

GOA-KARNATAKA RELATIONS 1763-1857

(A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDY)

Thesis submitted to

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By

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
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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this Ph.D. thesis entitled "Goa – Karnataka Relations 1763 – 1857 (A Political And Economic Study)" submitted to Goa University forms an independent work carried out by me in the Department of History, Goa University, under the supervision of Dr. N. Shyam Bhat, Reader, Department of History, Goa University, and this thesis has not previously formed the basis for the award of any degree, diploma, associateship or other similar titles.

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CERTIFICATE

I certify that this thesis entitled "Goa – Karnataka Relations 1763 – 1857 (A Political And Economic Study)" submitted by Rita Braganza for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History, Goa University, is a record of research work done by her during the period from 1995 to 2001 when she worked under my guidance. This thesis has not previously formed the basis for the award of any degree, diploma, associateship or fellowship to Rita Braganza.

I affirm that this thesis submitted by Rita Braganza represents the independent research work carried out by her under my supervision.



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I thank my husband, mother and other family members and friends for their unflinching support during the course of this research work.

Brigonda.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BOR	- Board of Revenue.
CDD	- Commercial Department Diaries.
GHA	- Goa Historical Archives.
IOR	- India Office Records.
KSA	- Karnataka State Archives.
LDCDC	- <i>Livro do Correspondencia da Canara.</i>
MR	- <i>Munções do Reino</i>
MSA	- Maharashtra State Archives.
PMBR	- Proceedings of the Madras Board of Revenue.
PMSCD	- Proceedings of the Madras Sea Customs Department.
QJMS	- Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society.
RV	- <i>Reis Vizinhos.</i>
SPDD	- Secret and Political Department Diaries.
TNSA	- Tamil Nadu State Archives.

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GLOSSARY

1. ***Alfandega*** - Customs House
2. ***Antigualhes*** - Antiquities
3. ***Bale*** - 2½ maunds, measure for grain.
4. ***Cartaz*** - A safe conduct pass for navigation issued to a non-Portuguese ship by Portuguese authorities against payment of a fee.
5. ***Commandante da Feltoria*** - Commander of a trading station in an Asian port.
6. ***Estado da India*** - Portuguese India.
7. ***Feltor*** - Factor or a person in charge of a trading station in an Asian Port.
8. ***Feltoria*** - Trading Station or an agency in an Asian port.
9. ***Fidalgo*** - Portuguese nobleman.
10. ***Khandi*** - Equivalent to 20 maunds or 3 quintals.
11. ***Livro do Correspondencia do Canara*** - The Book of Correspondence concerning Canara.
12. ***Machvas and Padavs*** - Sea vessels for transporting goods.
13. ***Padros*** - Priests
14. ***Reis Vizinhos*** - Neighbouring Kings.
15. ***Pe. Vigar*** - Parish priest.
16. ***Vedor de Fazenda*** - Royal Treasurer at Goa.
17. ***Xerafin*** - A silver coin of Goa equivalent to 5 tangas.

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CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

Goa and Karnataka, as the two neighbouring states on the western coast of India had developed close political, economic and cultural relations. History tells us that Goa and Karnataka were under one and the same political authority and administration for several centuries. Different dynasties and rulers of Karnataka held sway over Goa too. The political history of Goa, during the ancient and medieval periods, presents rulers of various dynasties like the Bhojas, Satavahanas, Chalukyas of Badami, Shilaharas of South Konkan or Goa, Kadambas of Goa, Kings of Vijayanagara and the Bahamanis of Bijapur. The political headquarters of some of these kingdoms were in Karnataka and from there they extended their political control over Goa. A predominant role was played by the Portuguese in the history of Goa from 1510 to 1961.

A glance at the political history of Karnataka reveals that from 1763 to 1799, the Sultans of Mysore, namely, Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan, dominated its politics. Their history is significant for their continuous and determined opposition to the English and their policy of territorial

aggrandisement. However, in this process Tipu tried to seek the French support. After the fall of Tipu at Srirangapattana in 1799, the authorities of the English East India Company at Madras annexed the coastal province of Kanara and Sonda to the Madras Presidency. This territory was strategically located. Then the Portuguese in Goa came into direct contact with their English counterparts in coastal Karnataka. In Mysore, the Marquess Wellesley appointed a Commission of five Officers - General Harris, Colonel Arthur Wellesley, Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant Colonel Kirkpatric and Lieutenant Colonel Barry Close as Commissioners for the affairs of Mysore, for the purpose of arranging the settlement of Mysore. The Treaty of Mysore of 22nd June, 1799 effected by Lord Wellesley secured for the English Company various substantial benefits, extended its territory from sea to sea across the base of the peninsula and later saw to the encircling of the Mysore kingdom by Pax Britannica. Mysore was restored back to the Wodeyars of Mysore, but the British Residency system was introduced. In 1831 occurred the Nagar insurrection and the English East India Company took over the administration of Mysore. From 1831 to 1881 Mysore was under the Commissioner's rule.

The present thesis on "Goa - Karnataka Relations 1763 - 1857 (A Political and Economic Study)" is an attempt to fill in a noticeable gap in the historiography of Goa - Karnataka relations. This period was a part of the long colonial rule of the Portuguese in Goa. But as noted earlier, in the politics of Karnataka this period saw great changes. If 1763 saw the rise of Haidar Ali, 1857 marked the end of the Company's rule. Another reason which prompted us to take up this study is the non-availability of a serious comprehensive and analytical study on the relations between Goa and Karnataka during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. There was much political and economic interaction between these two regions. But it has not been given due consideration by historians inspite of the availability of copious source materials. A quick look at the historical writings on Goa and Karnataka would show that this kind of a study is a desideratum.

Historiographical Survey:

B. S. Shastry's, "The Portuguese in Kanara 1498 - 1763",¹ is an important work on Goa - Karnataka historiography. It analyses in detail the Portuguese relations with the Kanarese chiefs, namely, the Nayakas of Keladi. This is a comprehensive study of the Portuguese activities in

Kanara. It concentrated both on their political and commercial relations. It reveals that Goa relied on Kanarese rice which was obtained by the Portuguese either by trade or by tributes from local chiefs or by force. The construction of Portuguese fortresses in the Kanara region gave an impetus to their trading operations. Due to the presence of other powers as rivals for trade in Kanara, particularly the Arabs and the Dutch, the Portuguese attempted to lord overseas trade by the system of *cartazes*. The Portuguese signed several treaties with the Nayakas of Keladi and they invariably had several provisions to protect the Portuguese commercial interests in Kanara. *Studies in Indo-Portuguese History*² is another notable work in this connection. It includes articles like "The First Decade of Portuguese - Vijayanagara Relations", "Timmayya and His Relations with the Portuguese 1498-1512", and "Portuguese Relations with Hyder Ali 1763-1769". These along with the other articles throw light on the relations that existed between Portuguese Goa and Karnataka. B. S. Shastry's research articles on "Socio-Economic Relations between Goa and Karnataka in their Political Setting (1000 A.D. to 1800 A.D.)"³ (3 articles) in the *Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society* provide valuable information on this subject. His article on "Tulaji Angria and the Portuguese 1742 - 1756"⁴ in the *Colloquium* examines

their relationship *vis-a-vis* the Peshwa and the English. It examines the factors undermining the love-hate relationship between Tulaji Angria and the Portuguese. His another article on "Portuguese Trade with Venkatappa Nayaka of Keladi"⁵ in the *Colloquium* gives insight on trade relations.

K. N. Chitnis, in his *Keladi Polity* makes a detailed study of the Nayakas of Keladi and their diplomatic relations. K. D. Swaminathan's *The Nayakas of Ikkeri*⁶ is an exhaustive work on this ruling family. It provides some details on their relations with the Portuguese. The work of N. K. Sinha⁷ on Haidar Ali and Mohibbul Hasan⁸ on Tipu Sultan only make a few references to the Portuguese. Suryanath U. Kamath's article on "Trade at Kanara ports (1500-1800)"⁹ in the *Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society* gives details of trade between foreign and local elements in the ports of Kanara. A. Appadorai's *Economic Conditions in Southern India*¹⁰ evaluates the nature and scope of economic history. It studies the economic condition of the region during A.D. 1000 - 1500. It studies the various factors which give an impetus to the upliftment of economic condition. Malathi K. Moorthy's, "Trade and Commerce in Colonial South Kanara"¹¹ furnishes elaborate information on various aspects of the economy of this region from 1799 - 1862. It

analyses the economic scenario in Kanara after the English occupation of the region. It highlights inland trade, sea trade, commodity composition and the role of transport and communication in South Kanara. It makes some references to trade between Goa and South Kanara.

Celsa Pinto's *Trade and Finance in Portuguese India (1770 – 1840)*¹² deals with intra-Asiatic commercial system. It focuses on trade in luxury items and necessities. The role of the indigenous and Portuguese merchants in the commercial transactions of the *Estado da India* is analysed. Teotonio R. de Souza edited *Goa Through the Ages*,¹³ Volume II *An Economic History* carries an article on "Goa-based Overseas and Coastal Trade (18th and 19th Centuries) by Celsa Pinto. Celsa Pinto's work, *Goa: Images And Perceptions*¹⁴ includes an article on "Tipu Sultan's Designs on Goa: Fact or Fiction?".

Another notable work on the economic history of Western India is Ruchira Bannerjee's *Mercantile Network of Malabar (1760 – 1800)*.¹⁵ She analyses the impact of the rise of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan on the economy of Malabar. The work deals with the mercantile network of various communities like Lombardies and Vanjaries in

facilitating trade. She outlines an analytical geographical location of the trade routes. P.P. Shirodkar's *Researches in Indo-Portuguese History*¹⁶ provides some references.

The above historiographical survey shows that the relations between Portuguese Goa and Karnataka from 1763 onwards have not been well researched so far. Our effort is to concentrate on their complex political and economic relations and analyse them historically and objectively.

Sources:

This study is largely based on primary sources like treaties, agreements, official documents and administrative reports. These evidences are collected from various repositories like Goa State Archives, Goa, Karnataka State Archives, Bangalore, Maharashtra State Archives, Mumbai, and Tamil Nadu State Archives, Chennai. Besides a number of useful works are consulted at the Heras Institute, Mumbai, Goa University Library, Goa, Central Library, Panjim, Goa and the Xavier Centre of Historical Research, Goa. The most important series of Portuguese records consulted include *Monções do Reino* (Monsoon Series), *Alfandegas* (Customs Records), *Reis Vizinhos* (Neighbouring Kings), *Antigualhas* (Antiquities) and *Livro do Correspondencia do Canara* (The

Book of Correspondence Concerning Kanara). India Office Records - Home Miscellaneous Series, Commercial Department Diaries, Secret and Political Department Diaries, the Proceedings of the Madras Board of Revenue, the Proceedings of the Madras Sea Customs Department, and other such English reports are consulted.

Monções do Reino volumes are original source materials which are related to diverse aspects of history. They provide minute details of correspondence on the affairs of the *Estado da India*. *Alfandegas* convey the functioning of the various customs houses, the policies of the administration and the items traded at the various depots. *Reis Vizinhos* focus on the relationship of the Portuguese with the neighbouring Kings. They contain letters written by the Portuguese officials to develop cordial relations with their neighbours. *Antigualhas*¹⁷ furnish information on the history of diplomatic relations between the Portuguese on the one side, and Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan on the other. It narrates the incidents reflecting on the relationship between the two powers. It includes information related to the correspondences between the Portuguese and other political powers too. *Livro do Correspondencia do Canara* furnishes information on the Portuguese, British and French activities

in Kanara during the reign of the last few kings of Keladi and of Haidar Ali of Mysore. These Portuguese records are consulted at the Goa State Archives.

The English records preserved at the Karnataka State Archives, Bangalore, include India Office Records --Home Miscellaneous Series. They highlight the English - French conflict for supremacy in India. They reflect the diplomatic dealings and alliances in Europe too. The Secret and Political Department Diaries consulted at the Maharashtra State Archives, Mumbai, provide information regarding the British alliances with various native rulers. They throw light on important matters of concern for the State. The Commercial Department Diaries deal with trading encounters between the British and the Portuguese. The Portuguese relied on the British to carry on trading transactions.

Important government records consulted at the Tamil Nadu State Archives are Extracts from Capt. Colin Mackenzie, Extracts from Minutes of Consultations, Extracts from Madras Board of Revenue, Consultations of Madras Board of Revenue, Correspondence between the Collectors in Kanara and Board of Revenue, Madras. Other sources consulted include Reports on a Joint Commission from

Bengal and Bombay, Report of F. N. Maltby, Report of Revenue Administration of Col. Mark Cubbon, Sullivan's Report on the provinces of Malabar and Canara, Thackeray's Report on Revenue Affairs of Malabar and Canara, Report of T. L. Blane on South Kanara District, Reports on Revenue Settlements, Minutes of Proceedings of Board of Revenue, Reports on Imports and Exports. All these records of the English East India Company furnish useful information on their political and trading relations with the Indian rulers as well as the Europeans. We are concerned with their relations with the Portuguese.

Some significant secondary works consulted by us include *The Cambridge Economic History of India*, Volume I C.1200 – C.1750 edited by Tapan Raychaudhuri and Irfan Habib, *The Cambridge Economic History of India*, Volume II C.1757-C.1970 edited by Dharma Kumar, *The Portuguese in India and Before Colonialism: Theories on Asian-European Relations 1500-1750* by M. N. Pearson, *Merchants, Markets and State in the Early Modern India* edited by Sanjay Subramanyam, *Trade and Finance in Colonial India 1750-1860* edited by Asiya Siddiqui, *Maritime India in the Seventeenth Century and Merchants, Companies and Commerce on the Coromandel Coast 1650-1740* by Sinnappah

Arasaratnam, *The Merchant Warrior Pacified* by George D. Winius and Marcus P. M. Wink and others on the history of India, Karnataka and Goa. These works and the historical perspectives that they provide have helped us in the formulation of our ideas on the present topic in a better and wider historical perspective.

Nature and Scope:

This work proposes to provide new empirical and analytical historical knowledge on Goa – Karnataka relations. The objective is to study the nature, content and underlying features of the political and economic relations between these two regions. The political and economic factors were complementary in nature, for, friendly political relations facilitated healthy economic ties and promoted trade and commerce. As a grain deficit region Goa had to depend on Kanarese rice. Kanara was considered as the granary of the Western coast and it produced and exported large quantity of rice. The Portuguese were compelled by the circumstances to maintain amicable political relations with the rulers of Karnataka, that too with those who controlled the grain surplus Districts of coastal Karnataka. Moreover, this region on the Arabian sea coast had several major ports like Mangalore, Barkur, Kundapur, Honnavar and Karwar. They

facilitated trade and commerce in a big way and all rulers, Indian or foreign, were longing to control them.

The Portuguese Government had signed several treaties with the Nayakas of Keladi with a view to procure merchandise from Kanara and also to have favourable balance of trade. This trend changed considerably during the reigns of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan. The English were also powerful on the coastal part of Karnataka after 1799. Our effort is to unravel the political, diplomatic and economic relations between these powers. However, the relations became more complex and complicated because of the involvement of other powers like the English, French and the Marathas under the Peshwas. The relation between trade and conquest is very well expressed by Asiya Siddiqui in the following words : "the expansion of trade was closely linked with British conquest and domination, and the supersession of the East India Company by private European traders and finances".¹⁸ The promotion of economic interest was always connected with political conquests and treaties. This was the case with the Portuguese in India also.

An important feature of this work is not to accept the stereotype created by historians in Indo-Portuguese

historiography. Most of the writers concentrated on the heydays of the Portuguese in Goa. We are concentrating on a period which marked the beginning of their decline. Further this study will consider trade in luxury items and also essential goods. We have used the records of the English East India Company to examine their relations with the Portuguese in Goa.

The present study is divided into six chapters. The introductory chapter provides information on historiographical survey, sources, nature and scope of the study and chapterisation. The second chapter is on the historical background. It depicts the political situation of India in general and of South India in particular during the mid-eighteenth century. The political condition in Karnataka and Goa is narrated, and the various powers vying with each other for political supremacy and promotion of economic interests and mercantile activities are considered. The relations between the Portuguese in Goa and Haidar Ali of Mysore form the subject matter of the third chapter. The political change in Mysore, the emergence of Haidar and his conquest of Bednore in 1763 and the political and economic relations between Portuguese Goa and Haidar's kingdom in Karnataka are considered. In the post-1763 period, Haidar

Ali established a firm footing in Mangalore, which was a bone of contention between the native and European powers. The Portuguese had established their Fortress-Factory¹⁹ system in the region and the emergence of a new sovereign posed a challenge to the long period of monopoly that they had enjoyed in the region. The involvement of the Marathas, English and French and its influence on the relations between the Portuguese and Haidar are discussed. The factors which influenced their relations, the nature of their political relations and their impact on the economic field are analysed here. The fourth chapter highlights the Portuguese relations with Tipu Sultan. The changes introduced by Tipu in the Mysore - Portuguese relations, the military reforms of Tipu, his relations with the French, and his annexationist tendency are discussed. The intervention of other foreign powers, particularly the English and the French, is also taken into consideration to examine the topic in its broader historical context. The Marathas and the Nizam of Hyderabad were also important factors in Goa-Karnataka relations.

The Portuguese relationship with the English in the Province of Kanara and Sonda is studied in the fifth chapter. The Portuguese government had cordial relations with the

English East India Company government. The Province of Kanara and Sonda was under the Madras Presidency. There existed busy trade between Portuguese Goa and early colonial Kanara from 1799 to 1857. Along with many other products, Kanara exported large quantities of rice to Goa. Similarly Goa exported varieties of goods to Kanara. Salt was a notable item in that list. The conclusions are presented in the sixth and last chapter. The political relationship between Portuguese Goa and the rulers of Karnataka was governed by their economic interests. Besides there are a few maps, appendices, glossary and bibliography.

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1. B. S. Shastry, "The Portuguese in Kanara (1498 - 1763)", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Bombay University, 1969.
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6. K. D. Swaminathan, *The Nayakas of Ikkeri*, Madras, 1957.
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 17. P. S. S. Pissurlencar, *Antigualhas : Estudos e Documentos sobre a Historia dos Portugueses na India*, Vol. I, Fasciculo I, Bastora, 1941.
 18. Asiya Siddiqui (ed.), *Trade and Finance in Colonial India 1750-1860*, Delhi, 1995, p.53.
 19. The Fortress – Factory system meant the establishment of Portuguese posts in the strategic locations where the Portuguese established the trade centres to sell and purchase commodities. This served both the purposes of controlling important trade centres and defending these posts.



CHAPTER - II

HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND

CHAPTER - II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The year 1707 marked the commencement of a new phase in Indian political scenario. The death of Aurangzeb in that year marked the disintegration of the Mughal Empire. The Mughals could no more provide stable condition in administration, economy and other areas. The Mughal Empire was no longer able to resist internal and external challenges. The central authority weakened considerably and resulted in the establishment of a number of minor principalities. The Mughal disintegration created a vacuum which provided local rulers their long sought opportunity to evade Mughal control and tax levied by them.¹ These local rulers tried to create an internal order in India and to limit the sovereign tendencies already inherent in the presence of the European Companies.

Between 1707 and 1757 tremendous change occurred both in the political situation and in the position of the foreign traders in India.² The Battle of Plassey (1757) laid the foundation of colonial contours and an era of annexation and consolidation of European Power in India. The

devastating impact of these changes was observed in the prolonged depression which in varying degrees affected large parts of India in the late eighteenth century. The English East India Company's take over of Bengal was visualised as part of a larger economic and political process. The causes for the war were attributed to the endeavour to control the economic resources between the East India Company and the Indian regional powers. After the disintegration of the Mughal Empire, Siraj-ud-daulah, the Nawab of Bengal posed as a formidable threat to culminate the lucrative gains of the Company. The defeat of the Nawab of Bengal, Siraj-ud-Daulah as a result of the conspiracy between Mir Jaffar, the Commander-in-Chief of the Nawab and the British, decided the nature of the future course of Indian politics.

On the eve of the Battle of Plassey the Marathas under the Peshwas in the Deccan expanded both in North and the South of India. The Maratha power was in the prime of its glory and conquered vast territories on the Indian subcontinent on the demise of Aurangzeb, the Maratha dream of establishing an Indian empire seemed not far away. The Maratha zeal of expansion came to a standstill with the invasions of Ahmad Shah Abdali in the vicinity of Delhi in 1757. The political scene further changed with the third

Battle of Panipat in 1761. It gave a death blow to the rising Maratha Power. Abdali crushed the Maratha Power and thwarted their advance towards the North by inflicting a devastating defeat for the latter. This defeat reduced the Marathas to a territorial power and further curtailed their supremacy. The supreme authority that the Peshwa came to wield in 1750 could not be continued for long. The Battle of Panipat (1761) considerably hampered his position.

The map of India was redrawn after the Battle of Plassey with the entry of the European (English) element in Indian politics. The victory of the British at Plassey gave scope to the French to compete and play their cards with the British on the Indian subcontinent. Simultaneously the French and the English showed themselves willing to employ military force to maintain themselves in India, and this included quarrelling with one another.³ Fifty years after the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) Great Britain signed the Treaty of Paris (1763) with France. This new peace signed after the Seven Years War was to maintain political stability among the European nations. In India, the French and British were at loggerheads over the dispute in the Carnatic. Dupleix, the French Governor entered into rivalries among the Indian Princes. However it was with the advent of Dupleix on the

scene that the report of French valour resounded throughout India.

Dupleix studied the nature of Indian polity which enabled him to exploit the situation to the advantage of the French. His utmost priority was to establish French supremacy in the South of India. To materialise his plans Dupleix waged regular wars with the English East India Company and the local Princes from 1750. The Anglo-French conflict in India intensified their rivalries in Canada, and the British government decided to cut off supplies and reinforcements from France. In June 1755 a French Convoy was attacked by Admiral Boscaven of Newfoundland, two French ships were captured, though rest escaped.⁴ Over 300 French merchant ships were seized which forced Versailles to send an ultimatum to London which resulted in the Seven Years War. The Seven Years War which began in 1756 further accelerated British attack further East. British merchants had long been sharing the Chinese and far Eastern trade, and when Spain intervened against Britain in 1761, a British force seized Manila.⁵ The uppermost thought prevailing among the British was to place France and Spain at a disadvantage while promoting their supremacy.

The Seven Years War in the mid-eighteenth century saw the French enclaves in India crumbling under British attack in 1761.⁶ During this period the main aim of the French was to carry on trade peacefully and debar themselves from the politics of the country. V. G. Hataalkar has pointed out that Indian politics being always subservient to European politics, France could not and would not interfere in Indian affairs unless and until she was forced to it by a war in Europe between herself and England.⁷ The Treaty of Paris was concluded by England with France to terminate the Seven Years War. The benefits of Britain were considerable, though it was meant for the appeasement of France and Spain. In America, Britain acquired Canada, Nova Scotia, Cape Briton and the adjoining islands, and the right to navigate the Mississippi, important for Red Indian trade. In West Indies, Grenada, St. Vincent, Dominica and Tobago were acquired. From Spain she received Florida. In Africa she acquired Senegal. In India, the English East India Company preserved its extensive conquests and although their trading ports were returned the political ambitions of the French in the subcontinent were finally extinguished.⁸ As Dutch power waned, English and French East India Companies rose to prominence, but with the Treaty of Paris in 1763, the British checkmated the French in India.

The period from 1580 to 1640 which witnessed the merger of Portuguese Spanish Crowns also signalled an era of prosperity for Spain. It was the foreign imports that brought the revenue which maintained the great fleets and armies of Spain. Portugal had already established herself as an imperial power in the East Indies and was consolidating her colonial empire. The colonial experience was very mixed. Colonisation itself will have to be viewed as an alliance between imperial and local forces.⁹ England and Holland united themselves to pose a challenge to Portugal as soon as she gained independence from Spain. Both these nations agreed cordially in their inveterate hostility to the Spanish and Portuguese.¹⁰ They targeted East Indian trade which was lucrative and their interference was hampering Portugal's monopoly in the region. But, in this game of overpowering Portugal, Great Britain visualised the rising prominence of the Dutch which soon was becoming much more dangerous than the Portuguese in Asia. The Dutch were inflicting heavy damage on the English East Indian trade, which the English Company was by no means disposed to endure.¹¹ The eighteenth century was a period of rapidly developing merchant capitalism. Holland had both a flourishing mercantile marine and an abundance of accumulated capital

but lacked the military power to maintain its hold on the distant trade with Asia and America.¹² The Dutch were always inimical to the English in the East whatever might be the relations between England and Holland in Europe.

The Dutch, the most flourishing mercantile people of the seventeenth century, lost their position of leadership by the eighteenth century. France and England had come to be the great rivals in world trade and their rivalry dominated the economic situation through most of the century. The reasons for the failure of the Dutch East India Company and the success of the English Company could be attributed to the following factors. The Industrial Revolution in England hampered trade transactions with India, mainly selling of goods. On the contrary, the Dutch were mainly concentrating on Indian production. The difference between the two Companies lay in Europe and rested in the superior political and economic machinery of England.¹³ The general nature of the Dutch colonial society was that it was a dependant economy, dependent to the extent that supplies for European consumers took precedence over maintenance of a market in which European goods could be disposed off.¹⁴ The maritime trade fed the stubborn power of resistance displayed by the Dutch Republic, and the greatness of

England was manifestly founded upon her world ranging commerce. The Dutch were intoxicated by their success against the Portuguese.¹⁵ The Dutch trading interests were primarily in the rice exports of Kanara. They established close links with the Kanara merchant families. After the establishment of a factory by the English in Bhatkal, the three European nations, namely, Portugal, Holland and England began competing for commodities and pushing up prices in the course of the seventeenth century. The Dutch glory sounded a serious warning to British East Indian trade, which the English Company did not take lightly.

