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**Identity, Creativity
and Modernization
Perspectives on
Indian Cultural Traditions**

Indian Philosophical Studies, XIV

Edited by
Sebastian Velassery
Vensus A. George

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

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CHAPTER IV

YOGA SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY: GENERAL PRACTICE AND SYNTHESIS

U.A. VINAY KUMAR

INTRODUCTION

The etymological meaning of the term “yoga” is “to unite” (*yuj bhavadau ghan kutvam*). There are several more meanings to this term, which are mostly contextual. However, the meaning “to unite” repeats itself many times over in modern treatises on Yoga; but seldom do these treatises provide logical explanation of the alleged unity involved. Normally unity can be cogently conceived only of two or more things. In this sense, the logical descriptions of the things that are to be united (*relata*) and the logical meaning of the specific unity have to be put forward, if a sense has to be made out of “unity”. The concerned *relata* could be “concepts”, “ideas”, or “entities”. The classical work, *Bhojavrtti to Patanjali’s Yoga Sutra*, defines the term “yoga” “concentration”. It comes from the root *yuj*, which means “to keep the mind fixed in abstract meditation”, and thus it stands for restraining the exercise of the mind, or concentration.¹ Different from etymology and the technical rendering of the term “yoga”, in normal parlance, it has been more often used to denote the practical discipline (*sadhanaa*) of attaining liberation.²

Yoga, as a practical discipline, is believed to achieve the ultimate goal of human life, *moksha*, as generally found in classical Indian Philosophy. Means to *moksha* is classified as primary and secondary. The primary means connotes the step that entails the attainment of the end in question immediately in succession after its fulfillment. The secondary means connotes a step that occurs prior to any other primary means that may just precede the goal that is to be attained. Yoga practice could be considered as primary or secondary means, as the case may be, depending

¹ Cf. “Bhojavrtti to Patanjali’s Yoga Sutra”, in *Yoga Sutra of Patanjali with Bhojavrtti called Rajamartanda*, trans. J. R. Ballantyne and Shastri Govinda Deva, ed. S.B. Tailang, (Delhi: Pious Book Corporation, 1985), no. I.1.

² We propose to use two “a’s” in the Sanskrit word that denotes practical discipline – “*sadhanaa*”. Two “a’s” refer to the elongated pronunciation of sound “a”, as “a” in the term “blast”. This proposal is made to overtly exhibit the difference between “*sadhana*” and “*sadhanaa*” rather than by denoting it through a diacritical mark, which may be missed in thought, even if diacritical mark itself is not missed in script. However we have avoided using the term “*sadhanaa*” to a large extent.

on the technical recommendations of different schools of philosophy. Sometimes, one may even refuse to assign any status to Yoga practice as a means to *moksha*, as some seem to say in Advaita.³ However, the Yogic-practice is almost indispensable as a means to *moksha* irrespective of the technically assigned status to it by different schools of thought.

Vedic tradition approves of the Yogic discipline. The word “*yoga*” is first found in Taittiriya Upanishad.⁴ Even Katha, Brhadaranyaka,⁵ Maitrayani⁶ and Svetasvatara⁷ Upanishads refer to various methods of Yogic discipline. Later, during the period of systematization in the schools, such as Nyaya, Vaisesika, and Samkhya we find explicit reference to the Yoga practice. Under what may be called as non-Vedic traditions, like Buddhism and Jainism, also we find an approval of Yoga-practice and prescription of the same in their religious order. All significant schools of Indian Philosophy, as referred earlier, have overtly or covertly prescribed Yoga- practice, as the/a means for attaining the ultimate goal of human life. The Carvakas may not have accepted *moksha*; nevertheless, it may not be logically impossible to defend a position that might characterize Carvakas as practitioners of Yoga – not merely with regard to its external limbs, such as *asana*, *pranayama* and others, but in what may be regarded as essential limb(s) of the Yoga-practice that is the last three limbs: *dharana*, *dhyana* and *samadhi*. Discussion on this possibility would, of course, constitute a separate theme.

