

# PERSPECTIVES ON MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS: A CRITICAL EVALUATION

A Thesis submitted for  
the degree of  
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by

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C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that Mrs. Kamladevi Ravindra Kunkolienkar has satisfactorily prosecuted her course of research under the conditions prescribed by the University.

The dissertation entitled "Perspectives on Mind And Consciousness: A Critical Evaluation" is the result of her original work under my supervision. The conclusions of her study are the results of her own researches. To the best of my knowledge no part of this work has been presented to any University for any other degree.

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D E C L A R A T I O N

The contents of the dissertation are my findings of research done under the guidance of Dr. A. V. Afonso. I hereby declare that the dissertation or part thereof has not been published anywhere or in any other form. It has not been previously submitted by me for a degree of any University.

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## SYNOPSIS

Critical studies of the contemporary articulations of the problem of mind and consciousness reveal that inspite of the anomalies and inadequacies, they constitute progress and advancement to the understanding of mind. This is particularly so when one evaluates contributions of L. Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle, J.J.C. Smart and D.M. Armstrong, P.F. Strawson, Donald Davidson, Karl Popper, Saul Kripke, Peter Smith - O.R. Jones and even Richard Rorty.

The discussions on mind when evaluated in terms of three perspectives, namely, the ontological (an inquiry into the existence or reality of entity called mind), the conceptual (an inquiry into the reducibility or irreducibility of the concept of mind) and epistemological (an inquiry into the satisfactoriness of the explanation of 'mind' in mentalistic terms), reveal that most of these philosophers tend to commit 'category mistake' as they attempt to refute arguments 'outside' the perspectives or frameworks within which their articulation is embedded.

Although each perspective is a significant contribution to the understanding of mind as it reveals 'some truth', it does not mean that all contributions, however 'laissez-faire' they may be, are philosophically significant. And even within those that are regarded as serious articulations like the above critical studies, there is a considerable amount of conflicts. And taking into account the logic of argumentation, the recent advances of empirical psychology and neuro-physiology and the criterion for the acceptance of a theory in philosophy of science, the researcher accepted functionalism (with the required modifications) as the most acceptable articulation of mind and consciousness.

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## I N T R O D U C T I O N

Philosophy aims at both explicit and implicit resolution of the fundamental issues that face man. And one of the fundamental issues that philosophy seeks resolution is the nature of philosophical inquiry. This inquiry sometimes called 'metaphilosophy' concerns itself with the methodological issues of how and why of philosophizing.

Two different kinds of metaphilosophy are possible: the aggressive and the defensive. Aggressive metaphilosophizing consists of finding faults with much or all of current philosophical practice within one's intellectual community. The defensive option in metaphilosophy consists in seeking rational ~~ex~~ for some or all widely dominant philosophical practices within the relevant philosophical community. It is this second option that is attempted while reflecting on "Perspectives on Mind And Consciousness: A Critical Evaluation".

Philosophical issues have the nature of being perennially controversial, even when the number of adherents and critics may not be considerable. It is neither the number of philosophers involved nor the recentness of the controversy that make the philosophical disputations noteworthy. It is the logic of argumentation, coupled with theoretical and empirical evidence that is the focal point of any philosophical controversy. One such issue that attracted attention from the beginnings of history to date is the problem of mind. Recent studies seem to be equally exciting to philosopher's mind as had been the problem at the beginning of the modern period. "Perspectives..." makes an

effort to understand the debate in the new form that it has acquired. This is particularly so when empirical evidence has been increasingly used to boost philosophical argumentation regarding the nature of mind.

The present dissertation is historically post-Rylean. But as Wittgenstein and Ryle are inseparable from this debate, both find a detailed treatment - as it is only on this canvas that the recent debate can be painted. Further, any general survey of literature on mind reveals that dualism in some form or other seems to be still a philosophical relevant position, whether neo-scholastic or Popperian interpretation. It is felt necessary that a consideration of dualistic interpretation in general is necessary as a take-off point before detailed and critical studies of the various contemporary positions is undertaken.

The canvas is so broad that some sort of selective and restrictive dealing is inevitable. The selection or restriction is however not arbitrary. Although there may be important philosophical contributions that the researcher may not be aware of and hence find no mention, there are some authors whose relevance is unquestionable, but are deliberately excluded for theoretical reasons. Philosophers inspired and influenced by phenomenological method have been excluded from the present study on the ground that meaningful comparisons are possible only in the climate where there is restriction on 'laissez faire' interpretations. And 'phenomenological method' seems to have in its very methodology, the possibility of solipsistic interpretations. May be on some other occasion, one may be able to grapple with similar philosophical monologues.

The present study is a critical evaluation of the recent arguments regarding the nature of mind and subsequently that of consciousness. And as it is well nigh impossible to pay attention to all philosophers of mind, one has to select a few for both theoretical and practical reasons. The theoretical justification for selecting a few philosophers lies in the fact that there has been too many repetitive lines or arguments with no insights to deserve separate and exhaustive consideration.

The researcher in the present study has attempted critical studies of arguments for dualism (Chapter I: Ontological Inadequacy of Dualist Interpretation of Mind); Wittgenstein's 'complex of mental concepts' (Chapter II: Complex of Mental Concepts: An Analysis); Gilbert Ryle's 'dispositional behaviourism' (Chapter III: Dispositional Behaviourism Reviewed); Smart-Armstrong's 'reductionism' (Chapter IV: Physical-Mental Identity); Strawson's 'dual predication' (Chapter V: Dual Predication or Dual Language?); Davidson's 'anomalous monism' (Chapter VI: Minimal Materialism - Overcoming Anti-Reductionism's Failures); Popper's 'psycho-physicalism' (Chapter VII: Dualism Re-admitted-Psycho-physical Interactionism); Kripke's anti-identity theory arguments (Chapter VIII: Minimal Mentalism-A Case for Dualism); Peter Smith's and O.R. Jones' 'functionalism' (Chapter IX: Eliminating Dichotomy-An Aristotelean Framework); and Rorty's 'hermeneutic<sup>si</sup> science' (Chapter X: Going Beyond the Debate-Eliminative Reductionism). In the concluding chapter (Understanding Perspectives: A Synthesis) a review of all the studies in terms of a three-fold perspective is attempted. After

a brief review of the critical studies that preceded, a comprehensive and methodological study of the perspectives on mind is undertaken. The issues raised and the questions posed by the thinkers in this study reveal three different perspectives: ontological, conceptual and epistemological. The ontological perspective is an inquiry into the existence or reality of entity called mind. The conceptual perspective inquires into the reducibility or irreducibility of the concept of 'mind'. The epistemological perspective is an inquiry into the satisfactoriness of explanation of 'mind' in mentalistic terms.

In conclusion, one tends to believe that given a perspective and framework, the position adopted by each modern contributor to the understanding of mind, has been noteworthy. It (the position) has contributed to the understanding of mind. Notwithstanding the inconsistencies and confusions in the individual positions, the discussion has contributed to a new perspective or a new line of argument in a perspective. The bane of the individual perspective has been the attempts at rejecting philosophical positions falling outside the specific perspective or framework.

In a world of divergent perspectives and conflicting lines of arguments, which position is acceptable? Taking a cue from the discussions on theory in philosophy of science, the researcher concluded that 'functionalism' is the best available theory to explain the complex human activities commonly attributed to 'mind'. In a world of conflicting theories in the varied perspectives, the theory that has greatest explanatory power at the ontological level, seems to be most acceptable one.

## CHAPTER I

### ONTOLOGICAL INADEQUACY OF DUALIST INTERPRETATION OF MIND

Religious conviction rather than philosophical justification is the single major factor for the acceptance of some form of dualism or other. There are however many other factors that either influence or are used as justification for dualism. The distinction between the thinking and the non-thinking is observed both from the external behaviour and from internal reflection. The conviction that there is something more to a human being than mere body or matter; and that this something more is mental, as opposed to being bodily or physical, is the doctrine of dualism.

This Platonic dualism restated and reviewed by Descartes in seventeenth century, occupied an important place in the discussions and debates of scientists, psychologists and philosophers.

The ascription of mental states, feelings and thoughts to another person, normally depends on one's own experiences (when one is put in a particular situation), and to support that the evidence is sought from the external behavioural patterns, although it still remains doubtful whether the particular behavioural pattern is a sign for a particular mental (inner) state. In other words, the very fact that these mental states of others are not accessible, leads to speculations about its nature and forces one to go for the division of a person into two components, the gross physical body and the mind responsible for thinking and other inner elusive mental states.

This two component view seems to be going against the

Contemporary scientific view, according to which every human behaviour in principle can be explained without referring to any non-physical entity. A man is subject to physical, chemical, and other bio-chemical laws as are other things in the world. His behaviour therefore, is causally determined and one need not postulate a 'free-will' to account for actions.

Recent advances in neuro-physiological research has influenced the philosophy of mind, making the problem more complicated and leading people to take various confused positions.

Every person has got a highly complicated mental life through visual, auditory and various other experiences. But when one considers the researches done in neuro-physiological fields, one finds that the counter part for the highly complicated mental life is the highly complex brain structure with billion inter-connections. The questions that then arise are : (a) Are mental states, brain states? (b) How could mere matter produce consciousness which is qualitatively different from matter?

After reflection one is naturally led to think of an essential entity, as soul or mind, which is entirely different from the physical body. Socrates, Plato, Descartes were all for dualism --- considered soul as something 'Divine' and 'immortal', 'indissoluble', 'intelligible' in contrast with body as mortal, dissoluble and so on. Descartes maintained that, soul and body have got opposite characteristics and are opposed to each other.

The problem about the existence of mind cannot be settled as other problems like whether unicorns exist? or mermaids exist? -- in these cases we decide after direct observation of the things

concerned. Mind (whether one's own or that of another) is not directly observable like other physical objects. It is like an 'eye' with the help of which one can see but whose existence can be known only through mirror images, sense of touch, etc. In the same way Cartesian mind enables a person to know and be conscious of other things other than itself. But this does not solve the problem about existence of mind. In spite of difficulties dualism was a popular and attractive view. Following in brief are the arguments for dualism :

- (1) Mental properties and physical properties are very distinct from each other and so they cannot be had by the same thing. So physical properties by extension are had by the body while mental ones by the mind.
- (2) Material objects lack the 'feeling' and 'thinking' aspect. Human beings can feel and think. Hence human beings are more than material stuff.
- (3) "A merely material being could not appreciate the marriage of Figaro, fall in love, believe in God, .... we evidently can appreciate Figaro, fall in love, believe in God, .... so again it follows that we are not mere chunks of physical stuff but something besides."<sup>1</sup>

Thus based on similar assumptions Descartes maintained that a human being is a composite of a mind and a body. In his sixth meditations Descartes writes:

"I have a body which is adversely affected when I feel pain, which has need of food and drinks, when I suffer hunger or thirst, etc. nor can I doubt that there is some truth in all this. The truth that my hunger, my pain, my pleasure are observed in a special

and peculiar way, as mine. Not as it were from outside, however I may sometimes observe certain parts of my body, for these feelings are felt as modifications of my own consciousness, of myself. The mind is not 'in' the body, as a pilot in a ship, but I am very closely conjoined to, and, so to speak, commingled with, my body. So that I form a unity with it. Other-wise I should not feel pain when my body is hurt but I who am a thinking thing, would perceive the hurt purely intellectually as a sailor would perceive damage in his ship. And when my body wants food and drink, I should precisely understand this and should not have those confused feelings of hunger and thirst. For assuredly, these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain, etc. are nothing but confused modes of self-consciousness which arise from the union and so to say, blending of mind and body".<sup>2</sup>

One may observe a curious feature of the composite nature of human being. That is, although the mind and body are two distinct entities, a sort of inter-connection, unity and inter-mingling of the two entities, is asserted.

No doubt, the attractive dualist version satisfies the common man, but turns out to be highly problematic when confronted by questions such as: What precisely is meant by a non-physical entity? Where is it located in the body? What is its nature? What is its relation with body? When exactly is it (mind) evolved in the evolution process? All the above questions remain unanswered.

Each argument given above in support of dualism is objectionable. The plausibility of Cartesian dualism goes on diminishing because of modern advances in neuro-physiology. Secondly, the Cartesian 'non-corporeality dogma'<sup>3</sup> makes the thesis unattractive. Hesitation to accept the thesis is because of the claim that activities like thinking or doubting requires no brain. Therefore, it assumes strictly that all human

activities are divided into two categories: mental and physical. But the problem arises with regards to the psycho-physical processes or phenomena like 'sensation' and 'imagination'. As these cannot be accommodated in neither of the groups (neither mental nor physical group), as these are not purely mental, nor purely physical.

Even after granting that physical and mental properties are distinct from each other, there is no reason why both the types of properties cannot be had by the same thing.

With regards to 'sensation' and 'imagination', one can go for a three-component picture with equally impressive contrasts between physical, intellectual and sensory properties.

Descartes did see this problem and this may be conjectured from the way he states it, in the second Meditation. Having established his existence he inquires into the nature of 'I' : "But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling .... and also which imagines and has sensory perceptions" .

The above quotation shows that Descartes is not treating 'sensation' and 'imagination' as extra-mental processes. But at the same time the reference to these words as mental is very thin and restricted. It seems that the first six words in the list are of a type where the last two (sensation and imagination) cannot be put, showing a faint distinction between the two groups of words.

However, Descartes clarifies the distinction in an interview to Frans Burman, in April 1648:

"When external objects act on my senses, they print on them an idea, or rather a figure of themselves. And when the mind attends to these images imprinted on the gland (i.e. on the pineal gland) in this way it is said to have sense-perception, (sentire). When, on the other hand, the images on the gland are imprinted not by external objects but by the mind itself, which fashions and shapes then in the brain in the absence of external objects, then we have imagination. The difference between sense-perception and imagination is really just this, that in sense-perception the images are imprinted on the brain by external objects which are actually present, while in the case of imagination the images are imprinted by the mind without any external objects, and with the windows shut as it were".<sup>5</sup>

This clarification suggests that for both the types of activities (sensation and imagination) - a physiological activity is required. Descartes also notes that the process of imagination is unlike that of pure intellect. Thus sensation and imagination "are not the transparently clear cognitive faculties of a thinking being; they have an inherently confused, indefinable, subjective quality - a quality which betrays the fact that what is involved is not the pure mental activity of an incorporeal mind, but the activity of a hybrid unit, a human being".<sup>6</sup> Descartes therefore, may be said to be creating a third category or component, as sensation and imagination cannot be properly fitted into his dualistic theory. The reason may be that they cannot be assigned either to the category of mind (res cogitans) or to the category of the body (res extensa). Therefore John Cottingham called it 'Cartesian trilateralism'. A person can be looked as a compound of three : (1) body, (2) intellect and (3) a centre for sensation.

Referring to the second argument for dualism, while

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interpreting the phrase "merely material things", if it was used to refer to sticks and stones -- then one can agree that they cannot think and feel. But the argument points out something else. That is human beings are not merely material beings but something else. And this something else is the non-material aspect of our life. But one cannot pass from 'merely material being' to some non-material being. For, a scientist will say that we are highly complex material beings.

The third argument in no way supports dualism. A merely material being cannot appreciate Figaro. But equally it is not clear how non-physical things have aesthetic responses. It is not decided by some detailed investigation that aesthetic experiences can be explained if located in a Cartesian mind alone.

Still a dualist can come with a strong version of above argument saying that things made of material stuff only cannot give out complex behavioural responses, which happens in case of a human being. Therefore, human beings have something additional, that is non-physical component. Once again it can be objected that simply on this basis one cannot conclude about the non-physical self, as we have not understood the 'how' and 'why' of a person's behaviour till today. On the contrary the researches in biological sciences and artificial intelligence, try to explain more and more complex behaviour with reference to physical systems.

Another argument for dualism is that, "people sometimes have experiences in which they perceive themselves from a point outside their bodies". This type of experiences suggest that there is a 'perceiver' distinct from what is 'perceived'. What is

'perceived' is the body. But the same body cannot be the 'perceiver', from a point outside the body, since it cannot leave itself.

To this type of 'out of body experiences' it may be objected that it is quite possible that it is an illusion or hallucination. Moreover it happens to be a subjective experience, where no criteria of verification can be applied.

In our ordinary language we ascribe both physical and mental properties to a person. In the naturalistic view, a person is a complex physical organism. For example, for a naturalist 'Jack' and 'Jack's body' will mean the same thing. But these two phrases cannot be interchanged and when one tries to do the exercise, they result into different things as in the statement 'I admire Jack' and 'I admire Jack's body'. This shows that they cannot be interchanged.

Interchanging and inter substitution is possible only when the two expressions refer to the same thing, such that they stand or fall together. A designator, is an expression which refers to an individual person or a thing. If two designators refer to the same property then they are co-referential --- meaning they stand or fall together, and they can be interchanged without affecting the truth aspect of the expression. On this basis the dualist can insist that since the above two expressions are different 'Jack' and 'Jack's body' are not the same thing.

But to this an anti-dualist can answer by saying that 'Jack' and 'Jack's body' - both the expressions refer to the same thing. The expression 'I admire Jack's body' is used conventionally to

stress the particular aspect of his personality, that is, bodily aspect which is not different from Jack. Many other aspects can also be admired in general. The important point is, it not only denotes Jack, but also focuses our attention on a particular aspect of his personality.

One cannot establish dualism merely on the basis of usage of expressions and words. It is true that our everyday way of talking presupposes a dualistic theory. However, it does not prove that dualism is true. } ??

Yet another argument for dualism can come from the survival of one's self in disembodied form after the bodily death of a person. One can imagine the destruction of one's body but the soul surviving. But one cannot imagine the continual existence of one's body when it has been destroyed. This shows the difference between one's 'self' and one's body. This distinction may be taken as supporting dualism. But the argument may be seen to untenable, as the naturalists can object to it, maintaining the view that the organic destruction is the total destruction of a person. lol

Descartes being influenced by the certainty of logical and mathematical statements, tries to get same type of statements in philosophy. He adopts a systematic method of doubt whereby he starts doubting the things around. Knowledge given to us by our sense-organs, cannot be certain, says Descartes. Further he doubts his body and meets no contradiction there. In all the above cases of doubt there is a 'doubter' involved --one who doubts. Ultimately he tries to doubt his mind. But doubting being a mental activity, reaches the conclusion -- that doubting itself

proves the existence of 'mind', 'self', -- 'I', which is different from body. Descartes concludes then, -- he thinks, therefore he exists. His arguments can be stated in the following manner :

"(a) I can feign that my body does not exist.

(b) I cannot feign that I myself do not exist.

Hence,

(c) I my<sup>self</sup> am entirely distinct from my body" .<sup>8</sup>

Descartes' argument turns out to be logically invalid, as its premises are true and the conclusion false. In the first premise he says that, just as it is possible to doubt other beliefs, it is possible to doubt the existence of his body also. Descartes feels that, doubting other beliefs is possible, as there is no self contradiction involved in it. In the same way doubting the existence of his body is possible. In this sense Descartes can keep aside his belief in bodily existence. That is, in the realm of ideas mind can be separated from body. But in reality, even after granting that mind and body are two distinct entities they cannot exist apart from each other.

Descartes argument can be shown as invalid, with reference to Leibniz's law. The law states "..... two co-referential designators can be swaped one for the other without affecting the truth of what is said except when they occur after a psychological verb like 'expects', 'believes', 'wants', etc. In other words the fact that two particular designators 'a' and 'b' cannot be interchanged salva veritate after a psychological verb is quite compatible with the truth of 'a actually is b'".<sup>9</sup>

Psychological verb functions to show or refers to a particular person's mental world. This can be clarified by the following :

(d) Jack expects the milkman to call today,

(e) Jack does not expect his wife's lover to call today,  
hence

(f) The milkman is not Jack's wife's lover".

