śrī Rajanīśā's idea. It should be noted that the pursuing of the puruṣārthas does not

mean that all or any puruṣārthas are actually pursued at all times, rather they are to be pursued in accordance with the dharmas of the life. Thus, the dharma would act as guṇa of the individual and also as an objective goal of 'action-in-itself' that pervades over the other goals of life; and the action-in-itself can be a moral or legal stipulation too that has to be internalized by the individuals in spite of the guṇas that may naturally be there in them.

6. Almost all my references to the supposed classical Indian Philosophical literature (note that it is not darśana-literature) in connection with the 'outside' view of puruṣārthas are meant to show that the referred ideas have historical existence in Indian thought. Further, they need not mean that the overt sociological meaning attributed to them in our context should exhaust their meaning in their historical context or textual context. Since my purpose here is to provide a generic outside view of puruṣārthas, I would not get into specific details of the classical work in question, like for example the puruṣasūkta. Examples for Sāmānya Dharma: (i) No one is superior or inferior, all are equal. Ṛg Veda Mandala-5, Sūkta-60, Mantra—5 [ajyeṣṭhaso S kaniṣṭhasa ete sam bhrato vavṛduh soubhāgyah`] (ii) Speak truth. [Satyam Vada]; Do not speak untruth [Nānṛtam vadet] (iii) Do not cause injury or death. [Na himsayet] (iv) Perform only those action which are not forbidden [Yānyavadyāni karmāṇi, tāni sevitavyāni/ no itarāṇi] Taittirīya Upaniṣad Ch. 1, Lesson-11 [Jois (1996) p.7] [Seen in a special way an SD can not be construed as a duty at all, for generally an SD does not entail any positive action. Therefore, it is a sort of inaction. And, upon such an SD which is the bear minimum for the society's survival, society is sought to be constructed. It is only by virtue of its juxtaposition with the positive duty, or by virtue of its possible violations which entail positive action that they are called as a duty or Dharma to mean some positivity]
7. The total bliss that an individual must obtain in his life through the (trivarga) puruṣārthas ought to be optimal rather than maximum. This optimality may be a singular totality or may be calculated in multiple segmental sums. In any case, the point is, it cannot be 'maximum' in the sense of mere quantitative measurement, because such 'maximumhood' includes the qualitative pleasure that is permissible by dharma on the one hand and the restriction imposed on bear maximum imposed by the dharma itself to avoid unforeseen miseries that may be invited through bear maximum on the other. An instance for the latter, i.e., restriction on dhārmic-maximum-can be found in the oath that taken during the marriage 'dharmeca,

artheca, kāmeca nāticarāmi, nāticarāmi,, nāticarāmi’—a promise is made between the spouses at the time of marriage. Therefore, when young, even if both spouses can have unbridled sex fulfilling all dharma-conditions, yet are advised refrain from going for such ‘maximum’ by their own word of promise. The promise is between not any two individuals- rather it is between two spouses who form the second consciousness to each other. My second consciousness would always be with me, to remind me of my promise whenever I tend to transgress my limits in puruṣārthasādhanā. My second consciousness would always perform a direct prescription of an ‘ought’ to me gently, and via my own earlier word of promise.

8. So it is not merely speaking or writing about something and relating it to mokṣa that would bring respectability to the work,- as Daya Krishna seems to think- but rather it is its being a part of the puruṣārthas with totality or viśvadṛṣṭi that lends value to it. Thus, as in the cone with mokṣa-standpoint, the bliss would at once be located at the apex enabling it equitable with mokṣa-bliss. Nevertheless, in point of fact, trivarga bliss would certainly be different from the mokṣa-bliss. [Daya Krishna says: “...Why is it that everything in India must claim to lead to mokṣa, even when prima facie it is concerned with something entirely different? The answer...probably lies in the fact that mokṣa was accepted as the highest value.....and thus, anything, to be to be respectable and draw attention to itself, had to be related to mokṣa....” 1997:31, and this seems to be an extremely naïve view]