³ Although it may be possible that Yoga practice as means to *moksha* may be rejected, nevertheless the case of Advaita as an example seems to be definitely incorrect. Let us elaborate: Advaita in general and Sankara in particular, do not reject Yoga-practice. [Cf. Shankara: *Aparoksanubhuti or Self-Realization*, trans. Vimuktananda Swami, (Delhi: Advaita Ashrama, 1982), p. 54 - Verse 100 onwards for Shankara’s description of *pranayama*, which is a Yogic limb]. In this text, Sankara prescribes an “object” for the action involved in *pranayama*, such as the thought “I am *Brahman*” in the inhalation (*puraka*) of air. Similarly, in Brahma-Sutra-Bhasya, Sankara does not deny anywhere the practice of Yoga as means for *moksha*. On the contrary, what he has actually denied is the knowledge as laid down in Samkhya and the practice of Yoga as a means leading to *moksha* independently of the Vedas. Sankara says: “Samkhya and Yoga are well-known in the world as means for the achievement of the highest human goal (liberation), and they are accepted by the good people and are supported by Vedic indicatory marks. However, their ((Samkhya-Yoga)) refutation centers on this false claim that liberation can be attained through Samkhya knowledge or the path of Yoga independently of the Vedas...” This, in some sense, means that Sankara accepts the practice of Yoga, at least, as the secondary means to the attainment of *moksha*. Cf. Swami Saccidanendra Saraswati: *Brahma Sutra Bhasya of Sankara*, vol. I, 3rd ed., (Holenarasipura: Adhyatma Prakash Karyalaya, 1998), no. II. I.2.3.407, pp. 671-672.

⁴ “Yoga atma” Cf. T.U., no.II.4.1.

⁵ Cf. B.U., no. I.5.23.; IV.6.23.

⁶ Cf. M.U., no.IV.4.8.

The above discussion makes it clear that Yoga has been widely practiced for attaining what may be generically called as *moksha*, whatever it might have meant from time to time, for different philosophers/laymen. If so, then two curious questions crop up here: firstly, how has Yoga-practice – an apparently non-cognitive enterprise – come to occupy a role in the intellectual enterprise, which is a cognitive activity, such as philosophization?; secondly, how is that, almost all schools of Indian Philosophy have accepted Yoga as an indispensable means, (*sadhanaa*), for the attainment of *moksha* despite the possible technical difficulties? Alternatively, the points of concern are: firstly, the general interface between Yoga-practice and philosophy; and secondly, the essential quality or limb(s) of Yoga that is perceived as the logical link between Yoga-practice and philosophization, such that Yoga becomes indispensable to all schools of Indian Philosophy. The former point is of general nature and confines mainly to the first question. This point seems to presuppose a historical existence of some kind of general practice and also more than one covert/overt philosophical position; and also that they utilized each other to make their own point, as for example, philosophy prescribes practical ways to attain the goal of *moksha*. However, these facts stand in need of analytical networking without which the alleged interface would make little sense. We attempt to elaborate on this point of analytical networking involved in the general interface first and then take up the point concerning the essential aspect of Yoga.

GENERAL PRACTICE OF YOGA AND PHILOSOPHY: AN INTERFACE

For an historical sort of explanation of the interface between general practice of Yoga and philosophical activity, one will have to go back to the concerned events in history. Such a project may also work out other related matters, such as the relevant sociology of the times in question.⁷ However, our enterprise being purely conceptual, we shall indicate, in an analytical manner, the plausible link between them. As such, one could perhaps come up with very many different analytical ways in which general practice of Yoga may be related to philosophical activity. However, the most plausible way seems to be Yoga practice (action) to be a means for the cognitive realization of *moksha* (value), the end. This relation could be called the “Means and End relation” [M-E relation].

It may be appropriate here to explain some crucial concepts involved in this relation as specifically relevant to the case in hand: the relation between Yoga-practice and *moksha*, i.e., relation between action and value. Some of these concepts may be of central importance to other normal cases of M-E relation. We have to restrict ourselves in our discussion to its role in the Yoga-*moksha* duo because the topic of M-E Relation is too vast to be

⁷ Cf. S.U. no. II.8-9.

attempted at in this short article. Hence, we are primarily interested in the application-part of the said relation to the specific case in hand. It is possible to treat this case as a special case of the generic M-E Relation.⁸ The generic M-E Relation always implies a causal link, to which we turn our attention in the next section.

Causal Link

Under normal circumstances, a person would not put in conscious effort to do/perform an action without being aware, however vaguely or wrongly, of the end-result, i.e., the fruit of his action, which is the consequence of his effort. Thus, one would presume some kind of “causal link” – real or imaginary – between the two or more concerned things⁹ consciously or otherwise. If no such causal link between “Means and End” is allowed, then no two things can stand in relation to “Means and End”. Causality here need not be denied on the grounds of a corresponding absence of ontological counterpart. For example, let us consider a case where money is a means and buying of goods is the end. In this case, there may not exist necessarily an ontological causality between the two. Nevertheless, so long as money is accepted as a means to buy goods, which is an end, a causal link between them, i.e., money and goods is, is surely conceived. We need not elaborate on this point as presumably our discussion would not have the occasion to question the ontological dimension of the *relata*, i.e., Yoga and *moksha*, in a direct manner as in the above example of money and goods. However, even in Yoga-*moksha* relationship, there involves an action, i.e., Yogic-practice, leading to the attainment of a value, i.e., *moksha*. Hence we turn to the analysis of the relationship between Yogic-practice (action) and *moksha* (value).