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In this example the psychological verb 'expects' does not refer to a particular man and hence functions differently to show what Jack thinks about the things. If in Jack's mental world the 'milkman' and his 'wife's lover' designate two different concepts, then the two designators cannot be interchanged freely.

In case of Descartes' argument, the two designators 'myself' and 'my body' pick out different things. Since he uses the psychological verb 'I can feign', which refers to a particular mental state of his, it cannot be inferred that the two designators cannot be interchanged, and that they are two different things. As in the earlier case the milkman infact can be his wife's lover.

The argument is against the conception of 'Mind' as a genuine entity. We find many objects in the world which no one would treat as genuine. Consider the word 'sake'. When we do things 'for the sake of' somebody we are not treating 'sake' as different from that somebody, or we do not ask such questions as, 'Can that somebody' exist without a sake? or how many sakes a person has got? These are senseless questions. Unlike the above account, the question 'how many?' can be applied sensibly to

genuine entities. Moreover those entities which persist through time, it is also equally sensible to ask, 'is it the same entity again or merely an exact copy of it?'

Thus when applied to the claim of a Cartesian mind the questions would be, 'how many minds are associated with one body?' 'is the mind that is associated with the body remain the same throughout or is it replaced by similar other mind or minds?'

As per the dualist view, it is one mind in one body. It can be objected that, nothing stops to suppose more than one mind in one body. Moreover a dualist does not prove his claim 'one-mind-in-one body' theory to be true. It is quite possible that many minds think and function in a parallel way in a body. As strawson puts it: "Suppose I were in debate with a Cartesian philosopher, say professor X. If I were to suggest that when the man, professor X, speaks, there are a thousand souls simultaneously thinking the thoughts his words express, having qualitatively indistinguishable experiences such as he, the man, would currently claim, how would he persuade me that there was only one such soul? (How would each indignant soul, once the doubt has entered, persuade itself of its Uniqueness?)"<sup>11</sup> .

Since it goes undecided whether 'one-mind story' or 'many-minds story' is a true story --- one can still ask --- since minds are non-spatial entities, how one mind can be distinguished from the other 'as they are qualitatively identical?'

Similar objection can be raised against 'soul'. If different souls are made of soul-stuff --- different from the physical stuff --- ~~the~~ the numbers which are non-physical will have to be

treated as made up of non-physical stuff. The question remains, what is that soul-stuff in this world and how one soul-stuff can be distinguished from another, 'as they are qualitatively identical'.

Descartes' dualism distinguishes mind from matter and treats humans as mind endowed and animals as automata. The question is: why animals should not have minds? They have desire for food and sex and some animals in their behaviour do exhibit their mental faculty.

Locke, for example, found no qualitative distinction between humans and animals:

"..... in all the visible corporeal world we see no chasms or gaps. All quite down from us the descent is by easy steps and a continued series of things, that in each remove differ very little one from the other..... There are some brutes that seem to have as much knowledge and reason as some that are called men; and the animal and vegetable kingdoms are so nearly joined that, if you will take the lowest of one and the highest of the other, there will scarce be perceived any great difference between them; and so on, till we come to the lowest and most in organical parts of matter, we shall find everywhere that the several species are linked together and differ but in almost insensible degrees".<sup>12</sup>

It is a scientific fact that from simple more complex forms have evolved. Dualism as a theory is threatened when a number of questions go unanswered. If evolution is true, then there are no gaps in between and in between the two extremes (say animals on one hand and human beings on the other), the chain is filled by various other species of organisms. This makes the dualist position difficult to defend as one cannot say at which stage, the mind evolves. Further, one cannot say that Chimpanzees have

no mind, and suddenly in case of man there is mind. Such a sharp demarcation at any level of evolutionary process is ruled out and therefore a dualist cannot account for his claim that humans alone have minds.

Again a dualist cannot hold that there are no gaps in the case of physical entities but in case of evolution of non-physical entity like mind there is a 'sudden jump'.

On the other hand if a dualist accepts evolution in both the realms, the physical as well as immaterial, then Proto-organisms will have to be allowed minds probably in their component of organic molecules, atoms and atomic particles and so on. This would create further difficulties for dualists.

The third argument is against the relation between mind and body --- interactionism --- as maintained by Cartesian dualists. Mind and body interact with each other. In other words, mental events give rise to or cause physical events and physical events cause mental events. For a naturalist or an anti-dualist this would mean a kind of physical transaction, for mind and mental events are considered as brain events. There is no difficulty in understanding the causal relation between the same type of events. But in the case of dualist account where mind is immaterial and body, material - the two distinct entities (one observable, the other abstract) it is difficult to say how and where these entities interact.

Descartes did try to locate the interaction in the pineal gland, leading to occasionalism. This only shows that even Descartes agreed that the seat of the mind is in brain. Today in the light of researches done in neuro-physiological field and the

attempts made by psychologists to understand mind and mental events, we inquire whether mind is the functioning of the brain.

A dualist is unsuccessful in explaining the 'how' of the interaction as he fails to explain the linking mechanism. In other words, how the last link in the causal chain in case of a mental event leading to a physical one, causes or gives rise to the first link in that physical event.

In explaining the causal chain or sequence in mental-physical events, the last link cannot be explained. In physics -- in case of fundamental elementary particles at the rock-bottom level of causal analysis, no further explanation can be given. The dualist can argue here that if this can be allowed in physics then why it should not be allowed in case of the mind causing bodily events and that of the body giving rise to mental events. Since here too, the rock-bottom basic causal relations cannot be explained.

Even after granting this to the dualist, more confusions are created --- puzzles and problems for which a dualist has no answer. In the case of 'mind to body' causality, it is a conscious decision of the person causing a neural-upshot in the brain. One decides to wiggle his right index finger --- the appropriate neural upshot --- leading to the desired movement. This a dualist will consider as a basic causal relation which cannot be explained further. If again, he decides to wiggle his second finger --- a neural upshot --- leading to once again the desired movement. This again is a case of basic causality. For the third time, he decides to make movements of all his fingers

vigorously --- a neural event leading to the desired movements taking place. This again is a case of basic causality. If we go on like this it will lead to multiplicity of connections between decisions and neural events --- all of which will be basic causal relations --- not systematised and none of which can be further explained. Unlike physics there are laws governing each decision which can be explained.

A dualist as he maintains that physical events have immaterial causes goes against the scientific principle that this world is 'causally closed'. Neural events in the brain are responsible for all our behaviour. In turn, those neural events, for dualists, are caused by mind, or immaterial events.

This contention of dualists that, the 'mental' causes and the 'physical' "goes clean against the fundamental principle of the physical sciences, namely that the causes of physical changes are other entirely physical events. Bio-Chemical and electrical charges are to be explained in bio-chemical and electrical terms; the governing laws allow no room for extraneous immaterial causal influences"<sup>13</sup>.

The closure principle neither can be demonstrated nor can be refuted by experimentation. If no explanation can be offered for a physical event that takes place now, with the current physical theory, or current scientific laws, then it does not mean that it is uncaused, neither we can say that it is because of some immaterial event. Science and scientific knowledge is dynamic, they allow for changes when the new theories are accepted and replace the old ones.

The un-ending research with regard to the human brain, from

the biological and chemical point of view has shown that purely physical explanations are possible for neural occurrences.

The closure principle rests on two ideas:

- "(1) First, that macro-phenomena such as the behaviour of human cells are the causal results of micro-phenomena (ultimately the behaviour of the atoms which constitute the cells).
- (2) Second, that the physical laws governing at least low-energy micro-phenomena at atomic level are now very well known, and leave no room at all, for the possibility of immaterial causal influences"<sup>14</sup> .

A dualist either has to deny the 'closure principle' or say that whatever the micro-biologists are doing is wrong. In other words, he ~~has~~ to reject the central scientific principles.

The Closure principle, does not allow for any immaterial event to be the cause of a physical event. Holding on to the closure principle, one can ask, what about the physical causes leading to immaterial effects? Only one way causal relation is claimed from bodies to minds. Epi-phenomenalism, as it is called, where physical events can cause mental events but not vice-versa is deemed as an alternative. Mental is the 'shadow' of the physical and therefore plays no role in whatever way, in understanding the events in the world. In one's own case one will affirm that, I have got a mind, but from this single instance we cannot generalise that others have minds. It is no better a theory than Cartesian dualism.

Attempts are made to solve the mind-body problem .at

different levels by taking a particular perspective. The inadequacy of Cartesian dualism to provide a satisfactory solution to mind-body problem, serves as a background, as a basis, with reference to which each perspective is developed. The main two approaches in a very broad sense are : (1) The reduction of mind to physical, brain-processes or to the functioning of brain and (2) falling back on dualism by accepting 'mind' --- but not in the sense of Cartesian entity. The physical-mental identity theory, Wittgenstein's complex of mental concepts, Ryle's dispositional behaviourism, the functionalist theory based on Aristotelian frame work and Rorty's eliminative reductionism --- can all be grouped under reductionist approach in a very broad sense.

There are many non-reductionist interpretations of mind in the recent mind-body debates. In fact, the neo-scholastic philosophy is the classic example of defense of dualism. In the discussion that follow, the concern is with thinkers falling within and reacting to analytic tradition. Donald Davidson and Saul Kripke deserve attention in the present context.

#### NOTES

1. Peter Smith and O.R. Jones, The Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p.17.
2. L.J. Beck, The Metaphysics of Descartes, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965, p.266.
3. John Cottigham explains Cartesian 'non-corporeality dogmma' as a problematic aspect of dualism and says that "by insisting on the essential non-corporeality of the mind, Cartesian dualism is committed to a thesis which modern advances in neuro-physiology have made less and less plausible." ("Cartesian Trialism", Mind, Vo.XCIV, No.374,

- 1985, p.218.)
4. Ibid., p.219.
  5. John Cottingham, Descartes' Conversation with Bruman, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976, p.27 and pp.74 ff.
  6. Ibid., p.219.
  7. Peter Smith et. al, op.cit., p.19.
  8. Ibid., p.38.
  9. Ibid., p.43.
  10. Ibid., p.42.
  11. P.F.Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1974, p.174.
  12. J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. J. Yolton, London: Dent, 1961., p. (Quoted in Peter Smith et al., op.cit., p.50.
  13. Peter Smith et al., op.cit., p.58.
  14. Ibid., p.59

## CHAPTER II

### COMPLEX OF MENTAL CONCEPTS : AN ANALYSIS

Wide discussions and often conflicting interpretations of Ludwig Wittgenstein's works has resulted in attributing to him views, ideas and positions which he might not have held. This may be due to Wittgenstein's style of expression. Sentences or statements interpreted in isolation from the rest of the work are inconclusive and hence may fail to give a clear idea of his position.

For a linguistic philosopher like Wittgenstein, language is the most important thing. In his early work, Tractatus, he held the view that the function of language was to 'picture' the facts. In his later work Philosophical Investigations, he pays attention to the pragmatic nature of language. Wittgenstein says that, the meaning of a word is to be understood, in the way the word is used. Thus, a word, may perform multiple functions, when used in many different ways and will have different meanings. A word is used as a 'tool' and "is characterised by its use just as a tool is characterised by its functions" <sup>1</sup> ! The use of a word can be understood only with reference to the context, both linguistic and social. He believes that language is behaviour of a special sort, a medium, an instrument through which we can reach one another's experiences. Consequently, one is naturally led to think and ask following questions : what is the link between our language and our experiencing a particular mental process? What is the basis for usage of words by human beings when we name a particular mental act? Wittgenstein inquires into the implication

of Cartesianism with reference to language. Descartes along with the empiricists maintained that what is immediately available to our awareness are ideas.

Descartes and other philosophers thought that this mental content vocabulary is learnt in the introspection process by giving oneself a 'private ostensive definition'. With the help of such a definition, the person mentally fixes his attention on the private mental processes and establishes a relation between the process experienced and the word used. It is private because what is going on in one's mind cannot be observed by others, neither can anyone be aware of it. If each individual learns the mental vocabulary by this method, then we need a strong argument to claim that the same thing happens in case of other minds.

Wittgensteinians interpret the relation between our experiencing a mental process and the language that is used to express, in the following way. According to them the words that we use stand for the ideas and thoughts in the mind of the speaker. Hence, language can be seen as only externally related to the 'private' thinking process. Ashok Vohra in Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind draws two conclusions from the definition of 'private language'. First, that it is possible to think without language. Second, a person might have a private language to record his own private mental acts for his exclusive use. Understanding the above two issues is imperative to understanding Wittgenstein's conception of 'mind'.

Wittgenstein discusses general issues about the nature of mind rather than the particular mental states like belief, thought, emotion, etc. There is a wide agreement among

commentators on Wittgenstein, that his 'argument' against the possibility of a 'private language', a language the words of which refer to what can be known only to the speaker and his immediate private sensations, is the central theme around which a philosophy of mind can be developed.

In order to understand the relation between the mental experience and the language that we use to express it, Wittgenstein often discusses the meaning and the use of the term 'sensation'. It is believed that the terms like 'sensation', 'sense-data' and 'sensible qualities' can be used interchangeably. They are also believed to be immediate objects of observation. The above mentioned features of 'sensation' are denied in the Wittgensteinian account of the mental.

One may observe that three different uses of the term 'sensation' can be given :

1. It is used to express or mention our experiencing a sensation as an act.
2. It is used to refer to the content of sensory experience.
3. The term is employed as a comprehensive term to refer to both the above uses.

He states further that, when one uses the term without specifically mentioning the 'use' to which the term is put, confusion results. Sensations are neither identical with sense-impressions nor 'ideas' as Berkeley claims nor with sense-data as C.S. Price and Bertrant Russell think.

Similarities between the three terms (sensations, sense-impression and ideas) force philosophers to declare them as

identical. That these terms cannot be used interchangeably can be seen from the fact that we cannot say 'sense-impression of pain' but sensation of pain. Neither can the above terms become the immediate object of perception. Sensations cannot be located in the sense we locate bones in the hands or the leg.

It is commonly believed and understood that our experiences remain 'private'. But Wittgenstein maintains that its (private experience) expression is through the language that is 'public'-- a language that is commonly used by a community, that has got its set of rules which a person is required to understand and learn.

But in the case of mental acts like 'sensations', 'pain-experience', the words used by the particular person refer to that person's own private experience and when communicated only the speaker (logically) understands it (experience). Thus, what we get here is an idea of private language, which may be described as "a language that refers to the experience of which only the speaker is aware and of which is not merely the case that it is not understood by anyone other than the speaker, but more, that it is logically impossible that it should be understood by any one other than the speaker"<sup>2</sup>. In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein writes : "The individual words of this language are to refer what can only be known to the person speaking to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language"<sup>3</sup>. Further he says: "The language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand"<sup>4</sup>.

The following features of 'private language' are visible on

the basis of analysis of above quoted two Wittgenstenian passages:

1. The words used by the particular person only refer to that person's own private experiences.
2. The words used also stand for that person's (speaker's) immediate private sensations.
3. Another person (other than the speaker) cannot (logically) understand the language.

Accordingly, 'private language' cannot have any word common with our public language. The language commonly used by a community is a public language. Words are the signs by which we mean certain things. Although they are the collection of alphabets they cannot be used anyhow. There are rules for the way they are used and each language has its own set of rules, which a person is required to understand and learn.

As 'private language' cannot be used to communicate to others (as one's sensations and experiences are 'inner' experiences) it will have its own rules and words. These words cannot come from or be used in public language. From this, it may be concluded that only the speaker can know the rules of private language. Wittgenstein maintains that even though 'private language' is possible, with that language not only one cannot communicate with others but also cannot communicate even with oneself.

Wittgenstein denounced the Cartesian conception of the term 'sensation' (and other mental vocabulary) that knowledge of the sensations of others is impossible. Cartesians maintain that a

person experiencing a sensation, is infallibly acquainted with his own sensations. Thus, by giving ostensive definition, sensations are named.

Wittgenstein points out that there is no criterion for doing so. In his 'diary argument' he says that when a person associates a sign with a particular sensation that is experienced, a definition of that sign is not given, because such a definition cannot be formulated. Wittgenstein further says that even though one understands the connection between the sign and the sensation and may even use correctly in future, but there is no criterion in present case to associate the sign with the sensations. As Wittgenstein puts it : "I impress ... on myself the connection between the sign and the sensation can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But in the present case, I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right <sup>5</sup>. In other words, the person cannot know for certain that he has used the sign correctly connecting the sensation. In fact, Wittgenstein says that we cannot talk about knowledge of sensations. The words 'I know' can have meaning only in a doubtful case that is stated. It becomes meaningful only in case of 'learning'. He maintains that, in case of sensations neither we have to learn about them nor we can have any doubts about them, as to doubt their existence becomes senseless, we just have them. The use of the words 'I know' in the first person psychological statements, Wittgenstein says, cannot be used as an expression of certainty. Self-knowledge, is understood as giving knowledge about one's real self, as claimed by Cartesians, that

is, knowledge about one's mind. Cartesians separate the mind from the body and suppose that this self desires, wills, thinks and so on and so forth. Thus, self-knowledge is equated with the knowledge about one's mind, and the question 'what am I?' can be equated with the question 'What is mind?' These questions are directed towards the inquiry into the nature of mind and self. There are many interpretations of the 'self'. Bertrand Russell defines a 'subject' as "any entity which is acquainted with something"<sup>6</sup>. Thomas Reid claims that mind is a substance --- when he says, "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling, I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers"<sup>7</sup>. Reid's contention, that, mind is a substance, may be questioned as there is no criteria to decide the existence of such a 'spiritual substance'.

John Locke rejects 'mind' as a 'substance' but thinks that it is 'tabula rasa' or a dark chamber. But does not reject the idea of the existence of mind altogether. Hume consistently thought 'mind' or 'self' to be a 'bundle of perception'. For him mind is, "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perceptual flux and movement"<sup>8</sup>.

Bertrand Russell developed further Hume's 'bundle theory' into 'logical construction theory', saying: "Empirically, I cannot discover anything corresponding to the supposed act; and theoretically I cannot see that it is indispensable. We say: "I think so and so", and this word "I" suggests that thinking is the act of a person. --- It is supposed that thoughts cannot just come and go, but need a person to think them. Now, of course it

is true that thoughts can be collected into bundles, so that one bundle is my thoughts, and another is your thoughts and a third is the thoughts of Mr. Jones" .<sup>9</sup>

Wittgentenians maintain that, both the empiricist and the Cartesian theories are based on wrong assumptions. Mind is neither like a 'ghost' nor a theatre where perceptions and ideas appear and disappear. Mind is not the name of a place where mental experiences take place.

In the Wittgenstenian sense, "a mind exists in so far as and only in so far as one or more of a person's mental capacities are being expressed. The term 'capacity' used here is synonymous with capacity, power, ability, faculty and disposition of willing, hoping, feeling, imagining, acting, perceiving, hating, remembering, thinking, deciding, wishing, fearing, regretting and so on. All these acts are called mental acts and the words that express these mental acts are called mental concepts. Mind is attributed to a being, capable of performing mental acts"<sup>10</sup> .

It may be interpreted that mind, according to Wittgenstein, is a complex of mental concepts. To an organism, if mental concepts are applicable, then there is said to be the existence of mind. Mind is not an organ but it is the ability and proneness to do certain things which a person cannot do without his body. Since mental concept is expressed in our behaviour, the behaviour of a 'person' and the mental concepts or acts cannot be separated from the body. All the mental capacities of person taken together is given the name 'mind' and therefore mind is not 'mysterious something' in the body. And there is no need for any evidence to

prove to oneself that man possesses a mind. Wittgenstein maintains that mind is revealed to us in linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour (the term behaviour referring to past, present and future behaviour) and it takes place in the complex of conditions in which that person is placed.