Further, we should note that if we equate śreyas with dharma, and if dharma fails, then śreyas fails too. But śreyas should not fail, our Philosophers thought. So then in such a context Daya Krishna’s citing of the resolution of the term ‘niḥśreyasa’ as ‘niścitam śreyah niḥśreyasa’ makes a lot of sense, because the mokṣa of Advaita then overtly tells that ‘that which is guaranteed śreyas’ in comparison with the dharma, which is not so guaranteed. In a similar manner, we should clarify the rest of the terms for mokṣa in different schools.

‘All human-beings’ being an impossible term to instantiate at any given time in an unrestricted sense of ‘all’ a general conception of a normal human-being is implied along with the life-stages every human-being, of necessity, has to undergo. Thus, ‘all’ means ‘an appropriate human for an appropriate puruṣārtha’ or vice versa.

Further, Vātsyāyana in his Kāmasūtra speaks of all the four puruṣārthas in the Second Chapter Trivargapratipattikaraṇam. It attempts to explain the four puruṣārthas and in its course, it states

- clearly that there ought not to be any conflict among them. Rather they should be complementary to each other such that they assist one in attaining mokṣa. The whole thing would make sense only if kāmā as a puruṣārtha has an acceptable distinct object to be attained without leading to conflict of any sort with other 'objects'- goals.
9. One could raise the doubt—how could mokṣa be indispensable or even as actually a desired for object? For, we know in common experience that people hardly long for either dharma or mokṣa. All that we see is the striving of the people day in and day out for artha and kāmā. To this, at this stage, we can say that the longing for mokṣa is a logical extension of the dhārmic life of trivarga. If an explicit longing does not exist, then it is yet to manifest
 10. One may agree that kāmā certainly requires another individual but may not agree with the same about artha. This could hold true even when an aesthetic object is posited for kāmā, for there cannot occur aesthetic object without some sort of 'consciousness' attributed to it. This makes the 'object' a conscious second 'person' In a way, then, kāmā-object precedes artha as a puruṣārtha, since family seems to precede such requirement of artha, where family itself is a result of kāmā. However, the important thing to note is that kāmā itself being a puruṣārtha, has a history for it. In other words, various understandings of kāmā in a successive and comprehensive manner could be possible. Artha, in order that it could be considered as true wealth; a second person or a society is logically necessary. Or else what one possesses as goods will be worthless to others and in turn to himself. One need not take trouble to protect such goods.
 11. The question "Could there be an SD, but whose violation does not/ need not conceivably lead to the annihilation of the society?" is an interesting one, but we would not wish to enter into a debate on this. However, it is logically possible to conceive a society with only SDs in it and still people being in perfect harmony without any conflict—or if there is, then with perfect conflict-resolution mechanism. It is because there has been not only violation of the SDs but also that the existing 'conflict-resolution mechanism' failed that the 'ought' of the SDs began to be elevated with new dharmas. The 'ought' never looked back then on until it culminated in mokṣa.
 12. Negatives and positives of linguistic formulation of the same proposition are possible. For example, 'Do not steal' may be re-stated as 'Do the non-stealing'. Hence, one could say that the dharma is positive in the sense of urging 'to do', and not 'to not-to-do'.