Yogic-Practice (Action) and Moksha (Value)

The formal semantics of “Means and End” asserts that means are actions that bring about desired states of affairs or end in the world. Such a formal semantics, however, does not seem to encourage or promote the idea of an end-in-itself, i.e., a thing having only a pure or an intrinsic value. This is because a pure intrinsic value is conceived as an absolutely isolated thing without any relation, real or imaginary, to the rest of the entities, in the manner means are related to some other ends. The formal semantics is

⁸ Cf. J.H. Woods: *Yoga Sutra with Maniprabha of Ramananda Saraswati*, ed. Mohan Chand, (Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers, 1987), pp. ix- xi. Cf. also S.B. Tailang, “Introduction”, in *Yoga Sutra of Patanjali with Bhojavrtti called Rajamartanda*, trans. J. R. Ballantyne and Shastri Govinda Deva.

⁹ Cf. For the analysis of a generic case of Semantics for Means and End Relations Cf. Jesse Hughes, Peter Kores and Sjoerd Zwart: “A Semantics for Means-End Relations”, taken from Web Page (2005).

interested in analyzing only those that are connected or connectible semantically both as a means and as an end, whereas a pure-intrinsic-value is an end-in-itself. An intrinsic value is a value or an end regardless of whether it is useful as a means to promote some other ends. This means that an intrinsic value can, in principle, both be considered as an end and a means, although the *relatum* has to be different in conceiving an intrinsic value as a means and an end. For example, one could hold, as in modern moral philosophy that a person *qua* person has an intrinsic value independently of his or her prospects of serving other ends.¹⁰ At the same time a person can have instrumental value too, that is he/she can surely be conceived as a useful means to promote other ends. Therefore, to call a thing as having an intrinsic value is to say that the thing necessarily has both intrinsic value and instrumental value. Hence, we have things that have pure-intrinsic-value and things that have intrinsic value and instrumental value.

Similarly, regarding instrumental value we can say that something has instrumental value if it has a value as a means to promote some ends. In other words, certain things will be considered as having instrumental value so long as they are only instrumental in producing an end. Again, if the function of certain things is only to promote some or the other ends then it shall be called as having an instrumental value. Therefore, if something has an instrumental value, then it cannot have intrinsic value. For in the above-mentioned example of “money and goods”, money has only an instrumental value. This means that the value involved here is a pure-instrumental value, i.e., it is an instrument bereft of end-value-content. An instrument will become a discarded entity the moment its instrumentality ceases, i.e., the end has been achieved through it. On the contrary, if something has intrinsic value in addition to possessing instrumental value then we have things that have instrumental value and intrinsic value. Therefore, we have things that have pure-instrumental-value, and things that have both instrumental value and intrinsic value.¹¹

By applying the result of the preceding discussion to Yoga-practice (action) and *moksha* (value), we get the following plausible relations between them:

¹⁰ Cf. Ibid.

¹¹ The object or objects and also their relation have to be real if any fructification of an action into value has to take place. Patanjala Sutras speaks of three sources of valid ideas. They are *pratyaksa*, *anumana*, and *sabda*. Cf. “*Pratyaksanumanagamah Pramanani*”, in J.H. Woods: *Yoga Sutra with Maniprabha of Ramananda Saraswati*, ed. Mohan Chand, no.1.7; p. 11. Any source of valid ideas has the characteristic mark – “the causation of valid ideas”. This means that a source, in order to be accepted as a good source for ideas, it has to cause valid ideas. Besides, later in a different Sutra invalid sources are also explained.

- A (i) Yoga-practice, the action, as having pure instrumentalvalue
 A (ii) Yoga, as having instrumental value and intrinsic value
 [To be contextually determined]
 A (iii) Yoga, as having pure intrinsic value – and
 M (i) *Moksha*, the value, as having pure intrinsic value
 M (ii) *Moksha*, as having intrinsic value and instrumental value
 [To be contextually determined]
 M (iii) *Moksha* as having pure instrumentalvalue

The resulting dyadic relations will be nine in number. They are:

1. A (i) ---- M (i); 2. A (i)----M (ii); 3. A (i) ----M (iii);
4. A (ii) ----M (i); 5. A (ii)----M (ii); 6. A (ii) ---- M (iii);
7. A (iii) ---M (i); 8. A (iii) ---M (ii); 9. A (iii) ---- M (iii).