Wittgenstein holds that 'private language' is not needed to know our inner states and we can certainly know other's pain and correctly make judgements about the internal states of others. As Wittgenstein puts it: "I can be as certain of someone else's  
11  
sensations as of any fact" .

This behaviour based certainty is different from mathematical certainty. It should be noted that there are different types of certainties. For instance certainty in a language game --- depends on the kind of language game. Not only are there types of certainties in each field, but also the criteria of certainty varies from one field or subject to the other. For example, the kind of certainty required in economics is different from the kind of certainty required in Sociology. In conclusion, it may be said that, for Wittgenstein, sensations are communicable. In other words, whenever others are in pain we can know it and when we are in pain others can know it.

Wittgenstein further maintains that it is not logically contradictory to say that one can feel other's pain. To him the actual pain felt by a person in his body can be 'experienced' or 'felt' by another person in an analogous sense. The criteria of 'pain' is the behaviour of the person through which he expresses that. Any pain or experience is termed as 'private' by Wittgenstein when it is not manifested in any way, like in the

case of "chess move considered and discarded in imagination" .  
 If there is itching sensation in an individual, and he does not communicate or report or express that in any way - if there is no publicly observable behaviour - then it remains private. In the same way some of our pains are private but we cannot pass from 'some' to 'all'.

Wittgenstein holds that sensations are neither incommunicable nor private. One cannot make it private by naming it privately, for naming requires concept formation and retention of it. This in turn is dependent on a great deal of stage setting. Such a stage setting requires, for example, the formation and retention of rules, which is not possible in 'private language'. Therefore, 'private language' does not make any sense.

One strong assumption on the basis of which philosophers claim sensations to be private is the fact that the particular person who is in pain, has before his consciousness, a particular 'state' of his physique which others cannot experience. But it is quite possible for one to know the experiences and understand them with certainty because of 'sameness' of our feelings and 'states of the body'. If one maintains that 'pain' which is experienced in one's own private consciousness can exist only when 'I' experience it (that is, if it is thought private in this manner) then, the statements 'he is in pain', 'you are in pain' will become senseless. For, we do not know, in this sense, whether there exists 'pain' as far as others are concerned, since we cannot experience other's pain.

Wittgenstein emphasises the language-game and the grammar of the words used and not the 'sensation' aspect of it. For a blind man, even though he cannot see anything but still can use the word 'see' in his language, in the same way it should be possible for a person who does not experience 'pain' understands the behaviour of the word 'pain' in the language-game. And, so he concludes, that in order to understand the meaning of the word 'pain' it is not necessary to have an experience of it, and that we do not learn the meaning of the word 'pain' the way we experience it.

One cannot name a sensation 'pain' in teaching a child that 'this is a pain', as 'pain' is not an object with physical properties. If there is no outward responsive behaviour (reaction to some sensation) then we cannot teach a child the meaning of the word 'pain'. It is this behaviour that we share with each other and it helps us in understanding and making sensation language possible.

Vohra, supports the Wittgensteinian claim of impossibility of 'private language' says that, "we are under the illusion that one could always 'pick out' the sensation 'pain' from the stream of one's consciousness and name it. But we forget that 'picking out' presupposes that we possess the concept of sensation and therefore it cannot serve to explain our acquisition of it. A concept is not formed merely by looking at a thing, or a colour. To have a concept means to know how the word is used, it is to know the rules which govern the use of the word in the language-game"  
13  
game"

Wittgenstein further maintains that even though the private

linguist succeeds in specifying a sensation concept, it is impossible to retain the same for future occasion. For Wittgenstein, the view that 'private language' is possible rests on the 'category mistake'.

Though Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind has far reaching consequences, it is unsatisfactory as he has not been able to address himself to the specific question 'what is mind?' His Philosophical Investigations appear to be 'dogmatically negative'<sup>14</sup> as every attempt made to analyse fundamental mental state is disposed off along with the refusal to admit that there exist private phenomena.

Wittgenstein repeatedly attempts to destroy the 'private' the 'inner'. For example, in his 'beetle' example he says : "suppose everyone had a box with something in it. We call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and every one says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; Not even as a something: for the box might even be empty"<sup>15</sup> . Further Wittgenstein says : "It is not a something, but not a nothing either. The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said"<sup>16</sup> . On the basis of the above two passages, it can be interpreted, that for Wittgenstein, 'mental experience' or

'private experiences' are such that nothing can be said about them.

Wittgenstein, throughout his Tractatus as well as Philosophical Investigations attempted to find out the link between our language, the words, the naming that we do, and our experiences. A person's crying when he is in pain is the behaviour, not the description of pain. Pain can be similarly ascribed to another person referring to his overt behaviour. In other words the statements ascribing pain to others are meaningful, only if they can be verified in public. It stresses the linguistic expression or external behaviour. This led C.W.K. Mundle <sup>to</sup> label ~~to~~ Wittgenstein's thesis (that nothing can be said about private experiences) as 'linguistic behaviourism'.

C.W.K. Mundle finds two different meanings of 'private language': (1) when symbols are used to refer to one's private experience in the rigorous Wittgensteinian sense and (2) when the rules for the use of the symbols are known only to the person who invents it. A person's communication with himself as far as his experiences are concerned will involve the use of symbols in the former sense of 'private language' --- that is, a symbol that is used to refer to his private experience. Considering the fact that, it is possible to express one's private experiences to others, it may be said that the language that will be used for this purpose cannot be private in the former sense (rigorous Wittgensteinian sense). Thus, the symbols used may be either 'public' or 'private' in the later sense, as far as the rules for the use of the symbol is concerned. Thus, in case of Wittgenstein's 'diary argument' the person using a particular

symbol, say 'E' to refer to a sensation, would describe it as a 'pain in my left eye'. The diarist can divulge his use of 'E' by explaining this in the public language. Again, "the diarist might reveal (something about) his use of 'E' by his behaviour, by groaning and clutching his left eye whenever he wrote 'E'" <sup>17</sup>. But Wittgenstein maintains that, if the diarist is able to reveal his use of 'E' through the above mentioned way, then it cannot be counted as a 'private language'. As Wittgenstein puts it: "Now what about the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I can understand? How do I use words to stand for my sensations? As we ordinarily do? Then are my words for sensations tied up with my natural expressions of sensations? In that case my language is not a 'private' one. Someone else might understand it as well as I" <sup>18</sup>.

C.W.K. Mundle points out that Wittgenstein confuses between the two senses of the 'private'. He says that Wittgenstein in the above passage "lays it down that if a person's use of "words for sensations" can be inferred by others from his behaviour, these words are not <sup>to</sup> be called "private". This is to define a 'private language' as one in which communication is impossible. But one important question which may be intended by a person who asks "Can there be a private language?" is .... : Can we communicate about our private experiences? To guarantee a negative answer to this question by giving an arbitrary definition of 'private language' seems frivolous" <sup>19</sup>.

Wittgenstein points out the lack of criteria for the identification of a sensation. According to him, memory criteria

is not justifiable since in that case one memory will be appealing to another memory. Wittgenstein questions the epistemic adequacy of private memory judgements claiming "the process has got to produce a memory which is actually correct. If the mental image .... could not itself be tested for correctness, how could it confirm the correctness of the first memory?"<sup>20</sup> In other words, Wittgenstein wants to stress that 'private experience' is meaningless as the experience is not able to verify 'correctly' the use of private symbol.

Norman Malcolm supporting Wittgenstein also advances various arguments to justify the claim "that there is an epistemically radical difference between private and public memory judgements"<sup>21</sup>. The arguments are advanced to show that it is impossible to have a criterion or 'concept of correctness' in the case of private memory judgements whereas it is possible to have a criterion in public memory judgements.

Malcolm says that term 'memory' as used in both 'private memory' and 'public memory' has radically different meanings. He says that, "by a memory impression we understand something that is either accurate or inaccurate, whereas there would not be in the private language, any conception of what would establish a memory impression as correct, any conception of what 'correct' would mean here"<sup>22</sup>. The concept 'correct' has no application in 'private language' and therefore there can be no rules in 'private language' leading to the possibility of that language. But Michael Stocker points out that, "without the prior distinction based on the impossibility of the occurrence of the concept 'correct' in a private language, Malcolm could not

invidiously distinguish between public and private memory  
judgements ...." .  
23

Stocker further argues that it may be shown that the concept 'correct' has an application in 'private language'. He refers to Malcolm's criteria for the correct use of a private term --- the consistent use of the symbol as a sufficient condition. Stocker presents a thought experiment to show the application of concept 'correct' in the private language: "In the epistemological present, while there is no doubt that the pain we experience is but the same - i.e., the numerically identical - sensation we could say 'Let us call this S'. Before the end of the same epistemological present we could say of the numerically identical pain 'This is S' ; and finally in still the same epistemological present we might sum up our activities by 'My use of 'S' was correct' .  
24  
Stocker further gives the example of different burnt fingers, where one can say that the 'pain' that is experienced from one finger is qualitatively identical with the 'pain' that is experienced from another finger. Because of the similarity perceived in experience, we may denote both the sensations' by using one symbol, may be 'S'. Thus, our memories, whether are veridical or not, becomes irrelevant, says Stocker.

However, Malcolm's contention may be better understood in his statement : "The point to be made here is that when one has given oneself the private rule 'I will call this thing "pain" whenever it occurs' one is then free to do anything or nothing. That 'rule' does not point in any direction. On the private language hypothesis, no one can teach me what the correct use of

'same' is. I shall be the sole arbiter of whether this is the same as that. What I choose to call the 'same' will be the same. No restriction whatever will be imposed upon my application of the word. But a sound I can use as I please is not a word" <sup>25</sup>.

Malcolm here is concerned with inter-subjective teaching and checking. Malcolm is right when he says that before choosing a rule for the private application of 'pain' anything or nothing can be called 'pain'. But this is true in case of public terms also. Stocker while arguing against Malcolm's contention, says that, the private application of term 'pain' "... is not true needs to be shown, not simply asserted - that after one has given himself the rule he could not know if he were keeping or violating it. Of course, he could change the rule - intentionally or not. But then again, so could a rule for a public word be changed - intentionally or not. And 'Rule R is changeable' does not imply 'one cannot check R for change'. The possibility that enough, or all, rules might change and thus one would not be able to check R for change is (i) again an appeal to scepticism which (ii) applies to public as well as private rules" <sup>26</sup>.

Malcolm maintains that it is impossible for the person himself to check his application of a private term, and therefore raises the very question that his argument was supposed to settle : can our private memory be checked? In conclusion it may be said that Malcolm's invidious distinction between private and public memory judgements is not justified. His attempt to present such a difference, fails. And it fails by being an example of Petitio.

Michael Stocker, thus arguing against Malcolm concludes that, "the 'private language' shows that no language at all is

possible; and therefore that it is felled by a reductio" .

Wittgenstein's contention that, communication is impossible in 'private language' is also objected to. C.W.K. Mundle argues for the possibility of communication in 'private language' saying that, "a person who has already learned to talk in the way that we all have - by means of ostensive definitions, explicit or implicit - can proceed to talk about his private experiences" .<sup>28</sup>

Wittgenstein in the 'diary argument' suggests that the diarist cannot have any use for the symbol or sign, that is associated with his sensation. Also it cannot have any meaning for him, because the diarist is not in a position to verify the correctness of his application of the symbol on any occasion. His diary argument runs as follows: "I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign 'E' and write this sign in the diary for every day on which I have the sensation .... I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition (of 'E') .... I speak, or write this sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation ..... in this way I impress upon myself the connection between the sign and the sensation. But "I impress it on myself" can only mean : this process brings it about that I remember the connection right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say : whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'" .<sup>29</sup>

One may observe that, in the above passage, the diarist has a memory and the capacity to recognise what he feels, sees or

hears. But Wittgenstein insists upon, that for the words to have meaning, there should be 'independent confirmation of the correctness' for the use of the private symbol. It can be shown that, in a statement when someone says 'that is an apple, isn't it?', the 'independent confirmation of the correctness' of his use of the word 'apple' in the above statement, is his hearing a sound which he has to recognise as a token of the sentence 'yes, it is an apple'. In this case the person has to rely on his own capacity to recognise his experiences in order to get such confirmation. Mundle says that "my recognising the sound I hear as the sentence, 'yes, it is an apple', confirms the correctness of my own use of 'apple' only because this sound (so interpreted) is evidence that another person (a) is having private experiences of seeing, touching, tasting, or smelling the object in question, and (b) he has performed a private act of ostensible recognition, that is, an act of the kind that I had performed before saying 'that is an apple, isn't it?'<sup>30</sup>. Thus it may be concluded that communication with oneself is possible in 'private language'.

It can therefore be concluded that we do frequently have distinctive experiences and recognising these experiences need not be thought as an impossible task. Although these experiences are private, they are as recognisable as other objects and are observable in public. But Wittgenstein in his beetle's argument denies 'private experiences' in case of others (other than oneself) when he says 'the box might even be empty'. Each one knows that there is something in the box in one's own case. But to infer the same about other people's boxes is not possible, simply because we do not have access to their boxes. Mundle says

that, Wittgenstein goes too far, when he says that, the box might even be empty'. In other words it results into saying that other people may have no private experiences. Mundle while arguing against this, says that we have "adequate evidence that other people see things as coloured, for they will, on request, describe and draw things which are both looking at, and their descriptions and drawings tally closely with what I see; and they could not discriminate the different things which I and they are looking at unless they saw them, as I see them, as differently coloured. Similarly with pains, etc. - I have no way of verifying that what you feel when you have a dental abscess is the same as what I feel when I have one. But your behaviour and your description of your pain may leave me no room for doubting that you are feeling localised sensations for which you feel strong aversion, and this is all I need to be sure about to have a reason, for e.g., giving you my last aspirin ; and I'd have no reason for acting thus unless I believed that you were feeling sensations in some degree similar to some species of the sensations which I call "pains" when I have them" <sup>31</sup>.

Mundle says that given two principles - the verification principle in some form and the principle that denies "meaning to the statement that similar physiological conditions give rise to more or less similar sensations in different people", <sup>32</sup> both cannot be accepted. For the second principle to be meaningful, we should reject the first principle. The second principle forms the basis for the argument from analogy and if we want to defend against philosophical scepticism, we have to depend on argument

from analogy. For, we all feel convinced that other people have private experiences which are similar to our own experiences.

Don Locke rejects Wittgenstein's claim that a 'private object language' is impossible. It is the claim that words cannot refer to private objects, sensations, what the person who is experiencing that, is aware of. Wittgenstein does not see the distinction between the two claims; that pains and other similar things which a person can feel and that, pains and other similar things which a person can know. A private object is something which only the subject can be aware of. Don Locke says that 'one's being aware of something' can be understood in two different senses: one's being aware of something may be taken as perceiving, some item, (for example, when one is aware of some sound or pain), and in the second sense it may be taken to refer to realising some fact (for example, our awareness that two and two makes four). Don Locke defines a private object, as one 'which only the one person can be aware of', that is 'awareness' in the sense of perception. So pain is a private object because it is something which only one person can feel and not in the sense that only one person can know of its existence. Supposing that we understand 'pain' as private object, in the sense that only one person can know, Locke inquires whether there can be a private object language in this sense of 'private object'? Locke observes that, there cannot be such a language for it "would be a necessarily private language, and .... that such languages are impossible. That is, if I am the only one who can know anything about X then I am the only one who can know what 'X' means, and consequently 'X' cannot be a genuine term in my, or any

language" . Thus, Locke says that Wittgenstein fails to distinguish between 'private object language' and a 'necessarily private language'. Locke says that Wittgenstein refutes the sceptic's claim that, only he (sceptic) can know whether he is really in pain. According to Wittgenstein sceptic's claim is not correct, and it is either false or incoherent. But Locke says that, Wittgenstein also makes the same mistake. Locke argues in the following way : "if 'pain' did refer to a private sensation then only the one person could know that he feels a pain; we can and do know that others feel pain; therefore 'pain' cannot refer to a private sensation"<sup>34</sup> . The first premise in the argument is false. But Wittgenstein does not notice that it is false and commits the same mistake as the sceptic. Don Locke critically comments that Wittgenstein mistakenly thought that the "absurd scepticism follows from a certain theory of language, a certain interpretation of the function of words like 'pain', a theory which must therefore be mistaken. Wittgenstein does not argue both that the scepticism is absurd because it is based on a mistaken theory of language, and that the theory of language is mistaken because it leads to an absurd scepticism. Rather he argues that the sceptical conclusion is absurd, and therefore that the theory of language which commits us to it must be mistaken. But Wittgenstein is himself mistaken in thinking that it is the theory of language which commits us to scepticism about other minds"<sup>35</sup> . Wittgenstein assumed that if a term had a private reference then only that one person would know whether what was said was true. In other words if 'pain' refers to a private

sensation then only that one person would know whether he feels pain. And this very mistaken assumption leads to scepticism. Wittgenstein's private language argument involves this assumption. But Wittgenstein failed to see this, as Locke says, "partly because of his basic desire to show that all philosophical errors arise from a misunderstanding of the workings of language, and partly because he does not distinguish the claim that pains and the like are things which only one person can feel from the claim that they are things which only one person can know"<sup>36</sup> .

The word 'pain' cannot refer to private object, which only one person can feel. That is, 'pain' refers to a private sensation, such that others also know, about the feeling of 'pain' in a person. Referring to 'pain' as a private sensation, it does not follow from this, that others cannot know about a person's feeling pain. Moreover others can know, what the person who is in pain says and talks about.

Don Locke points out that Wittgenstein would not accept, the problem of other minds, as a genuine problem. According to Wittgenstein, "the fact that we accept knowledge of other minds as knowledge is not something that can be or needs to be justified"<sup>37</sup> . Wittgenstein would not pass the problem of mind as 'unnecessary puzzlement' as he does in case of some philosophical problems. Alastair Hannay points out that Wittgenstein "... suggests that we treat the mind as sui generis, .... secondly, he points out certain features, or preconditions, of our understanding of mental phenomena which show that it is wrong in any case to regard the inner as an autonomous sphere of mental

life, as if, for example, what distinguished a mental image from a so called exemplary one was its privacy, unmeasurableness, and so on" <sup>38</sup> .

Wittgenstein says that, we should not ask, what an image is? or what happens when one imagines something? but should concentrate on the 'usage' of the word 'imagination'. According to Wittgenstein, our 'nature' of understanding mental phenomena has two necessary components : Distinction is experience and context of importance. Wittgenstein illustrates distinctions in experience with the help of notions like seeing as or aspect seeing where a particular figure "can be seen alternately as a representation of different things" <sup>39</sup> . Wittgenstein in the following passage points out the distinctions, "the colour of the visual impression corresponds to the colour of the object (this blotting paper looks pink to me and is pink) - the shape of the visual impression to the shape of the object (it looks rectangular to me, and is rectangular) - but what I perceive in the downing of an aspect is not a property of the object, but an internal relation between it and other objects" <sup>40</sup> . It is not to be concluded that one can see the object in two different ways. Instead one should say that "it follows in some way from this fact that I see something different in the two cases, the fact must stand on its own as that which 'gives us a reason' to use this expression here" <sup>41</sup> . For Wittgenstein, it is the kind of a thing which gives us a reason to say that we see something in a novel way and it is that we can "give a new kind of description of it" <sup>42</sup> .