13. Abhyudaya nihsreyase sādhanasarvena dhaārayati iti dharmah/ sa ca lakṣaṇa pramṇābhyām codanasūtrai rvyavasthāpitah// [“Dharma is that which sustains and ensures progress and welfare of all in this world and eternal bliss in the other world. Dharma is promulgated in the form of commands—positive and negative: vidhi and niṣedha] Parāśara Dharma Samhita—Sayana Mādhavācāryakṛta-Tīkāśahita—Vamanasharma (Ed.) (1893), Bombay Sanskrit Series, p. 63. Loc. Cit. Jois (1996) p.3. Dhāraṇād dharmā ityahurdharmo dhārayate prajāh/ yat syad dharanāsamyuktam sa dharmā iti niścayah// [“Dharma sustains the society, Dharma maintains the social order, Dharma ensures well-being and progress of humanity, Dharma is surely that which fulfills these objectives”] Karṇa Parva-Ch. 69, Verse 58 Jois (1996) p. 2
14. The human-being. Literally, ‘male’, and philosophically, ‘consciousness’, and I do not wish to enter into male-female controversy here. ‘Individualized purusa’ means the purusa who is conscious of his class membership.
15. However, this is a second order Dharma. Fourth SD from Taittirīya Upaniṣad mentions it.
16. There are two ways in which the “Puruṣa”—“the Society”— may be understood: one, the human society as having separate parents, the Mother and the Father. They are the Sri and Purusa respectively. This constitutes the logical interpretation, because the society as commonly understood, cannot have a ‘consciousness’ of its own. So then to speak of an initial social contract would become a logical impossibility, without the mediation of a conscious agent, who is higher than, and stands above the collectivity. It is in this logical spirit, The Great Puruṣa and Śrī could be conceived as the parents of the society. In this case, the society and its parents- are two distinct concepts. The second way of understanding makes the entire human society identical to the Śrī and Purua. In this the division is within the society and it is between the two great segments—Female and the Male, without whose active co-operation the society cannot emerge in the first place nor sustain. This conception is more akin to the ‘initiation’ of a family. And from this conception follows an SD: Mātṛdevo bhava, pitṛdevobhava, ācāryadevo bhava/ (‘Ācārya’ in this context means the one teaches this very tenet). See Govindacharya (1996) for a literal exposition of Puruṣa-sūkta.
- Another point of interest is that Puruṣasūkta is said to be a common entity for all the four Vedas. However, there indeed are variations in it in the form of difference in words or number of mantras etc.

Then, what is significant in this commonality and variation—if Puruṣasūkta marks the beginning of social contract- is the possibility of distinct societies (sampradāyas) called Ṛgveda-society, Yajurveda-society, Sāmaveda-society, and Atharvaveda-society being emerged as early as Vedic period. Gāyatri mantra has three dimensions (feet or pāda) and from these three pādas or dimensions came the three vargas of the puruṣasūkta. See Govindacharya (1999) pp. 3-4.

Further, at the level of SD—the Social Puruṣa-consciousness and the individual consciousness have not as yet fully integrated, which is what is responsible for the tension and the subsequent violations of the SDs and failure to abide by conflict-resolution decisions. Full integration is the goal of trivarga, and removal of such integration to free the individual from the bond is the general goal of mokṣa. Here freeing one-self does not imply returning to the pre-societal, barbaric consciousness. Rather it is the elimination of artha and kārma—the root-causes of all misery- that is the general goal of mokṣa.

17. "Dharma or rules of righteous conduct was evolved as a solution to ((the)) eternal problem arising out of natural instinct of man. In Śāntiparva of Mahābhārata (Ch. 59-14), after explaining that an ideal state of affairs had existed when people protected each other acting according to ((Sāmānya)) Dharma, Bhīṣma proceeded to state that when a few persons began to deflect from the path of Dharma being overpowered by sensual desires, passion and greed for wealth and material pleasure and they being physically stronger, began to harass the weaker ones, as a remedy to this situation.....the State was established with a King as its head....." Jois (1996) p.5
18. A viśeṣa-dharma like rāja-dharma may pervade a group of individuals who are Rājās, or his/their agents.
19. From the base of the pyramid where the society is identical with SDs, the tapering to apex denotes the higher order of dharmas as well as the delimitation of the agents/agency of such dharmas. At the end, the individual himself becomes the highest dharma unto himself when he becomes a realized person.
20. Searle, of course, is correct in speaking about the 'social obligation' with respect to 'promise'. He is correct when he speaks of the puruṣas by name ('Jones' etc.) because obligation can be there only between two or more identified concrete individuals. Then such identification must throw light on their psychological disposition as well. The names must be more specific and must be able to bring before the eyes almost two exact particular individuals who are party to the

promise, even though final arbitration needs the real individuals. Why?