Each and every one of these relations excepting “1” and “2”, seem to be not suited to understand the case in hand. Let us stretch our inquiry little further. “7” is ruled out because Yoga as a pure intrinsic value cannot act as a means to some other things, i.e., Yoga as a pure intrinsic value would be an end-in-itself. “2”, “5” and “8” are ruled out because *moksha* being an ultimate end cannot itself act as means to promote some other ends, unless *moksha* can be contextualized to yield some kind of instrumentality to itself. For the same reason “3”, “6”, and “9” are also ruled out. Relation “1” seems to be most suited for our purposes. In this relation Yoga would be pure instrumental value and *moksha* would be pure intrinsic value. Relation “2” may be acceptable if after the attainment of *moksha* certain further ends could be considered as promotable through *moksha* as means.¹²

The relationship between Yoga-practice (action) and the *moksha* (value) is established and justified by means of philosophical activity which is fundamentally intellectual and analytical nature. In the next section, we turn our attention to this important aspect of philosophical activity.

Philosophical Activity

Philosophical activity is essentially analytical and intellectual in its essence. It continues to be so even when we consider as its subject matter non-cognitive contents of some basic Yogic activity, such as posture (*asana*). This activity is mental in so far as philosophy tries to analyze the situation logically. It would not permit anything if the same does not abide by the rules of conceptualization and logic. The end-product of any analytical activity is an analytical system, which is certainly subject to revisions because it cannot claim immunity to the developments outside of itself, even if the analytical system in itself constitutes a closed system and

¹² Cf. Jesse Hughes, Peter Kores and Sjoerd Zwart: “A Semantics for Means-End Relations”, taken from Web Page (2005).

appears logically unassailable. The only exception, in principle, to this is the most comprehensive system. So if there is a revision, in an analytical system, it implies that a discovery or recognition of hitherto hidden and non-recognized external fact(s) including some internal logical flaw have come to be recognized.

Philosophical or analytical activity generally attempts to restrict itself to the logical networking of the given system, though some people might choose and pick up only some items within the given system¹³ leaving out some others which are within the relevant field of the given system. Such an analytical activity, in general, as said above is sensitive to the discovery of some non-recognized external facts. A discovery of this sort will always affect one or more items of the edifice. For this reason of the possible sensitivity of an analytical system, every initial analytical edifice may be likened to an apple-cart. The analytical edifice would come crashing down the moment some item in the edifice gets disturbed just as the apple-cart would when an item is recklessly removed unless it has greater explanatory potential to include the external data within itself as an integral part. Indeed, the magnitude of crash would depend on the location of the item that is affected in the totality of the edifice, and on the magnitude of the disturbance. Crash of a more foundational item will result in more serious harm to the analytical edifice as compared to a lesser foundational item.

The importance of this kind of an analytical enterprise, in the Indian context, lays in the fact that the object of knowledge morphs itself into a more fundamental object in its logically cognitive search for the same object, and through the process of search it becomes *moksha*-begetting. That is an object that is derived through analysis and analytical judgments that constitute the theoretical knowledge, and when the same is later known in a more fundamental manner leads to *moksha*. This later knowledge, in the Indian context, is the cognitive realization, which leads to the attainment of ultimate value, the *moksha*. Now, if the analytical edifice crumbles then the object crumbles, and if the object crumbles then *moksha* crumbles. For, the theoretical validity of *moksha* is dependent on the theoretical validity of the object.¹⁴

Philosophical activity or cognitivism, though may not play a vital role in the grosser dimensions of Yoga-practice, it does play an important role, especially in the subtler stages of Yoga-practice. Now, we move on to consider the role of cognitive activity in the Yoga-practice (action).

Yoga-Practice (Action) and Cognitive Activity

Yoga-practice is primarily an action-concept and not a cognitive

¹³ Cf. Joe Lau and Jonathan Chan: "Values- Intrinsic and Instrumental Values", Pages under Critical Thinking Web, (2006).

¹⁴ Please note that an object of knowledge derived through analytical construction will be written in this paper as "object(s)".

concept. In other words, practice of Yoga at the grosser levels does not involve cognitively. However, there is a subtler dimension to Yoga-practice, which involves cognitive activity. Thus, on the subtler planes of Yoga, such as *dharana*, *dhyana* and *samadhi* directly involve mind and its modes for their practice. Mind and its modes try to apprehend the objective reality provided by the analytical enterprise. Therefore, due to the intervention of the mind for the cognitive realization of the object supplied by the analytical enterprise particularly in the subtler stages of Yoga, cognitively or philosophical activity marks the Yogic-action. From what we have said, it is clear that philosophical activity does play a vital role in the actual practice of Yoga as a means to attain the goal of *moksha*.

Having clarified all the elements involved in the M-E Relations in the above sections, we move on to consider the briefly the resultant M-E Relation in the following section.