The French also emerged in the concert for trade in the East Indies. Britain wound up her rivalries with the Portuguese, as the latter ceased to be a challenging competitor in the East Indies. The English proved themselves as the victors in their struggle with the Dutch. As the Dutch power waned the British and the French East Indies Companies rose to prominence.¹⁶ The commencement of the eighteenth century signalled a complete change in the policies of the Europeans on the Indian coast. Now, the emphasis rested on the methodology to be followed to foster and maximise trading interests in the region. The wars undertaken by the European powers in Europe had their

repercussions on India. The British and French East India Companies engulfed themselves in violent quarrels which resulted from commercial rivalries. For twenty years South India became a battlefield of two distant European nations, and Indian affairs were entangled in the prolonged struggle between France and England for colonial and naval superiority.¹⁷

Trade in Asia was of strategic and utmost significance to traders from times immemorial. The zeal to occupy ports and hinterland and thereby to promote commerce was a top priority. When the Portuguese ventured in South India, the Arabs had already established themselves as trade magnates in the region. Towards the end of the fifteenth century, the coastal ports of Karnataka witnessed the advent of the Portuguese, and their trading activities commenced in the first two decades of the next century.¹⁸

The maritime trade of the Arabs which was predominant in Arab countries and even in China suffered a setback with the emergence of a powerful contender in the Indian Ocean. The success of the Portuguese is attributed to the possession of an excellent navy which was a novelty on Indian shores. During the fifteenth century they developed

scientifically the art of building ocean-going ships which were equipped with cannons.¹⁹ The Indian rulers during this period had not mastered the art of naval warfare which could successfully retaliate and curb Portuguese presence in the region. The Vijayanagara kingdom possessed a navy, but it was no match to the far superior Portuguese fleet. The Gersoppa Chief had a fleet, but not so good to venture in deep waters and oppose the Portuguese ships loaded with gunnery.

Goa was known for its strategic importance, trading activities and trading communities. The Arab traders utilised the port of Goa as a trade entrepot. They had already established themselves in the region on the eve of the Portuguese conquest of Goa in 1510. The Portuguese trading activities had an adverse effect on the Arab trade in the coastal towns of Bhatkal, Honnavar, Mirjan and Goa.²⁰ The Portuguese attempted to lord over the sea trade by the system of *cartazes*, meaning permits or passports. In the sixteenth century they were able to enforce their policy due to the absence of stiff competition from any European power in this region. The Portuguese trade proved in the hands of a free and wealthy people, a very powerful instrument of colonial and commercial expansion.²¹ The Portuguese

enjoyed a monopoly of trade on the Kanara coast for more than one century beginning with the sixteenth century and serious challenge to their activity came from the British during the second quarter of the seventeenth century and from the Dutch during the third quarter of the same century.²²

The efforts of the Portuguese to have a factory on the Kanara coast did not succeed so long as the Empire from the City of Vijayanagara had full control over the coast.²³ Krishnadevaraya was the ruling monarch of Vijayanagara on the eve of the conquest of Goa by the Portuguese. Afonso de Albuquerque made several attempts to convince Krishnadevaraya for his permission to erect a fortress at Bhatkal. He did not succeed in obtaining the permission, but after occupying Goa in 1510 he employed some captains to compel merchant ships to sail into the port of Goa, thus damaging the sea trade at Bhatkal. The downfall of the Vijayanagara empire lighted the aspirations of the Portuguese to control trade on the Kanara coast. But along with the Portuguese there arose a number of competitors who staked their claims in this region. The Nayakas of Keladi who were feudatories of Vijayanagara posed as tough rivals in the early seventeenth century. Venkatappa Nayaka (1582- 1629)

expanded his kingdom which stretched from the river Mirjan in North Kanara to the river Chandragiri in Kasaragod. With the defeat of Vijayanagara in 1565 at the Battle of Talikota, the Portuguese established themselves at Honavar, Basrur, and Mangalore. The Portuguese were primarily interested in pepper and rice of the Kanara region. As noted earlier, rice was produced in Kanara in abundance and the Portuguese largely depended upon its rice supplies for Goa and their other possessions in India, the Arab coast and Western coast of Africa.²⁴ They realised the might of Venkatappa and were apprehensive to invite hostilities due to the presence of the Dutch who were a hindrance to the smooth flow of the Portuguese trade. The Dutch were blockading the Goa bar practically every year and were attacking other Portuguese possessions all along the coasts of India and elsewhere.²⁵ The Portuguese at Goa sent an embassy to Venkatappa Nayaka in 1623 and concluded with him a treaty with a view to protect their interests in the pepper trade.²⁶ The rule of Sivappanayaka (1645 - 1660) proved disastrous to Portuguese interests in the Kanara region. He drove the Portuguese out of Honnavar fort, with the help of the Dutch, conquered Belur and Sakkarepattana and established Srirangaraya the fugitive emperor of Vijayanagara in the government of these two places.²⁷ The Portuguese thus

ceased to be politically important in Kanara. But they were permitted to trade on the Kanara coast by Shivappa's successors, beginning with 1664.

The principality of Sonda was however never an independent state, but subject to the sovereignty, successively of Vijayanagara, the Mughals, the Marathas and the Portuguese, until its total extinction in 1764.²⁸ By the end of seventeenth century the Nayakas of Sonda began to extend their political sphere and as a result served as a hurdle for Portuguese expansion. The Bhonsles of Sawantwadi were rivals of the Nayakas of Sonda. They were a source of constant conflicts due to the proximity of their territories. The Portuguese were interested in the trade of the Sonda ports and preferred to help the Nayakas against the Bhonsles. There were occasions when Sonda was taken by the Bhonsles, but was recovered by the Portuguese for the Nayakas.²⁹

The above survey reveals that by 1763 or roughly by the middle of the eighteenth century, the political situation in Peninsular India was confused and complex. There were many political powers - Indian and Foreign - vying with each other for political supremacy in different parts of South India.

In Goa the Portuguese had firmly established themselves. In Karnataka, the Nayakas of Keladi lost their political authority in 1763 and Haidar Ali had just emerged. In Western India the Marathas managed to continue their regime under the Peshwas. The Nayakas of Sonda were a minor ruling power of northern Kanara seeking protection under the Portuguese. Among the Europeans, the English were the most powerful. The expansion of the French and the Dutch as colonial powers in India was already sealed off by the English. The Arabs and the Dutch who figured conspicuously in the trade of the region earlier had dwindled now. It was in this political atmosphere that the Portuguese had to carry on their political negotiations and manage to steer the ship of the State. Because the *Estado da India* had lost its former glory by the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Their relations with the rulers of Vijayanagara and the horse trade that they had with them, and their treaties with the Nayakas of Keladi and trade contacts are too well known. B. S. Shastry has done considerable research on the Portuguese activities in Kanara from 1498 to 1763. The Portuguese normally maintained cordial political, diplomatic and commercial relations with the Nayakas of Keladi during this period. There were also instances of rivalry and fight between the two neighbours, particularly when the Keladi polity had

powerful rulers like Sivappanayaka. Some of the Keladi rulers did not meekly submit themselves before the Portuguese. They asserted their authority and tried to repulse the Portuguese from the ports of Kanara. They could even bargain on the provisions of their treaties with the Portuguese. The Portuguese gave priority to the commercial advantages they could derive from these treaties. Their objective was to secure rice and spices from Kanara and its hinterland which was known for its entrepot trade. The present work aims to study the political and economic relations that existed between Portuguese Goa and Karnataka from 1763 to 1857. This would cover the period of the Sultans of Mysore and the English East India Company in Kanara. The emphasis would be on coastal Karnataka as it facilitated the Portuguese trading activities through its ports. The hinterland, the ghats and the plains above them supplied the surplus goods for trade.

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CHAPTER - III

**PORTUGUESE GOA
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A new era began in South Indian politics with the emergence of Haidar Ali, who competed in the conquest for supremacy of the region. Haidar belonged to a plebeian family, but after joining the military under Nanjaraja, the Dalvoy of Mysore, he soon rose to prominence. He became famous as an outstanding Captain in the district of Devanhalli as well as in the battles at Aroot and Trichinopoly.¹ Haidar was then given powers of General, and orders to receive 10,000 men of arms and cavalry, and made master of the fort of Bangalore. With this war equipment Haidar set forth to establish himself as a sovereign. The English invasions in Southern India led to Haidar gearing his troops for an eventuality. The Portuguese prelate, Dom Antonio Jose de Noronha, the Bishop of Halicarnassus, informed Haidar that the English were conspiring to block the city of Pondicherry. Jose Pedro Ribeiro, a Portuguese Captain of the Portuguese infantry, in the service of the French was deputed to respond to the English attacks. According to an agreement concluded between Haidar and Jose Pedro Ribeiro, Dom Jose de Noronha handed over the

English hostages to Haidar at the Fort of Thiagar. In 1760, Haidar confined the Raja of Srirangapattan and usurped the whole authority of government.² He received from the Subah of Deccan the Zamindari of Mysore with a patent constituting him as Commander of seven thousand horses, and the title of Nawab Haidar Ali Khan Bahadur. With the demise of the Raja of Bednore, Badri Sumbhu, the Queen of Bednore assumed the government. The adopted son of the Raja, Maha Budhi fled to Srirangapattan, where he solicited Haidar to assist him in expelling the Queen. Haidar took advantage of the dissensions of these petty chiefs, and marched against the Queen of Bednore. In 1763, Haidar conquered Bednore from the Nayakas of Keladi. Sunda, a province dependent on Bednore also submitted itself, and came under Haidar's dominions.

To avert trouble he worked with tact and precision in implementing his strategies. To put himself beyond the reach of the one and the others he established his court at Srirangapattan, a well fortified city in Mysore.³ Haidar was determined to venture towards the seas to further the territorial limits of Mysore.⁴ This brought him in direct confrontation with the Portuguese in Kanara. In the process of carving a niche for himself, Haidar Ali had to encounter

formidable rivals, both native rulers and foreign forces. Haidar's policy was more firmly characterised by sound foresight and sagacity. His diplomacy was calculated to ensure that his enemies in India never combined against him.⁵ Haidar's policy towards the Europeans was governed by three important considerations:⁶

- (i) It was necessary to keep a check upon them
- (ii) It was advantageous to obtain military supplies from them
- (iii) To secure aid of any one of them in danger.

Haidar had to overcome many adversaries during his tenure both as Chief and Sultan. The Marathas posed a powerful challenge to Haidar's rise in South India. Though the Marathas continued their struggle in the Deccan, the southward expansion of Haidar's kingdom confined the former to their native boundaries.⁷ A group of politicians around Shahu thought that Maratha expansion should proceed southward and not northward, and traditionally the Mysore State was included within the sphere of Maratha influence.⁸ In March 1757 the Marathas entered into Mysore and due to the inability of Nanjarao to pay the contribution to Balajee Rao, a battery of 30 cannons was opened by Sadashiv Rao Bhau. A gun burst in the battery killed several

members. This event was considered ominous by both the parties and a compromise was subsequently arranged by which the Marathas agreed to take 32 lakhs of rupees.⁹ But the usurpation of the Mysore throne by Haidar Ali resulted in an antagonistic attitude by the Marathas. Therefore they besieged him in the fortress of Bangalore, but he could repulse them. And after he became master of the whole kingdom, he retaliated upon them the injuries which they had done to him.¹⁰ Haidar often applied, when he was attacked by the Marathas, to the authorities of the English East India Company. But the Company not being positively bound by any letter of treaty, did not give any aid to him.¹¹

The treaty of Paris (1763) proclaimed the British as the guiding force in international politics. The Portuguese glory in India was gradually fading. In a letter to the King of Portugal, during the period of his Viceroyalty, the Conde da Ega much lamented the decadence of the Portuguese power in the East and complained that, whereas in former, no vessel could navigate the Indian seas without their pass, these were obliged now to obtain a similar authority from their enemies and from pirates.¹² He had endeavoured to stimulate the declining trade of Goa by encouraging native manufacturers who were allowed to die out, and to this end

he imported into that city artisans from Thana, Surat, and Cambay, besides which he also introduced the cultivation of the cotton plant into Goa. However, the Portuguese littoral trade gradually faded with the emergence of the British and the Dutch as tough competitors. The Portuguese had incurred the hostility of the Dutch since 1580 during the merger of the Portuguese and Spanish Crowns. The Portuguese proved weaker in the late eighteenth century as deterioration had already begun in their sea-borne trade.¹³ From the very beginning of their rule over Goa, the Portuguese power had to depend on Indian collaboration, one aspect of this dependence was that of fiscal administration.¹⁴ Goa was a trade deficit region and the Portuguese depended heavily on the trade at the ports of Kanara to secure rice and other goods, particularly spices. Kanara was the stage where the indomitable Haidar Ali, the European rivals for worldwide colonies - the English and French, Kings of Keladi, the Angrias of Kolaba and the Portuguese played significant roles during the years 1747-69.¹⁵ The middle of the eighteenth century witnessed significant realignments of political forces and emergence of new political equations whose reactions were crucial in determining internal Indian politics. From the beginning of the eighteenth century the chief areas carrying

on foreign trade were mostly situated along the extensive coastline of the country.¹⁶

The Angrias of Kolaba had consolidated their dominions and posed a serious threat in Kanara. Tulaji Angria had his own armed fleet with which he harassed the Dutch, English, French and Portuguese, all along the coast down to Kanyakumari.¹⁷ This resulted in a precarious situation for the Portuguese who decided to unite with other European powers to annihilate the Angrias. By the second half of 1748 Tulaji sought for a peace treaty with the Portuguese, probably because the latter were being approached by the Peshwa for a naval aid against Tulaji.¹⁸ In 1749 Tulaji put forth a proposal of friendship which the Portuguese Viceroy agreed to accept provided the past offences were forgotten and all the merchantmen repressed by Tulaji were restored with goods. Tulaji sent his representative to Goa with a letter dated 16th October 1749 asking for aid in men, their expenses, etc. The Viceroy assured Tulaji that aid would be sent only after finalising the above proposed treaty. Tulaji's request for aid was not granted by the Portuguese and as a result he attacked Mangalore again in November, robbing two Portuguese vessels anchored at that port.¹⁹ The Viceroy took this opportunity to impose his order on the Keladi king

Basavappa to fortify the factory. But Tulaji's position became precarious and again he decided to conclude an alliance with the Portuguese against the Peshwa. In 1755 occurred the last struggle of Tulaji against the Peshwa who was also aided by an English fleet.²⁰ The proposed Treaty of 1749 was finalised in November 1755 between Tulaji and the Portuguese. The Peshwa protested against the Viceroy's aid for Tulaji. In spite of this protest the Viceroy sent the promised 500 men on receiving the stipulated sum of Rupees 2,00,000 from Tulaji. The Portuguese succour did not save Tulaji from Maratha-English combination.²¹ The Tulaji-Portuguese alliance ended on a bitter note as Tulaji violated an article of the alliance by trying to employ the Portuguese soldiers to fight Nana Pradhan's forces at Kharepattan. Following these events the Marathas under the Peshwa emerged as a powerful neighbour rival of the Portuguese in India.

The English through the English East India Company were already involved in trade with India. The English Company was a vigorous, self-reliant commercial body managed by a private corporation.²² The occurrence of the Industrial Revolution (1760s), the Battle of Plassey, and the occupation of Bengal provided further opportunities for

increasing their mercantile activities. Now, their presence was a more potent factor both politically and economically. Their commercial policies affected both exports and imports of India. The English trade was not just trade, it was reduced to the position of plunder, particularly in Bengal and the surrounding areas after 1757. From the commencement of British rule in India, there was an unfavourable balance of trade. The result was a continuous economic drain from India which increased in volume with the lapse of years, and impoverished an industrious, peaceful, and once prosperous nation.²³

As far as the Karnataka coast was concerned, the English established a factory at Honavar in 1751, chiefly for pepper trade. The British seized the opportunity to enter and dominate the trade market of the country. The post-Industrial Revolution phase saw the Europeans protecting their own interests while exercising their jurisdiction over trade wherever possible. Braudel has discounted both European naval superiority and their organisational skills in penetrating the Asian network.²⁴ He has called the availability of ready money, both from the New World, and internally as a result of European expansion, and of the growth of the banking system, stock exchange, etc. which

helped to mobilise limited savings as the best weapon of the Europeans. It was with developed capital backing that the English set out to face the other Powers, Europeans and natives in India particularly on the Western coast.

The Pombaline era was a turning point in the history of Portugal. Portugal at this juncture was under the direction of Sebastiao Jose Carvalho e Mello, known to history as Marquis de Pombal. As Minister for War and Foreign Affairs he controlled Portugal's destiny from 1750 to 1777. In Goa, Pombal's chief concern was to balance the budget and increase the royal revenues. Pombal set to work to streamline the state expenditure by introducing economic reforms.²⁵ He abolished sinecures allowances, hereditary posts, bonuses and reduced the salaries of bureaucrats. The Revenue Board was dispensed with a full fledged Tobacco Board by assuming its duties as well. The duties of the *Vedor da Fazenda*, the all powerful revenue chief was divided between two new posts to provide greater efficiency and reduce the misuse of public wealth. Pombal introduced over sixty reforms within six years (1769-74) to help the royal revenues. These reforms built up the necessary groundwork in the plan to build up a propitious climate for the expansion of trade, agriculture, and other beneficial economic activities

in Goa. Pombal's decree of 21st April 1771 made attempts to promote the agricultural development of Goa. Village community clerks were asked to prepare estimates of current crop production, and study the possibilities for making up food deficiencies. The result was evident, the next year rice reported a yield of 22,826 *khandis* from previously uncultivated land in 85 villages of Old Conquests. But unfortunately with the downfall of Pombal in 1777, his reforms were discarded. He functioned more as a dictator than a reformer. But he did change the state of affairs in Portugal which had deteriorated with the Spanish rule. Pombal's reforms were mainly designed to secure administrative and judicial efficiency. He introduced legislation to stop the flow of Portuguese gold into Great Britain and created Portuguese industries to manufacture those articles that Britain supplied to the Country.²⁶ But his attempts were no match to Britain, since Portugal had not even the beginnings of a manufacturing economy able to supply her needs.²⁷ Pombal was placed in a precarious situation in 1762, when Spain invaded Portugal. The Portuguese army was saved by the eventuality encountered by them by the English force led by James O'Hara and John Campbell. The peace treaty was signed in February 1763 at Fontainebleau.²⁸ The Portuguese in Goa were confronting a

panicky situation due to the crisis in Europe. The reign of Charles III (1759-88) in Spain created an unfavourable environment for the Portuguese Empire. The Pombaline Era witnessed several major changes in Portuguese policies both at home and in the colonies. The British and the Portuguese shared a love-hate relationship which depended on the nature of the circumstances. In fact the Portuguese expressed their view about this relationship in the following words "... we have no worse enemy in India than the Europeans, our 'ally' Britain being the worst of them. But keep up an outward friendship with all, while fomenting trouble between them and Indian leaders."²⁹

As seen above, Haidar had annexed the kingdom of Keladi in 1763, and then concentrated on subordinating the European presence in the region. The English had established a factory at Honavar in 1750. Now, Haidar gave the factors leave to remain. To maintain his possessions along the Western coast, Haidar had to build a strong navy. The English and the Portuguese had their navies and Haidar was well aware that their power, influence and success in war depended largely on their navies.³⁰ He therefore selected Mangalore as his naval arsenal and drew up an elaborate scheme for the construction of war ships and the

development of that port into a first class naval base.³¹ The Portuguese presence in Mangalore was accepted by Haidar and he initiated friendly relations with them. Towards the end of January 1763 Haidar wrote from Mangalore to Conde da Ega, the Viceroy of Goa: "I inform you that I, marching with my army on Bednur and conquering the lands, made necessary administrative arrangement for it, and from there I proceeded to this (region of) Mangalore which also I put in order. Pedro da Costa Bunicho, who resides in the (Portuguese) factory, met me, talking of favours with distinction which were agreeable to me. I wish that good friendship would increase between us". Haidar also sent some presents to the Viceroy. The Viceroy reciprocated the presents, congratulated Haidar on his victories and assured friendship.³² However, it is said that he was not as liberal as the Nayakas of Keladi in so far as the Portuguese missionary activities were concerned.³³ The Portuguese succeeded in preventing their fellow European powers, particularly the English and the French, from establishing permanent factories in the coastal region of Kanara.³⁴ But it was impossible for the Portuguese to check the advance of the English who attacked Mangalore, and it fell into their hands along with the Portuguese factory. France during this period gave an impression that it would give a mighty blow to the

English. Haidar sought to capitalise on the hostilities between the English and the French outside the Indian subcontinent. Probably, the aid that he desired from France was a sufficient naval force to crush that of the English. He was little disposed to place any great confidence in the services of the French or indeed of any European army in India, all that he valued was their military knowledge and skill as officers and engineers. Further he wished that France, or any other foreign nation should not retain any kind of inland footing in the Country.³⁵ The French also had no real intention to help Haidar except their hostility towards the British. In fact the Nayakas of Keladi had received stiff opposition from the French and their allies in Malabar.

The post-1763 period marked an era of vivid interplay in Indian and international politics. The British supremacy was at its climax and the English East India Company utilised it to the maximum level in the Indian subcontinent. Haidar Ali, established a firm footing in Mangalore, which was a bone of contention between the native and European powers. The Portuguese had established their Fortress-Factory system in the region and the emergence of a new sovereign posed a challenge to the long period of monopoly they enjoyed in the region. The Portuguese Factor at

Mangalore communicated to the Viceroy of Goa, Conde da Ega of the developments in the dominions of Kanara. The Factor of Mangalore, Pedro da Costa Bunicho alerted the Viceroy that Haidar Ali had conquered Mangalore and imprisoned the young Prince of Kanara.³⁶ Though Haidar had conquered Mangalore, the Portuguese factory in Mangalore was allowed to function with its traditional privileges.³⁷ After gaining a firm footing in Mangalore, Haidar Ali toured the significant places in Kanara and with scarcely any opposition, established himself as the sovereign of Kanara. The ambitions of this ruler were far greater than his spirit, and he was not content with his conquests alone. Further he ventured to create in his vast kingdom a number of outlets to the sea.³⁸ He devastated the regions above the Western Ghats and demanded tributes from various potentates and reduced a number of Chiefs to his vassalage.

The Portuguese Factor at Mangalore, Pedro da Costa Bunicho cautioned the Viceroy of Goa, Conde da Ega about Haidar's activities which posed a serious threat to the maritime manoeuvres of the Portuguese in the region.³⁹ At this critical stage Haidar Ali corresponded with the Viceroy and sought a friendly alliance with the Portuguese. The Portuguese adhered to the proposal of Haidar and

subsequently concluded an alliance to aid the latter with ammunitions to carry on his military acquisitions. Prior to these developments, in 1758 the Viceroy of Goa, Conde da Ega ordered Jose Eloy Correia Peixoto to join the army of Haidar Ali of Mysore, and not to quit his service without the Viceroy's express authorisation.⁴⁰ Peixoto aided Haidar during the crisis, when Khande Rao, plotted along with the Marathas to destroy Haidar Ali.

Khande Rao invited his royal master the first king to destroy Haidar and planned a coup in June 1759.⁴¹ The Maratha army knocked on the gate of Srirangapattan, when the Cauvery was in a raging flood in the monsoon rains. Due to this natural obstacle, the brother-in-law of Haidar Ali, Makhdoom Sahib could not succour the French support from Pondicherry where half of Haidar's army was dispatched. Though the prevailing circumstances were disadvantageous to Haidar, he calmly revived his strength and fled from Srirangapattan. He marched towards Anekal, chased by the Marathas and then to Bangalore. At Bangalore, Haidar was aided by Faizulla Khan of Kolar with a considerable body of men. Haidar remained in Bangalore for three months till he was joined by Makhdoom Sahib with the troops from Pondicherry. Haidar managed to bribe the Marathas for 15

lakhs of rupees, gained control of the chief forts, and drove Khande Rao from Srirangapattan. But before Haidar could commence a siege against the fort, the Dowager Queen induced the King to surrender Khande Rao and appoint Haidar as Regent and General of the Mysorean Army.⁴²

Peixoto was the only one of Haidar's European Captains outside the Fort of Srirangapattan who was in a position to render him any assistance in the Maratha crisis.⁴³ Some 80 Portuguese officers had accompanied Makhdoom Sahib to Pondicherry. During Haidar's flight to Anekal, Peixoto received urgent summons and joined the former at Anekal. Haidar marched swiftly towards Bangalore along with Peixoto, defeated Khande Rao and artfully gained favours from the second king Anand Rao. Haidar began a tour of the South Mysore country, increasing or lessening the garrisons, removing refractory or suspected governors and put his own trusty officers in their places.⁴⁴

The Portuguese Prelate Dom Noronha, the Bishop of Halicarnassus who considered himself as a purveyor of troops and military stores, offered to place at the disposal of Haidar the artisans he had acquired from the arsenal of Pondicherry.⁴⁵ The Frenchmen were presented to Haidar at

Hardanhalli, who were a timely and valuable accession to Haidar's strength. Haidar took this advantage of the Frenchmen to march on Srirangapattan and crush completely the power of Khande Rao. So Haidar acquired the military aid from the French too in his campaigns while establishing himself in the Kanara region. Since the Portuguese carried on trade, and relied on Kanara region for their imports, they had to accept the conditions laid down by Haidar. Portuguese Goa could hardly refuse so powerful a neighbour who moreover supplied its wood and pepper besides rice.⁴⁶ Haidar did not allow the Portuguese to enjoy such concessions and privileges meted out by the earlier rulers, namely, the Nayakas of Keladi. The Nayakas had permitted the Portuguese to have a factory at Mangalore, to build churches in the kingdom and to take grains from Kanara.⁴⁷

Haidar's diplomatic strategies were focussed on establishing his control over Southern India. To achieve this goal he concluded alliances with the foreign powers. Though Haidar initiated cordial relations with the Portuguese, he proved to be a dangerous rival to the latter. He cast his competitive glance on the fortress of Cabo-da-Rama which served the borders of the taluka of Salcete in Goa. Haidar

decided to invade the fortress of Cabo-da-Rama with the assistance of the French troops. The fortress had sufficient troops but not regular ones, as they were reserved for the defence of the other islands of Goa. After Haidar overran the territories of Sunda in 1763, he devised plans to take over the fortress of Cabo-da-Rama.⁴⁸ In January 1764 Savay Sadassiva, the King of Sunda, due to the persuasions of the Viceroy of Goa, Conde da Ega, took refuge in Bandora in the Ponda taluka of Goa. Thereafter Cabo-da-Rama was added to the New Conquests with its province of Canacona. The Portuguese looked upon this region as a buffer between Salcete and Haidar's Mysore.⁴⁹ A Portuguese garrison was placed at the Fortress to safeguard this part of Goa. As the King of Sunda had taken refuge in Goa, the Portuguese Viceroy had an advantage of guarding the movements of the King. The Viceroy thought it prudent to do so to prevent the King of Sunda from erupting any troublesome activities in the region. This decision of the Viceroy seemed politically sound during a phase of political confusion. Although Haidar had formulated the methodology of his target, he was unable to do so due to the withdrawal of the French Captain Huguel who commanded the French forces. Captain Huguel preferred not to fight against the Portuguese with whom his nation was at peace. He deserted Haidar and hence Haidar could not

conquer Cabo-da-Rama. The Viceroy of Goa concluded a treaty with Sadashiva, king of Sunda regarding the territories to the north of Karwar. The King agreed to hand over the fortress of Cabo-da-Rama to the Portuguese, to prevent it from falling prey to Haidar's attack. Sadashiva also handed over Canacona, Quepem and Sanguem areas to the Portuguese on the condition that these should be returned to him in case he succeeded in recovering other parts of his kingdom lost to Haidar. But Sadashiva never succeeded in retrieving his lost dominions. Haidar realised the treachery of the European soldiers, and made peace with the Portuguese, who yielded him the country of Karwar.⁵⁰ He became aware from this experience that he should not support a war with any European in his service except when they themselves were at war with each other.