A mere promise, on its own, will have only an SD-type of 'ought-force'- that is, the concept of promise is a sort of samanyadharmā, but of a higher-order. To be clearer: if non-stealing etc. are SDs, then promising to abide by them has to be separately stated, which in turn would become an SD at a higher level. But promising to pay Five dollars is a specific matter, and may be subsumed only under an SD of the general form 'all must keep the promise'. Even then, violation of an SD is an open possibility, and cannot be ruled out.

So what if Jones fails to keep the promise even in the case of Searle's *ceteris paribus*? There ought to be some *viśeṣa-dharmas* to book the violator of an SD. We must know the probability of Jones' keeping the promise beforehand, and an appropriate quantum of punishment—that is in conformity with his psychological make-up— that is to be awarded to him in case he violates the promise. Merely speaking of *ceteris paribus* (even though it turns the promise into a hypothetical one) in a blanket form will only ensure the logical inference of ought from is. Such an inference will have no practical utility. Nor is it a successful inference of ought from is in view of the fact that there is the presupposition of an SD in the form of a universal premise- 'all must keep promises'.

21. Nārāyaṇa or Puruṣottama, the absolutely Independent principle, having entered the Fire (agni) requires the co-operation of Śrīdevī for the purpose of creation of the world/society. Śrīdevī or Śrī Lakṣmi denotes both artha (wealth) as well as kāmā (Sex). And Her introduction into the life of Nārāyaṇa marks the beginning of the Society. Put it simply, it means that it is for obtaining artha and kāmā that the humans have come together to form a society. "Kāmamaya evāyam puruṣah" says Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa. xiv., 7, 2, 7. The Puruṣa- Nārāyaṇa is wholly pervaded by Śrī (or Lakṣmi)— kāmā—meaning 'desire' for all things including sex.
22. See Rajendra Prasad (1981) for an interesting discussion on puruṣārthas and its criterion.
23. Thus, many authors have attributed their own meaning to the scheme of puruṣārthas as if the scheme has been handed over to them just now. And, by presupposing that there ought to be complete sense to the puruṣārtha-scheme as of now in its advanced contextualized form of present times, they have missed out the different logical phases that the puruṣārtha-scheme has undergone. Take for example: Daya Krishna (1992: 283). He says: "But what is

the evidence for this supposed tradition ((varṇāśrama-puruṣārtha)), and is it as unambiguous as has been generally assumed?" In asking this question he seems to imply that if the varṇāśrama-puruṣārtha were not to be ambiguous then it could have been acceptable. So, as such he does not realize that the ambiguity in puruṣārthas is born out of its evolutionary movement. As such it is not impossible to remove this ambiguity. Needless to say that his is a grave mistake, and consists in not tracing- or rather not attempting to trace- the logical evolution of the puruṣārthas. This is, however, not to say that Daya Krishna's immediate criticism is invalid, if one takes the obscured views of puruṣārthas etc. as existing at present, into account. Similarly, what, according to Daya Krishna, K.J. Shah speaks of about "four goals as single goal" is really nothing but a messing up of the levels of puruṣārthas. Krishna (1997) p. 203.