Resultant Means-End Relation

The main result of assimilation of the four concepts is twofold and reflects on both the theoretical activity of philosophy and the theorization involved in the cognitive action. The former is affected by the cognitive action, where so many more new inputs come rushing to the mind, which results in the revision of the existing philosophical theory; and in turn, a suitable object will be analytically arrived at by the new enterprise for the purpose of the new cognitive action. This interface between action and value need not necessarily lead to a unilinear analytical edifice, in the sense that there need not be only one system that should continuously develop, although the whole of Indian Philosophy could, perhaps, be considered as one unified whole. On the one hand, the objects of *moksha* or simply *moksha*-object, the knowledge of which may keep changing in the sense that more than one object could exist at a given time. The reasons for this are the following:

1. Not all proponents of a given system need to accept all discoveries of new things discovered anywhere either while grappling with the analytical enterprise or in cognitive action at any given time, to modify the concerned system. This is because interpretation is a handy tool to adjust the new one with the rest, rather than changing the whole system just because of the one. As such, normal tendency of any system-builder is to defend and interpret his position as far as possible against all odds.¹⁵
2. In some cases, overt affiliation to a school of thought may cease for historical reasons. Hence, although at present we have traditional Nyaya Philosophy, we do not have, as of today, Nyaya traditional philosophers, who could enlighten us upon their possible reaction to the developments or

¹⁵ Cf. Joe Lau and Jonathan Chan: "Values- Intrinsic and Instrumental Values", Pages under Critical Thinking Web, (2006).

discoveries that have taken place within the tradition. It does not mean that there are no traditional Nyaya philosophers available today.

3. More importantly, if certain analytical systems have been built on rigid basics, without scope for incorporation of new discoveries, then it implies that they cannot be subsumed under a larger, more comprehensive system. This means that to that extent the system is closed for any external analytical modifications. In fact, no modification can be affected as such without violating its basics.

On the front of the Yogic activity, especially the cognitive one, modifications are affected in the ways of dealing with the object as per the need displayed by the object that is arrived at through philosophical analysis/analytical enterprise. The causality is required to link the means with its end, and at the same time the link itself has to ensure its disappearance once the end is realized, in the sense that the so-called cause or the means will have no locus to stand, once the special end, *moksha* is realized. *Moksha* is, after all, a no-man's land. In other words, Yoga-practice always and only has a pure instrumental value and *moksha*, by definition has pure intrinsic value, since it cannot be construed as means to promote any other ends. The M-E relation between them will always be of a "pure" sort. For this reason one will have to carefully examine the *moksha*-object derived in each school, and the suggested Yoga-practice in each case. Key to the whole matter seems to lay in understanding the essential Yogic concept(s) that may be running through all schools of Indian Philosophy.

Having looked into the general interface between Yoga-practice and philosophy, we move on to consider the essential limb(s) of Yoga that is perceived as the logical link between Yoga-practice and philosophization in the next section.

SYNTHESIS OF ACTION AND PHILOSOPHY: ESSENTIAL LIMB(S) OF YOGA

Cognitive realization is a process that involves mind and action of the mind with an operative object. Therefore, it must have a valid object, the knowledge of which is derived through analytical construction. In this way, analytic construction takes precedence even over all the means of knowledge (*pramanas*). Obviously, all the objects presented by different *pramanas* themselves constitute some part of the total subject-matter dealt within the analytical enterprise. However, in this paper, we will not take up all objects of either a single system of philosophy or of all systems. Rather we will confine to the *moksha*-object as the same alone is connected to the content of *moksha* in a pure M-E Relation, where Yoga-practice is accepted as the means with pure instrumental value. In such an effort, we are not interested in the possibility of *moksha* as an unconnected happening, i.e., attaining *moksha* is unconnected to a systemic conception of *moksha*, as for

example, someone who has no philosophical knowledge regarding *moksha* attaining it. We are also not interested in considering the non-cognitive dimension, i.e., the external limbs of Yoga, such as *asana*. Rather our main effort is to explicate the contact point between cognitive enterprise of philosophization and the corresponding cognitive realization of the object of knowledge through cognitive-action of Yoga. This, if done, would establish the essential link to the limbs of Yoga, accepted by all schools of Indian Philosophy, as means to the end of *moksha* both overtly or covertly.¹⁶

In our endeavor to clarify the above topic we make extensive use of texts from Bhojavrtti. In Bhojavrtti, meditations are said to be possible both with and without an object. It should be at once noted that the object that Bhojavrtti speaks of and the object that we have spoken of earlier, which is a result of analytic construction are two different things, even though the former can in some sense be brought under the latter. In Bhojavrtti, the term “object” of meditation means an object that is distinctly recognized.¹⁷ It is a meditation in which there is a distinct recognition (*samprajnata*) that is a kind of pondering (*bhavana*) whereby the nature of the object pondered is known thoroughly and without any doubt or error.¹⁸ The term “pondering” means the taking into the mind again and again, to the exclusion of all other objects, that which is to be pondered. A suitable object is of two kinds: it can be either the Lord (*Isvara*) or one of the twenty-five principles. These twenty five principles also are of two kinds: senseless and not-senseless. Twenty four are senseless and that which is not-senseless is the soul.¹⁹ Accordingly the meditation itself is called *samprajnata samadhi*, in which there is recognition (*prajna*) of the object involved. Thus, it is a concentration with distinct recognition of the object.