With the withdrawal of the French from aiding Haidar in his military campaigns, the latter had no further confidence in the French who deceived him. Manoel da Silva informed the Viceroy's Council of the State of Goa, regarding the alliance between France and Spain. Under the prevailing circumstances, it was necessary for the Portuguese to develop cordial relations with the British. The British naval force was stationed in the East Indies, and its withdrawal would

give the Dutch an opportunity to supersede in their ambitious designs.⁵¹ The authorities of the English East India Company also dispatched for Fort St. George, three ships to strengthen their position on the Coromandel coast. The French King's Edict of August 1764 stated the objective for trade and profits for the Frenchmen indulging in trade. The Seven Years War resulted in excessive expenses and losses followed by interruption of the French trade.⁵² The French Company was gearing itself to procure for themselves such supplies as were proportionate to their wants. They had to take prompt measures for both dispatching of their ships and adjusting of their debts.⁵³

The emergence of Haidar Ali changed the traditional relations between Goa and the Marathas. The Portuguese had to deal with a new master in Kanara, who was busy in expanding his territorial limits in the southern region. After the occupation of Sira in 1761, a district to the south of the Tungabhadra which was in the possession of the Marathas, Haidar initiated conflict with the Marathas.⁵⁴ The Nawab of Savanur, Abdul Hakim Khan remained staunch to his engagements with the Marathas. The Nawab was defeated in 1764 and had to submit to the terms imposed on him by Haidar. Savanur was placed under Fazl Ullal Khan, who was

to spread Haidar's conquest northwards. Dharwar was occupied by the above General, which sounded a serious warning to the Marathas. The Marathas at Poona made great preparations to repel this invasion. Peshwa Madhav Rao, in the month of May 1764, entered the Carnatic with an army of 30,000 horses and equal number of infantry.⁵⁵ Gopal Rao Patwardhan was sent on in advance but was defeated by Fazl Ullal Khan. But with the approach of the Peshwa, Fazl Ullal Khan facing the immense odds against him immediately quitted Dharwar fort and fell back on Haidar's army. The Peshwa alerted by the intelligence of Haidar's position and strength, employed his troops in driving out Haidar's garrison from the conquered districts. An attempt by Haidar to start a battle resulted in his discomfiture, and he retreated to his entrenched camp at Anavati. Madhav Rao seized Dharwar and occupied the whole of the country, north of Varda except Mundgod in North Kanara. Haidar made negotiations with Madhav Rao which was an adjustment of extreme moderation considering the desperate circumstances in which Haidar was placed. Haidar by the treaty at Bednore, among other stipulations agreed to relinquish all claims on Savanur, and paid 32 lakhs of rupees to Madhav Rao.⁵⁶

The province of Kanara was a part of the Keladi kingdom until 1763, and in that year it was subdued by Haidar Ali.⁵⁷ Haidar in the initial stage tried to be on friendly terms with the English. This is proved by the fact that when Stracey had an interview with him at Nileshtar, he gave a grant of all the Sonda pepper of that year (1766) at a price much lower than what he could get elsewhere.⁵⁸ The initial relationship between the Mysore Sultan and the British was marked by a deep desire to unnaturally exploit the Malabar resources without much odds.⁵⁹ Besides this, the transaction in which Haidar was interested was firearms, the request which the English postponed under some pretext, thus inviting the displeasure of Haidar. The rise of Haidar Ali created a daunting set of problems for the transporters of Malabar and Kanara. The traders who carried on trade on the Kanarese ports after 1763 found that the new ruler had drawn up his own plans for the procurement and sale of goods on the coast. It was immaterial to him whether the buyer was a native or a foreigner, what mattered to him was the "ready money" and European firearms. The political upheavals in Kanara and Mysore in 1762-1763, with the usurpation of power by Haidar Ali, and the subsequent disruption of traffic, had an impact on local trade. It resulted in a diversion of Malabari goods to Gujarat, Goa, and to the

Coromandel. A treaty was concluded on 23rd August 1764, between Nizam Ally, the Subedar of the Deccan and the English East India Company to outline their status with the emergence of Haidar Ali. The 10th Article of the above treaty stated "... it is necessary the management of the Countries dependent on the Carnatic Ballagatta in the Subardary of Viziepur should be under the influence of the Carnatic, that the Company can carry on their trade without interruption from coast to coast".⁶⁰ The Company further reiterated its stand for supremacy in trade, not only in India but also in Europe and in the Countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope. The English trade would continue so long as it was beneficial to their state and to the advantage of those subjects interested therein.

The English East India Company also helped to build up the Bengal Marine, thus continuing in a sense the work of the Mughal Emperor.⁶¹ The Subedar of Deccan relinquished to the English Company his rights to the Diwani of the Carnatic Balaghat countries.⁶² The Diwani was surrendered so that the Company would solicit the Emperor Shah Alam to grant them his *farmans*. The Nizam also agreed to assist the English in punishing Haidar Ali. The English did not deprive the Marathas of their Chouth from the Carnatic Balaghat

country.⁶³ This comport was agreed upon, provided the Marathas guarantee to the Company, the peaceable possession of the said countries. Secondly the English utilised the good offices of the Marathas to prevent them from assisting Haidar Ali. The English East India Company officials were determined to check the clandestine trade in pepper and other commodities in Malabar which they termed contraband.⁶⁴ Such export of pepper from Malabar created constant embarrassment for the British, so the British used to detach small band of armed personnel well equipped to thwart such attempts. Goa was an important transshipment point for Malabar commodities particularly pepper during the Second Anglo-Mysore War. Coconuts and its by products were bartered for rice, pulses, and other commodities that came through Balaghat to Goa. There was an uninterrupted flow of merchandise between Malabar, Kanara, Goa, Mysore, Maharashtra and Karnataka. The middle level traders lost their independence and became agents of coastal contractors when Peninsular Wars involving the Mysoreans, Marathas, the Nizam, the English and the French disrupted overland traffic. Prior to these developments, even bulky commodities like sandalwood were transported to distant markets to avoid seizure by pirates and European patrol boats in the Kanarese waters.⁶⁵

Soon after Haidar's conquest of Kanara, felling and transportation of sandalwood was subjected to government control. Haidar had started building up his own inventory of rice on the coast. Added to this he also took the unprecedented step of diverting the pepper from Bilghi and Sunda to the seaports. Earlier much of this spice was transported overland from Kanara to Goa and Maharashtra.⁶⁶ But since Haidar was eager to monitor the trade in spices and also anxious to cut off the overland traffic between his realm and Goa, the collection and sale of pepper were placed under government management.⁶⁷ Peninsular India comprising of Malabar, Kanara, Goa, and Konkan was bound by a common trading circuit. It was made up of numerous principalities. Haidar's invasion of Kanara and Malabar destroyed the political equilibrium. Further with the conquest of Sunda and Bilghi, Mysorean control extended right upto the Portuguese districts of Zambaulim, Ponda, Canacona, and Haidar was in a position to halt the flow of goods to Goa.⁶⁸ Before Haidar's incursion into Kanara, the native ruler warehoused his pepper, sometimes for as long as two years and waited for the Vanjaras to come up with an offer that satisfied him, rather than dispose off the commodity to the Europeans. Normally the Ghat merchants offered a much

better price than coastal traders which would have improved Haidar's prospects of buying arms for ready money.⁶⁹ During the Mughal period, the general economic and social life was basically conditioned by the fiscal policy of the government.⁷⁰ This, then brought about a strongly articulated relationship between the state and society. To understand the interplay of political and economic forces, it is but inevitable to analyse the social strata of the society. The changes perceived in Kanara during the later half of the eighteenth century were influenced by these factors. The society, the economy and political policies enabled the political formation of the region. A profound analysis of the above factors will enable us to comprehend the relationship between port cities, the mercantile community, shipping and the political processes.⁷¹ If further strengthened the construction of a network of communications and social mobility along the coast. The agreements among merchant communities and trade guilds regulate the common affairs of society.⁷²

In 1766, the Archbishop Dom Joao Jose Demello wrote to Haidar, acknowledged the receipt of his letter and informed him that the ammunition which could not be supplied earlier would be supplied soon. He further

reiterated the Portuguese goodwill towards Haidar Ali. The Portuguese Factor at Mangalore was instructed to provide detailed information about Haidar Ali which might be useful for the Portuguese in their future dealings.⁷³ The Portuguese dispatched some officers for the army of Haidar to further continue their diplomatic relations with the latter. Haidar sought military personnel both officers and soldiers from the Portuguese. The Portuguese complied with this request of Haidar. Some of the officers sent by them to Haidar were Lieutenant-Colonel Manoel Antonio de Sa, Captain Jose Maria de Mello, Adjutant Timotes Joaquim Estiene, Lieutenant of grenadiers, Alberto Pereira Graces, Second Lieutenant of grenadiers, Antonio Pereira, and Sergeant Francisco Xavier Navarro.⁷⁴ Though the Portuguese Prelate sent these officers, he expected that they should be given suitable positions in the army. Although all these correspondences portray friendly relations between Haidar and the Portuguese, both of them were cautious of their dealing with each other. Haidar's interaction with the Marathas in 1767 was not favourable to the Portuguese. In March 1767, the Peshwa scored a brilliant success against Haidar by capturing Fort Madagiri which was heavily garrisoned and was supposed to be impregnable. The King and the dowager Queen of Bednore who were imprisoned

there, were released and honoured by the Peshwa.⁷⁵ With this victory the Peshwa struck terror among the Maratha rivals and re-established himself as the redeemer of the weak. Now Madhav Rao claimed an interest in Sonda and the right to levy the one-fourth or Chauth in Mysore.

The commencement of the First Anglo-Mysore War (1767-1769) further complicated Haidar's relations with his rivals. His relations with the Marathas were not amicable, and so he sought to befriend the Nizam. The Hyderabad-Mysore alliance from the beginning sounded very unreal and it could not stand the strain of defeats.⁷⁶ So by the end of 1767, the Nizam had quit Haidar Ali. In September 1767 Haidar's son Tipu made a daring cavalry raid on the outskirts of Madras and carried with him among other prisoners, five Roman Catholic priests from the Portuguese settlement of St. Tome situated close to Madras. Peixoto pleaded with Haidar to allow him to keep the *padres* in his tent, with an assurance of producing them whenever they were wanted. This feeling of earnestness was looked upon by Haidar with suspicion, who handed over the *padres* to one of his Mohamedan chiefs, with strict orders that Peixoto should not be allowed to speak to them or send them anything. The *padres* were accorded by Haidar the same treatment like all

enemy prisoners - lie on the bare floor of a dungeon and live a scanty allowance of one measure of rice per head and four *fanams* a day.⁷⁷ The reason for the empathy showered by Peixoto towards the *padres* was known later. These *padres* were not Englishmen but Portuguese and French neutrals attached to various churches in St. Tome which was not a part of Madras but a Portuguese enclave within the limits of the city. In the meanwhile Peixoto managed to appease Haidar and so the *padres* were handed over to Peixoto.

After their release from Haidar, the *padres* took a hostile attitude towards Haidar and besought Peixoto to quit the service of Haidar. They questioned Peixoto regarding the support he gave to Haidar in a war directed against an European nation like Great Britain. The Anglo-Portuguese relations were cordial and the *padres* could very well comprehend that an alliance with Haidar would mar these relations. They cited the example of Captain Huguel, a Frenchman who refused to fight for Haidar in waging a war against Goa, simply because his nation was not at war with Portugal. They argued that Peixoto should not ally with Haidar against the British because Great Britain was not only at peace with Portugal, but was also her most ancient and faithful ally. To all these accusations hurled at him, Peixoto

justified his stand, that he had done so as an officer in the Portuguese army, and a servant of the Portuguese Crown.⁷⁸ Further he informed that the Viceroy of Goa who represented the Crown of Portugal in India had ordered him to take service with Haidar and not to quit his service without his express permission.

Peixoto served Haidar till the end of November 1767, and then left his service to return to Goa.⁷⁹ A document signed by Governor Bouchier of Madras and five members of his Council dated 27th November 1767 stated that Peixoto would be given good passage to whichever place he wished to go. When Peixoto was in Madras Chevalier St. Lubin intrigued with Col. Call who using his influence with Governor Bouchier damaged the reputation of Peixoto in the eyes of the Madras government. As a result, the English tried to secure his services against Haidar himself.⁸⁰ Governor Bouchier in a letter addressed to Peixoto asked him to grant them a favour by alerting them about any of Haidar's men who might be found in Madras, spying for Haidar. To fulfill this end he ordered a small party of sepoys, under a Corporal to be at Peixoto's disposal. The presence of Haidar posed a serious threat to the British and this is proved by a letter from the President and Council at Fort St. George dated

11th May 1768. This letter stated the prominent use of Haidar Ali, a formidable enemy of the British who not only proved troublesome but dangerous to the tranquility and even the safety of the Carnatic and the Company's possessions.⁸¹ His presence was more challenging because he was backed by the French in his endeavours.⁸² The French were gearing themselves, and at the slightest threat were ready to attack. During this period they were challenged by the British supremacy and to strengthen their position, they were willing to attach themselves immediately to some of the country powers and none were more favourable for the purpose than Haidar Ali.⁸³

The Christian community of Kanara were recruited by the British before Haidar did so. The British learnt the art of recruiting native Christians and managed to consolidate their military services. They enrolled these locals into their army and navy and awaited for a suitable opportunity to attack.⁸⁴ The English studied the situation and planned an attack on Mangalore which would mean the capture of half of the Bednore kingdom. The British wanted to create a diversion for Haidar, so when he was in the Carnatic, the Bombay Government sent an expedition on 10th February 1768 under Admiral Watson against Haidar's possessions in Kanara.⁸⁵

In the meantime the officers of Haidar attempted to kidnap the Portuguese Factor in Mangalore and take the fort forcibly.⁸⁶ Unfortunately this plot failed as the Captain of the artillery being a Christian, gave it out to the Portuguese Factor. Even though the Crowns of Portugal and England shared a long alliance of friendship, the English on landing at Mangalore dislodged the Portuguese and took possession of the Fort.⁸⁷ Later they sent a note to the Portuguese Factor saying "that the rights claimed by them under the Nawab's government being arrogated by our conquest, and it being unusual for any nation to suffer the fortifications and jurisdiction of another close under their walls - they must either strike their colours and take our protection and submit in all things to our laws or quit the place".⁸⁸ In a letter dated 26th December 1768, the Board of Directors wrote to the Viceroy at Goa clarifying the whole issue saying "that the Conqueror is at liberty to confirm or annul the privileges enjoyed by the Portuguese".⁸⁹ He also apologised for the discourtesy shown by Watson and Sibbald to the Portuguese Factor at Mangalore. Immediately after, Haidar wrote to the Portuguese for help in men and materials against the British saying it was their duty to protect his ports in exchange for the products and concessions they enjoyed from his dominions. The Portuguese promptly occupied the Fort of

Piro more to safeguard their own interests than Haidar's. In October 1768, a young Hindu, Sadasiva Camotim Vaga, Assistant State Translator in Goa was sent on a diplomatic mission to Venkappayya, Haidar's representative at Bednore. He was to secure consignments of pepper, rice and sandalwood for Goa, and early payment for the first arms consignment sent to Haidar, and the recognition of the newly re-asserted Portuguese right to Piro fort.⁹⁰

Treaty Between Haidar Ali And The Portuguese (1769):

Venkappayya was advised by the Secretary of State, Dom Joao Jose Demello, to take every care to ensure a lasting peace, to avoid negotiations which would hurt the English, but to negotiate for the restitution of the Fort of Mangalore.⁹¹ Haidar Ali's fight against the British ended in victory to Haidar on 4th April 1769. In 1769, Mangalore was once again in Haidar's hands and thanks to Camotim Vaga's good offices with the Governor of Kanara. Haidar ordered Sheik Ali, his Governor at Mangalore, to restore the Portuguese Factory and rights in that city.⁹² Negotiations between the two governments bore fruit and an honourable treaty was concluded and signed in August 1769. The peace pact between Haidar Ali and the Portuguese was also ratified.

Affectionate letters and presents were exchanged by all concerned. The terms of this treaty were contained in a letter of Haidar to Sheik Ali, the Governor of Mangalore. The terms were:

- (a) that the Portuguese should be allowed to build factories in that port (Mangalore) in the same manner as they had before.
- (b) that they should be given a tribute of rice and allowed to collect articles like rice, pepper, sandalwood, etc. as of old.
- (c) that all Christian prisoners should be set free.
- (d) that all the debts and accounts of ammunitions, lead, etc. brought by the Governor in the past years from the State of Goa should be settled without much delay.

In July and August 1769, the Prime Minister of Haidar, Venkappayya Pradhan wrote two letters to the Portuguese Viceroy at Goa stressing the obligations incumbent on both parties to honour the treaty.⁹³ Thus the treaty included provisions to safeguard the Portuguese interests in Kanara, particularly their economic interests.

The Anglo-Mysore War of 1767-1769 becomes significant as it was the first war in which the British

Government finished by suing an Indian power for peace. The overwhelming superiority of the European soldier was confirmed in the battle of St. Thome. The Indian powers saw that the Indian sepoy trained by the Europeans gained resounding victories for their masters. Naturally, ambitious rulers like Haidar Ali employed Europeans to train their armies. By the time the First Anglo-Mysore War was concluded by the treaty of Madras, Haidar was camping in Kolar. Peixoto was prevailed upon to re-enter Haidar's service by some of the French Officers at Pondicherry.⁹⁴ They led him to Haidar, who employed him only on half of his original pay with charge over the Europeans with Firelocks. Peixoto, however did not continue in his service for more than a year since he became disgusted at the gradual decay in Haidar's army and at the general disgrace of the Europeans, who had been wasting their wealth in dissipation. He went to Tellichery on a definite order to recruit soldiers for Haidar and never returned again. A note in his memoirs says that he took service with the Raja of Tanjore and fought for him when that principality was attacked by the English a few years later.⁹⁵

The Marathas under Peshwa Madhav Rao posed a perpetual threat to Haidar, and he knew that his most

formidable Indian enemy would again invade his country and try to occupy the largest portion of it permanently. So the peace treaty signed between Haidar Ali and the Portuguese in 1769 served as the sheet anchor of his foreign policy. But fortunately for Haidar, Madhav Rao was engulfed with a number of eventualities in his country. The repeated intelligence received at Fort St. George from Bombay Castle informed that Madhav Rao was involved in sorting out the complex problems faced in his kingdom, and so was not in a state to pay any attention to the war in which Madras was engaged with Haidar. The Maratha forces had suffered a considerable defeat from Janoji Bhonsle in the neighbourhood of Nagpur. Due to this Madhav Rao had to divert his treasures far away from Poona for its security. Haidar had repossessed Coimbatore and the British who attempted to reduce Bangalore found themselves at a disadvantage. This was because Bombay was not able to send garrison to Madras owing to their own limitations.

The British at Bombay were determined to apply to the Captain General at Goa for a Body of Europeans to act either as mercenaries or auxiliaries in conjunction with the Madras army at Mysore.⁹⁶ Alexander Callander was deputed for the purpose to investigate about the defence system of the

Portuguese in Goa. But, the Captain General of Goa was averse to the idea of deputing men to help the English against Haidar. The relations at this stage between Haidar and the Portuguese were neutral and they had yet not concluded any peace alliance amongst themselves. In the meantime, Vissajee Pant a Maratha admiral sent a fleet to the Port of Bombay to enable the British to attack some Portuguese nobles in Bombay. Though his real motive in sending the fleet was not known, it served the British forces at the port. The President of Council at Bombay received a letter from the Captain General at Goa which contained a letter by Naranno dated 4th January 1769 from Goa. Naranno informed the arrival of some horsemen from Haidar Ali and that the Madras army had camped near Bangalore. During this period Haidar was shifting from place to place with his army and had appealed even to the Marathas for help. The Marathas promised Haidar assistance in consequence of his having paid them a sum of money.⁹⁷ But before the payment was made, they did not send him any succour, although a body of 5,000 of their horses were close to Haidar's country.⁹⁸

Alexander Callander informed the British at Bombay Castle about the prevailing political scenario in Goa. He met

the Governor at Goa and tried to detect the sentiments of the Portuguese regarding the ongoing war with Haidar Ali. The Governor acknowledged that the Portuguese had not yet concluded any peace with Haidar, but both held a sort of correspondence and the Portuguese traded freely at Haidar's ports. The Portuguese were showing this neutrality with Haidar to maintain their relations with the British. They took a diplomatic stand and tried to follow a policy which would ensure their good relations with both Haidar and the British. The number of the Portuguese troops prevailing was increased. Two Portuguese ships were blocked in Bombay and two in Goa, one a *grab* with some armed boats known as *gallivats* composed the marine force of Goa. The territories of Haidar were contiguous to the Portuguese, except the island of Goa, all other regions were entirely without defences. Under these circumstances the Portuguese did not have power and the inclinations to assist the British. The character of the Governor was averse to every measure of enterprise, and he was sure that they would not send any considerable body of troops into the field. Nevertheless the Portuguese thought it absolutely necessary to regain the possession of Karwar on the Western coast because it would facilitate them to maintain a barrier between themselves and the Kings of Kanara.⁹⁹

The Portuguese owed the British a lot of debt. Alexander Callander reminded of this debt to the Portuguese Governor in Goa. The Governor replied that it was referred home by his predecessors, who had received letters from the Ministry of Portugal advising that it would be adjusted in Europe between the two Crowns. He added that he could not interfere in this matter until the approval of the King of Portugal was known. The Governor assured that he would mention about the debt in his next dispatches to Europe. An official was sent to the British army in the Mysore country with favours from the Savanur Nawab. In order to facilitate the service of the Subedar sent by Meiza Merankan, Naranno asked the permission of the Governor for men from Pondicherry and Karwar to enter the Portuguese territory¹⁰⁰. After a number of invasions by Haidar, the Governor of Goa was not able to discover the former's true motive. All men outlined to help the Subedar passed through the Portuguese territory and were later stationed at Vengurla.¹⁰¹

After the Battle of Plassey, the two British Governors who succeeded Robert Clive were hardly more than stop-gaps. Verelst succeeded Clive and at the end of 1769 Cartier succeeded Verelst. The combined rule of five years by the two

was little more than an introduction to the period of Hastings.¹⁰² This was the period when the stage was set for the revival of new powers. The annual tribute rendered to the Mughal Emperor was four times more than it was after 1775. But then there was a gradual decline with the strengthening of Maratha influence in the Deccan. Haidar was convinced that as the political scenario stood, he must join the combination opposed to the British. In 1770, Haidar received a letter from M. Henriques from Goa that they were awaiting for his correspondence with the Portuguese. Haidar was in search of an opportunity to develop cordial relations which will enable him to cope up with the British. The Pe Vigar Aleixo Lobo also communicated with Haidar and conveyed the receipt of peace ratification from Haidar. He further informed that a certain official would go to Mangalore in the Portuguese fleet. The Feitor of Mangalore, Thomas Joze Codmor received a letter regarding some accounts relating to the supplies of ammunitions sold to Haidar. There was much correspondence between the Portuguese at Goa and in Mangalore to deal with Portuguese - Haidar relations.

The Kanara region was a scene of brisk political and economic activities. The Portuguese issued passports to the agents of Haidar to trade in the Indian Ocean. In November

1770, Dom Joao Joze Demello, informed the *Commandante de Feitoria de Mangalore*, Thomas Joze Codmor about the plans and preparations of the Marathas.¹⁰³ The Marathas geared themselves to face any eventuality which might arise in the Deccan. The *Commandante* further alerted the Portuguese to reinforce and strengthen their Armada.¹⁰⁴ At this juncture the Maratha Commandants were in the forefront with a quest for Maratha expansion. But Peshwa Madhav Rao had not approved some stray incidents which resulted due to the activities of the Maratha Commandants.¹⁰⁵ The Peshwa expressed his willingness against the violation of the rights of the Portuguese in the Maratha factory. The Maratha fleet posed a threat to the Portuguese territories as it advanced nearer to them. The Portuguese *Feitor* at Mangalore was informed by Joao Joze Demello about the threat faced by the Portuguese and that he had to act in the best interests of both the States. The Maratha army stationed at Satara along with their frigates were ready for their mission and planning to attack.¹⁰⁶

In 1770, the Portuguese envoy at the Maratha Court sent a secret message that a total of 150 Maratha ships had concentrated at Gheria (Sindhudurg) and that large scale preparations were being made to attack Haidar Ali. At the

same time a Maratha army was demanding passage to Sunda and Kanara through Ponda, which was already a Goan province. All this information was passed on to Haidar by the Portuguese in Goa, as a gesture of goodwill and friendship, as well as an excuse for not lending him the warship he had asked for, since it was now required for self-defence.¹⁰⁷ Goa denied the permission asked by the said army, and promised Haidar action against the hostile navy in exchange for a back-log of the rice tributes which was one of Portugal's traditional rights in Mangalore. Governor Sheikh Ali of Mangalore however stubbornly refused to give the Portuguese a grain more than that year's tribute, maintained that 1767 and 1768 could scarcely be counted as normal years, and hence the rights should be waived.¹⁰⁸

Treaty Between Haidar Ali And The Portuguese (1771):

On 13th June 1771 a treaty was signed between the Portuguese and Haidar Ali by which the former were allowed to continue their factory at Mangalore and to collect other commodities and the tribute of rice without any hindrance.¹⁰⁹ By this Treaty it was agreed that the following terms would be adhered:¹¹⁰

- (a) that the Portuguese shall continue to be in possession of the Factory at Mangalore and shall enjoy all the privileges as formerly.
- (b) that the sandalwood, chillies, rice and pepper which grew in abundance in Canara shall be sold to the Portuguese at a fair price.
- (c) that the Vicars shall enjoy the same freedom in respect of the administration of the Sacraments and the jurisdiction in the administration of justice as here to fore.
- (d) that the Sarcar will place no difficulties in the way of those who voluntarily wish to become Christians.
- (e) that the State of Portugal shall fulfill its obligations in helping the *Sarcar* with its fleet as per previous Covenants with the Kings of Bednur. And in order that the Nawab may know the clauses of the Treaty, two authentic copies of the Treaty, one in Portuguese and the other in Canarese shall be sent to the Nawabs.