24. The idea of SD seems to come closer to Categorical Imperative (CI). However, the distinct difference between the SD and CI is that the former leaves out a scope for violation, which is pragmatic in essence, and the latter does not do so, and hence becomes more of an ideal type. Hence CI insists on a separate Moral Will that is separate from Holy Will. Although Moral Will is required in thrusting a moral injunction upon someone, it cannot be thrust upon at the most basic level of an SD, for the simple reason that the actual society has marched past the SDs a long time ago, actually experiencing the violations of SDs on its way.
25. The term 'social-space' rather than 'caste' or 'jāti' seems to be more appropriate rendering of the original idea. Daya Krishna (1992: 289) has mentioned that there was jāti already in existence even at the time of Yajurveda. If so, firstly the jati and varṇa are two distinct things; secondly, varṇa cannot mean a hierarchical order, since a supposed hierarchy in the form of 'jāti' was already in existence, where jāti does not necessarily mean hierarchy notwithstanding. The case of gaṇikastrī/veśyā (prostitute) to be classified under a varṇa is in point. Neither her guṇa, nor her karma would permit her to be placed under any of the varṇas, which are based on guna and karmas alone, and not even on birth-factor. A fifth varṇa was perhaps necessitated in that sense. But what is the exact meaning of 'varṇa' after all?

Varṇa system is an idealized classification and precedes the practice. Into this idealized system the actual people were fitted. Obviously, there is bound to be some or other sort of incongruity. But then what

is the first and foremost mark of this 'fitting'. The mark has to be external and perceptible for various reasons (given in the main body of the article). So then the only conceivable mark which satisfies the external visibility is 'dress-code'. And, one of the literal meanings of 'varṇa' is 'dress' or 'decoration' in Apte's Dictionary. (Gode (1979)p. 1394. Other similar meanings attributed are: 'outward appearance', 'cloak', 'mantle' or 'covering. Thus, 'jāti' seems to be an absolute misnomer, although it could well be a degenerated meaning for the term 'varṇa'. However, Singh(2001) p.167, informs us that "the term 'varna' had evolved from.... 'vari' meaning varaṇa or choice. Hence, 'varṇa' is that which a person chooses...." Ambiguities of the term 'varṇa' as jāti etc. seem to melt away.

26. When Daya Krishna asks the question, and puts forward a response: "...how are the...arthaśāstras and kāmaśāstras related to artha and kāma of the Indian tradition?...Artha and kāma as puruṣārthas.... are not supposed to be confined just to these ((arthaśāstras and kāmaśāstra))..." [Krishna 1997:43], he essentially seems to miss an important point. If, broadly, a goal is accepted as a 'to be attained' object, then, the different members of the group who accept this axiom, would go about putting forward the ways to attain it. There is bound to be difference in their perceptions and hence difference in their articulation of the ways. But that is not the point. Rather the point is: each articulated way, by common acceptance of the author's honesty, is an approximation to the ideal way, if there is one. In the instant case of the different puruṣārthas each śāstra dealing with the proclaimed subject-matter attempts at just the same. To either consider them as the only way to attain the presumed bliss, or to conceive them to be the actually existing way would be a grievous error, since the author would have just put forward his ideas in his work(s) in any case. Thus, to say that actual current/past kāma that is done is substantially different from what is prescribed in a book on kāmaśāstra cannot be made to mean that the kāmaśāstra has no relation to 'doing kāma'. This point holds true for all other puruṣārthas, or any ideal-actual dichotomies.
27. Śrī Vādirāja Tīrtha of Sodhe Mutt had given upadeśa to the fisher-folk segment at Maṭṭu near Kaṭapādi (about 5 Kms south of Udupi) to 'convert' them into Brahmins.
28. In the Dvaita scheme the sociological substance and ontological substance are identified and each substance is provided with gradual ascending way to get liberation from trivarga. Ascendance will not take place only in the case of nityanāraṅkī, who are not to be