Hannay says that, according to Wittgenstein the "concept of an aspect is fixed in terms of the importance the expressions referring to aspects acquire for us in ordinary contexts. This is what gives us the right to say such things as 'I am now seeing it as ...,' not some story about a personal contribution"<sup>43</sup>.

Wittgenstein maintains that a causal or a physiological explanation, for the above distinction in experiences, would not have helped in understanding of the mental phenomena, as "to understand a phenomena is always to seek a conceptual justification for it"<sup>44</sup>. In understanding the nature of the mental, Wittgenstein says that we should appeal to our experience and thereby find out whether there is anything to be distinguished. Secondly, we should appeal to the types of consideration, that Wittgenstein thinks as determining the importance of a distinction. Further, "the question of whether there are mental states, mental processes, or mental objects is to be settled by a "grammatical investigation the results of which are determined by the uses that have already been given to words in everyday situations"<sup>45</sup>.

According to Wittgenstein, we can understand 'mental phenomena' in the following way : when we are giving the nature of something, we are giving a description of it. In the case of mind there is nothing to explore, as there is nothing to describe. The talk about the mind as a medium is analogous with a sign. Just as we explain 'something' that we assume to be giving life to the sign or making it meaningful, so also mind should be understood as a non-body but a vital factor, pointing to genuine

experiences such as feelings, images, etc. It appears that there is mental accompaniment of acts like remembering, day-dreaming, expecting etc. But mind may not necessarily accompany these acts and may not serve to distinguish the above acts. Hannay Alastair interpreting Wittgenstein's views on mind says that "there is nothing specifically mental to point to as the mind at work, or if there is something specifically mental it isn't an explanation of the mental works differentiated by our psychological vocabulary. Similarly when I talk of aspect-seeing in terms of a personal contribution to a basic impression received from outside, nothing in the experience corresponds to this, to see something as a portrait of a friend is not to see one thing superimposed upon another"<sup>46</sup>. Any accounts of the mental processes are neither necessary nor sufficient for our understanding mental phenomena.

According to Wittgenstein, when we refer to 'mental occurrences' or 'mental processes' we cannot specify anything that we do in a mental process or anything that occurs mentally. In case of a colour of a flower that "we meant the colour; yet we cannot specify anything we did or anything that occurred, which can be identified with meaning the colour. So we think: "Meaning the colour is just something that occurs in the minds. You cannot say what it is, but you know what it is. It is a unique, indescribable mental occurrence. It is something definite but impalpable"<sup>47</sup>.

Malcolm interprets Wittgenstein's views on the mental in the following way. Malcolm says, for Wittgenstein the inclination to understand "the mental state of meaning the colour as being

"impalpable" or "intangible" ... is one of the greatest importance. It expresses our idea that mental phenomena are somehow mysterious. Mental acts and states, we feel, are tremendously significant. But we cannot say what they are. Meaning the colour just is "a particular mental act". Remembering what you ate for breakfast is "a certain mental experience". Intending to say "so I must leave at ten o'clock" is a perfectly concrete but indescribable mental state<sup>48</sup>. The fact that a mental experience is indescribable, one cannot get hold of it. That is, for example 'intending' as a mental act cannot be identified with an image or anything that we intend to do. Wittgenstein observes that, the part of the force of the word 'mental' indicates that one should not expect to understand how the word 'mental' works and further that it is something mysterious, inexplicable and occult.

But Wittgenstein dispells this mysteriousness, as he maintains that one should look around and look at the context in which we utter the words. We get confused about the mental concepts when we look inside. This way of looking for 'mind', Wittgenstein says, not only misguides us but throws off the track and make you search for the mental in a wrong place.

Wittgenstein maintains that, it is a fundamental error, that mind is something inner or outer. The 'inner' and 'outer' are, as if the two horns of a dilemma and whichever way one chooses, it is not without objections. If we consider a mental event as an 'inner occurrence' then it has harmful influence, that mental may become occult. A mental event cannot be understood as something

outer as "joy is not joyful behaviour" . The experience of joy is not equal to some grouping of gestures or some constellation of behavioural responses. According to Wittgenstein, joy designates nothing, it is neither inner nor outer.

In Malcolm's interpretation of Wittgenstein's views on the mind, Wittgenstein would remark that "philosophy should try neither to identify nor explain the phenomena of mind. What should it do then? It should describe language. It should remind us of what we say. It should bring to mind how we actually use the mental terms that confuse us philosophically" .<sup>50</sup>

Wittgenstein does not make it clear what the mental phenomena is. In Philosophical Investigations he often discusses the term sensation and the treatment of this term is understood as applicable to other mental phenomena. Wittgenstein's emphasis is on language and linguistic puzzles, rather than understanding mental phenomena. Many philosophers call Wittgenstein a linguistic behaviourist. But in Malcolm's interpretation Wittgenstein does not seem to be taking either reductionist or non-reductionist perspective.

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## CHAPTER III

### DISPOSITIONAL BEHAVIOURISM REVIEWED

Gilbert Ryle's book The Concept of Mind convinced many thinkers, that he has conclusively exposed the confusion of Cartesian dualism employing logical analysis based on a form of behaviorism.<sup>1</sup>

According to Ryle, to consider the mind as an entity, like the body is to commit a category mistake. The famous example of the visitor who wants to see the University and after being shown, the Registrar's Office, the senate house and the library, still asks "where is the University?" confuses the category of the University with the category of the seen units. Similarly, Ryle says, a category mistake of the same type has been committed, in confusing the category of mind with that of the body. Both mind and body exist, but not in the same fashion, as dualists thought or are thinking. Dualists think of a human being as a composite of both mind and body. Further, it is maintained that the mind makes the body work as a 'ghost' in the machine. Ryle thought of exposing the mythical mind, by introducing the key term disposition in his explanation of mind and mental concepts. 'Disposition' for Ryle are tendencies to behave.

He takes the example of the term 'intelligence'. As a psychological concept, it is considered as a thoughtful activity, that is, before performing an intelligent act, the person thinks and that his 'prior' thinking prompts his act. Ryle explains this as a single operation and not involving various processes as it will lead to infinite regress. For to have the 'prior thinking'

leading to the intelligent behaviour, another 'intelligent thinking' is required and so on and so forth. Thus there is nothing occult or ghostly about 'intelligence' as a mental concept.

According to Ryle, any mental predicate is an actualisation of some disposition. Some dispositions are actualised only in a particular way, whereas certain other dispositions like one's being intelligent are actualised in the various behavioural forms or patterns if and when placed in a particular situation. Dispositions are tendencies and a tendency is not the same as a 'capacity'. Ryle distinguishes between a tendency and a 'capacity', but holds that both are dispositions. Jane Roland brings out Ryle's distinction between a tendency and a capacity as: "a tendency implies not only that something could be the case, but that it would be the case regularly when the appropriate conditions are realised; a capacity implies the ability to do something under specified conditions but does not imply frequency or regularity"<sup>2</sup>.

Connected with this distinction (between a tendency and a capacity) is Ryle's further distinction between the phrases, 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'. "Knowing how to do a particular thing", Ryle says, "is an ability or proneness to do certain acts or things"<sup>3</sup>. 'Knowing how' refers to the skill in any performance whereas 'knowing that' refers to the knowledge of factual propositions. Mind is the functioning of the body, or the appropriate behavioural responses given as the actualisation of a disposition.

The application of a mental concept to oneself and to the

others are logically equal. For example, when one says 'I am afraid', it would be true if and only if the statement another person would make about the first person by saying 'he is afraid' would be true. If there were no criteria for the truth or falsity of this third person statement, truth and falsity would have no application to it. The first and third person statement are logically equal in truth value. Therefore, mental operations are publicly observable (in one's overt behaviour). Hence, mind is not something very 'private'. The view that a person has a 'privileged access' to his mind being private leads to solipsism, according to Ryle.

Ryle deals with other mental concepts in the same fashion that he treated 'intelligence'. He rejects 'freedom' and 'free-will' as understood by traditional moralists --- as a mysterious concept. If we accept the concept of 'free-will' he points out that it leads to ridiculous consequences. If the volitions are understood as voluntary, then it leads to infinite regress, and if they are treated as involuntary, then the resulting action does not become voluntary.

Ryle rejects 'consciousness' and 'introspection' as a method to know one's 'self' or one's mental operations. As Albert Hofstadter points out : "Indefatigable is the word for Professor Ryle as he tackles the job of showing in each domain --- intelligence, intellect, emotion, volition, sense, imagination --- how the meaningful reference of mind words is exhausted in the task of describing the ways in which people behave, and how the postulation of ghostly, occult events as causal counter parts to

their conduct is a futile effect of logical ineptitude" .

Ryle, then, comes with a host of arguments to deny consciousness through which we know our mental life. Ryle in his arguments says that if we know facts about mental life through consciousness then people would have reported in their expression, that it is through consciousness. And in another argument, Ryle says, if we know our mental life through consciousness, then nothing would have remained hidden to each one, in each one's case.

Still another objection of Ryle to 'consciousness' is that it is treated as mental. If it is maintained that mental happenings are known to us through consciousness, and consciousness being mental should be known through another consciousness ~~and~~ <sup>then</sup> it leads to infinite regress, maintains Ryle.

Further, Ryle argues against 'introspection' as a mental process through which we observe internal happenings. His claim is that 'introspection' cannot reveal to us the secrets of 'mind'. As per the 'official theory' of introspection there should be two things : the object that is introspected and the process of, or act of introspection. But we know that at any given moment we can attend to only one thing. This shows that we cannot 'know' simultaneously the object of introspection and the act of introspection. Again Ryle points out that the traditional theory of introspection cannot escape the criticism of infinite regress. If we know mental processes through introspection, then how is the process that we are introspecting known? In other words, if it is considered as a mental process, then it still requires another introspection to know the earlier introspection

as a mental process and so on and so forth.

Further, Ryle questions and doubts the infallibility of introspection when he points out that if it were true that introspection is infallible, then there would not have been any disputes in intellectual fields like philosophy with unending arguments. Ryle in turn brings in the term 'retrospection' in place of introspection, showing that there can be no difference between the private acts and the public acts. Just as one can catch oneself scratching which is an observable act in the public, similarly one can catch oneself day-dreaming which is considered to be a private act. So private acts are not 'ghostly' acts.

Applying the same thing to the knowledge about oneself and the knowledge about others, Ryle consistently maintains that, the things that we know and the way we know about ourselves are similar to the ways and things we know about others. Once we know a person with particular character and traits, we frame law-like propositions about the traits or dispositions which are established after observing certain behaviour. And this is possible with oneself as well as with others. Thus Ryle concludes that knowledge about oneself is not private and there is nothing occult or mystical about it. Nothing therefore, obstruct us from knowing others on the same line as we know ourselves.

The concept of 'I' as referring to soul distinct from body, as we find it in Indian thought, is another important mind related concept. Ryle attacks this 'ghost in the machine', which is supposed to be immortal. Ryle gets rid of this ghost by making

'I' only an index word, that stands for the particular person who utters it. Ryle argues: "'I' is not an extra name for an extra being; it indicates, when I say or write it, the same individual who can also be addressed by the proper name 'Gilbert Ryle'. 'I' is not an alias for 'Gilbert Ryle'; it indicates the Person whom 'Gilbert Ryle' names when Gilbert Ryle used 'I'".

With reference to the uses of the words 'I' and 'myself' Ryle discusses 'higher order acts' and 'lower order acts'. Just as on stealing a watch a robber is sent to the police, in which the act of sending him to the police is a higher order act against the former act of stealing, similarly when one finds oneself guilty and expresses the statement 'I found myself guilty', the words 'I' and 'myself' do not refer either to the body or to the two different entities. It refers to the person who makes the statement in two different contexts. He learns to direct higher order acts against the lower order acts of the people and then applies it to himself when the situation arises. Thus for Ryle, 'I' does not refer to any ghostly entity in the body.

Ryle exposes yet another intimately mind-related concept that of intellectual activities, like judging, inferring, to reach to conclusions on the basis of premises etc. They are said to be taking place in the secret chamber of mind. Ryle agrees that they are intellectual activities but says that there is no reason why they should be connected with imagery mind. Along with the above activities many day-to-day activities can be classed as intellectual ones as playing games or introducing bills in the Parliament. There is no fixed criteria laid down for defining an

intellectual operation. Thinking is thought to be mysterious, but it is the using of the language and words either silently or loudly as per ones convenience. To expose the claim that mind enjoys a separate status, Ryle analyses the important concept of thinking, essentially related to mind. He brings out a distinction between the two senses in which thought and thinking is understood. In one sense thought is the thinking activity whereas in the second sense thought refers to the product of the thinking activity. And a confusion between this two senses leads to the symposition of 'mind' as a ghostly entity in the body. Ryle takes 'induction', 'deduction' and 'judging' as the products of thinking activity and says that they are not to be confused with the activity itself. The theoretical findings are understood as one's thinking power showing up outwardly. Thus intellectual process is conceived to be a double process, which Ryle thinks is a vague conception. In writing or saying something, nowhere there are two operations taking place, one on a ghostly plane and other its outer manifestation.

Ryle sets to explain the process of inferring in detail. He criticises the traditional Cartesian dualism as a theory of mind, as 'seeing' the implications. Mastery in the field of arguing is achieved only through the practice and truth cannot be revealed in a flash of light. In case of a theory, it is said that the implications seen there help to arrive at certain conclusions. Ryle argues while theorising is an operation, seeing the implications is an achievement and these two cannot be similar. Theorising is just like calculating as it happens in mathematics

and then seeing connections. This, Ryle holds, disproves, the traditionalists' account of mind as 'seeing' the implications on a ghostly stage. Neither mind is a storehouse for abstract ideas nor it is to be identified with 'conscience' or one's 'inner voice' dictating a person in his actions. The instructions of the parents as far as do's and don'ts are concerned, are rehearsed by the child and the rehearsed voice is taken as the voice of conscience. Ryle hopes for a new epistemology, which will explain the fundamental concepts without referring to the events taking place in the ghostly mental world.

But if 'mind' and one's experiences at that level is denied then psychology is left with the 'behaviour' as its subject matter, which is the subject-matter of several other subjects. But Ryle points out that psychology has got its distinctive business of studying systematically and scientifically the unknown causes of known action and behaviour. Its approach being scientific help psychology to survive without presupposing the ghostly mental activity.

Ryle through his linguistic analysis has attempted to reduce mind and every mind-related concept to behaviour and disposition. He shares with the logical positivists the view that all metaphysical muddles and problems are created because of the confusions created by language and therefore, clarification of the concepts is important. Ryle's work Concept of Mind is an excellent example of this task. Ryle <sup>attempts at</sup> ~~in~~ exposing the Cartesian myth of mind and to do this he takes recourse to the ordinary language. On the one hand, he expells the Cartesian ghost out of the mechanical body and on the other, he introduces his theory of

dispositions.

Ryle thinks that all problems in philosophy arise out of unclarity in language. So he maintains that clarity and linguistic analysis be the sole aim of philosophy. He can be criticised by pointing out that, nobody will think that the problem of evil is due to lack of clarity. Therefore, linguistic analysis can be only a method to solve certain problems but not the sole aim of philosophy.

The linguistic analysis instead of giving an insight into the life and existence, only clarifies the meaning of sentences. Linguistic analysis as a method has been criticised by many philosophers. Thus Bertrand Russell on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigation comments, "Why a whole school finds important wisdom in its pages"<sup>6</sup>. Again, Waissman finds 'clarifying' is not the only business of philosophy. Waissman says: "There is something deeply existing about philosophy ... It is not a matter of 'clarifying thoughts' nor of, 'the correct use of language' nor of any other of these damned things ... Philosophy is many things and there is no formula to cover them all. But if I were asked to express in one single word what is its most essential feature I would unhesitatingly say: vision"<sup>7</sup>.

Ryle has been criticised for his view that philosophising should be done in ordinary language. Bertrand Russell has criticised Ryle for his emphasis on the language of 'uneducated people' and attacking "the sophisticated language of the learned"<sup>8</sup>. C.A. Campbell and Frederick Copelstone maintain that there can be no fixed and accepted usage of language as far as

mind and mental operations are concerned.

Ryle, in his Concept of Mind, by emphasising ordinary language tries to show that there is no dualistic talk (about body and mind) in the ordinary language. But contrary to his emphasis it is not only found in the ordinary language, but an attempt as above robs the common man of something that is very essential to live. The discussion of the distinction between mind and body figures so large, in every day thought, that a common man can clearly distinguish between thinking as fundamentally different from sweating. It is not something being like hot or cold, cannot be pulled by a rope and so on.

Considering the treatment of term 'mind' on par with the 'body' Ryle says that traditionalists have committed a category mistake. But Ryle does not bother in the Concept of Mind, to define what a category is; but in turn the reader gets the idea of Ryle's "syntactical difference between the mental and the physical"<sup>9</sup>. Warnock in the following objected to Ryle's category mistake by asking, "if one is not prepared and indeed is deliberately unwilling, to say just what a category is, and what categories there are, can one really be entitled to employ the term 'category'?"<sup>10</sup>.

Further to attack the ghost in the machine, Ryle analyses the meanings of mental concepts to show that there is nothing ghostly in them. For example, the concept of 'intelligence' he says, refers not only to one activity of a person but many types, and ones intelligence is displayed in the ways he carries out these activities. In this example, we find Ryle identifying the meaning with the "method of verification"<sup>11</sup>. Thus, Ryle's

approach appears to be positivistic one. But the positivists with their method of verification laid the emphasis on facts of life, whereas Ryle seeking meanings of the mental concepts was only to refer to what use they can be put, without going to the 'facts' of the nature, which are very essential to understand the meaning of the words we use in language.

Though Ryle states that he does not want to increase the knowledge about what mind is, yet he introduces the new theory of mind in the theory of dispositions. And this is made clear by his opening statement: "This book offers what may with reservations be described as a theory of mind"<sup>12</sup>. A disposition is, as explained by Ryle, "to do and undergo certain sorts of thing"<sup>13</sup> under certain conditions. Mind is not something over and above our body. We are disposed to behave in a specific way when placed in a particular situation. All our acts and behaviour can be explained in terms of dispositions, inclinations and abilities and there is no need of attributing all the above referred things to the ghost inside.

Critics of Ryle have questioned Ryle's theory of disposition. In Ryle's account the dispositions are exhibited only in overt behaviour. Why a disposition is understood always in terms of outward behaviour only? Can there not be a disposition which is not manifested in overt behaviour, but by virtue of which that person has private experiences? As A.C. Ewing pointed out, a disposition need not refer to mainly "to behave in a certain way, but a disposition to have private experiences of certain kind"<sup>14</sup>.

Again Ryle's account of mental concepts and abilities has been questioned. Ryle maintains that the presence of any ability in a person, is known from his behaviour. For example, the ability of being intelligent is displayed in intelligent doings or behaviour of the person. But sometimes an intelligent person might not act intelligently because of nervousness or anxiety, but that does not mean that he is not intelligent. On the contrary the so called over achievers, achieve not because of amount of potentialities they have for any trait but because of certain other conditions. Ryle's criteria of certifying the presence of any ability in a person exclusively in terms of overt behaviour, is fallible, although it is true that, the intelligence of a person is displayed in at least some of his acts. The 'leap' in Rylean inference, from one's overt behaviour to certify an ability in a person, is not as certain and guaranteed as Ryle thinks. G. D. Jha, in his critical study of Ryle's concept of mind, writes that Ryle has confused and has failed to distinguish "between the essence and evidence of mental concepts" <sup>15</sup> .