Haidar Ali promised likewise that Mysore would supply the State of Goa with sandalwood, pepper, rice and other articles produced in his dominions on the receipt of reasonable price. He restored to the parish priests or Vicars

their ancient privileges and allowed them to administer justice to the Christians of their jurisdiction. Haidar Ali further stipulated that the State of Goa should help his government with its fleet in accordance with the agreement made with the King of Bednore. However, the issue over the dominions of the kingdom of Sunda, fortress of Cabo da Rama, the district of Canacona, which were then in the possession of the Portuguese was left unsettled.¹¹¹

In July 1771, Governor Ujeni Appa of Kanara requested Portuguese aid for his overlord Haidar against the Marathas. Reminding him of their goodwill the previous year, Goa pleaded neutrality this time, in view of the non-aggression pacts signed with both parties.¹¹² By September 1771, another peace treaty signed between the Portuguese and Haidar Ali restored to the former the old rights conceded to them by the King of Kanara. These included the reservation of certain quantities of rice annually to be exported, duty free to Goa, freedom of worship, jurisdiction over Christians living in the factory area, and allowances to factory staff. Haidar also agreed to waive his claim on Cape Rama fort for sometime. Dom Joao Joze Demello assured Ujeni Appa about the continuation of their friendship. He further informed him about the refusal to allow Maratha

troops passing through Portuguese territory.¹¹³ The Portuguese were more worried about antagonising Haidar rather than the Marathas. In 1771 the Marathas and Haidar Ali were at loggerheads. The British maintained a strict vigilance on the movements of the Marathas and Mysoreans. James Sibbald, the British Resident at Honavar informed the Bombay Council that the Maratha fleet had stationed themselves at Honavar.¹¹⁴ They had plundered Malcole, a place twenty miles to the southward of Honavar. The Marathas awaited for reinforcements from Poona and so made no further attempts for attack. Haidar Ali was at Srirangapattan and his force on the Coast was very trifling. But no considerable reinforcements were sent to increase its defence.¹¹⁵

Haidar was aware that the Peshwa would die and he could count upon the chaos that would overtake Maharashtra on the demise of the Peshwa. But from September 1771 to February 1772 Trimbakrao, the Maratha Commander plundered Haidar's possessions. To Haidar's fortune, there was no prospect of the Peshwa's recovery and the campaign ended and a treaty was concluded in 1772.¹¹⁶ With the death of Peshwa Madhav Rao, Raghunath Rao whose unscrupulous ambitions had begun from post-Panipat

era posed a major obstacle in further disintegrating the Maratha empire. Raghunath Rao had allied with the British, the enemies of the Poona Government in order to fulfill his ambitions to occupy the seat of the Peshwa. He opened negotiations with Appaji Ram, Haidar's Vakil. But after he became Peshwa by murdering Narayan Rao, he abandoned his allied relations with Haidar Ali. He planned an expedition into the Carnatic to expel Haidar. But in January 1774 when he realised that the Barabhai conspiracy was against him, he was eager to have Haidar as an ally.¹¹⁷

The death of Peshwa Madhav Rao gave a rejuvenated impetus to Haidar's quest for power. The period from 1772 - 1776 marks a significant phase in Haidar's reign. In 1772 the Bhonsales were united and prepared a fleet and formed camps in the province of Bardez and Ponda.¹¹⁸ The Bhonsales tried to get the benevolence of the Portuguese. They asked permission for their army to pass through the lands of the Portuguese State into the jurisdiction of Haidar Ali and to aid them with men and ammunitions. The Marathas were provoking discord and threatening war. Both Colonel Henrique Carlos and Sargeant Jose Pacheco de Carvalho worked with much zeal for the safety and protection of Bardez. In these circumstances trouble prevailed in

Mangalore when the new Factor of Mangalore was not able to pay the required factory dues to Governor Sheikh Ali in 1772.¹¹⁹ Haidar's naval officers captured some officers and merchants from a Macao ship. Though they were retrieved later by the Portuguese squadron, the relations between the two were less cordial. Governor Demello made a compromise so that the Goa Government's relations with Haidar were not affected. He also ordered that all south-bound Portuguese ship captains should drop anchor at Mangalore and pay their respects to the authorities there who expected such courtesies.¹²⁰

On 19th March 1772, Dhulap, Commandant of the Peshwa stationed at Vijaydurg arrested a Portuguese frigate called *Santana*. The Portuguese Government of Goa lodged a complaint to the Peshwa about this incident. The Poona Government replied in a letter dated 4th May 1772, that they were forced to behave in this manner due to the unfriendliness displayed by the Portuguese towards the Marathas.¹²¹ They cited the example that the Marathas were not allowed to pass through Portuguese territory when they wanted to attack Haidar Ali. Hence, the Maratha-Portuguese relations turned bitter during this period. In February 1773, Governor Demello informed the

Commandante Feitoria da Mangalore regarding some acts of aggression on the part of the British at Surat. He instructed him to take necessary steps in view of the British actions which would hamper their trade of chillies and sandalwood.¹²² He further informed him about the movement of the Maratha fleet and the arrival of some Portuguese boats to tackle the Marathas. Governor Demello communicated to Xequé Aly the Governor of Mangalore about the credit and collection of dues. He informed the *Commandante da Feitoria de Mangalore* about the dues that should come to the State and the apparent non-compliance to the same by Haidar. He further told about the non-arrival of some documents on which depended the payment of dues and expressed his displeasure about the state of affairs.¹²³

The French during this period made attempts to retrieve power by concluding an alliance with Haidar Ali. The Frenchman Law de Lauriston had plans of constructing a fort at Karwar. As Karwar offered great commercial as well as military advantages, he thought of occupying Karwar with the assistance of Haidar Ali. The English had no real intention to render military assistance to the ambitious ruler of Mysore whose rise to power constituted the gravest source of danger to the Carnatic.¹²⁴ The Marathas were at the prime level of

their glory but the greatest obstacle to any concerted effort on the part of the Marathas was the decline of the authority of the Central Government and the consequent increase of power of the dependent chiefs. The deterioration of the French power was reflected in their efforts to co-ordinate all assorted elements having conflicting interests divided by sharp jealousies and suspicions.¹²⁵ The king of Portugal Dom Jose in 1771 issued instructions and guidelines to the Governor of the Portuguese possessions in India to maintain a policy in Asia without endangering other issues. He ordered to put an end to the detestable distinctions which degrade and rob the state of useful citizens.¹²⁶

The King of Portugal enacted the Code of Political, Civil and Economic laws to put an end to the outdated and exquisite orders which served as a pretext to the officials to oppress the commerce and harass the merchants to the extent of making them flee to other strange ports where they found more humane treatment.¹²⁷ He ordered the protection of the entire maritime commerce not only from the subordinate rulers of His Majesty but also from all the surrounding neighbours who sought their protection under the Portuguese flag. The objective of the Portuguese in Goa was to maintain what was their own, without the least intent

to conquer what was beyond their control. Their aim was to make the State peaceful so as to enable it to carry on the commerce from the fruits of which it will derive its strength.¹²⁸

While analysing the relationship of the Portuguese with Haidar, the King of Portugal considered the forces in the neighbourhood and the hatred Haidar had towards the Marathas. Haidar was averse to the presence of the British, and hence by decisive acts expressed his desire to earn the friendship and unity with the Government of Goa. The King of Portugal ordered the Governor of Goa to strive by all means available to win and establish friendship with Haidar. The Governor was also informed of the injustice meted out by the constant firmness with which Haidar distinguished himself in the favourable inclination and contemplation of the Portuguese State. Even after knowing the intentions of Haidar, the King of Portugal ordered the Governor of Goa to nurture with Haidar the most intimate and solid friendship which was prevalent amongst good neighbours whose interests were mutual and reciprocating. The greatest and only surety which could assure the fidelity of Haidar would consist essentially in the soundness of the public credit of the exchequer of Goa, its troops, its artillery carriages which will

cause great surprises of its prosperous and respectable navy.¹²⁹ It was true that while the State was provided with the help and friendship of Haidar, it had nothing to fear either from the Marathas or Europeans. And the Portuguese trade in pepper and sandalwood would derive great advantage over the treaty with the King of Sunda who had given them the exclusive right of the extraction of the pepper of Piro.¹³⁰

The political prudence of the period demanded that the Governor of Goa had to be cautious, that although at that time it was remote, the then reliable friend might turn into an ambitious and declared enemy. In these circumstances it was necessary for the Governor to take the following precautions. The first on which depended all the rest was the introduction of the Royal Exchequer of the troops, navy and commerce. The second was to man and preside over the passage of the province of Canacona which did not have any fort, the said province had its border with the territories of Haidar Ali and the markets of Piro and Sivansar which were well manned and fortified. These precautions had to be taken immediately in times of peace and foresee the times of war and what the state could sustain in that region should be reduced to a well organised defensive.¹³¹ Therefore if troops of the Government were posted in the mountains, and the

excellent square of *Cabo da Rama* which was situated within three kilometres of the province of Salcette on the coast and if troops and equipment have to be moved from the main forces posted, this was to be implemented to provide the necessary help to close those three routes which were defensible by their nature, the so-called enemies will not be able to invade the province of Salcette. The Portuguese were aware of the fact that the major enemies of the State and the most strong rivals were not the Asians but the Europeans. The Europeans would do more harm to the dominions of the Portuguese and cast hands at each opportunity to annihilate the Portuguese presence in Asia.¹³²

In 1774 Haidar was desirous of building a citadel at Mangalore to strengthen the entrance to the river and sent his engineer M. Catini to select a suitable place for its construction. M. Catini failing to find any place more suitable than the eminence commanding the river then occupied by the Portuguese factory, reported this to the Sultan.¹³³ The Portuguese were thereupon obliged to leave their factory and Mangalore was freed forever from the sway of Portugal. The British through their representative, Robert Hanshaw, investigated the Portuguese strategies in Goa. Robert Hanshaw, who resided at Goa gave an account of the

military and marine forces arrived in Goa from Portugal. He also informed the Portuguese intention to speedily attempt the recovery of the dominions they formerly possessed in the Islands of Salsette.¹³⁴ If the Portuguese were successful in their endeavours, it would have hampered the trade interests of the East India Company by reducing their customs and revenues in a very great degree. This would have resulted in the Portuguese becoming masters and obstructing British trade. But the prevalent condition among the Marathas, wherein there was division in the Maratha government and no head in the empire, it was difficult for them to aid the Portuguese with any effectual force.¹³⁵ The English Company negotiated with Raghoba and also agreed to give the Islands of Salsette to him, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Portuguese. Mostyn, the British representative at Poona, was informed of the intentions and motives of the Company which impelled them to take this step. He therefore should not break the good understanding which had till then subsisted with the Ministry at Poona. Incidentally, both Mostyn at Poona and Gambiar with Raghoba were to maintain their diplomatic relations at the places they were appointed.¹³⁶

In 1775, Dom Jose da Camara informed Pe Joaquim Manoel de Miranda about the expected arrival of Haidar. He further communicated to the Commandant of the Mangalore factory that he was aware of Haidar's order regarding the supply of rice. During this period, Camara conscious of the supremacy of Haidar decided to continue negotiations to develop amicable relations. Haidar's attitude towards the Portuguese was lukewarm and the former had entertained Italian missionaries in his empire. Considering the above incident Camara corresponded with Haidar and acknowledged the good relations which prevailed between the two parties.¹³⁷ The Portuguese missionaries were expelled by Haidar and this signalled a gradual change in Haidar-Portuguese relations.¹³⁸ This eventuality made it but inevitable for the Portuguese to review their political strategies. The balance of power between the Portuguese and Haidar was tilting upward to the advantage of Haidar. The Portuguese merely remained as one party in the game which was successfully being played by Haidar Ali. Camara, therefore communicated to the Feitor of Mangalore and ordered the dispatch of annual tributes to Haidar in the form of gifts to bridge the differences between Haidar and the Portuguese.¹³⁹

In 1775, as a result of dissensions with the Portuguese Factor, Governor Sheik Ali turned back the Portuguese fleet at Mangalore, not only empty handed but depleted. The Portuguese in a letter dated 20th May 1776 complained to Sheik Ali regarding the absence of the Portuguese flag in the factory.¹⁴⁰ This resulted in confusion, regarding the ships coming to the port. Haidar also conquered some Portuguese boats which were impounded. Governor Camara, hence deputed Camotim Vaga on a diplomatic mission to Haidar.¹⁴¹ He was instructed to make references to the good relations which prevailed among them and express hurt feelings by the recent events. It is interesting to note that Pombal had warned Camara to have no illusions about Haidar Ali's friendship since it only stemmed from his hatred for the Marathas and the English. Being aware of the intentions of Haidar, Camara therefore had to cultivate ties assiduously in order to refrain him from attacking Goa. Pombal was convinced that Haidar's loyalty would only last as long as Cabo da Rama and the three passes from Canacona were well defended and the finances up to the mark.¹⁴² Camotim was also sent because the Portuguese flag was lowered by Haidar's men at Mangalore. Therefore there were many minor irritants which required personal intervention by the Portuguese.¹⁴³

As soon as the Captain General Dom Jose Pedro da Camara received news of the incidents at Mangalore, he dispatched an emissary to find out the reasons which provoked Haidar to take such drastic action. As the state of affairs continued Dom Jose Pedro da Camara, proposed to Haidar that he would send a distinguished person Col. Antonio de Asse Castello Branco to Haidar's Court.¹⁴⁴ Haidar received the Portuguese Commission with courtesy but remarked that for a small affair such as the liberation of the fort of Mangalore, there was no need of such a big Commission headed by such a distinguished personage. He then bitterly complained that the Portuguese people had degenerated and were living in constant fear of the British. Instead of helping Haidar's government, they had sent a contingent to aid the British to capture Pier hill. Finally, Haidar reassured Col. Castello Branco that there was no cause to fear the English any longer as he would very soon wipe them off from the map of India.¹⁴⁵

Haidar decided that the relations between the Portuguese Government and himself should become cordial and he sought for a peaceful settlement. He therefore wanted the Portuguese to help him with 2000 soldiers. Initially,

Haidar was reluctant to meet the Portuguese Commission, but later agreed to do so. Col. Assa met Haidar and had negotiations with him regarding the restitution of the factory of Mangalore. But Col. Assa did not enter into any agreement with Haidar alleging that he was not authorised to do so by his Government. As a result Haidar treated the Portuguese with contempt.

Prior to these events in 1775 the Sunda King had sent an envoy to Haidar Ali to negotiate for the restitution of his kingdom.¹⁴⁶ Haidar was too ambitious to give up such a lucrative possession without sufficient compensation. Haidar demanded the exchange of Piro and Ankola for Rupees 4,00,000 while the Sunda envoy was hoping to get the whole kingdom for that amount.¹⁴⁷

The Portuguese realised that their position was precarious and Col. Assa conditionally agreed to the terms of Haidar for sending soldiers and officers from Goa.¹⁴⁸ Meanwhile the English Factor at Mangalore entered the fray by offering to advance Sunda the required loan for the above two places, namely, Piro and Ankola provided the English could establish a factory at both the places and were conceded certain advantages over other European nations.¹⁴⁹

A letter of Joao Tavares de Almeida, Governor General of Portuguese India, dated 28th March 1776 informs us about Haidar Ali's intention to build a number of ships at Mangalore, Basrur, Honavar and Calicut.¹⁵⁰ In a letter dated 30th November 1776 Haidar requested for carpenters and aid from the Portuguese troops.¹⁵¹ The Portuguese Government was aware that Haidar's activities might hamper their commercial interests and therefore did not respond to Haidar's requests. But Haidar managed to obtain the workers from the Dutch Governor of Cochin. Earlier in 1774, the Dutch took special note of Haidar's desire to reap quick profits without paying much attention to its resultant effect on the volume of imports and exports. The stiff transit duties that the transporters readily paid was a point that Haidar took into consideration when he allowed them to resume the carriage of spices from Bilghi to Sunda to Goa.¹⁵² The year 1776 saw frantic correspondence between Haidar and the Portuguese. In 1777, a French adventurer St. Lubin arrived at Collaby near river Chaul. He brought cargo consisting of artillery, firearms, cloth and copper along with twentyfive Arab soldiers.¹⁵³ Nana Phadnavis, the Maratha administrator favoured him initially to annoy the English but later dismissed him from Poona in 1778. Haidar realised that the

French power was gradually declining. In 1777 Haidar voluntarily offered to pay Kanara rice tributes to Goa, as well as the salary and emoluments of the Mangalore factory. However possibly to fence off any further demands, he staked his claims again to the Cape Rama fort area, which he said was part and parcel of conquered Sunda.¹⁵⁴ Camotim Vaga was the Portuguese envoy at the Haidar's court who was responsible for many good favours done by Haidar to the Portuguese. He also succeeded in persuading his government to supply Haidar in 1777 with carpenters and skilled artisans to speed up his work at the ship building yard at Kundapur.¹⁵⁵

The outbreak of the Peninsular Wars between Haidar Ali, the Marathas and the English led to the marginalisation of the indigenous seafaring merchants.¹⁵⁶ The Maratha sway over the overland routes and sandalwood producing tracts led to the overshadowing of any serious trade developments. In the realm of teak trade, Haidar made a major departure from the earlier practice of allowing coastal and inland traders to work closely for the procurement and transportation of logs. In 1776 he awarded the contract for supplying timber on the coast to a single merchant. But unless there was some specific reason, the rulers and customs' collectors did not

overcharge the itinerant merchants. In 1779 Haidar allowed Murdoch Brown's Company to establish factories in Mangalore, Karwar, Vaddakkara and the Nicobar Islands. Joao Texeira, Miguel Lackner, Vanmeerbecke and Warnet were regularly carrying rice from Karwar and Mangalore to ports in Malabar and Goa in imperial ships.¹⁵⁷ In 1781 nine Goan vessels carrying rice, pulses, tobacco and chillies from Udaiwar, Manjeshwar, Kumbbla and Calicut were captured. The protests of the Portuguese government were unheeded and 7409 *bales* of captured rice were sold in Tellicherry. The proceeds of the sale were credited to the Company of David Scott in Bombay. The violation of Portuguese neutrality and the indiscriminate attacks on Malayali, Goa, Gujarat and Konkani ships, upset the circuit that had been built by the indigenous traders of the Western coast. After 1781 the Portuguese pass-holders were afraid to venture south of Karwar. Many Konkani merchants temporarily suspended sea trading and decided to make overland shipments through the coastal districts, rather than jeopardise their crafts.

In 1782 some boats from the lands of the Sovereign of Mysore came into good understanding with various merchant ships of the subjects of Goa which navigated on the coast.¹⁵⁸ This was because earlier Muhammad Suffi's Fazee Madony

at Aguada turned into nightmare. The man watched helplessly as the Goan authorities confiscated the cargo of rice, on the plea that there was acute scarcity of this foodgrain in the Portuguese colony. So in 1782 by conducting negotiations, good harmony prevailed between the Portuguese and Haidar Ali. But the relations between the two states were not very cordial because a treaty of alliance was concluded between the Crown of Portugal and Great Britain. If the Portuguese used troops against the British, it would be an offensive war violating all the laws and against the decorum of the Crowns.¹⁵⁹ The Queen of Portugal had ordered that the *Estado* could not launch an offensive war against the British. But the treaty also did not permit the British to ask Portuguese help against the ruler of Mysore because of the system of neutrality approved by the international law and by other civilised nations. The treaty permitted the Portuguese to immediately carry out all works of fortifications in the factory at Mangalore.¹⁶⁰ The Portuguese wanted to protect the factory with artillery and war ammunition as well as officials and military troops for the defence of the port against the British and other enemies. The Portuguese ships began their trading operations at the ports of Haidar's kingdom. Col. Antonio da Castel Branco was sent to clarify and remove the doubts and

embarrassment caused to Haidar. Thus towards the end of Haidar's reign there was political and economic interaction between Karnataka and Goa though their relations were not very cordial.

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CHAPTER - IV

PORTUGUESE GOA AND TIPU SULTAN



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The Second Anglo-Mysore War (1780-84) was still going on when Haidar Ali with a severe attack of cancer died on 7th December 1782. On Haidar's death, the Portuguese Viceroy wrote to Tipu a letter of condolence and at the same time congratulated him on his accession. This correspondence was to initiate Tipu to restore the trade facilities in Mysore which had been cancelled by Haidar. Tipu at this stage had to tackle his dangerous foe – the British. As Col. Humberstone had retreated to Paniani, and Tipu had appeared on the scene, General Mathews was sent from Bombay with a strong naval and military force. The English made an attempt to annex Kanara to the Bombay Presidency. The English fleet under the command of General Mathews landed at Mirjan and captured its fort.¹ The forts of Piro and Basrur, and also the capital of Kanara, Nagar were conquered. On 1st January 1783, the British batteries stormed the fort of Honavar, leaving Capt. Torriano the Commanding Officer of artillery in charge of the fort. Due to the treachery of the Governor of Bednur, Bednur was captured on 27th January 1783. Tipu attacked Bednur, and

after a brave encounter with General Mathews obtained its possession on 30th April 1783. After the reduction of Bednur, Tipu marched to Mangalore, the principal sea port in his dominion.² The place was defended by the 42nd regiment of Highlanders under the command of Major Campbell. The chief burden of the siege fell upon the French auxiliaries who alone managed the batteries. Under these circumstances information was received regarding peace being concluded between England and France. The news of the peace in Europe between England and France reached Madras on 24th June 1783. The English hastened to secure a ceasefire, as their position at Cuddalore had become very insecure.³ Tipu's army, with the support of the French, was pressing the English to surrender, but the news of the peace altered the entire situation. Bussy readily consented to a ceasefire and made an attempt to compel Tipu also to stop hostilities. Tipu at first hesitated, but later changed his mind in view of the exclusion of the French from the contest, the Bombay attack on the western coast and the Madras offensive from the South. He agreed to an armistice at Mangalore on 2nd August 1783. With this the hostilities on both the eastern and western coasts were suspended.⁴

In September 1783, Tipu's agents, Appaji Ram and Srinivas Rao arrived at Madras to hold negotiations with the British Government. In case of any difficulty they were required to refer to Mir Muin-ud-din, the Mysore Commander in the Carnatic. The terms which they put forward were that there should be mutual restitution of conquests, but Tipu should be given Tiagar, Vellore and other places in the Carnatic as a *jagir*.⁵ The envoys of Tipu further asked for a mutual release of prisoners, and Ayaz and those deserters who had taken up residence at Tellicherry and with the Raja of Travancore should be delivered to Tipu, and no protection should be offered to his rebel subjects by the Company in the future. Lastly an offensive and defensive alliance between Tipu and the English was to be formed to revive better relations between the two.⁶

The reply of the Madras Government to these proposals was that Tipu should entirely evacuate the Carnatic, including the possessions of the Rajas of Tanjore and Travancore. This evacuation was to be completed within four months of the cessation of hostilities and the Company was unable to grant any *jagir* to the Sultan. But the Company agreed to restore all the Mysorean prisoners of war, but the case of Ayaz would be dealt by the Company. The Company

had entered into an agreement with Ayaz for the security of his person, therefore it would not surrender him.⁷ The Company did not demand for the return of its deserters who might be unwilling to return to its service. With regard to the signing of an offensive and defensive alliance, the Madras Government pointed out that it was not prepared to conclude any such engagement with Tipu, because the non-fulfillment of its terms would lead to war with him as it had resulted earlier with Haidar Ali. However the Company was willing to stipulate that if the Company was at war with any Indian or European power or if Tipu was at war with any other power except the Rajas of Tanjore and Travancore and the Nawab of Arcot, who were under the immediate protection of the Company, no assistance was to be offered by the Company or Tipu to their respective enemies.⁸ This convention of neutrality was suggested by the Madras Government to Tipu to convince him that the British would not allow the Nizam or Marathas to overrun on Tipu's territories. But this proposal of the Madras Government was opposed by the Bengal Government.⁹

Warren Hastings refused to grant the Madras Government permission to negotiate a separate treaty. He was confident that the Marathas would compel the Sultan to

submit to the Treaty of Salbai. However, there were three factors which obliged him to agree to a separate peace with Tipu. First, the pressure from the Court of Directors who enjoined on him an early peace.¹⁰ Secondly, owing to the poor state of Bengal finances, and the prospect of a famine in Northern India which had compelled the Bengal Government to prohibit the export of grain from the province, the Governor-General and Council no longer entertained the idea of a renewal of hostilities. Lastly, Anderson, the Company's agent with Scindhia, convinced him that it was futile to object to a separate peace with Tipu.¹¹ Since the Marathas had considerable claims against Mysore, which they wanted to settle before peace was made between Tipu and the Company, their mediation would not only be not helpful, it would, in fact, complicate the negotiations and delay the peace. Anderson was not sure of the Maratha assistance inspite of the promises of Mahadji Scindhia and Nana Phadnavis. But Tipu was bitterly opposed to a peace on the basis of the Treaty of Salbai, because Tipu felt that there would be a rupture in British relations when hostilities took place between Tipu and the Peshwa.¹²

In October 1783, Anthony Sadler, Second in Council and Committee of the Presidency, and George Leonard

Staunton, Private Secretary to Lord Macartney proceeded towards Mangalore in order to secure the release of the English prisoners of war, and to enter into a treaty with Tipu.¹³ These Commissioners, accompanied by Tipu's agents departed from Madras on 9th November 1783 and landed at Conjeeveram on 11th November 1783. They met Sayyid Saheb, who was empowered by Tipu to treat the English and hear their proposals. They proposed that the Mysoreans should entirely evacuate the Carnatic, and after that they would order the English Officers to evacuate those parts of Tipu's kingdom occupied since the commencement of the war.¹⁴ But Mangalore and other Malabar possessions of the Sultan would be restored only after all the prisoners were released. Sayyid Saheb turned down these proposals. He was prepared to enter into reciprocal agreements and was ready to release all the Company's prisoners of war after Mangalore had been evacuated by the English. The Commissioners set out to Mangalore to meet Tipu and resolve the main issues. However due to military reasons Tipu did not want the Commissioners to visit Srirangapattan.¹⁵ Although the armistice had been signed, the prospects of a peace treaty were not bright. The Commissioners presented a memorandum to Tipu on 13th February 1784. Tipu replied and argued that none of his letters or agents were sent to the

English during the time of concluding the Treaty of Salbai and that the present negotiations were to be carried on without any reference to the Maratha State.¹⁶

The French Commander, M. de Bussy and his troops declined to fight against the British. Tipu was exceedingly hurt at the conduct of France, in concluding a peace without his participation, but much more irritated against the troops who refused to comply with his orders. He was aware of the insufficiency of his own army, who were in a state to prosecute the siege. Mangalore was very significant to Tipu, and the prospect of losing a place of so much consequence, when they were on the point of conquest was unpalatable for Tipu. He tried every possible strategy both of promises and threats to prevail on the French to resume their operations. But the French quitted the camp of Tipu, mutually dissatisfied with each other. Tipu entertained sanguine hopes of being master of the place in a few days, when the arrival of General Macleod with considerable reinforcements and supplies, put an end to his expectations.¹⁷ When Gen. Mathews invaded the West Coast, Tipu's Roman Catholic subjects gave him both financial and military help in the conquest of Mangalore and other places. Negotiations for peace were initiated and a treaty of peace was concluded

between the British and Tipu. This treaty agreed to the mutual liberation of all P.O.Ws and restitution of occupied territories by both parties. Accordingly Mangalore, Honavar and all other places taken by the English were delivered to Tipu.