- identified with any sociological varṇa or jāti. Therefore, as dvaita would have it, there is no problem if there is total identity between sociological substance and ontological substance not only for the purpose of trivarga but also for liberation
29. M.N. Srinivas' idea of 'sanskritization' seems to have the hypothesis of Dvaita MI, consequently everyone wanted to 'become a Brahmin' in order to attain mokṣa at the end, because eople identified 'social substance' with 'mokṣa substance'. Srinivas' sociological approach seems to confirm our hypothesis of the interplay between DI and MI as essential to understand Indian Sociology, even though Srinivas committed the mistake of generalizing his idea of 'sanskritization' across the whole Indian region.
 30. Individual is lost in the cog mire of society. He has no freedom to act in a manner that violates any law/dharma. An individual may violate a law in two ways, viz., selfish and selfless. Most guilt of violation falls under the first category. While Arjuna's contemplated violation of the duty of fighting falls under the latter. As per karmayoga, whichever viewpoint one may take, he has no freedom to violate a law, and this is what Kṛṣṇa teaches Arjuna. Having said this Kṛṣṇa had to satisfy Arjuna's deeper questions pertaining to the 'ought' from an individual's point of view. It is to satisfy this deeper query that Kṛṣṇa proposes a Viśvadṛṣṭi in the Bhagavadgītā.
 31. Please refer to Note 23 above.
 32. Conflict could be intra-individualistic, in addition to inter-individualistic. For example: at times, I may have to decide precedence in two preyas of artha and kāma. Therefore, conflict need not necessarily be social alone- that is between two or more individuals. This type of intra-individualistic conflict also has to be resolved. Such a conflict, as in the King's predicament, is as follows: "In a situation of distress, a man must preserve his wealth; he must preserve his wife, even if he has to lose his wealth; and he must always preserve himself even if it means losing both his wealth and wife" Mahābhārata V. 37, 17 [Emphasis mine] (Poona critical edition & Manu VII, 212, 213.) However, this legislation may or may not have absolute value depending upon the nature of distress and the person's psychological disposition in question and the political circumstances. However, what is important to note is that the intra-personal conflict also has been recognized by the classical thinkers. [A similar political legislation is made by Montesquieu 1949:980, but apparently to be followed under normal circumstances is as follows: "If I knew of something useful to me, and harmful to my

family, I would reject it from my mind. If I knew something useful to my family, and not to my country, I would try to forget it. If I knew of something useful to my country, and harmful to Europe and harmful to mankind, I would look upon it as crime." [Both references are cited in Malamoud (1981).]

33. Check Ref. No. 24 above, and the first example given for SD.
34. Choosing the sanyāsāśrama is in a way to call off his social contract, wherein he does not form a part of the society. Therefore, he has no obligation towards the society though he may interact with the society for its own benefit. He does not form a part of society because he has in a way abdicated all his artha and kāma desires. Along with such abdication, dharma also vanishes. At that stage, he is a lonely person. Therefore, there is no question of his committing adharma either. The individual has the freedom to choose the āśrama he desires to be in, if he can make an informed choice.
35. Can there be the freedom to switch the varṇas? This question has been the hotbed of arguments and counter-arguments. If there were autonomous and self-regulated determination of the varṇas without social dependence in switching the varṇas, then perhaps there would not have been so many problems as are faced by the Indian society as of today. However, there seems to be nothing in the Dharmasāstras etc. that prohibits one from switching varṇas. Any rigidity that one may find seems to be capable of being explained off as rigidity with respect to the 'actual ontological division' and not to an actual specific individual in the society. Thus, it could be perfectly logical to say that a 'śūdra cannot know/study vedas' since, the term 'śūdra' here denotes the predominance of intellectually feeble guṇa of tamas. We should note that such feeble guṇa in no way prohibits the functions that go well with the quality of tamas. Similarly, almost every prohibition ('niṣedha') can be interpreted as to mean incompetence or inappropriateness of a specific individual as marked by the social-space to perform a specific task. Competence to perform a task has to be acquired. Appropriateness of a task for a specific individual has to be determined. Competence has to be acquired, if it is perceived to be absent, and if one wishes to acquire. No one can legitimately prohibit someone else acquiring such competence. In such acquisition, switching varṇas should have been absolutely possible freely and smoothly. After all, the same Sāṅkhyan ontology that has been extensively used in the Smritis for societal purposes also provides for the ontological category of puruṣa who is at the backdrop of every conglomerate of trigunas of sattva, rajas, and tamas. A śūdra, who