¹⁶ When a philosopher specifically makes a choice from among the given items and goes for an analytical system, for whatever reasons he deems fit, the end-product, that is his analytical system may or may not be fitted within a homogeneous and more comprehensive analytical system. If it can be fitted within the larger system then the one in question may be said to be good, as it permits a kind of subsuming under a broader and more comprehensive canvass. Such a system carries with it a greater explanatory power.

¹⁷ Cf. “Bhojavrtti to Patanjali’s Yoga Sutra”, in *Yoga Sutra of Patanjali with Bhojavrtti called Rajamartanda*, trans. J. R. Ballantyne and Shastri Govinda Deva, no. I.17. Eric Loomis gives an excellent review of the Book *Classical Indian Metaphysics: Refutations of Realism and the Emergence of “New Logic”* by Philips Stephan. It sums up the arguments and counter-arguments between Sriharsa and Gamgesa on the topic “Distinctness”. The whole thing exhibits the dogged persistence with one’s own philosophical stand. Cf. Eric Loomis: “Book Review II”, in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. XXVII No.3, (2000), pp. 355-363.

¹⁸ Cf. “Bhojavrtti to Patanjali’s Yoga Sutra”, in *Yoga Sutra of Patanjali with Bhojavrtti called Rajamartanda*, trans. J. R. Ballantyne and Shastri Govinda Deva, no. I.17.

¹⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

The above-said “distinct recognition” has to be interpreted as knowledge, which one already possesses through analytic construction. If the cognitive action involved in *samprajnata samadhi* has to be predominantly a philosophical activity – rather than an action aimed at an experiential sort of understanding of an object that is already given – then there would have been no pre-knowledge of the object that is so emphatically said to be required for meditation. If this is so, one has to say that the philosophical introspection is still in progress, without arriving at an object as yet. Now, if an object is already derived in an analytical activity, and if the same is now looked into in *samprajnata samadhi*, then the difference between the “knowledge of the object” as derived in the analytical activity, and the “concentrated view of the same object in *samprajnata samadhi*”? The answer seems to lay in the need for total readjustment of our cognitive framework along with the change in relevant behavioral pattern consistent with the cognitive frame, which can perhaps be done only through cognitive realization of the object. However, one may further say that there is no need to do any such adjustment later to *moksha* since the pure intrinsic value has been attained already. To this it can be said that the readjustment itself constitutes *moksha*. Further, in claiming the requirement of pre-knowledge of the object for *samprajnata samadhi*, and not that *samprajnata Samadhi* itself invents a philosophical object, we can say as follows: even if in the process of meditation, as in *samprajnata Samadhi*, mind excludes modifications (*vrttis*) of all other things excepting that of the specific object of meditation, such meditation cannot include in it all types of objects that are derived in different analytic constructions. For example, the Advaita speaks of subject as the object of meditation. If this is the case, since such a subject cannot be distinctly recognized, unlike in the case of an ordinary object – recognition of which is a necessary precondition for the *samprajnata samadhi* to begin – *samprajnata samadhi* type of meditation cannot encompass within its fold such an object. After all, the *samprajnata samadhi* itself has to grow into the next stage of meditation, i.e., concentration without recognition of the object (*asamprajnata Samadhi*).

The *asamprajnata samadhi* is said to be a meditation without any object.²⁰ In *asamprajnata samadhi* not having an object does not really mean the negation of the philosophical object that is arrived at through analytic construction. Rather, here the specific meaning is the negation of all those objects that cause modifications (*vrttis*) of the mind. Due to the removal of all modification-causing *vrttis* in *asamprajnata samadhi* the subject who is meditating is totally at peace. This is because all objects that create *vrttis* have ceased. The subject is of course continuing to exist. Such a subject is said to be unmodifiable because it is without *vrttis*. In fact if, strictly speaking, meditation implies the “meditated upon” then the meditation itself in a way ceases because there is no object that is to be

²⁰ Cf. Ibid.

meditated upon. It can even be said that the person has attained *moksha/kaivalya*.