The treaty of Mangalore was a diplomatic victory for Tipu, for on the whole, he was able to secure favourable terms from the Commissioners.¹⁸ He had secured the undignified burial of the treaty of Salbai. The Commissioners accepted the condition that the signatories would not assist the enemies of each other, directly or indirectly nor would they make war upon each other's friends or allies. Tipu also succeeded in putting down the demands of the Commissioners for commercial privileges in his Kingdom. The British acquired those places in the Carnatic which were held by the Mysoreans and were allowed to retain Dindigul and Cannanore. They secured the renewal and confirmation of all commercial privileges given to the Company by Haidar by the Treaty of 1770. They further obtained Tipu's assurance to restore them Mount Delli and the privileges enjoyed by the Company at Calicut. The British uncompromised only with regard to those demands which were either unimportant or were too exorbitant to be acceded

to by Tipu. Tipu was successful in making the English accept his terms at a time when he had just succeeded to power, when internal conspiracies were raising their head, when the French had withdrawn from the contest and when the Marathas were threatening to join the English to settle their old scores.¹⁹ The treaty of Mangalore was signed on 11th March 1784. Macartney on his arrival as Governor brought about this treaty. Prior to this, in May 1782, Hastings concluded the treaty of Salbai with the Marathas.²⁰ This treaty was signed to check the rising power of Tipu, who had won a victory at Annagudi over Braithwaite, the English Commander. Another factor responsible for the above treaty was that early in 1782 the French fleet under Suffren appeared on the Indian waters. Hence Hastings was pressed from all sides to conclude a treaty with the Marathas at any cost because that would be at any rate advantageous to the English interests in the Anglo-Mysore war. Though the treaty of Salbai seemed disadvantageous to the British for the time being, it proved to have far reaching consequences. The treaty of Salbai was concluded without reference to Haidar Ali but with a specific provision that the Peshwa would compel him to relinquish all his conquests in the Carnatic. Haidar, and later his son Tipu paid scant regard to this treaty. Consequently a new treaty was concluded on 28th October

1783 between the Marathas and the British which provided that if Tipu refused to accede to the terms of the treaty of Salbai, the Peshwa would assist the Company in waging war against him. With the withdrawal of French support for Tipu, it further encouraged the British and Marathas. Immediately after signing the treaty with the English in 1784, Tipu sent an embassy to France, to remonstrate against the conduct of that nation for having made peace with the British. The Ambassadors left India in 1784, and proceeded to Constantinople, but there they met with obstacles which caused a considerable delay and therefore they returned to Mysore by the end of 1786.²¹

Tipu felt humiliated by the Treaty of Mangalore, and commenced a system of persecution against the Christians in Kanara.²² The Roman Catholics were under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Goa. Therefore, Tipu was convinced that they were acting under orders from the Portuguese Government.²³ His animosity appeared to have been specially directed against the Portuguese and he drove many people of that nationality out of Kanara. He prohibited the supply of rice to their vessels on the plea that it was all required for his own army. Tipu, like his father, was anxious to develop friendly relations with the Portuguese in

order to secure their alliance against his enemies. In return, Tipu was prepared to grant the Portuguese all the commercial privileges which they had formerly enjoyed in his kingdom. The Portuguese did not want to ally themselves with Tipu owing to their friendship with the English. Besides they were anxious to capture Sadashivgad and were reluctant to help a power which they regarded as dangerous to the security of Goa.

Kanara suffered severely from the cruelty and the exactions of Tipu who suspected that the native Christian population had helped the English. He was determined to force them to become Muslims. The Christians of Kanara were charged for having assisted the English in their operations in Mangalore from the time of Admiral Watson to the end of the siege of 1784.²⁴ That the persecution meted out was a political move is borne by the fact that Tipu rewarded all those Christians who had been loyal to him by bestowing on them lands confiscated from the deported Christians.

In 1778, Haidar Ali had occupied Nargund and handed it over to Venkat Rao Bhave, a Brahmin Dessai, on condition that the latter acknowledged his supremacy and paid him an

annual tribute. This Dessai tried to make friendship with the English. Venkat Rao defied Tipu Sultan and joined the poligar of Madanapalli. He gave the Peshwa information regarding Tipu and joined other Dessais in evading Tipu's demands for tribute.²⁵ So long as Tipu was engaged in the war against the English he left the Dessais to their devices. After the treaty of Mangalore, Tipu decided to punish the Chief. This Chief claimed protection from Nana Phadnavis, who intervened that the tribute demanded by Tipu was more than that the Marathas and Haidar used to realise. Tipu replied that he had a right to levy what he chose from his subjects, and that the Poona Government had no right to interfere in his internal affairs²⁶. Nana rejected these terms.

Tipu sent Sayyid Ghaffar towards Nargund to inquire into the conduct of the Chief. As the Dessai was hostile towards the Sultan, Tipu sent his brother-in-law Burhan-Uddin to Nargund. Burhan seized Nargund but later withdrew his siege. The siege was raised by the orders of Tipu who was anxious to maintain friendly relations with the Marathas.²⁷ Negotiations were held between Nana and Tipu's agents. Nana's policy was to recover all the Maratha territories south of the river Krishna which Haidar had conquered.²⁸ For Tipu the capture of Nargund had become

necessary not only for subduing and chastising its chief, but because it was of strategic importance in the northern frontier in view of the imminence of a conflict with the Marathas. Nana, the Maratha Chieftains and the Nizam formed a coalition against Tipu.²⁹ An offensive alliance was formed with the Nizam, and the invasion of Mysore was to be carried out immediately. After recovering their respective territories in possession of Tipu, the Nizam and the Marathas were to divide the rest of their conquests equally among themselves. In May 1786 began the campaign for the invasion of Mysore. The Maratha-Mysore war was provoked by the Marathas and the Nizam who were anxious to reduce Tipu's power. It was only after Cornwallis expressed his inability to help the Peshwa that Nana accepted peace proposals from Tipu. The treaty of peace between Tipu and the Peshwa was signed in April 1787.

Tipu's new measures brought ruin on the traders of Kanara and poverty on many of its most skilful husbandmen.³⁰ Trade enabled strangers to pry into the affairs of the State, and according to Tipu, exports strip a country of its best produce and imports stifle local industries.³¹ In many cases the close collaboration between the Asian overseas traders and the private firms, made it

hard for Tipu Sultan to single out the English traders for economic sanctions. He conceded that the efficiency of his embargoes on the sale of rice in Mangalore to the British and the Portuguese lay in identifying the Maskati merchants who acted as frontmen for them.³² During the Second Anglo-Mysore war Goa was an important trans-shipment point for Malabar commodities particularly pepper.³³ Coconuts and its byproducts were bartered for rice, pulses, and other commodities that came through Balaghat to Goa. There was an uninterrupted flow of merchandise between Kanara, Goa, Mysore, Maharashtra and Carnatic. The middle level traders lost their independence and became agents of coastal contractors when Peninsular wars, involving the Mysoreans, Marathas, Nizam, the English and the French disrupted overland traffic. The Goan merchants had managed to survive by working a compromise with the European private traders-cum-Company officials.³⁴ Tipu's commercial regulations since his accession to power were founded on the basis of making the Sovereign, the chief merchant of the dominions.³⁵ Commerce with Europeans, especially with the English was considered pregnant with danger in every direction. Possessed of this view, he prohibited the cultivation of the pepper-vine in the maritime districts, and merely reserved those of inland for the growth of trade and

traded with the true believers of Arabia.³⁶ He liked black pepper better than red, for red pepper he believed was the cause of itch, and therefore ordered that in all coastal districts the red pepper vines should be rooted out. His one rule of finance was never to have less revenue than his father had. His only way to make up for failures was by compelling one set of landholders to pay for the shortcomings of the rest. He forced those who had means, to pay not only the rents of waste lands but of dead or runaway holders whose numbers were yearly increasing.

Proposed Treaty Between the Portuguese and the Marathas:

The Portuguese realised the prevalent danger with the rise of Tipu Sultan. Dom Federico Guilherme Souza informed the Parishes of Kanara about the imprisonment of the priests which had further dampened relations between the two States.³⁷ When Tipu released some priests, the above Governor thanked him for the consideration shown towards the priests. The Portuguese in a letter dated 18th September 1784 communicated to Karim Beg, Tipu's official about their willingness to issue passports to Narapa and permission to buy merchandise.³⁸ However, the Portuguese were not at all prepared to ally with Tipu Sultan. So when the Marathas

proposed an offensive and defensive alliance against Tipu they readily accepted it with minor modifications. The following are the main clauses of the treaty proposed by the Marathas along with the replies of the Portuguese:³⁹

1. The Peshwa thinks of destroying Tipu, and in this the Portuguese should help him. As far as possible no peace will be made with Tipu, but if there is no alternative, and hostilities cease, the Portuguese will not think that the Marathas had broken the treaty.

The Portuguese are ready to ally themselves with the Peshwa.

2. While the Marathas will advance southward into Tipu's territory, the Portuguese will operate against him on the sea-coast.

The Portuguese agree to this.

3. After the war is over the Peshwa will pay to the Portuguese all the expenses incurred by them. In return the Portuguese will hand over to him all their conquests.

The Portuguese do not want any money. Instead, they will prefer to retain Sunda and some other territory which the Peshwa may like to give them.

4. If on the conclusion of peace the Peshwa receives any war indemnity from Tipu, he will pay to the Portuguese all the expenses incurred by them in the campaign, and will prevail on Tipu to cede to them a part of the territories occupied by them.

If the Peshwa receives war indemnity, and in return restores the territories conquered from Tipu, the Portuguese will also do the same. But they will get from the Peshwa a part of the money which he receives from Tipu.

5. In case the Peshwa does not receive any money, the Portuguese will not demand any war expenses from him.

The Portuguese agree to this, but they will not restore the territories conquered by them unless the Peshwa demands from them such a sacrifice.

6. After the peace is concluded, if Tipu breaks it by attacking the Portuguese, the Peshwa will help them.

The Portuguese accept this.

7. In the territories annexed by the Marathas, the Peshwa will confirm the commercial privileges which the Portuguese had formerly enjoyed.
8. Hindus will not be converted to Christianity in the Portuguese kingdom; nor will cow slaughter or the destruction of temples be allowed. In return the Peshwa promises to prevent the Muslims in his army from converting Christians to Islam.

The Portuguese will not compel either Brahmins or Muslims to become Christians.

Nor will cows be slaughtered unless they belong to the Christians.

9. If there is an engagement between the Mysore and Maratha navy, the Portuguese will help the latter.

The Portuguese agree to this.

10. After seizing Tipu's territories and punishing him, the fortresses of Sadasivgarh and Ximpim and their adjoining lands will be left in the possession of the Portuguese.

The Portuguese accept this.

Although this treaty was never ratified, and the Portuguese did not give any military help to the Peshwa, Tipu's relations with them remained estranged. It is

important for us to stress that the above clauses clearly reflect the political, economic and cultural interests of the Portuguese in Karnataka and particularly in the coastal region.

During the period of the Second Anglo-Mysore War, in 1783, the *Alvara* of 8th January 1783 lowered the rates of duties on exports from Goa. The arrival of this decree on the wake of the declining trade did improve the exports from Goa like those of Goa - Balaghat. But the smuggling of treasures on board the Portuguese ships was prevalent inspite of the strict customs regulations. Captain Domingos Xavier Ribeiro of the ship *Amavel Donzella* requested for the safety of treasures on the ship with the intention of reshipment.⁴⁰ He further stated in this letter dated 12th October 1786 to grant permission from the Customs Master to reship the same. According to the Customs Master's report, the above mentioned person had attempted to carry the treasures including money in a clandestine manner.⁴¹ As a result double customs money was levied on the amount seized and the person discovered was to be rewarded.⁴² In Goa, the Governor, Francisco da Cunha e Menezes (1786-94) found himself in a tight corner, confronted with difficulties on many sides. In the first place, the chronic war with the Bhonsle,

"the bad neighbour and perpetual foe" had come to a halt following an attack on him by the Raja of Kolhapur.⁴³ But it is was an uneasy truce which forced the Portuguese to keep their powder dry and for any sudden flare-up in hostilities. Secondly, the King of Sunda, who had ceded part of his territory to the Portuguese in return for help against the Ruler of Mysore and after having lost his kingdom to the latter had since been living in Goa under the protection of the Portuguese flag, was now intriguing with the Peshwa and other neighbouring potentates to recover it.⁴⁴

The Portuguese corresponded to the Bombay Council in 1783 and sought for better relations between the two nations. They further communicated their request that the Portuguese fortress should be allowed to maintain all franchise and privileges. Although the Portuguese requested for a continuation of their earlier alliances, the British arrested some local soldiers and forced them to transport arms.⁴⁵ The British authorities began to harass the local merchants trading between the two regions. The Portuguese demanded the release of prisoners and the goods seized, assuring the British that they will protect the interests of their merchants in the Portuguese region.⁴⁶ As the relations between the Portuguese and British were not favourable, the Portuguese

focussed their attention on getting sympathies from Tipu. The Portuguese informed Tipu, that due to the British invasion of the latter's territories, certain merchants have sought asylum in the Portuguese territory.⁴⁷ Mohamad Sufi, a merchant from Tipu's territory was granted protection under the laws of the Portuguese King.⁴⁸ In 1784, the Portuguese promised to send to Tipu clocks which would be dispatched after repairing them. Though the above incident portrays a phase of cordial relations between the Portuguese and Tipu, their relations varied depending on the British attitude.⁴⁹ The Portuguese had to rely on British support to maintain their empire in India. In 1784 some British sailors who had deserted the British ship were apprehended by the Portuguese and handed over to the British authorities.⁵⁰ The British acknowledged the gesture of the Portuguese and continued their alliance with the latter owing to their traditional friendship.

The Queen of Portugal Dona Maria I formulated a new plan and regulation for the trade from *Estado da India* to Mozambique and to the East African Coast introducing the reduction in the duties at the port of Goa as well as in the ports of Daman and Diu.⁵¹ The Governor General Dom Frederico Guilherme de Souza was instructed to concentrate

on linking Goa commercially with Cape of Good Hope, Mozambique and Macau. Brazilian tobacco was introduced into Goa during 1776 to 1785 and due to the frauds committed the Governor was asked to personally inspect the cargo on landing at the port of Goa. The financial position of the *Estado da India* from the year 1783 to 1787 was 99,27,638 *Xerafins*, 3 *tangas* and 56 *reis* and the expenditure amounted to 97,92,957 *Xerafins*, 13 *tangas* and 2 *reis*.⁵² So the average earnings of the *Estado* per year was just around 47,000 *Xerafins*. In order to regulate the traffic of ships as well as the customs duties, the Queen issued a Charter on 27th May 1789.⁵³ The Crown was engrossed in tightening the apparatus for the administration of finances in the Orient. Portugal was making efforts to revitalise the Asian trade at the level of the government as well as on the individual levels by the experienced businessmen and intelligentsia.⁵⁴ The ships coming from Lisbon were to be directed towards the ports under Portuguese control so that the port of Goa would in due course attract merchants from the Coromandel coast and Bengal. The trading in Bengal and Coromandel was recommended as useful and necessary for Portugal.⁵⁵

In 1787 the Pinto Revolt was engineered by Fr. Caetano Francisco Couto and Fr. Jose Antonio Gonsalves, who were

dissatisfied with the policy of racial discrimination of the new Archbishop, Dom Frei Manuel de Santa Catarina (1784 – 1812). It has been suggested that apart from the desire of getting fairer treatment for the Goans, the two priests were also spurred by personal ambitions. There were a few dioceses suffragan to the Goa Archdiocese lying vacant, and they aspired to be appointed thereto. The leaders of the revolt established contacts outside Goa both among Goan communities scattered all over Malabar and neighbouring Indian potentates. As for military help from neighbouring potentates Cunha Rivara rules out any co-operation with both the Bhonsle and the Maratha, that is the Peshwa. The Bhonsle, Khem Sawant III, was at the time lying low after the attack from the Raja of Kolhapur. As for the Peshwa, it is true that a Goan priest, Fr. Jose Ribeiro in the know of goings-on in Goa, was at the time living in Poona and had a brother serving in the Company of Dom Miguel de Noronha, a Portuguese *fidalg*o, in the service of the Peshwa. But according to Cunha Rivara, Noronha belonged to the Portuguese nobility, and any co-operation with men under him could be discounted.⁵⁶ Cunha Rivara believes that Tipu Sultan must have intervened in the plans of the revolt. This is because one of the conspirators, Joaquim Antonio Vicente, came from Portugal to France as soon as news of the revolt

reached Lisbon, to negotiate a commercial treaty with the French and secure French help against the British. Tipu had sent a splendid embassy to Paris comprising of Mohammed Derveish Khan, Akbar Aly Khan, and Mohammed Osman Khan. They landed at Toulon on 9th June 1787, and were received by Louis XVI with pomp and grandeur. The Ambassadors demanded immediate assistance and active co-operation of the French nation, in expelling the English from India in return for which, they promised an equal division of the spoils, and of all the territories that should be conquered by the united arms of France and Mysore. But Louis XVI could only assure the Ambassadors of his friendship, and promises of future assistance, when delivered from his own cares and anxieties.

Tipu Sultan was unable to receive aid from the French because Louis XVI was loaded with enormous national debt and public discontent prevailed in the country. The Portuguese sought an alliance with the Marathas when Fr. Jose Antonio Gonsalves, the main personality behind the revolt escaped into the Maratha territory.⁵⁷ Fr. Gonsalves was detained in the Maratha territory, and hence the Portuguese deputed Dessai Sirpoti Rao to place the above clergyman in safe custody. The Portuguese further

mentioned the handing over of Tulaji Powar by them, and so on similar grounds this clergyman should be handed over to the Portuguese.⁵⁸ Though the Portuguese had signed a treaty with the Bhonsle, they maintained neutrality with the Raja of Kolhapur. The treaty signed by the Portuguese with the Bhonsle had stipulated that the former would help the Bhonsle against the Raja of Kolhapur.⁵⁹ This treaty was formulated because the State did not want the Bhonsle to be ruined by the King of Kolhapur. The Portuguese desired the contribution of Nana Phadnavis to intervene and bring peace among the above rulers. Such dissensions between rulers would strengthen the political power of Tipu Sultan, for whom they, then would be an easy victory. But Tipu Sultan was in a precarious state because his ambassadors were unable to receive aid from the French. So the native rulers made attempts to isolate Tipu Sultan by formulating alliance with one another. Three French Frigates were received at the port of Goa by the Portuguese and the Portuguese Governor granted licences to French brokers to hold talks regarding their trade. The above developments resulted basically due to the treaty of trade between France and England. The Mhamai Brothers acted as official brokers of the French in Goa.⁶⁰ In this capacity they attended to the needs of the visiting Frenchmen and French ships, and acted as

moneylenders and political informers.⁶¹ The French never gave Tipu adequate naval support inspite of the triumphs of the French Admiral Bailli de Suffren against the formidable British naval power at sea.⁶² The British power was making capital gain out of the sympathy of these Indian rulers who were not only supplying cash and materials to the English and their allies during their war against Tipu, but were also extending moral support to the enemies of the protector of their own motherland.

Although Tipu had been disappointed in his expectations of assistance from France, his insatiable ambition and restless imagination would not allow him to remain quiet, but excited him, for the sake of getting possession of more territories.⁶³ In 1789 when his extensive kingdom was threatened on all sides by the armies of the British, the Nizam and the Marathas he reversed his policy towards the Portuguese. The English began to move with their army and declared a war with Tipu in 1789. The English army was victorious in many provinces and Tipu was compelled to sue for peace. The Christians who were circumcised by Tipu and enrolled in the army were fleeing away from the Sultan's lands.⁶⁴ He therefore sent an embassy to the Governor and Archbishop of Goa. In the

letter he admitted of having paid no heed to the supplications of the Christians. He had dispatched his trusty messengers to convey his stand to the Governor and Archbishop and he would do the needful to improve the relations between the two regions. The French might not have aided Tipu Sultan because the French ship 'Adelaide I' was seized by the Poona Court in 1787. The Marathas detained the brig and demanded ransom money for the Captain and crew held at Vijaydurg.⁶⁵ The brig was detained for almost one and half years at Vijaydurg. When Dayot, Captain and Commander of 'Adelaide I' was unable to reach a settlement with the Regency at Poona, Leopold Albert Sollier was empowered to represent the matter. Sollier was a private merchant, who traded on the West Coast in 1788-1789. The power of attorney for claiming the balance amount and for arranging the release of the ship was transferred to J. A. Michel. After the French Resident, Montigny had concluded negotiations with the Marathas for the release of the ship, Viscount de St. Riveul, Commandant of the Naval Station of India, directed that the brig be sent to the Camotims in Goa.⁶⁶ The ship 'Adelaide I' was sold by the Camotims and the proceeds were remitted to Michel. Simultaneously, they sought help from the Camotims for the protection of their own private commercial interests tied up with this affair. The role played

by the Indian merchants at the basic working level in European trading activities improvised the commercial relations from complete stagnation.

In 1789, Tipu through negotiations established friendship with the Nizam and the Marathas, and a Confederacy against the English was arranged. But the British diplomacy outwitted that of the Mysorean and succeeded in bringing the Nizam on their side.⁶⁷ Tipu made futile attempts to enlist the support of Turkey and France through missions which returned nothing substantial to contribute to his military designs. The immediate provocation for the disastrous Third Anglo-Mysore War (1790-92) lay in the attempt of Tipu to tighten his hold on the Western coast. Taking advantage of the enmity between Tipu and the English, the Raja of Travancore in 1789 purchased from the Dutch the forts of Cranganore and Ayakotta which Tipu considered very important and for the purchase of which he had already been negotiating. Lord Cornwallis, the British Commander found that Tipu had only a remote possibility at the time of receiving any help from France and also no country power would help him. He considered Tipu's attack on Travancore to be an act of war, and declared a war on Mysore. Cornwallis brought both the

Nizam and the Peshwa within an alliance against Mysore. Tipu's efforts to woo the Nizam and the Peshwa failed and convulsions of the Revolution prevented the French to be of any help to him at this crucial period of his career. He had therefore to fight single handed a formidable league of alien and local powers. The Marathas supported by some Bombay forces ravaged the territories of Mysore. The English established easy communication with the Carnatic and the Nizam's dominions to have uninterrupted supply. When the army of Cornwallis supported by the Nizam and the Marathas reached six miles near Srirangapattan, Tipu realising the futility of further resistance deputed his envoys to negotiate peace.⁶⁸

In 1790, when the British and the Marathas came together for the destruction of Tipu, the Governor of Portuguese India ordered the occupation of the Province of Canacona. The Anglo-Maratha alliance disturbed the Luso-English relations in India. This was revealed by the case of the Piro or Sadashivgad fortress being besieged by the Marathas in August 1790. The capture of Piro by the Marathas caused a rupture in Goa-Poona relations. This event led to the dismissal of Governor Cunha e Menezes by the Lisbon Court.⁶⁹ On 17th January 1791, a treaty was

signed between the Portuguese and the King of Sunda in which the latter abdicated his rights to the Portuguese in the territories of Ponda, Zambaulim, Panchamal, the fortress of Cabo de Rama and Canacona. The king of Sunda further agreed to make certain money allowances for the support of a Portuguese garrison at Piro. He pledged not to leave Goa and to endeavour to recover his former territories of Ponda, Zambaulim, Supem, and other regions from the Marathas. The Portuguese marched to Piro, which was already in the occupation of the Marathas. However, there were within the fort many troops favourable to the cause of the king of Sunda, and with Portuguese aid the fort of Piro was obtained from the Marathas.⁷⁰ Thus the Portuguese occupied Piro. Though there was a war between the Portuguese and Tipu in 1790, peace was concluded in 1791 and the Portuguese Government also opened negotiations as they required the old ports for the conveyance of rice from Kanara.⁷¹ Soon after the treaty of Srirangapattan (1792), Tipu negotiated with the Viceroy at Goa for handing over Sadashivgad to him. The Portuguese Government with a view to maintain good relations with the Sultan ordered the Fort to be handed over to General Mohamad Reza the representative of the Sultan. Not long after in token of his goodwill Tipu ordered that the ports of Barcelore, Coondapur and Mangalore be opened to

all traders coming from Goa and that no obstacles be placed in the way of their purchasing rice and other essentials from Kanara. The Portuguese merchants were allowed to export rice from Mangalore at reduced rates. Tipu in return wanted to establish a commercial house in Goa, but the Portuguese authorities did not comply with his wishes, because they were afraid that this would make the English angry. According to Mohibbul Hassan, inspite of this, henceforth Tipu's relations with the Portuguese remained cordial.⁷² After the treaty of Srirangapattan (1792) Tipu's economic, financial, and military resources were sapped, his kingdom was opened to attack due to the cessation of Baramahal and Coorg. The English had become supreme and their trusted garrisons consisted of Christians. The Coorg Raja, Dodda Virarajendra had managed to escape from Srirangapattan and with the aid of the English had been able to recover Coorg by the Treaty of 1792.