Ryle's criteria of certifying a disposition in a person, poses the difficulty of requirement of infinite number of 'if statements'. It is not enough just to mention three or four or ten of such hypothetical statements concerning a particular disposition and to say that he is disposed to behave in that way. In fact the criteria limits the ability of a person to few acts. Therefore, in order to understand the disposition infinite number of 'if-statements' are to be mentioned. A very appropriate criticism of Ryle's criteria comes from Peter Geach when he says:

"It is really a scandal that people should count it a philosophical advance to adopt a programme of analysing ostensible categorical into unfulfilled conditionals, like the programmes of the phenomenologists with regard to 'physical object' statements and of neo-behaviourists with regard to psychological statements" .

Ryle distinguished between the "single-track" and "many-track" dispositions; 'smoking cigarette' is a 'single track' disposition referring to only one tendency whereas 'greediness' is a 'many-track' disposition. The tendencies brought under one term are of different types and not of same species, therefore, they cannot be brought under one 'many-track' disposition.

A further criticism of his dispositions is that Ryle has not distinguished between human dispositions and dispositions of other non-living objects. Although there is a distinction between physical and mental dispositions Ryle has not made it clear in what way, these are different from dispositions of other objects.

It is the main aim of this theory of dispositions to show that the mental concepts are dispositional. Ryle holds that the traditional dualist theory has misunderstood the logic of mental concepts. He maintains that mental concepts are not reports of occurrences, for there are no such occurrences in the ghostly world. But Ryle's introduction of 'mongrel-categorical' terms, shows that he overlooked the logical distinction between the two terms. The dispositional words according to Ryle are one type of logical words while episode words are of other logical type. This occurrence-disposition dichotomy proves to be a handicap for

Ryle, and is forced to say that logic of both, the occurrent and disposition words, meet in the 'mongrel-categorical' terms. This weakens Ryle's original thesis (that disposition and occurrent words are logically different) and also shows that concepts are not purely dispositional and dispositions or semi-dispositions cannot replace 'mind'.

Ryle while criticising consciousness as an intimately mind-related concept, tries to identify consciousness or one's awareness with his behaviour and thus finds "Not-worlds but one world; not a ghost, but a body; (people are not) occult but obvious"<sup>19</sup>. That consciousness is private and not something that can be publicly observed is essentially a common man's as well as a philosopher's view. One's being aware of a particular object in his surrounding, remains private to that person, unless he makes a statement or expresses his awareness of the object in some way, others do not know it. Consciousness is obvious, a natural fact, a pre-condition that we do not refer to it in our conversation as there is no such need.

Ryle's attempt of replacing consciousness by dispositions, results in absurd consequences. Thus, as he maintains there are dispositions and body behaves according to these dispositions. Thus the idea that an intelligent man's body is disposed to behave intelligently under certain conditions, without that man's being conscious of his intelligent doings, is absurd and unacceptable. Thus in case of 'creative people' they cannot be held responsible for their 'creations' but the credit of creating will go to their dispositions.

D. M. Armstrong analyses Ryle's example of brittleness in

glass, that is when the glass is lightly struck it breaks because it is brittle. Brittleness for Ryle would not be the cause of breaking of the glass, rather it is the disposition in glass. And dispositions are manifested in 'if conditions'. When the same thing is applied to mental processes like thinking, according to Ryle's account then, if there is any thinking going on then it should lead to actions. If it does not, then it amounts to saying that, that man was not 'thinking'. Armstrong finds the logical behaviourism of Ryle unsatisfactory as a theory of mind. As he points out: "when I think but my thoughts do not issue in any action, it seems as obvious as anything is obvious that there is something actually going on in me that constitutes my thought. It is not simply that I would speak or act if some conditions that are unfulfilled were to be fulfilled. Something is currently going on, in the strongest and most literal sense of "going on", and this something is my thought. Rylean Behaviourism denies this, and so it is unsatisfactory as a theory of mind. Yet I know of no version of Behaviourism that is more satisfactory" .

Treating every mental concept as a disposition to behave (bodily overt behaviour) Ryle has identified mental concepts with bodily behaviour. Armstrong goes for a programme of giving a complete "physico-chemical" <sup>21</sup> account of man, i.e., of physical and mental processes. He attacks Ryle's above position in the following: "Behaviourism is a profoundly unnatural account of mental processes. If somebody speaks and acts in certain ways, it is natural to speak of this speech and action as the expression of his thought. It is not at all natural to speak of his speech

and action as identical with his thought. We naturally think of thought as something quite distinct from the speech and action that, under suitable circumstances, brings the speech and action about. Thoughts are not to be identified with behaviour, we think; they lie ~~down~~<sup>22</sup> behind behaviour". Armstrong in turn thinks that 'mind' is the 'inner cause' of any behaviour.

Ryle perceives dualism as committing a category-mistake which consists in replacing a causal hypothesis in place of functional description. The mental terminology, in fact is used to describe the way we behave or perform, but is misunderstood as describing the performances as if they are the effects of mind and mental processes. This is what Ryle sets to refute in his book the Concept of Mind. He puts forth the theory of dispositions, which he thinks can account for all mental happenings. Well, this itself can be considered as a mistake, an ignoratio elenchi. For it appears that he has misread the nature of mental happenings. He terms all mental conduct statements as 'dispositional' and 'semi-dispositional' statements. As he defines it (disposition), it is a tendency to behave in a certain way when placed under a particular situation, that is our behaviour depends on the 'under-if' conditions. But one may observe that it is not only difficult but also impossible for one to know all the possible 'under-if' conditions and perhaps this is because of the nature of the mental happenings itself that they refuse to be reduced to 'dispositions'. Again Ryle's introduction of 'semi-dispositional' or 'mongrel categorical' statements, which are part episodic and part hypothetical, raised doubts about the success of his theory of dispositions. Moreover,

Ryle says that dualism ignores this (semi-hypothetical) nature of statements about mind and treats them as categorical. According to Ryle, a categorical statement can be distinguished from a hypothetical one, in the sense that the former is stating a fact while the latter is not. Albert Hofstadter observes Ryle as using the word 'fact' in a peculiar way. He says that one can find, in this world, hypothetical statements stating facts. For example, one can say that "it is a fact that water freezes at 0 degree centigrade at normal pressure", which may be an "experimental fact"<sup>23</sup>. This shows that Ryle wants to restrict the use of the word "to a very small portion of what would ordinarily be said to be the case"<sup>24</sup>.

It is still puzzling, as to what sort of things can be termed as facts. Taking Ryle's example of 'John Doe is speaking French'<sup>25</sup>, he considers as a factual report and it is a 'semi-dispositional' statement. It may be formulated in the following way: "for all x, if x understands French and x is listening carefully to John Doe, then it is highly probable that x understands what John Doe is saying"<sup>26</sup>. This way of formulation shows that there is no pure categorical statement apart from Ryle's 'mongrel-categorical' sense and hence the above mentioned distinction between a hypothetical and a categorical statement with reference to 'fact' cannot be maintained. But Ryle maintains that hypothetical statements do not state facts. Hofstadter therefore says that it is a sign of nominalism.

Albert Hofstadter explains systematically how a historical account of the origin of the dualistic category-mistake is given

by Ryle : "(i) People know how to apply mental conduct concepts. They know how to distinguish intelligent from unintelligent behaviour, good from bad arithmetic, politic from impolitic conduct, fertile from infertile imagination, before they develop any theories about how the distinctions are made. That is, they already know how to distinguish an intelligent performance from others, and how to distinguish it as intelligent, simply by reference to the overt characteristics of performances and the dispositional and semi-dispositional characteristics of persons.

(ii) For some reasons or other (theological, philosophical, etc.) the theorist wants to understand the distinction between mental and non-mental behaviour. He already knows, together with others, how to distinguish the one from the other. What he wishes to know now is the nature of the distinction.

(iii) In attempting to solve this problem, he supposes (and here is where he trips) that the distinction is a causal one. Mental conduct differs from non-mental conduct in that the former is caused by a different kind of things than the latter. Intelligent behaviour is caused by the operation of an intellect within the person, and this is what makes the behaviour intelligent.

(iv) The mistake consists in looking for a causal differentiation between intelligent and non-intelligent, emotional and non-emotional, etc. behaviour. We already have the differentia in the behaviour and dispositions and semi-dispositions, referred to, and we need only analyze our language to find it"<sup>27</sup> .

According to Ryle, they are the same reasons mentioned above which forced Descartes to save religious and moral lives of men

from 'mechanistic' approach of 17th century.

Ryle's historical account offers nothing as evidence for such a category mistake as dualism. It only gives information about the confusion with reference to a criteria to distinguish between the intelligent and non-intelligent behaviour where (people) take a cause, which serves as the criteria. It is not to distinguish between the intelligent and non-intelligent behaviour. The mental terminologies were introduced, but to explain the same, a principle called 'mind' or soul was pre-supposed. A human being's behaviour differs from that of a stone. By using Ryle's terminology one can ask, 'how can we explain the fact that whatever dispositions and semi-dispositions human being has, a stone cannot share?'

Hofstadter says that dualists are more bothered about giving a theory explaining the basis of such a distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent behaviour. The question, 'how do we differentiate intelligent from non-intelligent behaviour?' refers to the logic of the language, to the logical analysis of the words used in the language.

Every problem in philosophy cannot be solved by logical analysis, as Ryle does in Concept of Mind. Ryle is of the opinion that, there is nothing else in philosophy save, 'logical analysis' and hence any philosophical problem is that of logical analysis. Hofstadter says that Ryle perceives logic where it is not really there and therefore, one may say that he is committing a category-mistake.

It is of utmost importance that any philosophical idea which

prevails should be subjected to severe re-examination. it is not only the case that, the search and re-examination should be of the idea and its basis, but also it is important that, while re-examining one should not deviate from the heart of the subject. Dickinson S. Miller observes that Ryle's pitiless re-examination of concept of mind (as an entity) and mind associated other concepts like consciousness, not only shows such a deviation, but also that his arguments are irrelevant to the conclusions he draws. With regard to consciousness he should have considered the facts that force us to have this concept of consciousness. In other words the re-examination of its grounds should have been done. But Ryle does not consider this important, as according to him it is not necessary to question the basis of familiar facts. Therefore, the irrelevant discussion may be taken as not proving his point.

Ryle compares 'mind' with a 'ghost'. But the analogy itself is defective. As D. S. Miller shows: "A ghost is something that appears, however nebulous it may be and however likely to evoke the exclamation, "Whence and what art thou, questionable shape"?<sup>28</sup> Another name for it is an apparition". The meaning of 'ghost' as we understand is folklore and other types of literature, as a nebulous body and not as 'mind'. Further the ghost appears, whereas consciousness and mind does not 'appear' like a ghost.

According to D.S. Miller, "consciousness is a field of appearance. It is the condition, for each one of us, of having any world at all"<sup>29</sup>.

Further, he points out that, "the privacy - that is, the fact that another person can not perceive it" --- (it refers to a

person's conscious vision of others) --- "extends to a man's thoughts, imaginations, emotions, sensations and will. This does not mean, of course ..., that we do not often use these words or the like of bodily behaviour that can be observed; it means that a man's own side of all this, his own experience of it, can not be observed" <sup>30</sup>. Ryle uses the word ghostly in the sense that it is mysterious and elusive. D.S. Miller maintains that, unlike a ghost "the content of the field of consciousness, however, is the least ghostly thing in the world of thought, for it reveals its true and whole nature in the very fact of its existence, it has no claim to existence as content of that field except precisely in so far as it does appear. As present in that field it is exactly what it appears to be. Consciousness is the one realm where appearance and reality coincide" <sup>31</sup>.

Consciousness itself is not an action, it is a field of appearance. Still more it is not an event. An event is something happening, or taking place, coming to an end or changing. An event is not something concrete by itself. Something concrete must exist so that 'in that' event take place. In other words field of consciousness must exist and then there is the appearing, disappearing, 'changing of qualia, concrete qualia, colours, sounds, tastes, bodily sensations, etc. the concrete appearances of our experience" <sup>32</sup>.

Ryle attacks consciousness denying the claim that it is through consciousness we are aware of our mental life. Ryle says, if that were the case, then nothing would have remained hidden to each one in each one's case. But it may be pointed out against

Ryle, that negatively it shows, that there is something which remains hidden and if it is not accessible through consciousness then certainly not through our behaviour, as it is public. If consciously experienced mental processes, are not able to reveal the 'hidden' how can our outward behaviour expose the mental?

One may observe that the criticism implied in the ghost metaphor does not hit the target. The metaphor may be taken as misdescribing and misrepresenting dualism.

Most of the people consider a belief in the ghost as a superstition. Thus Ryle's intention here is to show mind as mythical and a superstition, like a ghost. H.P. Rickman in his paper, "exorcising the ghost in the machine" points out that "members of some primitive tribes, believe that minds and soul are ghosts or ghost like, though some people still believe that souls can 'materialise' as ghosts ... ghosts can be seen, heard, felt and smelled. They can move objects and throw things about. They are material manifestations though the matter of which they consist is rather thin"<sup>33</sup>. In other words it may be taken as suggesting that 'mind' itself is a thin matter animating and controlling the matter constituting our bodies.

If it is interpreted in this way, then it is not a mind-body dualism. In turn it may be described as "two-tier materialism"<sup>34</sup>. Modern behaviourists consider only the content of sense impressions as the only thing that has any epistemological value. And then finding themselves in a situation from which, the escape they see in this 'two-tier materialism'. Observing, that the 'overt behaviour' is not self explanatory and it fails to give a coherent and intelligible account of all that is there

(especially with reference to mental experiences), modern behaviourists are forced to search for something (consisting of thin matter may be) and say that a machine is inside another machine. Then they perceive the 'ghostly behaviour' of the matter. This has reference to the movements of the brain-particles, fizzing of neurons in the brain, unobservable movements of the speech organs and so on - which according to them accounts for, our normal overt behaviour. Thus the behaviourists "as devoutly as ghost hunters in supposedly haunted houses or spiritualists round their ouija boards that this ghostly, material world, hidden behind or within the observable one, would also become observable if only we could look more closely" .

Dualism, as Ryle has criticised, Rickman says, does not represent 'dualism' in a serious sense. A dualistic theory according to Rickman makes sense, when there is the pre-supposition of two entities, distinct from each other, as in Cartesian dualism: "I am not something tenuously infused into that body; I am not a breath of air, not a flame, nor a vapour, nor breath itself, nothing of all that I can invent with my imagination" .

H.P. Rickman, while arguing for dualism says that there is sufficient evidence in the history of philosophy leading to a clean distinction between mind and matter. And a man need not be conceived as a machine haunted by a ghost. Mind and matter can be distinguished, mind is the subject and matter is the object of knowledge or cognition. The acts of feeling, perceiving and

desiring are all mental acts or subjective experiences corresponding to which there is something that is perceived, felt and desired. And this relation is irreversible. This can be seen from simple examples. One can perfectly say 'I perceive a billiard ball', and 'I like cake'. But to say 'billiard ball perceives me' or 'cake likes me' is absurd.

Ryle emphasises the distinction between simple or chance overt performances and overt intelligent performances. Performances are the workings of our mind, "... the styles and procedures of people's activities are the way their minds work ... overt intelligent performances are not ~~clear~~ <sup>37</sup> to the workings of minds; they are those workings". And in "judging that someone's performance is or is not intelligent we have ... to look beyond the performance itself... we are not trying to pry into some hidden counter part enacted on the supposed secret stage of the agent's inner life. We are considering his abilities and propensities of which this performance was an actualisation"<sup>38</sup>. For example, the hitting of the bull's eye by a professional marksman and by a novice, though are indetical as far as their occurrences are concerned, are dispositionally distinct. In other words professional marksman's hitting is skillful, directed, thoughtful action than the novice's action. Ryle by using several terms and their opposites like 'intelligent act', 'chance act' and along with other terms like 'heed', 'conscious', 'minding', and the opposites of these creates "terminological confusion"<sup>39</sup>. As Ryle says, an intelligent performance is the working of the mind, since it is 'directed action' and hence the performer is responsible for that action.

When we say A's action is intelligent rather than stupid, in order to judge the 'intelligent action' in this second sense, we should assume that it is intelligent in the first sense. The term 'intelligence' is used here as two different species of directed action. In other words, "his action must be, in our judgement, directed before it can be well directed. How he directs his action will determine what professor Ryle calls his "character of mind". Similarly the word "chance" may mean simply an undirected, "mechanical", action, or it may mean an unskillful directed action. The novice in Prof. Ryle's illustration who hits the bull's eye his first shot will certainly be said to do so "by chance", but his action will be no less a "working of mind",<sup>40</sup> however ill-directed". A similar treatment can be given to the terms 'minding' or paying some heed to what one was doing. Paying some heed means doing something carefully, that is one is not doing that mechanically. In other words it is directed action. The consequences of such an interpretation are as follows: The person who is paying some heed is prepared for various associated tasks and tests which might have cropped up and at the same time prepared for the task with which he actually coped, and that his actions were not simply directed but well directed. This unclarity as far as the terms are concerned and ambiguities as far as their usage are concerned, and the confusion that is created, is not only misleading but also perplexing to the readers. One may even go to his extent of saying that Concept of Mind gives a "constructive thesis, that of the explanation of mentality by the device of dispositions"<sup>41</sup>.

Even granting that a distinction that can be made between

'intelligent' and 'non-intelligent overt behaviour' by referring to one's dispositions, there is every possibility that the professional marksman may make a chance shot and the novice a skilled one. Thus whether a performance is a 'working of mind' or not, we can never know by referring to dispositions. And therefore, the dispositions are irrelevant in certain cases as that of a professional marksman and a novice. Thus Ryle's distinction between the terms may be said to be a play upon the words.

Ryle does not consider self-knowledge as private, something to which the person has got privileged access. There is nothing occult or mystical about self-knowledge. Once we know how a person is disposed to behave, we can frame law like propositions about his behaviour.

But Ryle forgets that in case of doubtful instances, as that of a professional marksman and a novice, the performer himself alone has a 'private access' to his ability and proneness - in short, the 'working of his mind'. And therefore he alone can tell whether his performance was a chance action or a result of working of mind.

Moreover, our overt actions only represent a small portion of the working of our mind. And there is the wealth of non-overt bodily activity, to which the performer alone has a 'private access', which may be revealed to the others through the method of introspection.

Ryle in the phrase 'knowing how' takes the word 'know' as a capacity verb and the phrase 'knowing how' as referring to skill,

in an operation. For example, 'one's knowing how to play chess', or 'knowing how a machine works', etc. is dispositional --- 'is an ability or proneness to do certain acts or things'<sup>42</sup>. But Ryle never makes clear the logical status of 'knowing that'. 'knowing that' refers to our knowledge of factual propositions. But one may notice that this distinction does not hold in the strict sense, in ordinary language, for instance, when Smith says 'I know how the accident took place'. Also the phrase 'knowing that' is used in ordinary language, not referring to any factual propositions, as in the case when we say 'Sita knows that she ought to speak the truth' or 'Sita knows that cheating is bad'.

Thus the distinction between the two phrases 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' may be observed as unstable says Jane Roland. Roland refers to John Hartland Swann's discussion of 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'. According to Hartland Swann every instance of 'knowing that' is an instance of 'knowing how' and therefore 'knowing that' statements can be reduced to 'knowing how' statements; i.e. "if we call the statement "Johnny knows that Columbus discovered America" dispositional, then it must be translatable into some such form as "Johnny knows how to answer the question 'who discovered America'? or 'what did Columbus discover'?"<sup>43</sup> correctly". However, the reduction is possible, provided the 'dispositional analysis of "know" is given up.