The same thing follows when we take the ceasing of modification of the mind in a strict sense from the viewpoint of the object of analytic construction. The object is meditated upon irrespective of its object's cognitive (ontological) counterpart. In most cases of Indian Philosophy, particularly in Vedanta, the object does not access itself to a simple process of "removal of *vrttis* of the mind so that the object remains at the end". Yet it can be confidently asserted that some or the other *vrttis*, which are at present existing, either has to be modified or to be eliminated in entirety. This means that the *moksha*-object has to, of necessity, transform, as it were, itself into the finally experienced object. When this happens there would remain no awareness of distinctness of any object even if for argument's sake such difference still continues to exist. Such a view is held by the Dvaita School. In saying all these we are of course not making the distinction between permanent and impermanent states of *asamprajnata samadhi*.²¹

In *asamprajnata samadhi* the loss of distinct recognition simply means an object, as opposed to subject, is no more in the field of mental vision. As such, mind itself ceases in *asamprajnata samadhi*. The subject itself may be said to exist with or without apprehending itself. This state is characterized as meditation without object. However, the individual *purusa*, the subject, being a thing to be apprehended cannot be located outside the purview of meditation. Locating outside would necessarily imply an object. Furthermore, such a subject could very well be a suitable object as derived through the analytic construction, and which now calls for the cognitive realization. This means that the object becomes a cognitive object first through cognitive efforts of removing all that is inessential to retain only that is essential. After all what does not exist and given can never be apprehended. The *purusa*, therefore, must have to be in the domain of the given. In this process what remains as essential, which has been earlier an object and a cognitive object respectively, becomes entirely grasped as the subject at the end in specific context of Samkhya-Yoga systems. This would happen, as said already, only if the cognitive-subject is already in the field.²²

The shedding of inessential and moving on to the essential can be called a "looping inward Yoga". Alternatively, a process that tries to comprehend the currently left out essentials can be called as a "looping outward Yoga". Finally, a "quantum leap" is the third type where, theoretically speaking, there would be no relation between the anterior and the posterior stage to the attainment of *moksha*. These are the three possible M-E Relations in our context. Having made these general comments, let us move on the consideration of the object of the analytic construction.

²¹ Cf. Ibid.

²² Cf. Ibid., p.19.

Object of Analytic Construction

The analytic construction, which is basically philosophization, seeks to arrive at one or more objects as the fit things for cognitive realization leading to *moksha*. The analytic construction as a rule claims that valid objects, which are primarily presented through different *pramanas*, but which has to go through the analytic tests of the philosopher. He has the freedom to choose the *pramanas* he wants for the presentation of his world-view. He has to safeguard against misconceptions and error. The mind is central to the whole process because ultimately it is the mind that apprehends the *moksha*-object. A Yogically cognitive apprehension of the *moksha*-object is called “cognitive realization”. All recommended objects for meditation must be ontologically real, or else the alleged *moksha*-object would itself yield only an “illusory cognitive realization”. In fact, the ontological reality is important even for objects lesser than the *moksha*-objects, since they too have certain real ends in view.

The cognitive realization of the *moksha*-object begins by dealing with the mental fluctuations (*citta-vrttis*). This act of dealing with the *citta-vrttis* is the prerequisite for any meditation. This is what we usually call *samprajnata samadhi*. To say that *vrttis* of the mind are to be stopped is not to say that valid *vrttis* are not valid. It means rather that inessential mental *vrttis* are to be removed from the purview of the mind. Since valid mental *vrttis* alone can guide one to make further progress in cognitive realization, it is important to maintain and continue with the valid mental *vrttis*. In fact going along the teachings of Bhojavrtti, one notices that there is at least one essential mental *vrtti* at the end as may be found in *virama pratyaya* of *asamprajnata Samadhi*. This *vrtti* remains, but not as ordinary objectual *vrttis*, but as “in which recognition is lost.” Now that we discussed the object of the analytic construction, we must take up for our consideration the reality of error, which often occurs in such a cognitive endeavor.

Error

Almost all schools of Indian thought explain the error that takes place in our perception through what is generally known *khyativada*. Different schools of Indian philosophy propose different theories of error. To mention a few: Naiyayika system, particularly Kumarila proposes the *anyathakhyativada*; Samkhya system and Prabhakara put forward *akhyativada*; and Advaita system presents *anirvacaniyakhyativada*. Similarly theories of error are also presented by non-Vedic schools, such as Buddhism. Error occurs in the conceptual level, because ontologically speaking things are things and they remain what they are. It is the conceptual grasp of the ontological objects that matters. In grasping these objects one could commit mistakes. The question of how error takes place can be understood at two different levels. The first type of error takes place at the normal empirical level and we try to set right the wrong through

physical explanations. The second one, which is our concern here, is the error that occurs at the level of metaphysics. This kind of error occurs when some basic matter that we unquestioningly accept is challenged by the analytic construction. Thus, the error here consists in what is accepted to be true is shown as an error by the analytic construction. This type of error is made right by a subsequent explanation that is put forward about what the right thing is.