During the reign of Tipu Sultan the period from 1792 to 1799 was marked by various reforms and reorganisation particularly in the military and commercial departments. In 1792 the annual income was only Rupees 118½ lakhs. So Tipu raised the land revenue and this enhanced the assessment. The monopoly of the government was

introduced on the tobacco trade.⁷³ Maximum advantage was gained by the merchants through a combination of overland and water transport in the most cost effective manner. The Vanjara participation in spice trade in Kanara helped the *Rajas* and the traders to get out of inconvenient contracts and agreements that bound them to sell the spices much below the market rates to the European officials settled on the coast. The itinerant merchants of Kanara and Malabar would conveniently slip past the guards posted by the European factories or later by the Mysorean Government. The end result was that in defiance of all "official" restrictions, cardamom and pepper moved freely to the wholesale markets of Haveri, Goa and Poona.⁷⁴ The best aromatic wood grew in Mysorean forests adjoining Malabar. Coota Moosa, the partner of Domingos Rodriguez Junior took the opportunity to opt out of inconvenient contracts binding them to make deliveries to the European Company officials and sold their consignments at a higher price to private traders. Many preferred to travel via Khanapur and Keelaghat to the Portuguese enclave, where they bartered sandalwood and ivory for raw silk, cotton and woolen textiles.⁷⁵ In 1792, Tipu made a belated, but frantic effort to raise a navy. As per the naval regulations, the fleet was placed under the Board of Trade. The Sultan realised that

the navy and commerce were interdependent. Tipu was one of the first Indians to recognise that a strong navy was the secret of the might of the European powers. However he could not accomplish his target due to the heavy loss of coastal territory at the conclusion of the third Mysore war, when Malabar was ceded to the English.⁷⁶

The treaty of Srirangapattan (1792) greatly enhanced the strength and territorial extent of the possessions of the Company. The English Company in 1793 declared free trade to all persons in pepper, sandalwood, cardamom and all other things except muskets, powder, swords, match locks and all sorts of arms.⁷⁷ In a treaty dated 17th January 1791, the king of Sunda had assigned to the Portuguese all his rights in the territories of Ponda, Zambaulim, Panchamal, as well as *Cabo da Rama*, and the jurisdiction of Canacona. In a letter dated 3rd March 1793, the Portuguese confirmed that Piro or Sadashivgad was handed over to the Sultan.⁷⁸ Sebastiao Joze Ferreira Borroco, *Chancelor da Relacao de Goa e Secretario do Magestoso Estado da India Azia, Portuguez* hoped that with the handing over of Sadashivgad a cordial relationship would be reestablished between the two sovereigns.⁷⁹ Though permission was granted for the purchase of merchandise a limit was set up for the amount of

goods to be traded. Pundalik Camotim negotiated in the trade transactions and tried his best to obtain the goods urgently. But he was unable to get the merchandise. As Tipu did not pass orders for the supply of rice, the Portuguese arrested a person who crossed the borders and entered Goa. When some soldiers from Tipu's army came in his pursuit, the Portuguese did not hand him over to them because there was no mutual agreement among the two sovereigns.⁸⁰

The treaty of Srirangapattan and its provisions were very humiliating for Tipu Sultan. At this crucial moment Tipu also made advances to the Nizam and the Peshwa, even though they had invaded his kingdom and dismissed his agents from their Courts. Tipu tried to pacify the Nizam through religion. But these appeals to the Nizam's humanity and religion fell on deaf ears. Tipu's negotiations with the Peshwa's Government were carried on through the Raste family. But due to the progress of Cornwallis, the Marathas wanted Tipu's power to be weakened. Tipu was deprived of half of his kingdom, pay three crores and thirty lakhs of rupees and two of his sons were held as hostages for the due performance of the treaty of Srirangapattan.⁸¹ Tipu nursed a grievance against the British and sought opportunities to

recover his lost position with the help of the French.⁸² He along with the French envisaged the conquest of Goa as a launching pad to strike at the roots of the English power in India. Both of them considered Goa as a strategic location for their operations against the British. Tipu wanted to avenge the humiliation suffered by the treaty of Srirangapattan and revived his power on the Indian subcontinent.⁸³

Goa was the seat of the Governor General of Portuguese India, and it was one of the places on the West coast of India at which the British feared that the French forces would make a landing. This danger which arose from the weakness of the Portuguese power in India led the Home Government to direct the Government of Bombay to adopt measures for the security of Goa.⁸⁴ This was done in conjunction with the Governor General of Goa and was subject to any order from the Governor-in-Council. The Governor General of British India was also impressed with the Goa Government on the subject of strengthening its defence. Miguel de Lima e Souza, a native of Bombay, was deputed by the Government of Bombay to proceed to Goa to confer with the Governor General of Goa on various points connected with the state of the several Portuguese settlements in India. He was to

ascertain the state of the defence in Goa, Daman and Diu, the number of armed forces and the state of fortification, should Portugal fall into French hands. According to Miguel de Lima e Souza's report, in case of French attack on Goa, the Portuguese would not be able to defend themselves, without British assistance. The Portuguese needed the assistance of the British ships and troops, and were averse to the French and inclined to place everything in the hands of the British rather than submit to the French.⁸⁵

Although the French did not stand by Tipu in the Third Anglo-Mysore War, Tipu did not lose hope. In a letter dated 2nd April 1797 addressed to the representative of the people residing in the Isles of France and of La Re-Union, Tipu made overtures towards good relations. Tipu informed that in the Third Anglo-Mysore War the ambitious English, due to lack of sufficient confidence in themselves allied with the Marathas and Nizam, and attacked him from different quarters. When Tipu was about to conquer them, the French army under the command of M. de Cossigny received an order from M. Bussy to abandon the Mysoreans. As the Mysorean army was abandoned by the French, they were forced to make peace, which was very humiliating. Tipu cited this factor to apprise the French, that they should assist the

Mysoreans if Tipu declared war against the English.⁸⁶ Tipu focussed on the common enemy, the English and the hatred he had against the English. As a gesture of friendship, Tipu would assist the French with facilities both on land and sea, and also provide gunpowder or other ammunition desirable. By providing the advances to the French, Tipu asked for the following:⁸⁷

1. Reimbursement of the advances and necessary supplies furnished at the end of the war, from the sums taken from the common enemy.
2. As he suffered greatly in supporting the cause of the French in the last war, he required that all towns, forts, territories, which were within his former boundaries should be his by right and the Republican troops would have no claims on it.
3. If the fortune of war shall put them in possession of Goa and Bombay, the port of Bombay, and the territories dependent on it, belonging to the English, shall belong of right to the French, but Goa and its dependencies shall belong to Tipu.
4. In order to achieve the conquest of the English and Portuguese possessions and those of their Allies, it was necessary that Tipu should be assisted with from five to ten thousand regular

troops or national guards, and from twentyfive to thirty thousand of their new citizens, selecting the most subtle and instructed of them.

5. To facilitate the attack and capture of Goa, a port essential for French squadron and transports, it would be necessary to disembark at Tipu's Port of Honavar, situated in Latitude 14° 35 N. and 70° Longitude.
6. They would commence hostilities against the English and the Portuguese, when in case the Nizam and the Marathas should join them, they would wage war against them also, for it was necessary to subjugate them also, and to render their tributaries to them.

Tipu put forth these intentions to the French Republic and requested them to reflect on the above suggestions before replying to him.⁸⁸ He expressed his willingness to support the French in their endeavours towards the British in India. The British realising the intensity of the political scenario befriended the Portuguese in Goa, to fight their common foe - the French. The Portuguese Empire in India was tottering and the British sought to aid them in order to crush the power of Tipu Sultan who had once again risen up after the

Third Anglo-Mysore War. The European nations, that is France and England allied themselves with the Mysoreans and Portuguese respectively to prove their supremacy on the Southern coast. France, with the emergence of the Republic rose up with renewed vigour to deal with their traditional foe - the British. The British realised that there was none equal to Tipu to challenge the British authority in any State of India. Tipu after the humiliating terms of the Treaty of 1792, began to add to the fortifications of his Capital, to remount his cavalry, to recruit and discipline his infantry, to punish his refractory tributaries and to encourage the cultivation of his country which was soon restored to its former prosperity.⁸⁹ In 1797 Tipu Sultan dispatched an embassy to Mauritius with the sole intention of preparing the grounds for a military alliance between the French and himself.⁹⁰ The secret correspondence contained the terms, objectives, and a detailed plan for the conquest of Goa. After the conquest of Goa, Goa would be handed over to Tipu and Bombay to the French. The whole expedition would be carried on by targeting from the Mysorean territory.⁹¹

Lord Wellesley arrived at Madras on 26th April 1798, and was bent upon waging war with Tipu even though the Court of Directors were against such a drastic step. In

addition to other preparations, he hoped to revive the Triple Alliance of 1790, and in that attempt he succeeded in winning over the Nizam to his side and brought him under a Subsidiary Alliance. As per this treaty, the Nizam disbanded all his French troops and accepted a British subsidiary force for his protection at his own cost. The Marathas at this time showed no interest in the war and refrained from any involvement. The Marathas after the Third Mysore War were vigilant over the danger of the fast rise of the English power and distrustful of the English alliance and were determined not to assist the English in crushing a rival even though that rival was the 'Muslim' ruler of Mysore.⁹²

The British realised that the Peshwa would not cooperate with them, so the only Maratha chieftain who may aid them was Parshuram Bhau. This Chieftain was well known for antipathy subsisting between him and Tipu Sultan.⁹³ So there was a reasonable resumption that Parshuram Bhau would be disposed by a prospect of advantage, to assist in the reduction of the Sultan's power. The Earl of Mornington therefore wished to have a direct communication between the Company's Government and Parshuram Bhau. He desired that Lt. Col. Little and Mr. Uthoff were to be employed on this mission and that for this

purpose they should proceed to Goa immediately. These representatives were to be sent to Goa because there it would probably be easy and secure to contact Parshuram Bhau.⁹⁴ The main point which they had to communicate to Bhau was his immediate and cordial co-operation at the head of the largest force in cavalry which he could assemble with the British army in Mysore, for the purpose of prosecuting the war against Tipu with the utmost vigour.

On 3rd February, Lord Wellesley directed General Harris to suspend negotiations with Tipu and invade Mysore. The invasion of Mysore was an open act of aggression, because Tipu had not entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with the French. With the destruction of the French fleet by Nelson in October 1798, it was impossible for the French to send any part of their forces to India. The French would not send any force which might strengthen Tipu, because the command of the Indian waters was in the English hands.⁹⁵ Tipu's army had suffered both in numbers and discipline since the Third Anglo-Mysore War. Tipu dispatched missions to France without caring to find out whether France or her colonies were in a position to render him any aid. The result was that Tipu virtually played into the hands of Wellesley and supplied him with a *casus belli* that Wellesley was longing

for.⁹⁶ The Fourth Anglo-Mysore war though only of short duration proved to be decisive. On 5th March 1799 at Sedaseer, Stuart inflicted a crushing defeat on Tipu. With the arrival of Bombay forces all of Tipu's hopes evaporated. Tipu fought like a fearless soldier till his end nursing deep resentment against the British. With the removal of this formidable foe, the English ascendancy was more or less established on the Indian soil. The fall of Srirangapattan marked the end of Tipu's rule over Mysore and the establishment of British paramountcy. The fourth Anglo-Mysore war resulted in the death of Tipu and the restoration of the Wodeyar dynasty. A Commission was set up to conduct the affairs of Mysore and it consisted of General Harris, Col. Wellesley, Henry Wellesley, William Kirkpatrick and Barry Close. It was the Company which was to assume paramount supremacy over entire Mysore.

Tipu took an unusually great interest in trade and commerce and actually encouraged the export of pepper, chillies, sandalwood, cardamom and rice. He established a royal board of nine commissioners of trade with 17 foreign and 30 home factories to carry out under his own elaborate instructions, an import and export trade by land and sea and brought much prosperity to Mysore.⁹⁷ Tipu's economic

reforms could not bear much fruit because of the two major wars which he waged against the English.

The Portuguese were friendly with the English in Europe and they maintained the same relations in India too. Tipu Sultan, the sworn enemy of the English, wanted to have alliance with the Portuguese and the French and strike at the English. Neither the French nor the Portuguese could really extend support to Tipu. The Portuguese power was waning in the second half of the eighteenth century. They did not have the power and courage to ally against the English in India. Moreover, the Portuguese in Goa had to depend on the provisions imported from Karnataka. Thus the Portuguese were in a dilemma. Tipu knew this factor well and tried to capitalise on that and sought political and military support from the Portuguese.

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83. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24
84. Bernard Anderson, "The Diplomatic History of the East India Company 1798-1813", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Bombay University, 1969, p.268.
85. *Ibid.*, p.269.
86. Collection of letters entitled "War with Tipoo Sultan", 1800, p.127.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
89. P. N. Chopra and *et. al.*, *Op. Cit.*, p.95.

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90. B. Sheik Ali, *Op. Cit.*, p.24.
91. *Ibid.*
92. P. N. Chopra and *et. al.*, *Op. Cit.*, p.96.
93. Robert Montgomery Martin (ed), *The Despatches, Minutes and Correspondence of the Marques Wellesley during his Administration in India, Vol. I, London, 1836, p.563.*
94. *Ibid.*
95. Mohibbul Hassan, *Op. Cit.*, p. 298.
96. *Ibid.*, p. 300.
97. B. Sheik Ali, *Op. Cit.*, p. 38.



CHAPTER - V
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The fall of Srirangapattan and Tipu Sultan's death on 4th May 1799 marked the rising supremacy of the British power in India. It led to the extension of the British territory and increase in revenue in the Peninsula and command over Central Mysore added to the limits of the Governments of fort St. George and Bombay.¹ Though Great Britain and Portugal were allies, the circumstances in Europe were such that the age old alliance underwent a severe test of the time. Mornington also endeavoured to negotiate with Portugal for the cession of Goa, for which Malacca might be given in exchange.² This was because, Goa with meagre resources was the only vulnerable point on which the French could bank upon. Mornington therefore suggested to the Goa Governor to admit a detachment of British troops in that place.³

The dissolution of Mysore set forward the British dominion by finally removing an inveterate enemy who for nearly three decades challenged the British possessions in South India. It gave the British a complete command over

the sea coast of the lower Peninsula, and thus greatly diminished any risk of molestation by the French.⁴ Wellesley partitioned the dominions of Tipu; to the Nizam were ceded, the districts of Gooty and Gurrankonda and a part of Chitedurg lying to the North-East. The English reserved for themselves a large portion including Kanara, Wynad, Coimbatore and Dharmapuram and all the lands below the ghats between the coast of Malabar and the Carnatic together with the fort of Srirangapattana. In the remaining portion of Mysore, excluding those areas shared by the English and the Nizam, the old Hindu ruling dynasty of Mysore was restored.⁵ In the settlement of the territories, the objects of Governor-General Wellesley were two fold :

- 1) To obtain reasonable indemnification for the cost of war.
- 2) To safeguard the Company's interest in Mysore against any possible danger.⁶

It may also be noted that the English kept for themselves the most strategic areas mostly on the sea coast. This facilitated their growth further, both politically and economically. Thus Wellesley decided to restore the ancient dynasty of the Wodeyars for the triple purpose of pleasing the Nizam, maintaining the Company's influence and winning the favour

of the local powers. Krishna Raja Wodeyar III was placed on the throne of Mysore with the administration entrusted to the able Dewan Purniah. The new State of Mysore formed virtually a dependency of the British dominion and was brought within the Subsidiary Alliance.⁷

In Portugal, the Prince Regent, Dom Joao being informed of the events in France feared the possibilities of a French attack on the Portuguese possessions in India. He, therefore, advised the Governor to maintain very cordial relations with the British in India, because a continued Anglo-Portuguese alliance in Europe was of extreme necessity to Portugal.⁸ In 1800, Lord Granville, the British Foreign Secretary proposed to Portugal for the cession of Diu to the East India Company. This cession was to be carried in lieu of monetary compensation or by the transfer of some British territories to the Portuguese Crown. But the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Luis Pinto de Souza rejected the offer reminding the British Government of the Treaty of 1661. According to this treaty, the British were obliged to protect the Portuguese interests in India in exchange for the transfer of the island of Bombay to the British.⁹ In August 1800, the French Government had ordered an expedition of two ships namely 'Geographer' and 'Naturalist' commanded by Captain

Barectin, with scholars and artists aboard. As the unique aim of this expedition was to augment the knowledge of geography and natural sciences, the Regent Prince of Portugal directed that in order to facilitate their smooth journey, they should not be detained by the Portuguese Warships.¹⁰ So also they should be allowed in any port of the Portuguese dominion and should be provided with all help, protection, assistance if necessary.¹¹ He further asked the Governor of Goa that in case these French travellers entered the port of Goa, he should receive them well, allow them to communicate with the inhabitants of the land and treat them with attention they deserved. This gesture of the Regent Prince was exceptional since the political situation in Europe was going through a tough period at the beginning of the 19th century because the war clouds were gathering over Europe's horizon and Napoleon was emerging more and more powerful and victorious.¹²

In 1800 Portugal reminded Great Britain of the cordial relations and obligations resulting from the Treaty of 1661, when the island of Bombay was ceded to Great Britain. They insisted vigorously on aid to be provided on the military front for the security of the Portuguese Government at Goa.¹³ The Portuguese further proposed that equality should be granted

and that it would be convenient if both the states would enter into a treaty. As Napoleon experienced considerable loss in Egypt the Portuguese felt that it was not necessary for the British troops to be stationed at Goa. The Portuguese forces were good enough to repel any attack from the French, and they wanted to escape the vigilant activities of the British force.¹⁴ The British were establishing a military force to check the relentless disposition of the Maratha power and to make conquests in the Konkan region.¹⁵ The favourable result of the Anglo-Mysore wars had left the British power in India without an apprehension or invasion from any formidable enemy. Tipu Sultan commanded a well disciplined and organised army which could oppose the British armies in the field, but fortunately for the British Government no other native power had similar perfection.¹⁶ The French at this time were not very formidable since Bonaparte's army was dying away in Egypt. But there were hopes that they would rise above their misfortunes and might recourse to the Marathas. The outcome of the Anglo-Maratha wars dampened the French hopes of aid from the Marathas. Wellesley implemented the System of Subsidiary Alliance and the Maratha empire came under the domain of the British.

In 1801, the position of Portugal was desperate because there was a strong suspicion that Goa along with the other Portuguese possession in the East would be ceded to France.¹⁷ On 29th January 1801, Spain and France signed a Convention and ordered Portugal to break off her cordial relations with Great Britain. They further demanded from Portugal to open her ports to French and Spanish ships and close them to the English. If the above terms were not fulfilled, the Franco-Spanish Convention threatened the invasion of Portugal.¹⁸ In February, these terms were delivered to the Prince Regent and although a negotiator was sent to Madrid, war was declared. Hence it was considered absolutely necessary that a commanding force be stationed at Goa to defend it against any attack. With the withdrawal of Russia from the second coalition directed at France, and Napoleon's victory at Italy in June 1800, the Franco-British conflict ended in a stalemate.¹⁹ The British navy held mastery of the seas due to the exploits of Admiral Nelson. But Republican France seemed unconquerable on the Continent. The treaty of Amiens was concluded in March 1802 between England and France. Great Britain promised to restore all its recent colonial conquests except Ceylon and Trinidad. Napoleon agreed to evacuate the French Army from Egypt, Naples, and Portugal. Portugal and Naples were too

weak to resist French domination.²⁰ The treaty of Amiens was intended to be permanent but it proved only a truce in the struggle between France and Great Britain. In January 1803, Wellesley informed the Governor of Bombay of his proposed plan to attack Poona. But Wellesley's plans had to be altered due to the probability that the French would endeavour to get possession of the Portuguese settlements in India.

During the regency of Purniah, the British communicated to him about the demand for resources needed to carry on various expeditions in India. In November 1802, Purniah was instructed to repair the forts of Hurryhar and Hoonelly. The British were in need of grain and rice, and so the Dewan was asked to stop the exportation of the former entirely, and of the latter from the countries bordering the Ghats.²¹ Purniah was further instructed to prepare an equipment for a force which would require twenty field pieces, and to repair all the carriages that it required.²² Captain Johnson of the Bombay Engineers was instructed to execute his plan for removing six 12-pounders from Goa to Hullihall. The Acting Resident at Goa, Lt. Dillon was requested to facilitate these transactions to enable prompt action. Besides him, Reeves, the Paymaster Major Doolan, the Commanding

Officer at Goa, Read, the Collector were urged to adopt all measures to facilitate these operations. Duncan was requested to send 30,000 lbs of salt provisions, packed in kegs of 45 lbs each. Salted beef was prepared for the European troops by the Garrison Storekeeper by the orders of Webbe in consequence of the notice received from him.²³ The above preparations were made on the eve of the advance to Poona.

The year 1807 marked the zenith of Napoleon's power. By a Treaty of Alliance dated 7th July 1807, the Czar consented to associate with Napoleon against England if she did not curtail her maritime claims by 1st November 1807, and agree to make over the conquests made since 1805 to France and her allies.²⁴ Napoleon, being perturbed over the stiff attitude adopted by England, at an assembly of diplomats gave a threat to the Portuguese ambassador that he would no longer tolerate an English ambassador in Europe. He would declare war against any power that received one, after two months from that time and that as the English no longer respected neutrals at sea, he would no longer recognise neutrals on the land.²⁵ He even signed the secret treaty of Fontainebleau in October 1807 for the partition of Portugal and its colonies between France and

Spain. As a follow-up measure, the French army led by General Junot passed through Spain to oust House of Braganza from power. Napoleon had resolved that if Great Britain controlled the seas and was invulnerable to invasion, then he would defeat her commercial means.²⁶ He applied the Continental System against Great Britain to reduce her to bankruptcy by winning her balance of trade. The conflict between Napoleon and Portugal simmered when Napoleon's Continental System was not adhered to by Portugal.²⁷ Portugal to avoid absorption from France and Spain became dependent upon England. In July 1807, A. Wellesley was commissioned to lead British troops and expel Junot and the French from Portugal. Junot surrendered on 3rd September and Wellesley felt that the liberation of Portugal by this battle justified some British courtesies.²⁸

In November 1807, a secret Convention was signed by the King of England and the Regent Prince of Portugal specifying that upon establishing the throne in Rio de Janeiro by the Portuguese Monarch, England would not recognise any other dynasty than that of the House of Braganza on the throne of Portugal.²⁹ The Governor of Goa was ordered to receive with great hospitality, the ships and vessels from Great Britain with which the Portuguese Royalty

was bound by the strong ties of alliance. The Regent Prince also signed and issued a decree on 8th June 1808, from Rio de Janeiro which stated that since the French emperor had invaded States of Portugal in the most perfidious manner, violating the subsistent treaties between the two Crowns without any provocation of hostilities and declared a war against his Crown, Portugal in turn declared a total war against France on land and sea authorising the army and privateers to fight against the French.³⁰ The beginning of 1809 assured Portugal liberty from French forces, but the stationed British troops continued in Goa, when it was extremely difficult for the French to come down to Goa. By the end of the year 1812, the danger from the French to the British was no more felt. Lord Minto felt that the maintenance of the British detachment in Goa was not necessary for its security from the external attack and hence he instructed his envoy, Captain Courtland Schyle to continue to reside there in the same capacity even after the withdrawal of the British garrison.³¹ For the damages and losses incurred to the strongholds of Goa, necessary orders were sent by the British Minister to carry out repairs and indemnify the damages. Though the British troops had been gradually withdrawn since 1813, the problems in connection

with the damages caused by them were still an issue of discussion till the beginning of the year 1815.³²

The beginning of the Napoleonic Wars marked a period of increasing duties, imposed not for the purpose of protecting native industries, but as a means of obtaining funds urgently needed for the protection of the war with France.³³ The duties imposed by Napoleon affected practically every form of import and imposed a very heavy burden upon English consumers. This phase lasted till 1815, that is until the end of the Napoleonic reign. The Congress of Vienna (September 1814 - June 1815) was the most distinguished political assemblage in European history. It was represented by the major victors in the war of nations namely Russia, Prussia, Austria and Great Britain, besides other countries.³⁴ In India, after the death of Tipu Sultan, Lord Mornington was able to inaugurate a change in British policy towards the Indian States.³⁵ The British maintained a balance of power which saw its climax in the period from 1813 to 1815. In Mysore, Krishnaraja Wodeyar III ruled under the able guidance of Purniah. Purniah's prosperity solely rested on the goodwill of English East India Company. The Company was empowered by Article XIV of the Subsidiary Treaty to render its advice in any matter

concerned with the Raja's Government such as economy of finances, better collection of revenue, administration of justice, etc.³⁶

During the rule of the Raja, the Mysore Government suffered from defalcation of revenue. There were also failures of crops during 1812 and 1813. So it was evident that the fall in revenues was due to variations of the seasons. There were factors within the internal government which were responsible for the decline in revenue. Krishna Raja Wodeyar III was a child of five years and during his minority the Regent and Dewan was Purniah (1800 - 1811). After the departure of Sir John Malcolm, the first Resident at Mysore, in 1804, Purniah was left to pursue his own plans, in possession of undivided authority, undisturbed and uninstructed by the Government of Madras, or their representative, the Resident.³⁷ From the first year of the rule of Krishnaraja Wodeyar III, the condition of Mysore gradually deteriorated and occasional remonstrances were addressed to the native court by the Resident. In the year 1811, the Raja assumed power and ruled upto 1831.