Ryle in Concept of Mind builds a theory of mind by inquiring into the logical behaviour of words, in sentences containing mental concepts. His attempt is to reduce these mental concepts to dispositions. A disposition, according to Ryle, is the

tendency to behave. Therefore, mind and other mental concepts according to Ryle, can be analysed and explained in terms of dispositions which are manifested in overt behaviour. In his dispositional behaviourism, Ryle, through a conceptual analysis rejects ontological existence of mind.

#### NOTES

1. Morris Weitz like Malcolm calls Ryle a logical behaviourist. Ryle through out his book Concept of Mind inquires "into the logical character of certain model sentences containing imagination, perception, though, emotion, etc., words and concepts". Behaviourism because, it has the implication that every description of human beings, containing mental terms, may be replaced by a purely physical description --- that is, a description containing no mental terms. It holds that physical side as being the more fundamental and the mental side as derivative. Morris Weitz, "Professor Ryle's Logical Behaviourism", Journal of Philosophy, vol. XLVIII, No.9, 1951, p.297.
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21. Ibid., p.1.
22. Ibid., p.7.
23. Albert Hofstadter, "Professor Ryle's Category - Mistake", Journal of Philosophy, vol. XLVIII, No.9, 1951, p.265.
24. Ibid.
25. G. Ryle, op. cit., pp. 124-125.
26. Albert Hofstadter, "Professor Ryle's Category - Mistake", Journal of Philosophy, vol. XLVIII, No.9, 1951, p.266.
27. Ibid., pp.261-266.
28. Dickinson S. Miller, "'Descartes Myth' And Prof. Ryle's Fallacy", Journal of Philosophy, vol. XLVIII, No.9, 1951, p.273.
29. Ibid., p.271.
30. Ibid., pp.271-272.
31. Ibid., p.274.
32. Ibid., p.276.

33. H. P. Rickman, "Exorcising the Ghost in the Machine", Philosophy, Vol.63, No.246, 1988, p.491.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., p.492.
36. R. Descartes - 'Discourse on Method' and other writings, trans. by A. Wollaston, London: Penguin, 1960, pp.110-111.
37. G. Ryle, op. cit., p.58.
38. Ibid., p.45.
39. Hume R. King, "Professor Ryle and the Concept of Mind", Journal of Philosophy, vol.XLVIII, No.9, 1951, p.283.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., pp.283-284.
42. G.D. Jha, op. cit., p.8.
43. Jane Roland, "on 'Knowing How' And 'Knowing That'", The Philosophical Review, vol.LXVII, 1958, p.381.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE PHYSICAL-MENTAL IDENTITY

It is common knowledge today that an intimate relation exists between the brain processes and mental processes. Various attempts at exploring the working of the mind, in different sciences has resulted in various conflicting and disputable theories of mind. The last three decades has seen immense increase in literature concerning mind-body relations. The spurt in literature is dual - on the one hand there have been rather successful findings of neuro-physiologists reported in science journals, and on the other there have been new philosophical positions developed both based on and independently of neuro-physiological findings.

To begin with, it was behaviourism as a psychological theory founded by Watson which influenced philosophers like Gilbert Ryle and R. Carnap. They developed the metaphysical behaviourism also called as logical or analytic behaviourism. In this logical behaviourism it is contended that all mental processes are analysable in terms of statements about overt behaviour. Dispositions were assigned the causal role to bring about the particular behaviour under particular conditions.

U.T. Place thinks that this 'dispositional analysis' can be applied to cognitive and volitional concepts but it cannot be applied to other mental processes such as experiencing, sensation, consciousness and so forth. In Place's words: "In defending the thesis that consciousness is a process in the brain, I am not trying to argue that when we describe our dreams,

fantasies and sensations we are talking about processes in our brains. That is, I am not claiming that statements about sensations and mental images are reducible to or analysable into statements about brain cases, in the way in which 'cognition statements' are analysable into statements about behaviour"<sup>1</sup>.

Most of the recent literature on Identity Theory takes off from three celebrated works: U. T. Place's "is consciousness a Brain process?" --- Herbert Feigl's "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'" and J.J.C. Smart's "Sensations and Brain Processes".

One label seems to be appropriate to the three writers, namely they are scientific realists<sup>2</sup>. They are realists because they assume that physical world exists extra-mental. They are scientific realists because they accept that the most acceptable account of the world is one given by contemporary natural science whose creditability lies in its success. Smart's realist presuppositions are such that they accepted the contention that "concepts and law-statements of physics, or, at any rate, the concepts and law-statements of hypothetically completed physics, suffice, in principle at least, to give an account of all natural phenomena"<sup>3</sup>. And biology, Smart believed, does not require anything more than complex physical systems to explain its workings, and consequently the workings of human organisms. U. T. Place and H. Feigl although did not go so far as Smart, they still had as their presuppositions the understanding of science as "normal science"<sup>4</sup>.

These three philosophers were attracted to the behaviourist thesis as an explanation of nature of mind<sup>5</sup>. These authors found the behaviourist thesis very attractive in the sense that the

mind is nothing but behaviour in certain sophisticated ways. There are no inner thought processes prior to behaviour. If such is the case, then it is possible to give a physicalist account of — human beings and their actions.

One notices however, certain reservation on the part of Place and Feigl. Place finds 'intractable residue of concepts'<sup>6</sup> and Feigl observes 'raw feels'<sup>7</sup> which cannot be reduced to behaviouristic account of mind.

The identity theory can be stated as that which holds and seeks an identity between brain processes and mental processes. There is no correlation between the two above mentioned processes according to J.J.C. Smart. Smart maintains that, "that these should be correlated with brain processes does not help, for to say that they are correlated is to say that they are something 'over and above'<sup>8</sup>".

As mentioned earlier U.T. Place in his article "Is consciousness a brain process?" contends that consciousness is a process in the brain, but denies that "statements about consciousness are statements about brain processes"<sup>9</sup>. First, because a person's sensations and mental imageries can be described by that person without even knowing what brain or a brain process is. Secondly, the verifying methods of the statements about conscious experiences and of those about brain processes, are different. Lastly, Place holds that, there is no self-contradiction involved in saying that one's being in pain but there being no corresponding brain events taking place.

Place argues for his statement that consciousness is a

brain-process as a 'reasonable scientific hypothesis'. He asserts an identity between consciousness and brain processes. For example, a cloud on closer observation is seen as composed of tiny particles of water droplets. From a distance we call the 'mass of tiny particles' a cloud. But there are no two things. When we are enveloped in a cloud - we are able to observe the 'micro-structure' of a cloud - an experience that is different from - when we look at a cloud from a distance and hence its description in different words. But in this example there is the continuity between observation of cloud and observation of tiny particles and therefore the statement is easily intelligible. Whereas in case of a brain-process and consciousness there is no such continuous observation. That is, an introspective report can never reveal the brain processes going on in the brain while one has a conscious experience.

Place's strong argument for an identity between brain processes and consciousness depends upon the analysis of similarities and dissimilarities between lightening and motion of electrical charges. That lightening and motion of electrical charges is same, but statements about lightening do not mean the same as the statements about electrical charge. We are able only to observe the lightening, but not the electrical charges. Place, says that, "as in the case of consciousness, however closely we scrutinise, the lightening, we shall never be able to observe the electric charges, and just as the operations for determining the nature of one's state of consciousness are radically different from those involved in determining the nature of one's brain processes, so the operations for determining the occurrence

of lightening are radically different from those involved in determining the occurrence of a motion of electric charges" <sup>11</sup> .

Yet the two events are observed as identical not merely because of their systematic correlations but because of the capacity of 'technical scientific observations' to explain the common man's observation of the same event. In the case of 'lightening' example there is the motion of electrical charges, leading to the lightening which a common man reports as a sort of visual stimulation in the form of a flash of lightening. Place points out that similar is the case of relation between statements about sensations and statements about brain-processes. Therefore, a behaviouristic account of sensations may not be correct, but a physicalist account can still be attempted.

But this programme of identifying brain-processes with conscious experiences is threatened by 'phenomenological fallacy'. The fallacy that is committed while describing an object's properties as literal in one's 'phenomenal field' <sup>12</sup> . The description of object's properties depends on our being conscious of that object. What we are describing in fact are our conscious experiences with regard to that object and based on their phenomenal properties we infer their real properties. 'Phenomenological fallacy' leads to believing in an entity that does not have existence either in the known world of physics or in the brain of the person who has that experience. There are no 'after-images', there are only experiences-as-of-imaging-something-green. And these experiences are, according to place, identical with brain processes.

It was J.J.C. Smart's article "Sensations and Brain Processes" that was greatly responsible for putting the newly formed identity theory on a firm footing on the philosophical map. Smart tries to overcome some of the defects in Place's views and argues for an identity between sensations and brain processes, on the basis of scientific facts and knowledge that shows human being as merely 'physico-chemical mechanisms'.

Reacting to the 'phenomenological fallacy' with reference to after images smart further developed it into a theory. When someone reports 'I have a yellowish-orange-after-image' it is commonly believed that, the report contains something which is 'irreducibly psychical'<sup>13</sup>. To mention them they are our sensations and states of consciousness. To allow sensations as having an irreducible psychical nature, is to place them beyond a physicalist account and thus sensation would become then 'nomological danglers'<sup>14</sup>. Therefore, Smart maintained that sensations must be treated as brain processes of a certain sort. Thus, sensations are identified with brain processes.

Smart argues, "it is that in so far as 'after-image' or 'ache' is a report of a process, happens to be a brain process. It follows that the thesis does not claim that sensation statements can be translated into statements about brain processes. Nor does it claim that the logic of a sensation statement is the same as that of a brain-process statement. All it claims is that in so far as a sensation statement is a report of something is in fact a brain-process"<sup>15</sup>. A nation is not something over and above its citizens. Yet the logic of nation statements is different from that of citizen statements. Though

the two set of statements logically are different, Smart says, that it does not imply a nation is over and above its citizens.

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A 'strict identity' is sought between sensations and brain processes. That is, sensations are not 'somehow spatially or temporally continuous' with the brain-processes. A person not knowing anything about brain-processes, but reporting his sensations of an object does not pose any difficulty to the identity-theory. As in the case of lightening, the person only knows 'lightening' as a flash of light that causes the visual stimulation, but may not know anything about electrical discharge.

U. T. Place speaks of experience which are contingent matter of fact whereas Smart claims his is a topic-neutral, in the sense that, he talks of something which is described in terms of sort of stimulus. In reply to an objection Smart clarifies, that when a person reports, 'I see a yellowish-orange-after-image' he is saying something like this: "there is something going on which is like what is going on when I have my eyes open, am awake, and there is an orange illuminated in good light in front of me, that is, when I really see an orange" .

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Smart emphasises the words 'there is something going on which is like what is going on when', to show that the report about one's sensations can be neutral. Smart asserts that after-image, in itself is not a brain process, rather the process by which we have an after-image is a brain-process.

The third person, namely, Herbert Feigl, helped the development of identity-theory although not to the same extent as

Smart and Place. He accuses neo-behaviourists and radical materialists for evading the mind-body problem and not offering a genuine solution for the same. He finds that, "epiphenomenalism, while not evading the problem offers a very queer solution"<sup>18</sup>. Again, 'person' as defined by Strawson in his meta-physical essay, seems to Feigl as synthetic coming together of a living body and occurrence of mental states in it.

However, Feigl finds the scientific task of identifying the 'raw feels' and other mental processes with the brain events, as the most plausible view. The reports of the experiments conducted by W. Kohler, W. Penfield, E.D. Adrian, D.O. Hebb, W.S. McCulloch, strengthened the correlation between the mental and the physical favouring the development of identity theory. Feigl argues for the identity theory by saying that, "the solution that appears most plausible to me, and that is entirely consistent with a thorough going naturalism is an identity theory of the mental and the physical, as follows: certain neurophysiological terms denote (refer to) the very events that are also denoted (referred to) by certain phenomenal terms. The identification of the objects of this two-fold reference is of course logically contingent, although it constitutes a very fundamental feature of our world as we have come to conceive it in the modern scientific outlook utilising Frege's distinction between sinn ('meaning', sense, 'intention') and Bedeutung ('referent', denotatum, 'extension'). We may say that neurophysiological terms and the corresponding phenomenal terms, though widely differing in sense, and hence in the modes of confirmation of statements containing them to have identical referents ..."<sup>19</sup>.

Going a step further Feigl tries to give some definite properties to his 'raw feels', as a result according to Place, Feigl comes close to committing the 'phenomenological fallacy' — and therefore finds it difficult to show that there is no distinction between the properties of 'raw feels' and their 'neurological basis'.

On the basis of the above three fold philosophical foundations we can understand the latter developments as reaction to the same. D.K. Lewis and D.M. Armstrong seem to be further developing Smart's initial articulations of identity theory.

Lewis and Armstrong identify sensation and mental states with brain processes. They used Gilbert Ryle's theory of disposition to distinguish between mental state and outward behaviour. They propose a causal analysis of mental concepts. It is suggested that a logical analysis can be given of all the mental concepts in purely physical terms. The concept of 'brittleness' is taken as a model for proposed analysis. Being brittle means, the objects being in a particular state, such that if struck sharply, it will break. That is, the state of the object and the striking brings about the shattering of the object. Thus 'brittleness' occupies the causal role. The concrete nature of the state cannot be explained properly only from its definition but by further scientific research.

The example given is that of a gene. A gene is held to be responsible for certain hereditary characteristics, that it brings about. It is the latter scientific research, which illustrated the gen as DNA mole-cules,

According to this view, all the mental concepts are of the same sort as that of 'brittleness' and 'gene'. Just as a gene, as a cause, produces hereditary characteristics in the same fashion, a mental process can be assigned a causal role which brings about the physical behaviour, for example, the 'purpose', a mental state in the organism, which causes certain physical activities in the organism, which in turn brings about an event.

Lewis says that mental states are given to us in consciousness as occupants of causal role, that is, sensation plays a passive role to bring out certain sorts of behaviour. There are various types of causal role corresponding to different sorts of mental states. The different causal roles which constitute different mental states are of an interlocking type, such that it is not possible to give an account of one type without giving an account of the others and vice-versa.

Since the nature of that which plays the causal role, cannot be defined in this causal analysis, the materialists can maintain that these mental states are to be identified with the physical processes going on in central nervous system.

Armstrong reacts strongly to the problem of secondary qualities particularly Smart's subjectivist account. Armstrong proposes an objectivist account (on the basis of above models of 'brittleness' and 'gene') of sensations wherein he claims that colours, tastes, smells, etc. are qualities of physical objects identifiable when the findings of scientific investigations were correlated. For instance, he claims that heat (perceived or felt) was identified with the motion of molecules of the hot object. He further claimed that complex properties of

object may cognitively appear simply out of the "gestalt  
20  
character" .

A sharp distinction between man and the rest of nature can be made as man has a highly developed capacity for thought, feeling and deliberate action. In a limited sense the above processes may be found in animals but the full blown development of what we name as 'mind' remains unmatched. These unmatched mental processes, in the Identity theory, are identified with the states of central nervous system. This theory maintains that when a person has a particular experience, corresponding to this, a particular brain-state or process takes place in the brain in the similar way in which lightening is an electrical discharge. The so-claimed identity between the two distinct processes - the mental and the physical - is based on the empirical research. This research shows a great dependence of mental processes on brain-functioning. But the identity theory's position that there is a perfect correlation between a person's experience and corresponding brain event goes beyond the evidence provided by empirical research.

The identity theory thesis has been criticised severely by many philosophers: particularly J.J.C. Smart's and D.M. Armstrong's positions have been critically analysed by modern analytic and non-analytic thinkers. It must be admitted that the adherents of identity theory - U.T. Place, J.J.C. Smart, Herbert Feigl, D.M. Armstrong and others have influenced latter philosophers including Richard Rorty. They have also influenced empirical research in the area.

By using the analogy of 'Morning star' and 'Evening star' Stevenson shows that, if the two stars are strictly identical with each other then we should be permitted to say that evening star appears in the morning and vice-versa. Moreover, evening star should have all the properties, including defining properties of the morning star.

The same should be true about the strict identity between sensations and brain-processes. But the present evidence falls short of supporting this type of identity. That is, the exact correspondence between the two still remains to be shown, that from observation of a person's brain-states, one will arrive at the knowledge of his experiences.

Although sensations are not synonymous with brain-processes - they refer to the very same properties, - what brain processes are referring to, Stevenson points out that, by seeking a strict identity between the two, the problem of nomological danglers has not been solved, for the sensations retain their properties, as identified with the properties of brain-processes. Further a psycho-physical law which states that a sensation occurs, when a certain brain-process takes place; the same (law) can be modified in this theory, saying that "a brain-process has P-Properties if and only if it has certain M-Properties"<sup>21</sup>. But there remains the problem of finding out which brain-processes are to be termed as sensations and consequently a psycho-physical law in the form of "whenever such-and-such a brain process occurs, there is a sensation"<sup>22</sup>.

It is maintained that sensations are identical with brain-processes. In order that they should be identical, both of them

should share some common properties. Now if sensations are denied - indirectly it results into the denial of brain-processes --- as the sensation properties are properties of the brain-processes.

Smart while replying to the objections raised by Stevenson, admits that the sensation reports are topic-neutral and they are neither materialistic nor dualistic - but sensations have neuro-physiological features. Inability to specify the neuro-physiological properties, points out the 'jump' that the identity theorists take from insufficient evidence to the identity between material and mental. Objections have been raised against the theory on the similar lines by Roland Puccetti who calls it 'a materialist fallacy of mind'<sup>23</sup>. According to Puccetti, our mental states can always be distinguished from physico-chemical processes going on in our brain. While commenting on the 'central state materialism' of D.M. Armstrong he says that although Armstrong's theory is consistent with scientific research, it has to face certain logical consequences as the identity maintained between the mental and the physical, cannot be accounted for. Giving an instance of an imagined experiment conducted on three people wherein, there certain neural areas were stimulated. By looking at the screen, the pictures of the stimulated nerves and other cells, each one should be able to tell correctly, what states (mental states, different sensations, etc.) would be experienced irrespective of the stimulation of a particular nerve centre in anybody's brain of the three people', as they have 'equal observational access' to the pictures on the screen.

The aim of the argument here, is to show that there is a

strong disparity between what the neuro-anatomist observes on the screen and the experiences about sensations, reported by the person whose neural areas are stimulated. Puccetti firmly believes that irrespective of advanced scientific research and knowledge, the distinction between the mental and the physical will remain.

Leslie Stevenson replies to the objections raised by Puccetti referring to the experiment on three people. He says, that each one had an introspective access to their own states and this can be allowed, because the central state materialism does not deny the existence of introspective awareness of mental states that is in the theory of brain-states. However, Leslie Stevenson casts doubt on the materialist account of introspection as given by Armstrong. Leslie Stevenson's reply appears to be unsatisfactory because he is casting doubt on the identity theory while at the same time he relies on it to reply to the objections raised by Puccetti.

An argument based on mental structure is put forth by J.J. Clarke to maintain the distinction between 'mind' as an integrated whole and 'brain' physically functioning organ, like a machine. Multiple thoughts, feelings, experiences go to make up a person's mental life. Although individual perceptions and experience (one perception and experience from the other) are distinguishable, they are only episodes in one integrated whole.

Thus J.J. Clarke objects to the ground on which identity is claimed by D'Weissman a supporter of identity theory. D'weissman maintains that just as by the physical change we mean a change in its structure, the mental activities (where mind is considered as

a pure act) imply a structure where activities are taking place. Further, a change is the organisation of matter in some specific way, in the same fashion mental activities are based on, or depend upon the specific material organisation and that this 'material' is identified with physical.