In fact, there is no easy method to decide about the correctness of different ontologies except through an analytical examination of the ontological view in question. What is important is that once a certain matter is held to be conceptually erroneous, it logically entails that cognitively some re-adjustment/relocating has to be effected in our cognitive framework. In this view, even the so-called purely conceptual category mistake, in order to be corrected, has to have a corresponding cognitive adjustment. Of course the analogy of “forest and trees” for category mistake may be too naïve a thing, to warrant meditation, for it is, even though cognitively significant, does not involve a radical revision of our understanding, either of the whole of *Weltanschauung* or some significant part of it thereof.

In concluding this point, we can say that error in its most generalized formulation is said to be “non-knowledge”. If something, i.e., a notion “X” constitutes knowledge, then not having the notion “X” is an error. This X may within it contain not only what is, but also what is not. We are of course using simplified version of field “X”, so that we can hasten to reach the meditation (*dhyana*) of Yoga-practice. In the attainment of cognitive realization in *dhyana* the object of *dhyana* plays a significant role. Hence, in the next section, we turn our attention to the role the object in the cognitive realization.

Role of Object in Cognitive Realization

The explication of the question of the possible types of objects involved in cognitive realization is very complex. In knowing a *moksha*-object “T”, someone knows “T+ nT”, where “nT” refers to something that is “not-T”, which has no real ontological location in the field “X”; or in knowing *mokshai-object* “T”, “T- t1”, where “t1” refers to an element of “X” having real ontological location in “X”, as a unitary whole (in both cases), then error is said to occur. The “unitary whole” simply means (T+ nT) or (T-t1) as the case may be, without differentiating between “T”, on the one hand and “nT” on the other; and not comprehending the totality of “T” by deducting “t1” in the second case. Obviously then, in the dissection/non-comprehension of totality of the unitary knowledge in case 1 and case 2 respectively “T” or “T-t1” will always be primary knowledge, which always represents the apprehended part of “T” (*dhyana*/meditation). Shankara calls *dhyana*, at some texts, as *nididhyasana* and considers it as

upasana.²³ Yet in *upasana* the object of meditation (*upasya*) has to be in consonance with the scriptures (*sastra*), and should be concentrated on it until it is obtained. According to Shankara “for *nididhyasana* the objective knowledge is the object, and the same has to be looked at in a concentrated manner... The non-self-thought should be left and mind should concentrate on Self. ... This *adhyatmayoga* [concentration on the Self] is not *cittavrttinirodha* [mere removal of mental fluctuations] but the *vaidikadhyana* [meditation on divine knowledge].”²⁴ It is clear from the above quotations that the most important difference between *dhyana* and *nididhyasana* seems to be one of *purusatantra* and *vastutantra* respectively.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we need to address the more important question: “how the mind, a lesser entity, can concentrate on the Self, a greater entity.” This is a real problem because being a lesser entity than the Self, mind cannot comprehend the Self. Therefore, Advaita seems to recommend a kind of “take off” from the *nididhyasana*. It is difficult to say whether the manifestation (*darsana*) of the Self (*moksha*) takes place on its own independent of *nididhyasana* or whether it is dependent on *nididhyasana* itself. Since there is no logically perceivable link between the two Advaitins consider the attainment of *moksha* as a “Quantum Leap M-E relation”, in which there would be no relation between the anterior and the posterior stage to the attainment of *moksha*. The means prepares the way for *moksha*; nevertheless, the end – *moksha* – is experienced independent of the means, as there is a “Quantum Leap” between the means and end.²⁵ However, Samkhya and Yoga systems would consider the attainment of *moksha* with the help of an “Inward Looping M-E Relation”. Isolation/alooofness of the *Purusha* (*kaivalya*) is the Samkhyan equivalent of *moksha*. *Purusa*, being a conscious principle – what I really am – has to attain isolation from nature (*prakrti*). Nature in this context primarily denotes the body. At the time of attainment of the *kaivalya*, the Yogi has fulfilled the four ends of life (*purusharthas*) and has transcended the *gunas* – *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Times and *gunas* return to their source, and Consciousness of the *purusha* (*citisakti*) is established in its own natural purity. In other words, all inessentials have been shed off permanently through an “Inward Looping M-E Relation”. The unity of the single reality, the *Purusha*, is attained.

²³ The term “*uapasana*” in Sanskrit literally means “Sitting near” (*upa+asana*). *Upasana* is a systematic practice of a prescribed method of worship or practice of meditation upon some aspect of nature. Normally such prescription of meditation methods is taken from Hindu scriptures, Vedas or Puranas. Cf. Web Page, <http://www.answers.com/Upasana>.

²⁴ Cf. Swami Saccidanendra Saraswati: *Brahma Sutra Bhasya of Samkara*, vol. II, pp. ix-x.

²⁵ Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. xxiv-xxv.