Although the main object of Wellesley was to march the army to Poona, and reestablish the Peshwa's authority, he

had to delay in his plans. In a letter to Lt.Col. Close, Resident at Poona, Wellesley mentioned the various obstacles faced by the British. It was not practicable to march through the southern Maratha territories because the British had not received any satisfactory communication from the Patwardhan family. Though there prevailed confusion at Poona, the heads of districts and villages in Maratha lands had raised their troops, which would be destructive to the British supplies and their communication with Mysore. Considering the great distance between Mysore and Poona, Wellesley felt it was necessary to establish a depot on the Bombay Coast.³⁸

A dominant feature of the sea trade of Kanara of this period was that it was export-dominated.³⁹ The excess of exports over imports was also the characteristic of the trade dealing of India in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In fact, this single character foreign trade was the problem of most of the under-developed colonial countries. The fluctuations in trade were dominated largely by the interplay of several factors like vagaries of weather, the piratical threats, political upheavals like internal rebellions in the trading countries, the natural calamities like famines or droughts in the dependent areas, a change in the tariff policy

of the government, unforeseen commercial causes, etc. From 1802 to 1804 there was excessive demand for Kanara rice from Bombay, Goa, and Malabar markets and as such the export of rice at Mangalore to Arabia was prohibited and rice was exported to the places of demand. It is said that Vithalji Kamat, Keshav Parab Cawandy, Vithoji Sinai Dhempe and the Mhamai Brothers were involved in the flourishing trade in rice along the West Coast of India.⁴⁰

Sir Thomas Munro described the trade of Kanara in 1800, highlighting the fact that one third of the rice exported reached Arabia and the rest to Malabar, Goa, and Bombay. Arrack, salt and gin were imported from Goa. A letter of Sir Thomas Munro to the Madras Board of Revenue dated 29th April 1800, mentions an advance to the tune of 4000 *Bahadury pagodas* to the Captain of Frigate sent by the Governor of Goa to enable the Captain to purchase rice from Kanara. Buchanan also described rice as the grand article of export being sent to Muscat, Bombay, Goa and Malabar. John Sturrock observed that more than half of its exports went to Malabar, about one third to Goa and only a small quantity to foreign countries such as Arabia and Zanzibar. Exports were made from all the ports of the district but the rice trade with Goa was chiefly carried on at Hangarkatta,

and with Persia, Arabia and Zanzibar, at Kundapur and Mangalore. As far as Kanara was concerned, three-fourths of its sea-borne trade was carried on at Mangalore while rest was shared by the ports of Kundapur, Hangarkatta (Barkur), Malpe (Udupi), Mulki, Kasaragod, Kumbala, Manjeshwar and other ports. The only two foreign settlements in India with which the Kanara coast had trading connection were Mahe and the Portuguese settlement of Goa.⁴¹ A document belonging to the year 1845 reveals that with Goa the trade was more than Rs.1,60,000.

Mangalore was the most important port in Kanara. In 1809, Alexander Read considered it to be the emporium of Kanara. The principal port of Barkur was Hangarkatta which concluded a large export trade in rice and paddy, principally to Goa. In a fine season, as many as a hundred native crafts were seen loading for Goa and the ports of North Kanara.⁴² On account of the salt monopoly introduced in Kanara by the Company Government in 1807, the inhabitants of the region had to depend on the Government supply. Even the licensed manufacturers were unable to meet the demands of the region, and as such, a large quantity of salt was imported from Goa by land on payment of a customs duty of 12 annas per *maund* which was considered to be equal to the profit on

the manufactured salt of the district. Salt occupied a place of considerable importance in the trade dealings of the period. In spite of its long sea coast, Kanara did not produce sufficient salt to meet its own demand. In 1808, the selling prices of salt confirmed by a General Agent were as follows :

	<i>Star pagodas</i>	<i>Rupees/per garce</i>
Bombay Salt	23	80 ½
Goa Salt	21	73 ½
Arabia Salt	21	73 ½
Gersoppa and Goa Salt	22	77
All other parts of Kanara for Kanara Salt	20	70

In 1809, the prices of all these three varieties of salt were increased in the same ratio or 10 *Star pagodas* per *garce* at the above mentioned places of sale. The salt imported from Goa to Kanara was further shipped to the Amindivi Islands.⁴³ In 1809 Alexander Read, wrote to the Board that the export of rice to Goa should not suffer as the troops at Goa were more than the previous year, and the supplies could be procured from Kanara.

The changes in the tariff policy and the occasional restrictive measures which the Company Government in Kanara adopted affected the trade between Kanara and Goa. Customs constituted an important source of Governmental revenue in Kanara. In 1812, there arrived from Mangalore to Goa, a shipment of 9 horses priced at 300 *Xerafins* each, thereby possessing a total value of 2,700 *Xerafins*. Besides merchandise, in Kanara, treasure too was imported and exported from and to the neighbouring regions like Mysore, Coorg, Goa, and the Maratha States.⁴⁴ In 1813-1814, the double duty imposed (as per the Regulation of 1812) on goods imported and exported under Portuguese colours acted nearly as a prohibition, and would have put a stop to the export of rice to Goa altogether but for the decision of the Madras Board of Revenue to withdraw it. According to the Report of the Board of Revenue of External Commerce, in 1813-1814 the trade with Goa had decreased and was confined to rice from Kanara. The double duty on goods led to a decline in trade. The salt imported from Goa had no duty and it was retained at the monopoly price. The market price of salt was more and it ultimately fell on the consumer and there was hardly any check on the importation of salt.⁴⁵ The value of salt exported from Goa for the year 1813-1814 was about Rupees 88,338 and other trifling goods amounted to about

Rupees 7,456. The exports from Kanara valued Rupees 4,38,374. Out of this Rupees four lakhs was the value of Kanara rice and the rest was the values of coir, coconuts, and paddy from Malabar and few other things.⁴⁶ This trade was therefore the most beneficial and though it decreased very much since the withdrawal of the subsidiary force, yet the returns of the year was about Rupees 1,72,820.⁴⁷

The period after the French wars saw the awakening from lassitude which was to be accompanied by a movement for greater freedom of economic intercourse between nations.⁴⁸ As noted earlier, in Mysore, the Company was empowered by Article XIV of the Subsidiary Treaty to render its advice in any matter concerned with the Raja's Government.⁴⁹ The Governor of Madras had his jurisdiction over Mysore. According to a report from Fort St. George dated November 1818, the British felt that the reason for the diminished exportation of grain to Goa was due to the increased local demand. But the British trade with Goa proved a drawback because of the 10% export duty demanded by the English Company.⁵⁰ As a result of this heavy duty imposed on rice which was an article so necessary for the inhabitants of Goa, there were frequent complaints. These complaints were received from the traders and the

merchants of Goa.⁵¹ In order to maintain cordial relations with Portugal, the British tried to remove the defect prevalent and increased the export of grain to Goa.⁵² In 1828 the British Government sanctioned the single duty on all exports on foreign vessels from Kanara.

The political climate in Portugal during the nineteenth century contributed towards consolidating the image of the *Estado* as a unit economically independent of Portugal. The Napoleonic invasion of Portugal in 1807 culminated in the granting of independence to Brazil in 1825. This resulted in Portugal concentrating on her home affairs with little time to bother about her colonies. Portugal experienced economic difficulties which compelled the Lisbon Government to exercise only the most tenuous control over its far-flung eastern empire. Hence contraband reached fresh heights during this period.⁵³ Trade declined between Lisbon and Goa between 1808-1821 because the Portuguese Crown resided in Rio de Janeiro, and due to relentless British pressure.⁵⁴

Goa served as an important entrepot for the Portuguese empire even in the nineteenth century. It highlighted in the hinterland, coastal, and overseas trade during this period. The period from 1816-1819 demonstrated the commercial

importance of Goa in comparison to other ports in coastal India and as a major emporium within the Portuguese empire. Tobacco leaf valued at about 15,000 pound sterling entered Goa legally from Bahia on a yearly basis while contraband tobacco worth an additional 15,000 pound sterling entered from Balaghat.⁵⁵ In Goa, tobacco was consumed extensively for smoking, sniffing and chewing. Balaghat tobacco was bought mainly by the inhabitants of New Conquest areas. As the population in these areas was predominantly Hindu who were not accustomed to smoking tobacco imported from the west, they relied on Balaghat for regular and cheap supplies. Balaghat provided as much as two thirds of the tobacco consumed in Goa.

The cheap Balaghat tobacco largely affected the consumption of Brazilian tobacco and hit at the revenue earnings of Goa. Though efforts were made to check the activities of the contrabandists, this trade continued. The merchants and contractors were significant beneficiaries of this trade which was conducted in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Saltpetre was also obtained from Balaghat which cost between 60 to 80 *Xerafins* per *Khandi*. The Mhamais were among the private traders at Goa, who dispatched regular consignments of Balaghat saltpetre to

Lisbon. Bamboos and cattle were imported into Goa from Balaghat, priced at 30 *Xerafins* per 1000 and 9 *Xerafins* each respectively. Balaghat textiles were one of the most important items in Goa's importing economy. Large quantities of Balaghat textiles were sent to Lisbon during 1780-1807. Goa exported to Balaghat items like salt, local liquour such as arrack and feni, salted fish, arecanuts and the paper and sugar imported from Lisbon and Macau. Goa conducted a flourishing trade with Balaghat and imported consumer items like tobacco, rice, wheat, condiments, spices, and coarse textiles which catered to the needs of the locals. Quality wood was imported from Malabar and Kanara to Goa particularly for building ships. Different kinds of vessels, *canoes*, *machwas* and *padavs* were used in transporting goods, between Goa and Kanara.⁵⁶ The diminished export of rice to Goa in 1816-1817 was due to the reduced demand on account of the imposition of a tax on its import to Goa from the British ports to the extent of 4% which with the 10% export duty payable to the Company Government proved a disincentive to the Goa trade.⁵⁷ From its bilateral trade with Balaghat, Goa not only drew revenues from levies on imports and exports but also from its re-exportation. Goa dispatched to Balaghat approximately 4,000 pound sterling annually, particularly copra and coconut oil as well as other

agricultural products.⁵⁸ The total Goan trade in exports and imports totalled an impressive 1,000,000 pound sterling per year for the period 1816-1819. The balance of payments difference was a small yearly deficit averaging 21,000 pound sterling.⁵⁹ Four destinations accounted for 96 per cent of total Goan exports; Brazil, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia and Lisbon.

In November 1827, a letter was submitted to the Governor-in-Council by the Sub-Collector of Kanara, in which was enclosed a copy of a letter from Master Attendant at Mangalore⁶⁰. This letter by the above officer suggested the expediency of altering the then prevalent practice of admitting entry vessels from the Persian Gulf without passes or documents of any description from the ports to which they belonged.⁶¹ This issue was referred to the Government of Bombay and the Board of Revenue replied that no deviation should take place at the ports subject to that Presidency. In 1829, Kanara showed a decrease in the revenue obtained from land customs. This decrease was ascribed to a diminished exportation of betelnut and to a falling off in the importation of piece goods and of Goa salt.⁶² There was also a decrease of sea customs to the tune of Rupees 29,104 -1 -5 in Kanara, chiefly in consequence of a diminished exportation of cotton, rice and pepper.

The maladministration of the Mysore Raja due to his inexperience and inability coupled with corrupt officials led to his deposition from power in 1831.⁶³ Lord Bentinck, the Governor-General inspired by the highly exaggerated representations of the Madras Government took a serious stand on the issue instead of giving a serious warning to the Raja.⁶⁴ After 1831, Mysore was administered through a Board of Commissioners with the assistance of a native agency. In 1832 with the resignation of Lt. Col. Briggs, Sir Mark Cubbon was appointed the sole Commissioner of Mysore.⁶⁵ The Commissioner scrutinised land rents and reduced it wherever it was high. In 1833 trade was thrown open to all by the British Parliament and the private merchants could participate in all kinds of commercial activities in India.⁶⁶ By this period the English East India Company became the ruler of vast territory in India but were not inspired by any large vision of administration and statesmanship.⁶⁷ The Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars had paralysed the great manufacturing and trading centres of the Continent.⁶⁸ This resulted in greater demand for British manufactures and colonial goods in India.⁶⁹ This demand was met by the simultaneous development of the steamship and the sailing vessels. The gain in political power

strengthened the Company's prosperity upon the rock of tangible success due to India's helplessness.

The period from 1815-1848 witnessed an attempt by the diplomats of Europe to bridle the forces unleashed by Napoleon Bonaparte. The Metternich System turned into a 'Trade Union of Kings' and failed to take account of the needs and desires of a strongly popular and parliamentary government like that of England.⁷⁰ England, under Canning and Palmerston, pursued a policy of adroit opportunism, of judicious sympathy with national aspirations. The Metternich policy failed both in Austria and Germany because it aimed at imposing an uniform system of repression on a series of peoples or states, which objected to being denied the aspirations of race or of liberty.⁷¹ The autocratic powers, by trying to repress and not to moderate or assimilate the expansive force of the new ideas, produced the explosion of 1848. This period of turmoil which prevailed in Europe did not hamper British commercial relations in the colonies.

In 1839, Kanara experienced a satisfactory rise in the collection of land revenue. There was a considerable increase in the cultivation of every species of agriculture and a great

increase in the produce of land⁷² There was considerable extension of coconut plantations and almost all waste spots along the coast were occupied and planted. But the principal plantations of the betelnut in Balaghat were on the decline for the last 20 years.⁷³ The fall in betelnut, pepper and cardamom was because of the diminished demand owing to the dissolution of the armies assembled in the Maratha empire and diminution of currency throughout India.⁷⁴ The condition of the peasants was deplorable because they had to contend themselves against an inferior soil or high assessment. The discontent of the people steadily increased and as a result 19th century was rent by innumerable peasant uprisings in every part of the Peninsula.⁷⁵ Decline in the value of money was the inevitable consequence of the revenue and fiscal measures of the British. The super-imposition of a money economy over a hereditary and predominantly barter economy of rural India proved quite inadequate. In spite of the conspicuous role of agriculture in the economy of the land, the lot of the peasants who formed the majority of the population was deplorably bad.⁷⁶

For sometime subsequent to its assumption by the British, Kanara was said to have been almost universally considered as one of the most lightly assessed and flourishing

portions of the Madras territories. However, soon conditions changed and collector's reports from there showed the prosperity of the District as on the decline. The declension was attributed to the assessment of the land. In a letter which Dickinson addressed to the Madras Government on 1st February 1831, he stated the assessment to be so very high, that it was impossible for the ryots to continue to pay.⁷⁷ As a result of this peasants left their villages and assembled together, offered obstinate resistance to the collection of land revenue and people of Kanara in general had been driven into rebellion by the rigour of the revenue administration. The circumstances that saucars and public servants were supplanting the original landed proprietors of Kanara had been adding intensity to the discontent of the peasant population there. The British authorities favoured this development as one attended with positive advantages both to the country and the government.⁷⁸ The insurrectionary assemblages of peasants were called *koots* or assemblages. The ryots of Bekul, Buntwal and Mangalore wanted a general remission of rent but the authorities were not prepared to grant it. Proclamations were issued by Dickinson requiring them to disperse. At Mangalore he issued warrants for the apprehension of 16 persons who were the ring leaders of the *koot* movement. Most of them were secured and confined in

the Collector's Cutcherry. As they had not dispersed, Dickinson issued a proclamation on 2nd February 1831, stating that he had received all their petitions, was convinced of their losses and would grant them liberal remissions. After Dickinson, Cameron took charge as the Collector and he managed to suppress the *koot* Movement.⁷⁹

According to C.R. Cotton during 1828-1829, rice and paddy were major articles of export from Kanara to Goa. Besides these Kanara imported from Goa dates, drugs, paper, dry grains, sugar, wines and spirituous liquors.⁸⁰ From 1838-39 to 1845-46, Kanara exported the following quantities of rice to Goa.⁸¹

Year	Quantity in <i>Muras</i>
1838-39	1,35,727
1839-40	1,11,492
1840-41	1,26,591
1841-42	84,356
1842-43	1,18,507
1843-44	1,63,809
1844-45	1,20,094
1845-46	78,433

In a letter dated 4th August 1841, the Chief Secretary, L. R. Read remarked that salt should be transported from the

Bombay and Goa territories into the southern Maratha country through the Presidency of Madras.⁸² In the district of Kanara there were several passes which were leading into Goa and trade was carried through these passes in an illegal manner. Tenai, located seven miles from the British station of Tuklavaddee, trade was carried without weighing or correctly ascertaining the amount. The Governmental revenue was not paid and so there was a crucial need to investigate into the affairs of this region. There were no proper checks on this region which came under the Belgaum district.⁸³ The contents of the letter of Read were ordered to be communicated to the Board of Revenue, who would then ask the Principal Collector of Kanara to institute necessary inquiry into the irregularities. Necessary action would then be taken respecting the levy of duty on salt at the stations on the Kanara frontier of the Goa territory.⁸⁴ It was further ordered that Blair, the Acting Collector of Kanara would state his intentions on the measures to be taken to meet the above views expressed by the Bombay Government.⁸⁵ The Land Customs Act No. VI of 1844 increased the export duty from 3% to 4½% and nearly doubled it on goods exported to foreign European settlements.⁸⁶ The Acting Principal Collector observed that this measure would certainly hamper the trade with the Portuguese who might go to other markets

under the Bombay territory and consequently the people would lose a good and secure mart for their chief produce.⁸⁷

According to the decree of 5th June 1844, the Portuguese took a liberal attitude towards the British and admitted English ships on the basis of the Luso-British Treaty on 3rd July 1842 in the ports of Cabo Verde, Guinea coast, St. Thome e Principe, Angola, Benguella, Mozambique coastline, Goa, Daman and Diu, Solor and Timor Archipelago. The British could not trade in any product produced in the above areas, and the articles of trade which were traditionally exported by these regions was to be prohibited. Articles such as gun powder, fire arms, salt, soap, wine, vinegar were to be allowed. The ships of the English East India Company had to pay the same duties as was paid by the Portuguese ships. These ports were to allow ships of other nations as per the freedom granted to trade with Portuguese possessions.⁸⁸

In 1844 there were protracted disturbances in the southern Maratha country and the British feared that this might be carried to the districts of Kanara. The northern part of Kanara was adjoining the Portuguese territory of Goa on the north and the southern Maratha country. Kanara, particularly the northern part had been the scene of many

outbreaks originating from trivial causes, and from the character of the people it was impossible to place much dependence on their loyalty and attachment.⁸⁹ In December 1844 there were three companies of infantry in the Northern Division varying from 40 to 70 miles from each other at Honavar, Sadashivgad and Sirsi. There was only one regiment stationed at Mangalore, and so there was urgent need for attending this problem which otherwise would be hazardous. Though everything was quiet in the region, Thompson thought it a prudential and precautionary measure to have more troops in the Northern part of the District to suppress any demonstration that might show itself against public peace.⁹⁰ Due to the prevailing disturbances in Dharwar and Belgaum, Thompson suggested the detachment of 3 companies of the 28th regiment to Sirsi. Thompson further communicated to the Chief Secretary to the Government at Fort St. George that he had received information from the political agent in Belgaum and the Collector of Dharwar. They alerted Thompson that the rebels were entering Goa with a view of exciting the inhabitants to join them in rebellion. In Belgaum, General Delamotte was strengthening his ports to prevent attacks on Belgaum, so it was more probable that they would come through Goa to Mangalore.⁹¹

In 1845 the borders of Kanara were not safe and hence Thompson made every arrangement necessary and also withdrew the treasuries from the frontiers. The police force stationed at Ankola, Soopah and Sonda was inadequate and so immediate employment of 80 armed peons and 4 *duffadars* was ordered. This force would be discontinued immediately after tranquility was restored in the neighbouring districts. The internal disorganisation of the Goa province and the unhappy dissensions made it probable that the rebels from the country will have no difficulties in collecting adherents to their cause and obtaining means of continuing their hostilities.⁹² Thompson requested the Chief Secretary, Fort St. George to dispatch the troops from Cannanore into the northern part of Kanara. Major Gen. Hill, Commanding Officer, Mysore division was also asked to reinforce troops for Sirsi from the 28th regiment. G. S. Forbes received information that arms and ammunition were being collected at Moofsah in Goa.⁹³ Forbes requested the Officer Commanding, Goa territory to inform him about bodies of men assembling in the neighbourhood of the Company's frontier.⁹⁴ Jugglebett, situated near the northern ghats was advantageous in terms of supplies, healthiness and good water. Hence Lt. Fleming, Commanding Detachment 35th regiment was requested by R. D. Parker, Joint Magistrate,

Sirsi to march to Jugglebett and detach the Ghats.⁹⁵ Besides this arrangement the Major in Command of the 35th Regiment had detached 2 Companies to Yellapore and 2 Companies to Hullial to keep up with the communication.⁹⁶ There were two regiments stationed at Mangalore which was unnecessary because the neighbouring province in North Kanara required a larger force to strengthen their outposts. The detachment of a regiment at Sirsi would ease the troops of Honavar and Sadashivgad and also be on the spot to send aid into Soopah and Sonda when occasion required.

The Collector of Kanara contemplated that when the rebels would find that the posts in the southern Maratha country were strengthened they would cross over into Goa.⁹⁷ There was also the possibility of them entering the northern parts of Kanara where they might get support from the local inhabitants. It was therefore desirable to apply to the government of Bombay for over two steamers for Vengurla or Raree to transport the Madras troops to wherever they might be required on the coast of Kanara or Malabar.⁹⁸ The Government would prefer keeping such reinforcements from Mysore above the Ghats to serve as a check on the Nuggur district and the North Western parts of Mysore. The 35th regiment was directed to march on to Sirsi and Maj. Gen.

Cubbon was requested by His Lordship in Council to send a Ressalah of Silladar Horse to act with the above regiment and to be stationed at Yellapoor.⁹⁹

Courtney informed Parker that on 26th January 1845 the Insurgent Chiefs with about two hundred followers fled towards the Goa frontiers. They were immediately pursued by the force under Lt. Col. Outram in the villages of Osup and Hewul. These villages on the borders of Goa were attacked and routed with considerable loss by Outram. As a result the insurgents were compelled to seek shelter in the thick jungles of the southern boundary of Kanara in the Portuguese possessions.¹⁰⁰ Due to the proximity of the Goan territory and the difficult nature of the country they had been able to avoid being captured. But now the Portuguese were inclined in seizing them, and had already taken some of the chiefs of Osup into custody. These insurgents would be compelled to retrace their movements in the Kanara region. Though there seemed to be less reasonable grounds to apprehend any rebellion from the insurgents in North Kanara, it was prudent to take precautions against it.¹⁰¹

In March 1845, Thompson communicated to the Chief Secretary, Fort St. George that a letter received from

Courtney, Political Superintendent in Sawantwadi speaks undecidedly of the amount of the co-operation they might expect from the Goa Government. He further informed that the Portuguese Government might take active measures for apprehension of the rebel chiefs because of the Bombay mission.¹⁰² Major General Lovell who was in HULLIAL had submitted to Government his suggestions for the most advantageous location of troops in Kanara. After the receipt of the order from Major General Lovell, R. D. PARKAR the Acting Principal Collector and Magistrate in Kanara increased the personnel in Soopah and Sonda. According to the intelligence received by PARKAR, the chiefs of the Sawantwadi insurgents had returned from the Goa territory. A vigilant watch was maintained by the Bombay troops along the Ghats. Hence at this juncture if the guards on the Kanara frontier were greatly reduced, a strong inducement would be held out for the chiefs to enter Sonda. As Sonda taluka was covered with dense jungles there would be great difficulty in rendering the expulsion of these invaders. The stationing of a regiment at Sirsi, the additional personnel of 200 peons and 10 duffadars would be sufficient to prevent any bad consequences. As there were no arms to hand over to these men, they would be paid Rupees 5/- per month to the peons and Rupees 8/- per month to the Duffadars¹⁰³. This extra

establishment would be maintained until the insurgent chiefs were captured and assurances received from the Bombay authorities that all danger of a second insurrection had ceased.¹⁰⁴

The Goa Government was unable to capture the Chiefs who had taken refuge in their territory. Babu Dessai and Hanumant Sawant had returned into the region of Sawantwadi and were most probably making an attempt to ascend the Ghats in the southern Maratha country. There were reports from Dharwad and Belgaum that there might result fresh disturbances at Vengurla.¹⁰⁵ The circumstances of the chiefs having been able to remain in the region of Goa, when the government professed its desire to capture was taken as an offence by the British. They inferred that the Wadi insurgents had a considerable body of adherents in Goa, whom the government had neither the power or the will to control.¹⁰⁶ Under these circumstances the Canara Balaghat region had to be backed by the moral force of a considerable body of military at Sirsi.¹⁰⁷ There were seeds of future disturbances in Goa because the insurgents at an earlier period were joined by two or three headmen of villages from Goa.¹⁰⁸ Hence the Madras Government was requested to allow the 35th regiment to proceed to Sirsi as a measure of

precaution on account of the unsettled state of the southern Maratha country.¹⁰⁹

In 1845-46, Goa exported to Kanara by sea commodities like coconuts, dates, furniture, glassware, grain of sorts, spirituous liquors, wine, coir, dried fish, piece goods (silk), provisions of sorts, salt (value was Rupees 5888/-), timber and sundry items. In the same period, Kanara exported by sea to Goa drugs of sorts, tamarind, grain-dry, paddy and rice (value was Rupees 1,32,357/-) piece goods-cotton, silk, fish bladder, salt(pure), pepper, timber wood black and timber wood jungle.¹¹⁰

The Act VI of 1848 abolished the differential duty on goods imported and exported on foreign bottoms as well as duties on goods carried from one port to another of the Company's territories. As far as the trade of Kanara was concerned, the proposal to retain the duties on exports to ports outside the Company's territories had already become a dead letter. For example rice intended to be carried to Goa was conveyed in native vessels to some ports in Bombay presidency and thus secured exception from duties.¹¹¹ The years from 1849 to 1870 were characterised by the spread of the belief in the efficiency of free international intercourse

and there was an almost universal reaction from the old principles of State regulation and restrictions.¹¹² The general idea was that colonies were valuable as monopolies and were estates that should be worked for the benefit of the Mother Country as well as for their own. Hence in all the colonising nations - Spain, Portugal, Holland, England and France - there was formulated an elaborate code of laws intended to make of colonies remunerative assets.¹¹³

The Collector of Kanara observed that the total abolition of all duties on exports by sea except indigo would affect the whole sea custom revenue.¹¹⁴ So far as Kanara was concerned this measure would entail not only a loss of the net revenue but involve an annual charge of Rupees 15,000 to Rupees 20,000 for maintaining an establishment to prevent smuggling in salt and to keep a register of shipping and other matters pertaining to trade.¹¹⁵ Rice being the chief commodity of export from Kanara, a general tariff would not materially affect the district. In 1851 the price of pepper and its exports improved in the Kanara district. The flourishing condition in Balaghat indicated the result of the abolition of duty and its benefits to the ryots. There was a serious decline in the value of the staple agricultural produce of the District.¹¹⁶ Hence it was very essential to put the trade of

Kanara on an equal footing with that of Bengal. In 1854 cholera prevailed severely at the northern and southern extremities of the Kanara district. The price of rice was higher than that of the last 14 years. It was very essential for the small landholders of the District that their crops should command a good price at an early period. When the price was higher later, the benefit was shared between the cultivators and the dealers.¹¹⁷ During the period 1855-1856, the exports of Kanara by sea to Goa included cotton wool, cotton goods, coconuts, rice, metal iron bar and bolt, molasses, cardamom, maize, pepper, timber and wood. About 121 Portuguese coloured native craft arrived at the ports of Kanara with 1,747 tonnage. During the same period 122 Portuguese Coloured native craft departed from the ports of Kanara and the tonnage was 1,693.¹¹⁸ However, the Portuguese commercial interests clashed with those of British India. The British tariff policy curbed the Portuguese progress and the former's colonial interests proved disadvantageous to the latter. During the revolt of 1857 the Portuguese Governor General had to permit a detachment of British troops to pass through the Goa territory. The Portuguese authorities had to render every possible assistance to the detachment for its proper transit.¹¹⁹

The Anglo-Portuguese relations portray Portugal as a satellite nation. It must not be imagined that sheer benevolence on the part of the British Government saved Portugal from obliteration as a colonial power. Confronted with threats to their sovereignty, the Portuguese Government usually replied by presenting documentary proof of their legal and historical right to any territory under dispute.¹²⁰ The position of a satellite depended not only on the benevolence of the protector but also on the astuteness and agility of the weaker party. Yet in the long run Great Britain was not prepared completely to abandon Portugal, whatever her motives might have been for so acting.¹²¹

The Portuguese in Goa had to carry on their relations with the English in Kanara. As England and Portugal were traditional allies, politically it was not a problem for the Portuguese to interact with the company government in Kanara. But the English control over trade, tariff and other commercial regulations which they introduced from time to time adversely affected the Portuguese colonial and economic interests. Nevertheless they had to maintain trade relations with Karnataka, particularly the Kanara and Balaghat regions to import the much needed food grains. Trade with Kanara used land and sea routes. Much of the trade was

carried out by private merchants and they generally belonged to the Saraswat Brahmin community. The Saraswat Brahmins or Konkanis played a crucial role in both Kanara and Goa. For instance, in Kanara the Konkanis of Buntwal were very active traders. In Goa, the Mhamai Brothers, Dhempes and others were prominent traders. There were also Gujarati Vania and Parsee traders in Goa. Private trade was very prominent.