Although it is true that activity pre-supposes structure, it is not true in case of mind in the above mentioned sense according to Clarke. He distinguishes between formal, social and aesthetic structures. The operations in mathematics, as of giving a geometrical proof - are based on a certain system of propositions whereas in case of a car's moving, it is based on its physical parts, the way it is made up. Thus, Clarke distinguishes between a formal structure and a physical structure, and argues for an analogy between human mind and mental structure; saying "Structures of the formal rather than the physical kind provide the most appropriate analogies of the human mind that, to put it bluntly, mental operations are more akin to formal structures such as mathematics than to physical ones such as motor cars"<sup>24</sup> .

He further states that, to identify a particular colour the person must have come across 'a conceptual scheme'<sup>25</sup> against which the identification is possible. The same thing can be applied to mental processes like cogitating, reflecting where person grows physically but not mentally, his thought would not make any sense, as there is no prior background to it to make it meaningful. Therefore the operations going on in mental structure are like the ones in formal structure and therefore it resembles

the formal structure and differs from physical structure.

W. Keneale points out that, in his work 'A Materialist Theory of the Mind' Armstrong is influenced by the Place-Smart view. Still he objects to it on the ground that they have paid little attention to the analysis of the mind.

Keneale remarks that Armstrong's theory cannot be a right one for following reason : "for those who say 'the mental is the cerebral' do not maintain the identity of an individual presented for consideration under two different descriptions, but talk of kinds of things, events or states"<sup>26</sup> .

Again, central state materialists claim the intelligibility of mental without showing which things or processes are mental. They also hold that mental states are, "given solely as states apt for the production of bodily behaviour"<sup>27</sup> . Further, the identity between the mental and the physical, is treated as contingent and can only be understood through the scientific reasearches that is, in the neuro-physiological studies. In connection with this William Kneale comments that, they (central state materialists) can be questioned as far as their using philosophical terminologies like 'contigent' and 'empirical' are concerned. All sorts of misunderstanding with regard to this theory can be attributed to its advocates as they ignored the need of logically examining their thesis of identity and their failure to give a philosophical programme where the meaning of the mental 'must mean' what it means if the so-claimed contigent identity is to be taken seriously. Mental states are assigned the causal roles in the identity theory without giving an account of their intrinsic nature which is necessary since we experience

them directly.

Mental processes are considered as important because of their role as intermediaries in the causal sequence that is, between a stimulus and a response. A lack of further knowledge about them, forces the materialists to postulate them as 'topic-neutral'. Thus they make the way clear for the identification of the mental processes with the processes in central nervous system.

Armstrong tries to distinguish his theory from 'Two Aspects Theory' on the one hand, and Behaviourism on the other. Thus he finds the complete reduction to behaviour as incorrect and leaves it open that mental phenomena that is, the "topic-neutral analysis makes the disembodied existence of mental states logically possible. But his assertion that mental phenomena should not have disembodied existence, shows his inconsistency in the position and inability to give a complete description of the mental in physical terms.

Armstrong names his position 'realistic reductionism' which is more persuasive than 'behaviouristic reductionism' of J.J.C. Smart. To explain the difficulty with regard to secondary qualities adopting the similar method, as used to explain the mental states he "analyses them as states possessing certain external, causal properties, but whose intrinsic nature is left unspecified by this identification"<sup>28</sup>. Even if materialistic account is true in some sense, "it will not be automatically expressible in the frame work of common sense psychology"<sup>29</sup> and even that some of the data, presently available discourages such

a hope, for example, the fundamental left-right bifurcation of cerebral function, to which nothing in the common sense psychology of perception and action corresponds.

The analogy between materialism and gene as DNA molecules is not a correct one. The latter is an exact scientific theory to serve the molecular biology. Contrary to this, common sense psychology, with beliefs, desires, sensations is not a scientific theory in the same sense because the mental states as causes "are picked out by a system which has evolved naturally, and whose form may depend significantly on its extra-scientific functions"<sup>30</sup> .

An objection may be raised with regard to the status of mental states as occupants of causal roles. Armstrong had initially stated that his aim was to do justice to these states but latter he takes the same as "rough indications" of the physical phenomena to which they are related.

Materialism denies facts such as mental experiences and after-images, which normally is accepted as what really takes place. Hence, a materialistic theory is not correct in spite of strong arguments that may be advanced in favour of this theory. Just as an unconscious person is not aware of anything, in the similar way a materialist while giving a materialist account of the mental experiences, sensations, etc., must pretend to be anaesthetised. As Broad points out, if one is conscious he would comment that the theory is false.

Don Locke defends materialism and replies to the above objection. We all know, that when we have a conscious experience, what goes on in our minds. Although we cannot explain its nature,

it is not the 'electrical discharge' in neurons, as far as our experience is concerned. Broad's view is mistaken, for it is not necessary to know what conscious experience is, in order to be conscious of something.

None the less, the major criticism against the theory that has been advanced by different philosophers is with regard to the different categories. Mind belongs to one category while body to some other category and the resulting problem of relation between the two. The problem may be formulated in Colin McGinn's language: "Intuitively, the problem is that the characteristic and definitive features of the brain are different in kind (in category) from those of the mind - the former being intrinsic the latter extrinsic. This is also what prevents us identifying representational mental states with intrinsic brain states: these mental states are not, as brain states literally are, situated within the head" .

McGinn believes that bodies or objects external to a person are also responsible in constituting mental states, whereas one's physical states are not constituted in the similar way. Therefore an identity between the mental phenomenon and internal physical phenomenon is just impossible.

Much confusion has been created by the name of the theory itself, as 'Identity theory'. An 'identity' can be sought between two events or two things. For that, two objects should be first picked out independent of each other and then only the identification of one with the other is possible depending on the properties of the two. As the name 'identity theory' suggest that

an identity is sought between the mind and brain. In other words it means that materialist accepts that there are things what we name as mental states and something called brain-state and on closer examination we find, that these two different states refer to the same thing. But any talk about mental states shows that they are different from brain-states. And therefore they have different features and can be identified. Then a materialist has to identify those states, first, independent of brain-states which may lead him into trouble.

Don Locke while defending materialism says that as opposed to Double Aspect theory materialism denied mental events with features, different from brain-events. Materialism is not asserting an identity between "two independently specifiable items", i.e., "... the Materialist does not identify minds with brain, in a way that we identify the Morning Star with Evening Star, he identifies mind as being brain, in the way that we can identify a particular plane as being a Boeing 707'<sup>32</sup> .

Don Locke, therefore insists that materialism should not be taken as identity theory - in the sense involving first finding out two items, which are independently specifiable - as is done in Double Aspect Theory but rather should be understood as an 'identification thesis' where there is "a further specification,<sup>33</sup> of a single specified item" .

This further development can be seen in the 'Disappearance view' by Richard Rorty and Paul Feyerabend which is not without defects.

However, Don Locke admits a major difficulty which materialism is facing, that is, of accounting for after-images,

dreams etc. The features exhibited in the above events neither can be located in the physical world, as they do not belong to the objects outside nor they can be found in our brains, as they are not brain features. According to Don Locke they have purely a mental existence when they are experienced and cannot be accounted for, materially, and therefore materialism faces a serious problem.

According to Jerome Shaffer, the contention of the identity theory can be doubted, for it does not meet the 'co-existence requirement'<sup>34</sup> which should be met, so that the identity is possible. In order to claim - 'an identity between C-states' and B-processes'<sup>35</sup> they should be located at the same place. But we do not find C-states and B-processes as located at the same place. B-processes occur in the brain whereas "it is not true that C-states also occur in the brain, or inside the body at all, for that matter. To be sure, I may have a pain in my leg or in my head, we do locate sensations in the body. But that is not to say that we give location to the state of consciousness that I have when I am having a sensation. The pain is in my leg, but it is not the case that my state of being-aware-of-a-pain-in-my-leg is also in my leg. Neither is it in my head"<sup>36</sup> .

Criticisms levelled against the identity theory show the non-correlation between the mental and the physical. It appears that the gap between the two is unbridgeable. Professor Ayer makes similar comment : "If what we are seeking is a bridge to cross a seemingly impassable river, it will not help us merely to elevate one of the banks"<sup>37</sup> .

A scientific explanation regarding mind body problem, is doubted since on these scientific hypothesis mental events and brain processes would require to be predicted as a sort of special events and therefore it will be unscientific account. Even though a perfect isomorphism is established between our brain-states and mental processes, considering that the person concerned on whom the experiment may be conducted may be a neuro-anatomist, who has to confirm the occurring of particular mental states when certain centres are stimulated in his brain, and therefore the success will be essentially based on a private report. This shows that any number of researches done to explore mental in terms of physical will not confirm the identity between the mind and the brain. Puccetti maintains that, "what I mean is that our experience of uniquely private mental events is a fundamental fact of human life (and, apparently, of some other Earth-bound forms of animal life). To ask how or why, this is so, <sup>38</sup> seems to me an entirely vain question" .

The characteristic principle of all materialists and physicalist, is that they uphold the principle that the world is self-contained or causally closed. But in their reductionist programme they face the difficulties as far as 'intractable residue of concepts' and 'raw feels' are concerned. In other words experience, sensation, and mental imagery in terms of inner processes, they find as irreducible. Herbert Feigl insists in his theory of 'psycho-physical' identity that not only mental processes are real but that they are things in themselves. Hence they are not 'irrelevant' as we find in epiphenomenalism.

If we suppose that materialism is true, then logically we

cannot know, it to be true. For if our opinion is treated as solely the result of chemical processes taking place in the brain, they are determined by the chemical laws and not of logic. Thus materialism can be seen as self-defeating.

Armstrong's theory cannot be strictly classified as an 'identity theory' for unlike Feigl, Armstrong has not identified the conscious processes along with brain states. As he reduces the importance of consciousness and its significance, it can be termed as epiphenomenalism. Armstrong fails to discuss Popper's World 3 objects (objects of human artifacts, theories etc. created by human mind). Since it requires conscious efforts (worlds, consisting of consciousness and other mental processes) on the part of the individual to understand world 3 objects in Popper's psychophysical interactionism.

Popper points out that the identity between a mental state and a brain-state cannot be advanced on the basis of gene - D.N.A. analogy. For the later has got the empirical evidence in its support, whereas in case of former analogy, we know that mind is not an organ and there is no evidence to say that the corresponding physical change in the brain is sufficient to explain some triggered behaviour in an organism.

Thus, Popper says that the claim in the analogy is not only unwarranted but even misleading. By making use of some physical vocabulary the problem will not be solved as is understood or thought by its supporters. If we stop using 'mental language' (the language that is used to refer to mind and mental processes) that does not imply that, mind and physical processes does not

exist or that their problem is solved. By using different language, the things cannot be made different or thing will not be different.

In the physical mental identity theory the ontological distinction between 'the mental' and 'the physical' is not maintained. It rejects 'mind' as an ontological entity only to reduce it to physico-chemical brain-processes. A version of physical-mental identity theory maintains that, there are no 'minds' but there are only 'brains' accepting a sort of monism which 'explains away' mind.

#### NOTES :

1. U.T. Place, "Consciousness Is Just Brain Processes", in Body, Mind And Death, New York: Macmillan Company, 1964, p.277.
2. The term scientific realists is used in the sense, they do not indulge in metaphysical discussions or speculations of transcendental mind as an independent reality whose justification is non-empirical.
3. D. M. Armstrong, "Recent work on the Relation of Mind and Brain", in Contemporary Philosophy, vol. IV, ed. G. Floistad, Dordrecht: Martins Nijhoff Publishers, 1986, p.46.
4. Kuhn uses the term normal science to describe science as traditionally understood - real, objective and its laws as universally final. |||?
5. Behaviourism works at two levels at the level of explanation of what essentially constitutes mind, and at the level of methodology. Methodologically speaking behaviourism would be the thesis that we have no other way to understand what 'mind' is except the way it works/functions ontologically behaviourism would accept (Gilbert Ryle-Concept of Mind) mind as nothing but the way body functions.
6. The 'intractable residue of concepts' that Place talks about are those elements which force us to explain notions of consciousness, experience, sensation, mental imagery in terms of some inner processes.
7. 'Raw feels' was first coined by the psychologist E.C. Tolman.

He meant roughly the unconceptualised items of direct experience, sentience, the phenomenally given (e.g. sense-data or sensations). Feigl uses the term to refer to common referents of phenomenal terms and certain neurophysiological terms with logically independent sense.

8. J.J.C. Smart, "Sensations And Brain Processes", in The Mind-Brain Identity Theory, ed. C.V. Borst, London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1970, p.53.
9. U.T. Place, "Is consciousness a Brain Process?" in The Mind-Brain Identity Theory, ed. C.V. Borst, London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1970, p.43.
10. Ibid., p.44.
11. Ibid., pp.47-48.
12. Phenomenal field is what psychologist calls, a peculiar sort of internal cinema (after-images) on the mental screen, Ibid., p.49.
13. J.J.C. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes", in The Mind-Brain Identity Theory, ed. C.V. Borst, London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1970, p.53.
14. Feigl uses the expression 'nomological danglers' for the laws whereby the entities dangle. Smart uses the expression to refer to the dangling entities themselves.
15. J.J.C. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes", in The Mind-Brain Identity Theory, ed. C.V. Borst, London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1970, pp.55-56.
16. Strict Identity: An example of a general is given. A successful general who is in the present time slice, is the same one who as a small boy stole and ate the apple in an earlier 'time slice'. Smart talks about the four dimensional object which has 'the general - I see - before me for its late 'time-slice' is, identical in the strict sense with the four dimensional earlier object which has the small boy - stealing apples for an earlier 'time-slice'.
17. Ibid., p.60.
18. Herbert Feigl, "Mind-Body, Not a Psuedo Problem", in The Dimensions of Mind, ed. by Sidney Hook, America: New York University Press, 1960, p.37.
19. Ibid., p.38.
20. Gestalt Character: The 'heat' perceived or felt, of objects, can be identified with the motion of the molecules of the hot object. The proposed model for such an identification, as in the above example, was that, a complex property of the

objects is grasped by a perceiver as a simple, which cannot be analysed, 'gestalt'. Armstrong thinks that though it solves many problems for the physicalists, it remains very implausible phenomenologically.

21. J.T. Stevenson, " 'Sensations and Brain-Processes' --- A reply to J.J.C. Smart", <sup>The Mind-Brain Identity Theory,</sup> ed. C.V. Borst, London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1970, p.90.
22. Ibid.
23. Roland Puccetti, "A Materialist Fallacy of Mind" Philosophy, vol.XLV No.173, 1970.
24. J.J. Clarke, "Mental Structure and the Identity Theory", Mind, Vol.LXXX, No.70, 1971, p.523.
25. Ibid., p.525.
26. William Keneale, "Review: "A Materialist Theory of Mind" by D.M. Armstrong, Mind, vol. LXXVIII, 1969, p.293.
27. Ibid., p.295.
28. Thomas Nagel, "Armstrong on the Mind", Mind, vol. LXXIX, 1970, pp.396-397.
29. Ibid., pp.398-399.
30. Ibid., p.399.
31. Colin McGinn - Quoted in "Weak Externalism and Mind Body Identity" Cynthia MacDonald, Mind, vol. 99, No.395, 1990, p.387.
32. Don Locke: "Must a Materialist Pretend He's Anaesthetised?" The Philosophical Review, Vol. XXI, No.84, 1971, p.225.
33. Ibid.
34. Jerome Shaffer, "Could Mental States be Brain-Processes?" in The Mind-Brain Identity Theory, ed. C.V. Borst, London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1970, p.115.
35. By C- States Shaffer refers to the mental states e.g. feeling pain, having an after-image, thinking about a problem, etc. B-Processes are brain-processes.
36. Ibid., p.115.
37. A. J. Ayer; "The Physical Basis of Mind: A Philosopher's Symposium", in The Physical Basis of Mind, ed. by Peter Laslett, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968, p.70.
38. Roland Puccetti, "Science, Analysis, and the problem of Mind", Philosophy, vol.XXXIX, No.149, 1964, p.258.

## CHAPTER V

### DUAL PREDICATION OR DUAL LANGUAGE?

P.F. Strawson attempts to solve the mind-body problem in a way different from the other theories employing the concept of 'person' as central to the issue. He takes the concept of a person as a primitive concept and that of pure ego as non-primitive, in the sense that it can be explained only with reference to the concept of a person.

Strawson begins with the common experience that an individual does distinguish between himself and his states while identifying himself among others. Some conditions are required for this identification and distinction. And to reach these conditions Strawson refers to the picture of purely auditory world where "... the being whose experience it was - if any such being were possible at all might recognise sound universals and reidentify sound particulars and in general form for himself an idea of his auditory world;..."<sup>1</sup>

But even in this situation he would not have any idea of his being the subject of his auditory experiences for two reasons. First, he would have become one item among his auditory experiences, and secondly, we cannot imagine, a sound being the subject of experiences.

Strawson considers it necessary, for any individual, to have an idea of the subject of the experiences, in order to know or have an idea of himself. It not only looks difficult but also is impossible to have such an idea, for such an idea will be of his particular experience other than all experiences. And if it is an

item in his experiences then it cannot be the idea of what 'has' all the experiences.

While describing what we think of ourselves, in the ordinary sense in terms of things that we ascribe to ourselves, such as actions and intentions, sensations, thoughts and feelings, perceptions and memories, Strawson brings about, the two-fold division of a human being into body and mind. Strawson discusses the ascription of certain things to ourselves when he agrees: "We ascribe to ourselves, in two senses, position: location (I am on the sofa) and attitude (I am lying down). And of course we ascribe to ourselves not only temporary conditions, states, situations like these, but also relatively enduring characteristics, including physical characteristics like height, colouring, shape and weight. That is to say, among the things we ascribe to ourselves are things of a kind that we also ascribe to material bodies to which we should not dream of ascribing others of the things that we ascribe to ourselves"<sup>2</sup>.

The material thing to which physical characteristics are applied is the body and it is the same thing to which sensations, consciousness and other enduring characteristics are applied. Strawson raises two questions in this connection: "(1) why are one's states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all? (2) Why are they ascribed to the very same thing as certain corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation, etc?"<sup>3</sup>.

Answer to the first question can be given in terms of the unique role that a person's body plays in his experiences. Strawson mentions perceptual experiences in particular. For, a perceptual experience is contingent and complex and its character

(of perceptual experience) is dependent on the facts about one's own body, such as the way it is located and the state of certain organs of one and the same body. Further, Strawson says that, "... each person's body occupies a special position in relation to that person's perceptual experience, ... for each person there is one body which occupies a certain causal position in relation to that person's perceptual experience, a causal position which in various ways is unique in relation to each of the various kinds of perceptual experience he has; and - as a further consequence - that this body is also unique for him as an object<sup>4</sup> of the various kinds of perceptual experience which he has" .

In the above given passage Strawson explains why a subject of experience has a special kind of relation with his body, why he thinks his body is more important than other bodies. But it does not answer the question why at all states of consciousness be ascribed to myself? That is, it does not explain the concept of a person.

Strawson mentions two views concerning this issue: Cartesian and the no-ownership view. On the former view it is clear that there are two distinct substances, with their appropriate states and properties. The consciousness belongs to one of the substances and not to the other. According to Strawson, 'why at all states of consciousness are ascribed to any substance?' remains unanswered in Cartesian dualistic approach.

Strawson refers to the linguistic approach as 'no-ownership' or 'no-subject' doctrine of the self.

The 'no-ownership' theorists give importance to the 'unique

causal position of a certain material body in a person's experience"<sup>5</sup>. The unique position of the body is sufficient for one to ascribe one's experiences to oneself as possessed by or owned by that thing. This misleading idea of ownership would make some sense if the possessor of the experiences was the body. A question may be raised with regard to states of consciousness, as what states of consciousness will be contingently true as depending on the corporeal states of one's body where a body is identified in purely physical terms? - To this question, if the supporter answers that they are 'my experiences', then it means, that they (no-ownership theorists) are re-introducing the 'ownership of experiences', the very same thing, what they want to avoid.