has tamas as predominant nature, for example, also has rajas, sattva, and above all has purusa in him, and hence he cannot be denied an opportunity to improve himself into a sāt̄tvic persona. The School of Yoga being an inseparable partner to the Sā̄nkhyan ontology, teaches verily this. Further, the Social Puruṣa—the Nārāyaṇa—cannot afford to be a mal-formed Being, with robust head, but lean and weak legs, for then He would die sooner than later of osteoporosis or arthritis of advanced stage!

However, the recognition of such a switching by the society is a different matter. An authoritative recognition could have been accorded to switching if there was recognition for either a case of full self-determination, or at least to that determined by value-neutral social entities. Neither was the case is a moot point. So rigidity had crept into the idea of social-space (varna) due to pre-dispositions of various sorts such as for e.g. when (under what circumstances) do we attach the freedom to choose a varna to an individual? Or, is this freedom unconditional? Whether or not one has the required ability to make a proper choice? What if one's choice is incorrect? Who has to ordain the conversion? etc. 'Gunas' as in 'gunakarmavibhagasah' seems to have had a crippling effect on its Social application in this sense, even though it does not speak of the determination of varna by birth. The statement 'janmana jayate sudrah, samskarat dvija ucyate' seems to have lost its tenor in history, Valmiki's or Caitanya's case notwithstanding. It is for this reason the 'jāti' in the sense of 'heirarchy' is an external imposition on the ideal-type division of the varnas as in the smrtis etc. And this imposition may not be of recent origin as we have Karṇa as 'Rādheya' as determined by birth—rather than his nature (guṇa) or deeds (karma) even at the times of Mahābhārata

36. To say this is not to say that 'high' and 'low' substances were never conceived in mokṣaśāstra. The point is, the 'high' or 'low' substance of ontology need not necessarily be the same as sociological substance. The social DI-substance, even if apparently low, or high, the same can attain to the status of a mokṣa substance by practicing that which is conducive and prescribed for the same, and they (the concerned DI-substance) will do so if they are ontologically high.
37. 'Sanskritization' of Srinivas is a sub-conscious way to do away with the undesirable practices. However, something, which is socially exists, has to be ontologically accounted for to begin with. That is precisely what the scholars attempted at during the Yajurvedic times.

38. One cannot afford to have two consciousnesses simultaneously, and allow both of them to remain so in the conscious locus of the individual, for then, they would tear the individual into pieces by the two opposite forces, which are either equal or unequal. If equal then they would cause equilibrium, but an uneasy one—a potential tension prevails in it, waiting to burst out any time. Such a state is not a natural state. He has to make a choice. However, choice cannot rest with the individual. So the individual was 'forced' to choose the 'ought' at the level of contextualized puruṣārthas. This is the Categorical Imperative of Kant. Kant had this in mind when he tried to identify the Moral Will with the Holy Will. Only thing that seems to have gone wrong with the idea is the creation of a distinct Holy Will, which had the dichotomous effect when juxtaposed with the individual's Moral Will, and Kant had to merge them to create a single Will. (Daya Krishna rightly questions this mergence). In a way, the Indian Dharmaśāstris faced a similar situation, at the second level—i.e., the contextualized puruṣārthas.
39. Compare what Vātsyāyana says about dharma while commenting on the Gautamasūtras: "Dharma produced by the repeated performance of yoga follows on even in the next birth. After dharma...has reached the highest limit where no further increase is possible...." [Emphasis mine] Gangopadhyaya (1982:369-370)Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya. The quantifiability of dharma is highlighted in Vātsyāyana's words. Such a dharma pertains to the result of yoga-practice is a different matter. After all we have karmayoga, or bhakti-yoga etc. to remedy the imbalance caused by jñānayoga even within the Vedānta tradition.