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CHAPTER - VI

CONCLUSION



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This thesis on “Goa-Karnataka Relations 1763 –1857 (A Political and Economic Study)” enriches our knowledge about the relations between these two neighbouring regions on the Western coast of India. B. S. Shastry has contributed considerably to the understanding and reconstruction of this area of history. But he emphasised on the details of the Portuguese activities in Kanara from 1498 to 1763. And he has written an article on the early relations of the Portuguese with Haidar Ali. This study has concentrated on the details relating to the period after 1763 and upto 1857. Thus this is a notable quantitative and qualitative addition to the historiography of Goa-Karnataka relations.

In the history of Goa, the period from 1763 to 1857 was a part of the long Portuguese colonial rule. But by now the Portuguese heydays were over and this period witnessed the decline of the Portuguese as a colonial power. With Goa as the capital of the *Estado da India*, they were active and an important colonial political power to be considered in the history of India.

In the history of Karnataka, the year 1763 saw the rise of Haidar Ali as the ruler of Mysore, and he was followed by his son, Tipu Sultan (1782 to 1799) who is popularly known as the 'Tiger of Mysore'. Their rule is particularly significant for their determined and prolonged struggle against the British. In this venture they tried to seek support from the Portuguese. It was in the region of Kanara occupied by the Sultan of Mysore (1763-1799) that the Portuguese were active since the beginning of the sixteenth century. They had established their factory at Mangalore and carried on trade in rice, pepper, timber, sandalwood and other commodities. The Portuguese had signed treaties with the Nayakas of Keladi and imported whatever goods they required in Goa and elsewhere. After the death of Tipu, the authorities of the English East India Company at Madras annexed the coastal province of Kanara and Sonda to the Madras Presidency. The English control over the coastal regions of Karnataka necessitated political and economic ties between the English and the Portuguese. Thus coastal Karnataka was a region which every south Indian ruler or colonial power wanted to possess or at least trade with, because it was known for the production of rice and the western ghats and the hinterland regions were fertile areas for the production of spices,

sandalwood, good quality of timber, etc. The ports of Kanara facilitated coastal and overseas trade and Kanara like Goa was known for entrepot trade. Kanara, the granary of the Western coast attracted the attention of the Portuguese, for, Goa was a grain deficit region and had to depend on the import of rice from Kanara, Malabar and other places.

We have looked at this subject objectively and analytically in a proper and broader historical context. This context was a complex and confused one as the politics of South India during the second half of the eighteenth century and first half of the nineteenth century saw the presence and activities of Indian rulers like the Marathas (during the Peshwas), the Nizam of Hyderabad, the rulers of Mysore, namely Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan, the king of Sonda and others. The role played by the Portuguese in Goa, the English in British India, particularly on the coastal districts of Karnataka, and the French becomes significant. These ruling powers entered into agreements with each other for their mutual advantages and to fight out their enemies. All such agreements had political and economic dimensions and implications.

The present study is based on the data collected from primary sources such as administrative records, treaties and their provisions, and other official documents collected from the archives and libraries. A large number of Portuguese and English documents are consulted. Perhaps for the first time English East India Company's records are utilised in understanding the Portuguese relations with the English in Kanara. Many books related to the history of Karnataka and Goa are referred. This work provides new empirical and analytical historical knowledge on Goa-Karnataka relations. We have examined the nature, scope and implications of the political and economic relations between these two regions. The political and economic factors were complementary in nature, for, friendly political relations facilitated healthy economic ties and thereby served the interests of the parties concerned.

An important aspect of this study is not to accept the stereotype created by the historians so far in the field of Indo-Portuguese historiography. Until now most of the historians have concentrated on the heydays of the Portuguese in Goa. We have taken up a period which marked the beginning of their decline. Further all commodities traded, both luxury items and essential goods are taken into consideration.

In the first chapter an attempt is made to explain the need for this study. The main sources, the nature and scope of the study are detailed. In fact this thesis fills in a noticeable gap in the historiography of Goa-Karnataka relations.

A historical backdrop is provided in the second chapter. After the death of Aurangzeb the political condition in India was deteriorating. Later the Battle of Plassey and the success of the English in Bengal decided the nature of the future course of Indian politics. On the eve of the Battle of Plassey the Marathas under the Peshwas in the Deccan expanded both in North and South of India. But the political scene further changed with the third Battle of Panipat in 1761. It produced disastrous consequences for the Marathas. However, they continued to rule until 1818. In the Carnatic, there was the Anglo-French rivalry and the Treaty of Paris (1763) sealed the fate of the French. The English emerged victorious in the Carnatic wars and they checkmated the French in India.

Trade in Asia was of strategic and utmost significance to traders from time immemorial. There existed a zeal to

occupy ports and their hinterland. This was done with a view to promote trade and thereby profit. When the Portuguese ventured in South India, the Arabs had certain trading settlements in the region both in Kanara and Goa. The Portuguese conquered Goa in 1510. Their commercial activities commenced in coastal Karnataka from the beginning of the sixteenth century. Both Kanara and Goa were known for their strategic importance, trading activities and trading communities like Saraswat Brahmins, Vantias, Muslims and others. To control trade and particularly sea trade, the Portuguese introduced the system of *cartazes* or passports. They were also well-known for their "Fortress-Factory" system introduced to develop and protect their trade. The Arabs and the Dutch who figured conspicuously in the trade of western India had dwindled by the eighteenth century.

In the 1760's, with the rise of Haidar Ali to power in Mysore, there began a new phase in South Indian politics. In 1763 he conquered Bednur and with that the coastal districts of Karnataka also came under his political control. It was mainly in this region that Haidar had to deal with the Portuguese. Haidar's policy was firmly characterised by sound foresight and sagacity. His diplomacy was calculated

to make sure that his enemies in India did not ally against him.

Soon after assuming power, Haidar Ali wrote to Conde da Ega, the Viceroy of Goa and wished that friendly relations would develop between them. In Portugal Marquis de Pombal was at the helm of affairs from 1750 to 1777. He introduced economic reforms in Goa. These were aimed at balancing the budget and increasing the royal revenues. Though Haidar had sought Portuguese friendship, the presence of an ambitious ruler like Haidar in Kanara was a powerful challenge to the Portuguese activities and interests in that region.

In the military field, the Portuguese had helped Haidar in 1758 itself and since then it continued throughout Haidar's reign. It was with the Portuguese military help that Haidar repulsed the Maratha army from Mysore in 1759. Then Jose Eloy Correia Peixoto was the only one of Haidar's European (Portuguese) Captains outside the fort of Srirangapattan. It is to be noted that the Portuguese also could not afford to ignore the requests of Haidar for military help because the Portuguese were dependent on the rice, pepper and other commodities imported from Kanara.

Moreover, Haidar was eager to monitor the trade in spices and also anxious to cut off the overland traffic between his realm and Goa. For this reason he had placed the collection and sale of pepper under the government management. In 1766, the Archbishop Dom Joao Jose Demello from Goa wrote to Haidar and informed him that the ammunition which could not be supplied earlier would be supplied soon. He further reiterated the Portuguese goodwill towards Haidar Ali. The Portuguese dispatched some officers and soldiers for the army of Haidar to further continue their diplomatic relations with him. However, Haidar's interaction with the Marathas was not favourable to the Portuguese. Haidar and the Marathas did not have cordial political relations.

The English attacked Haidar's possessions in Kanara in 1768 and occupied the fort of Mangalore. The English and the Portuguese were in alliance at home and the latter did not wish to antagonise the former in India too. Therefore the Portuguese through their representative cautiously advised the English and negotiated for the restitution of Mangalore to Haidar. When Haidar reoccupied the port of Mangalore in 1769, he ordered the restoration of the Portuguese factory and rights in that city. Negotiations between the two governments bore fruit and an honourable treaty was signed

between Haidar and the Portuguese in August 1769. The provisions of the treaty reflected the political, military, economic and cultural relations between them. The Portuguese were particular to protect their economic interests in Kanara. The Portuguese used to collect rice tribute in Mangalore.

The English were eager to procure the Portuguese help. But the Portuguese took a diplomatic stand and tried to follow a policy which would ensure their good relations with both Haidar and the English.

In June 1771, another treaty was signed between the Portuguese and Haidar Ali. According to the provisions of this treaty the Portuguese were allowed to continue their factory at Mangalore and to collect the tribute of rice and other commodities like sandalwood, chillies, pepper, etc. This treaty also included clauses which protected the political, military, economic and cultural interests of the two parties concerned.

In 1771, Haidar sought the Portuguese aid to fight against the Marathas. The Portuguese were able to plead their neutrality on the basis of the non-aggression pact

signed with the Marathas. In spite of this, another treaty was signed between Haidar and the Portuguese in September 1771. It had provisions governing Portuguese interests in Kanara. The Portuguese wanted to antagonise neither Haidar nor the Marathas. In 1775, the Portuguese corresponded with Haidar and reminded him of their amicable relations. Even after this, Haidar expelled the Portuguese missionaries from Kanara. He occupied a few Portuguese ships at Mangalore. Now the balance of power was tilting to the advantage of Haidar. Nevertheless the Portuguese dispatched their annual tributes to Haidar. The Portuguese knew that Haidar's alliance with them stemmed from his hatred towards the Marathas and the English. During 1776-77 there was much correspondence between Haidar and the Portuguese and Haidar desired to reinforce his army and build ships at the ports of Kanara with the Portuguese assistance. In 1776, Haidar introduced measures to control trade and they adversely affected the Portuguese commercial interests in Kanara. By 1782, once again there was a cordial atmosphere and the Portuguese resumed their trading operations at the ports of Haidar's kingdom. Thus the relations between Haidar and Portuguese were not consistent and were governed by political and economic exigencies.

As the second Anglo-Mysore war was going on, Haidar Ali died in 1782 and his son Tipu Sultan assumed power in Mysore. On the death of Haidar, the Portuguese sent a letter of condolence to Tipu and congratulated him on his accession and initiated Tipu to renew their trade facilities in Mysore. Like Haidar, Tipu was also determined to fight the English. In this venture he sought the support of the French. When the English invaded Kanara which was controlled by Tipu, the Roman Catholic subjects there supported the English against their own ruler. After concluding the treaty of Mangalore with the English in 1784, Tipu punished his Roman Catholic subjects for showing disloyalty to him. Some of them were forced to accept Islam as their religion. These subjects were under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Goa. Tipu drove away many Portuguese men from Kanara and prohibited the supply of rice to their vessels, on the plea that it was all required for his own army. However, this was a momentary and retaliatory measure of Tipu. Tipu, like his father, was anxious to develop friendly relations with the Portuguese in order to secure their alliance against his enemies, particularly the English. In return, Tipu was prepared to grant the Portuguese all the commercial privileges which they had formerly enjoyed in his kingdom. The Portuguese did not want to ally themselves with Tipu

owing to their friendship with the English. In addition to this they were eager to occupy Sadashivgad and were reluctant to help Tipu whom they considered as dangerous to the security of Goa.

Tipu's commercial regulations were founded on the basis of making the Sovereign the chief merchant of his kingdom. His policy was to collect more revenue than his father had collected.

The Portuguese were apprehensive of Tipu's power and his political and territorial designs. Therefore, when the Marathas proposed an offensive and defensive alliance against Tipu, the Portuguese readily accepted it. Though the treaty was not ratified, its clauses indicate the political, economic and cultural interests of the Portuguese in Karnataka and particularly in Kanara.

Even if the Portuguese - Tipu relations were not cordial, there prevailed trading and commercial interaction between the two regions as earlier. Goa interacted well with Kanara and Balaghat. The English factor played a crucial role in Tipu - Portuguese relations.

In 1790 when the British and the Marathas joined together to destroy Tipu, the Portuguese took advantage of the situation and occupied Sadashivgad or Piro. This resulted in a war between the Portuguese and Tipu, but soon peace was concluded in 1791 and the Portuguese opened negotiations as they were in dire need of the Kanara rice. Piro was handed over to Tipu and as a reciprocatory gesture he allowed the Portuguese to enter the ports of Barcelore, Coondapur and Mangalore to trade with rice and other essentials. Tipu went a step further to cement his friendship with the Portuguese by permitting them to import rice from Mangalore at reduced rates. Tipu wished to set up a commercial house in Goa, but this proposal was rejected by the Portuguese as they were aware that it would antagonise their age-old ally - the British.

Both Tipu and his ally, the French considered Goa as a strategic location for their military operations against the British. Tipu corresponded with the French for military support to oppose the British. However, because of the condition in the Home government, the French failed to extend any help to Tipu against the British. Tipu's relation with the Portuguese were not as cordial as they were during the reign of Haidar. Tipu's policies towards Goa, had put the

Portuguese in the state of a dilemma. They could not afford to antagonise either Tipu or the English.

After the death of Tipu and fall of Srirangapattan in 1799, the authorities of the English East India Company government at Madras partitioned the territories of Tipu. While some territories were ceded to the Nizam, large areas including Kanara, Wynad, Coimbatore, Dharmapuram and all lands below the ghats between the coast of Malabar and the Carnatic together with the fort of Srirangapattan were annexed by the English. In the remaining portion of Mysore, the Wodeyars of Mysore were restored. However, it was virtually a dependency of the British dominion. The English kept for themselves the most strategic areas mostly on the sea coast. This was to provide a fillip to their colonial development in India.

After 1799, the Portuguese in Goa had to deal with the English in Karnataka. Portugal and Great Britain were traditional allies and as such in the political field they maintained cordial relations in India too. The Portuguese commercial interests forced them to concentrate more on the Kanara and Balaghat regions of Karnataka.


A dominant feature of the sea trade of Kanara of this period was that it was export-dominated. In fact excess of exports over imports was also characteristic of the trade dealing of India in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During the early half of the nineteenth century also, Karnataka exported rice and paddy to Goa along with spices, quality wood for building ships, tobacco, wheat and coarse textiles. Many prosperous private traders of Goa like Dhempes, Mhamais and others traded in Kanara and Malabar and imported rice to Goa. Rice was one of the grand articles of export from Kanara to Goa as also to other places like Malabar, Bombay and Muscat. The Balaghat textiles imported into Goa was further exported to Lisbon.

In spite of its long sea coast Kanara did not produce sufficient salt to meet its own demand. Salt was a major item exported from Goa to Kanara. Other items exported from Goa to Karnataka included local liquor such as arrack and feni, salted fish, arecanut, paper and sugar imported from Lisbon and Macau. Portuguese boats and ships could be seen often at the ports of Kanara like Karwar, Honnavar, Kundapur and Mangalore.

The ports of Kanara and Goa played the role of entrepot ports. They not only imported to meet the local needs but also imported to re-export the merchandise for centres of demand elsewhere in India and abroad. The colonial policies of the English in areas of trade and commerce adversely affected the Portuguese in Goa.



MAPS - I TO V




MINISTÉRIO DO ULTRAMAR
Junta das Mesas Geográficas e de Investigação do Ultramar


LEGENDA

- Capital do Distrito
- Limites do Distrito
- Limites do Concelho
- Concelho de Povo
- Propriedades

Source: Gonçalves Pereira, *India Portuguesa* (Lisboa, 1952)



Source : Shwartzberg, Joseph, *A Historical Atlas of South Asia*, (Chicago, 1978), p.55.



REFERENCE


1/4 of Square of Districts **POONA**
 Capitals of Districts **DHARWAR**
 — of Tahsils, Ashtes and
 Name States **KHED**
 Rivers **Chimchwad**
 Important Villages **Palghar**
 Hill Forts, Lakes, Tanks and Ponds
 of Historical interest **1878**

● Towns above 20,000	Population over 20,000
● Market Towns	do do 10,000
● Tahsil Offices & Market Towns	do do 5,000
▲ Places of Pilgrimage & Fairs	do do 1,500
○ Railway Stations	do do 1,000
□ Towns & Bungalows	do do 500
○ District	do under 500
△ Sea Ports	

BOMBAY PRESIDENCY
SOUTHERN PORTION.
1878.

Scale of 8 English Miles to the Inch.

SOUTH INDIA ECONOMIC



Scale 1:2,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 50 Miles


0 20 40 60 80 Kilometres

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
- Port
- Tonnage of largest vessel anchoring
- Route
- Bridge
- Diamond mine
- Iron mine
- Iron (convertible into steel) mine
- Salt
- Salt-petre
- Fruits, localised/processed agricultural product
- Indigo
- Craft product
- Rupee mint, Aurangzeb

Source : Habib , Irfan , *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire* , (OUP , 1986 reprint) .

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SOUTH INDIA



APPENDICES - I TO VI



APPENDIX - I

(A) IMPORTS FROM GOA TO CANARA IN 1848-49

Imports	Quality	Value Company RS.
Coconuts	Cwt. 1,155	4,613
Grain	Qrs. 169	1,277
Salt	Cwt. 97,435	22,923
Wines	Gals. 160	355
Wood-Sandal	Cwt. 41	1,226
Sundries		3,039
	Total	33,433
Treasure- Gold		5,137
Silver		72,874
	Total	78,011
Total Merchandise and Treasure		1,11,444

(B) IMPORTS INTO CANARA BY SEA, IN THE OFFICIAL
YEAR 1849-50

Articles imported from Goa	Quantity	Value in Rupees
Earthenware		9
Coconuts	No. 27,341	409
Coconuts Dry	Cwt. 765	3,060
Grain Dry	Qrs. 17	132
Horses	No. 2,075	136
Onions	Cwt. 359	717
Salt	Cwt. 1,12,103	35,267
Spirituous liquor		39,779
Wine of Sorts	Gs. 529	2,911
Sundries		3,156
	Total	45,846
Gold		5,952
Silver		87,020
	Total	92,972
Total Merchandise + Treasure		1,38,818

Source: Fort St. George Reporter for External Commerce, 1850.

APPENDIX – II

EXPORTS FROM CANARA TO GOA						
Exports	1848-1849		1849-1850		Increase	Decrease
	Quantity	Value	Quantity	Value		
Coir and Coir ropes	Cwt. 4,653	8,550	Cwt. 2,089	3,801		4,749
Cotton piece goods-plain	Ps. 26	107	Ps. 4	38		69
Grain – Rice & C.	Qrs. 24,917	2,10,686	Qrs. 22,759	1,95,292		15,394
Spices- Pepper & C.	Cwt. 355	4,096	Cwt. 408	2,429		1,667
Timber		8,685		7,303		1,382
Wood – Jungle	Guz. 9,065	900		423		477
Sundries		1,306		1,982	676	
Total		2,34,330		2,11,268	676	23,738
Treasure – Silver				90	90	
Total Merchandise and Treasure		2,34,330		2,11,358	766	23,738
				Deduct Increase		766
				Net Decrease		22,972
Re-Exports						
Sundries		57		1,275	1,218	
Total		57		1,275	1,218	

Source: Fort St. George Reporter for External Commerce, 1850.

APPENDIX III

STATEMENT OF TREASURE IMPORTED BY SEA FOR THE
OFFICIAL YEAR 1851-52

Imports from	Zillah	Total value of silver coins	Gold coins	Grand Total
Goa	Canara	60,164	1,391	61,555

IMPORTS INTO CANARA BY LAND IN THE OFFICIAL
YEAR 1851-52

Articles	Foreign European Settlement		Value
	Goa		
	Quantity		
Betelnuts	Cwt.	1,059	4,677
Catchu	or Cwt.	849	5,094
Terrajaponica			
Fruits – Coconut	No.	20,01,690	30,025
Fruits – Dry	Cwt.	2,541	10,163
Oil Coconut	Gallons	5,213	3,284
Provision – Salted			7,089
Salt – (Goa)	Cwt.	28,422	7,278
Sundries			4,970
Total Merchandise			72,580

IMPORTS INTO CANARA BY SEA IN THE
OFFICIAL
YEAR 1851-52

Articles	Goa		Value
	Quantity		
Coconuts Dry	Cwt.	43	151
Chillies	Cwt.	166	580
Fruits			268
Porcelain and Earthenware			3
Glassware			1
Cotton goods printed			2
Carried over			1,005
Provisions Salted			923
Wine of Sorts	Gs	525	3,012
Sundries			1,096
Total			6,036
Gold			1,391
Silver			60,164
Total			61,555
Total Merchandise			67,591

Source: Fort St. George Reporter for External Commerce, 1852.

APPENDIX IV

EXPORTS FROM CANARA BY LAND, IN THE OFFICIAL YEAR 1852-53						
Articles	Foreign European Settlement (Goa)			Total		
	Quantity		Value	Quantity		
			C. Rs.		C. Rs.	
Cotton Wool	Lbs.	5,158	1,006	Lbs.	5,158	1,006
Cotton Goods - Piece Goods Plain	Pieces	2,585	1,305	Pieces	2,585	1,305
Gallnuts or Anallcoy	Cwt.	3,200	3,207	Cwt.	3,200	3,207
Grain - Grain of Sorts	Quarters	160	661	Quarters	160	661
Rice	Quarters	14,892	69,392	Quarters	14,892	69,392
Wheat	Quarters	1,590	17,529	Quarters	1,590	17,529
Wax - Bees	lbs.	11,244	4,819	lbs.	11,244	4,819
Sundries			5,689			5,689
Total Merchandise			1,04,608			1,04,608

Source: Tabular Statements for the year 1852-53, Fort St. George.

APPENDIX V

IMPORTS INTO CANARA BY LAND, IN THE OFFICIAL YEAR 1852-53.				
Articles	Foreign European Settlement Goa		Total	
	Quantity	Value Co.'s Rs.	Quantity	Value Co.'s Rs.
Betel Nut	Cwt. 1,710	7,632	Cwt. 1,710	7,632
Catchu of Terrajaponica	do. 415	2,489	do. 415	2,489
Fruits - Cocoanut	No. 25,01,238	37,518	No. 25,01,238	37,518
Do. Dry	Cwt. 3,192	13,768	Cwt. 3,192	13,768
Oil - Cocoanut	Gals. 7,006	4,398	Gals. 7,006	4,398
Provision - Salted	Cwt. 2,392	14,813	Cwt. 2,392	14,813
Salt (Goa)	do. 44,058	11,283	do. 44,058	11,283
Sundries		5,281		5,281
Total Merchandise		97,182		97,182

Source: Tabular Statements for the year 1852-53, Fort St. George.

APPENDIX VI

Imports Into Canara, 1 st May 1853 – 30 th April 1854		
Articles	Goa	
	Quantity	Value in Company's Rupees
Metals - Bolt and Ingot	Cwt. 1	48
Brass	Cwt. 4	180
Provisions - Fresh		1,826
Provisions - Salted		466
Wines	Gls. 232	266
Treasure - Gold		660
Silver		52,994

Source: Fort St. George Reporter for External Commerce, 1854.



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