Strawson critically remarks that the attempt made by the no-ownership theorists, emphasising the logical transferability of experiences fails. In indentifying experiences, they are referred to as 'experiences of some identified person' and therefore they are to be ascribed to that person and as such it is logically impossible that a particular state experienced by a person, should have been experienced by anyone else, as they are logically non-transferable.

Thus commenting on 'Cartesian dualism' and 'no-ownership theory' Strawson says that both the theories look at the notion of 'I' in two different ways. Also, in both the theories the question as to why states of consciousness should be ascribed to a physical body only, remains unanswered.

Thus the role of a single body or its unique position is not sufficient to explain, why states of consciousness can be

ascribed to that body, or to anyone. In other words it does not explain why, anyone should have the 'conception of a subject' one who possesses those experiences.

With regard to the notion of a 'subject' Strawson considers it a necessary condition, that in order to ascribe states of consciousness to oneself the way one does, one should also ascribe them to others, other than himself. Strawson maintains that "the ascribing phrases are used in just the same sense when the subject is another as when the subject is oneself"<sup>6</sup>.

Although we do not find in the dictionary the first person, second and the third person meaning of the word 'pain', yet philosophically there is difference in verification in two cases - that is, in the case of oneself and in the case of others. One cannot strictly talk about ascription of states of consciousness to oneself. A prior step before ascription is identification, and in one's own case, one does not identify oneself in the way we identify others.

If the states of consciousness are ascribed to others in the sense of Cartesian egos to which only private experiences can be ascribed in correct logical grammar, then Strawson says the problem is insoluble.

Ascription of states of consciousness to oneself requires one's ascription of those states to others. The latter task in turn depends on identification of other subjects of experience and identification is not complete only with identifying others as subjects of experiences.

Cartesianism as a doctrine cannot help in the identification

of subjects of experience. Even if it is supposed that bodies can be distinguished from one another it is not possible to distinguish between subjects of experience based on the above criteria.

The explanation that a particular subject stands in a particular relation to a body, just as 'I' stands in a particular relation to 'my' body, is not sufficient for the above mentioned purpose. For 'I' stands in a particular special relation to the particular body in each one's case, giving that person an idea of his being the subject of experiences. It makes him think that these experiences are 'mine' and therefore a subject perceives his body as unique among other bodies. In the case of others we cannot just talk of uniqueness of the subject of experiences. Strawson while commenting on Cartesian dualism expresses his views on the uniqueness aspect of subjective experiences: Strawson asks, "what right have we, in this explanation, to speak of the subject, implying uniqueness? Why should there not be any number of subjects of experience - perhaps qualitatively indistinguishable - each subject and each set of experiences standing in the same unique relation to body N (or to body M)? uniqueness of the body does not guarantee uniqueness of the Cartesian Soul" .<sup>7</sup>

The concept of a person as Strawson puts it, 'is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation etc. are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type" .<sup>8</sup>

Strawson maintains that it is a necessary condition of our

states of consciousness, that they are to be ascribed only to a body, with corporeal characteristics - that is they should and can be ascribed only to the 'person'.

We think of a 'person' as a compound of two - (1) body and (2) ego, pure consciousness or mind and assume that there are two subjects of experience. On reflection and careful thinking we reach the fact that there is only one subject and the other non-subject. This position makes it difficult and impossible to understand the idea of different, distinguishable and identifiable subjects of experience. And therefore one cannot assign either any experiences to oneself or to any other. So alone with the concept of ego or pure consciousness, the concept of 'person' cannot be explained. It has got meaning, only when it is treated as a 'secondary' 'non-primitive' concept, when it is explained and analysed in terms of the concept of a person.

Strawson comments on Hume with reference to his views on ego or pure consciousness. Hume, he says, vainly was searching for a principle of unity, but said that he could not discover in himself anything but perception. His search, as Strawson points out, was vague, as there is no principle of differentiation, so no principle of unity.

Strawson contends strongly for the view that the concept of person is prior to any ego concept, or pure consciousness as different from corporeal characteristics. Pure subject, pure consciousness cannot itself be the subject of any experience. 'I' refers to the 'person' as a whole.

Curiously enough, Strawson does not deny logical secondary

existence of the ego just as we talk and think of a dead body - a dead person so one can think of a disembodied 'person' because a person is not an embodied ego.

Strawson argues for the logical primitiveness of the concept of a person.

- (1) First, as he maintains that in order to ascribe oneself the states of consciousness, one should know to ascribe the same to that thing, to which one ascribes the states of consciousness in one's case.
- (2) In order to term oneself as the subject of experiences he also must term others as the subject, in the same way.
- (3) This is possible only when 'oneself' and the other individuals possess both the types of predicates (states of consciousness as well as corporeal characteristics).

Karl Popper shares with Strawson the contention that one gets an idea of a 'person' first, before one learns to use the word 'I'. He favours Strawson's view that an individual should be treated as an 'integrated person' first and then the physical and mental properties can be distinguished. Popper offers the following grounds to support his socialistic type of a theory. ?

- (1) With the inborn interest in the people around, the child learns the 'persons' first leading to the conception that he is a 'person'. Thus, 'genetically' and 'psychologically', Popper claims that first there is the understanding of a 'person', as an integrated whole and later on of the self or mind. (2) His being aware of the different organs of the body, what he has got and also what he does not possess and at the same time learning that

all his actions are not permitted or rather are checked by people around, helps him to form the idea of his self.

To be more precise and to give a clear picture of his position Strawson mentions two types of predicates. M-predicates and P-predicates. M-predicates are those which can only be properly applied to material bodies whereas P-predicates can be properly applied to persons only. The fact that the concept of a person is primitive, only means that it is not to be understood in a certain way as considering it as a secondary entity to both the concepts - concept of a body and that of a mind. For this would lead to type-ambiguity, on ascription of predicates, as they will mean different things when applied to material objects and when applied to persons.

Strawson inquires into the logical character of P-predicates. He says there is no sense in identification of an individual of a special type, unless there are principles by way of which we come to think that, that individual is of this type, and the same applies to P-predicates. And further, there must be some criteria, logically adequate to ascribe the particular P-predicate to that individual. If it is not adequate, then one has to go for relation between the criteria (the way of telling, how P-predicates can be ascribed) and what P-predicate ascribes, for, the telling, is only a sign of the presence of P-predicate in that individual. By way of correlation and observing that in oneself one can find out whether the ascription is a correct one or not.

But going back again, Strawson maintains that unless one learns to ascribe at least some states of consciousness to

others, one's ascription of states to oneself is not possible. Strawson asserts that, we ascribe P-predicates to others on the basis of observation of their behaviour and that the behaviour criteria one goes for are not simply signs of the presence of what is meant by the P-predicate, but are criteria of a logically adequate kind for the ascription of the P-predicate.

But this he regards only a partial picture of character of P-predicates. First, there are certain P-predicates which we ascribe to oneself on the basis of behaviour criteria. The way we ascribe P-predicates to others, it is not true in all cases of ascription of P-predicates to oneself. Yet there remains a distinct basis, entirely different from the mentioned above, that one ascribes P-predicates to oneself-when one reports about the felt tiredness, depression etc.

The problem to be faced is, how this can be reconciled with earlier criteria for ascription of P-predicates to oneself? While seeking a reconciliation between the two Strawson points out at one possibility of denying the real ascriptive nature of P-predicates and that they are to be taken as similar to those other forms of behaviour on the basis of which other P-predicates are ascribed to different individuals. But this way of reconciliation points to the failure of recognising the special nature of crucial class of P-predicates.

There can be more than one primary process of teaching oneself the inner private meaning of certain P-predicates and equal number of ways of learning how this is to be applied to others. In the other way also there can be more than one process

of learning how such predicates are to be applied to the others and how in one's case it is to be exhibited (form of behaviour), what Strawson calls P-utterances. Thus, these P-predicates in character, 'have both first - and third-person ascriptive uses'. That these P-predicates are such that, they can be unambiguously and adequately applied to the others that is "... on the basis of observation of the predicate and not on this basis, i.e. independently of observation of the subject: the second case is the case where the ascriber is also the subject" .

Strawson cites a good example of the concept of depression to explain the nature of such P-predicates. We talk about one's behaving in a depressed way and also about one's being depressed (feelings). Feelings can only be felt or experienced but not observed. But the concept as it is understood covers both the aspects. As Strawson puts it, that X's depression is something, which is felt by X but not observed, by X, and which is observed by others but not felt by others.

According to Strawson, the problem of mind and other Philosophical problems arise when, only one aspect is taken into consideration as self-sufficient to explain the problem. There is oscillation between philosophical scepticism and philosophical behaviourism. Considering only one aspect leads to the logical gap between the criteria on the basis of which we say X is depressed and the actual state of being depressed.

Turning again to the concept of a person or the possibility of P-predicates, Strawson recognises the primitiveness involved in the concept of a person and therefore asserts the unique character of P-predicates. These predicates which usually involve

doing something necessarily imply a state of a mind or intention which is indicated by a particular form of behaviour (bodily movement). In such predicates although it is possible for the others to ascribe a P-predicate on the basis of observation, it is not possible for the person who is doing that, to ascribe states of consciousness on the basis of observing oneself. Yet, one will not deny the fact that he himself and the others did ascribe to him, the 'same' predicate. In doing so we are trying to understand the present and the future bodily movements by observation and inference, not only in our own case, but in the case of others also, that is we see others as self-ascribers.

In this context, it is easier to understand, how one can and does see oneself and others as persons. One will agree that we each one act, and act on each other and our actions are in accordance with a common human nature.

Strawson considers the common human nature as an important condition for the individuation or the concept of a person. The relation between a part and a whole, can be properly understood, in case of a machine or in case of different organs in a living body. But a human being, a person is a 'whole' himself, is related to the society and acts according to the common human nature, in an entirely different manner, from a machine.

Strawson grants a (logically) secondary existence to the pure consciousness or mind. As stated earlier, pure consciousness itself alone, is not sufficient to explain the concept of a person. Imagining oneself in a disembodied form is possible if two conditions are satisfied - (1) One is to imagine that one is

not experiencing that he has a body, (2) to imagine as not having any power to introduce any changes in the world, which a person with a body is doing.

He should feel and imagine disembodied in the sense that as far as people are concerned, there should be no reactions to him as a person. This leads to two consequences. The first one, is that he will be living a solitary life and the second in order to retain in himself the idea of being an individual, in this disembodied state, he has to remember his earlier experiences as a person.

Strawson takes the concept of person as primitive, that is a 'person' should not be thought as a compound of mind and body. If so, then both the predicates ascribing conscious states and ascribing physical attributes become applicable to the 'person' himself. But, then if the physical attributes are ascribed to 'person' and the material body which he possesses, strange consequences follow. We are forced to say that John Smith and his body have identical physical attributes which occupies a certain spatio-temporal position. As C.B. Martin says: "The body of a person is six feet tall and weighs 180 pounds. It seems a needless duplication of effort to say that the person possessing the body also is six feet tall and weighs 180 pounds. The consciousness of a person is in some conscious state. It seems a needless duplication of effort to say that the person possessing the consciousness is also in that mental state. Indeed, this duplication of effort seems not only needless, but incomprehensible. Surely the physical and conscious state predicates that apply to the person... apply simply in virtue of

the fact that they apply to the body and consciousness that (he) possesses. Otherwise, it would be an incomprehensible coincidence" <sup>10</sup> .

This difficulty, Strawson can overcome, if he accepts dualism abandoning his view about the concept of a person as logically primitive. Another alternative is to say that a person has a material body.

Strawson lays down the following criteria to identify one's body among others. He says that the body which one calls one's body is a material thing such that it can be picked out from others and identified by ordinary physical criteria, and which can be described in ordinary physical terms.

But the same criteria can be used to identify the dead material bodies. Therefore, we do not refer to persons simply as material bodies. Norman Burnstein while criticising Strawson says, "we would not say that it was John Smith's body which was standing at a certain spot, S, which moved from S at a certain time T, and which was six feet tall and weighed 180 pounds; we would say that it was John Smith who was standing at S, who moved from S to T, and who was six feet tall and weighed 180 pounds" <sup>11</sup> . Thus it shows that, a particular material body and a particular person are two distinct particulars.

A person can be distinguished from any other material body, in so far as, he will have conscious experiences along with physical attributes whereas a material body will have only physical attributes.

However, it is a conceptual truth that when we talk about a

person, we do not refer to that person only as having conscious experiences but that he has got a material body too.

Considering that a person 'X' as a material entity will have material parts (different organs), one can without any difficulty say that, a material entity and its parts are at the same place, at the same time. One can say then, Mr. 'X' stands in the same place, where his legs are. But we cannot say the same thing about Mr. 'X' and his entire body, as his body is not, as per Strawson's theory a part of Mr. 'X'. It is also denied that a person has a material body. So Burnstein says that Strawson has to specify in what different sense can we say of a person as having a material body.

To avoid this difficulty, if Strawson abandons the conceptual truth that "a person has a material body then a living person's body, like his consciousness, is not an independently identifiable particular; its identification ultimately rests on the identification of the particular person to whom it belongs"<sup>12</sup>. A corpse can be identified in both the ways, as a dead body and a person who no longer exists. Living body then is not a 'basic particular' whereas a corpse can be. There is unclarity saying as Strawson has done in case of the concept of person as 'primitive', that it cannot be applied to animals. Strawson does not refer to this restriction.

Ayer notes the similarity between Strawson's views and Professor Hampshire's views. Prof. Hampshire also suggests that persons are to be distinguished primarily in terms of their capacity to act and that further the concept of action also solves the problem of personal identity. They can be

distinguished only in the fact that, the latter envisages the concept of action at least partially physical so that the notion of existence of disembodied ego is self-contradictory whereas Strawson grants a 'logically secondary existence' to disembodied ego.

Strawson has outlined the consequences of the ego existing in a disembodied form - first one is leading a solitary life and secondly in order to experience oneself as an individual in the disembodied form one is required to remember the past experiences.

Strawson allows in his 'person' theory, the possibility of existence of disembodied ego. Sommers in an objection to the possibility of disembodied spirits says: "... Strawson does admit into his ontology ghosts outside of machines, bodiless spirits. Of such ghosts it is essential that they should once have been persons, that they should be disembodied ... Thus, in Strawson's ontology, we have three things, spirits, persons and rocks, such that the predicate weighs a hundred pounds applies to rocks and to persons but not to spirits, while the predicate thinks applies to persons and to spirits but not to rocks. But if these predicates are univocally predicated, there can be no such three things. yet if we are to make sense of any belief in immortality, we must predicate some predicates univocally of persons and immortal spirits" .

Among the two consequences outlined by Strawson, only the latter is objected by Ayer in the following way. If it is possible for the disembodied ego, to have experiences similar to

those, it had with the condition that none of experiences will establish the existence of his body, then there is no need for him to retain his earlier experiences. This is equal to a person's survival after the bodily death. Strawson's contention that personal identity can be held on through the retaining of one's experiences - that is memory, cannot be accepted - as it is well known that memory of a person is not sufficient for the above Purpose.

Ayer is more inclined to accept the fact that it is the identity of body that is important in personal identity and that a person is said to own certain states of consciousness, as they stand in a special causal relation to the body, with which that person is identified. Ayer attempts to show that there is no internal incoherence in the 'no-ownership' doctrine of the self. Ayer remarks that Strawson should not have named it no-ownership doctrine because it allows a body to own experiences by way of a causal relation. Ayer says that the theory needs a contingent proposition - stating that one's experiences are causally dependent on one's body; but merely by virtue of this dependence, all of one's states on one's body, thought of as causally dependent becomes an analytic one. Ayer says both are to be treated as distinct propositions and there is no contradiction and inconsistency in this.

Ayer argues for the 'ownership-doctrine': "The Position is that a person can be identified by his body; this body can be identified by its physical properties and ~~S~~ spatio-temporal location as a contingent fact there are certain experiences which are causally connected with it; and these particular experiences

can then be identified as the experiences of the person whose body it is. There is nothing inconsistent in this<sup>14</sup> .

Ayer comments that Strawson is probably being misled by illegitimate questions like, which of the experiences are to be assigned to a particular body, as dependent on a particular body. The question is illegitimate because the experiences are identified earlier, independent of the body. Rather one should see what experiences are dependent on a particular body, as belonging to a particular person's body at a given time.

The argument from analogy is used by many Philosophers to prove the existence of other minds. Strawson puts it in the following way for critical consideration: "That it is necessary condition of one's ascribing states of consciousness, experiences, to oneself, in the way that one does, that one should also ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe them, to others who are not oneself"<sup>15</sup> .

Strawson attacks the argument from analogy, by saying that it is based on the assumption, of the very thing which it is supposed to justify. Strawson thinks that, even granting the case that 'my' experiences are associated with 'this body' which is distinct from other bodies does not prove the fact that other bodies are owned by other subjects with their experiences. Strawson's above mentioned contention, according to Ayer, leads to the denial of the body, as a 'subject' of experiences. Ayer critically comments that, Strawson in turn discusses, the 'hybrid theory' of no-ownership doctrine of the self.

Ayer, refers to Wittgenstein's criteria to understand

mental experiences. Wittgenstein held the view that every inner experience has a outward manifestation, and only then the statements about it (mental) becomes meaningful. But it can be -- objected that, if the outward manifestation is deceptive and this possibility is always there, then our attribution of certain experience to other person is a mistaken one. Therefore, they are not to be treated as identical with one's inner experience. Yet they cannot be treated logically distinct either as then it seems that there is only one-way entailment. the entailment must be from experiences to their outward manifestations but, alongwith outward manifestations there must be something else and this something remains a problem.

The physical states are a criteria to infer the inner states in question. The logical adequacy of such criteria, as discussed by Strawson one can understand in his example of a card. The card gets this logical adequacy for calling a particular card, by way of different marks on it. But in addition to this, it is in the context of the game that over and above the markings on it, properties are ascribed to it. In the similar way, when predicates are applied to others on the basis of physical criteria, they should bring out fully the meaning of that predicate, which physical criteria alone cannot do and hence it is logically inadequate.

But Ayer points out that, "the reason why the appearance of the card is a logically adequate criterion for its function is that the connection between them is established by the conventions which allot to cards of various designs their  
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respective powers in the game" .

And further he says that, the connection between a mental experience and its bodily expression is not on par with the connection which is conventionally established between the appearance and function of a token in a game.

Ayer says that, there can be a weaker form of analogy between a mental state and its manifestation in one's own case and attributing states of consciousness to others in their physical states. Weaker because there can be a gap between the outward manifestation and actual experience, that might lead to incorrect attribution in one case. But over all, the behavioural criteria are not fallible, and to a large extent success is guaranteed.

Ayer considers the distinctness between the inner states and outward manifestations, and poses the question: can one say that they are identical? An identity between the mental and the brain-states, cannot be sought. It is not proper to hold the view according to Ayer that experiences are literally located in brain, yet he says that one can hold that they are causally dependent on the conditions of the brain.

To treat them as identical is to reduce mental to the physical, and this in turn is based on psycho-physical laws, whose validity one might try to understand in one's own case and then apply to others but this again is a case of analogy.

Strawson finds the argument from analogy as circular. That in order to ascribe experiences to oneself - one has to learn how they are to be ascribed to others.

Ayer reacting to Strawson's views says that, there is no

circularity, if one maintains that, our knowledge as a conscious subject is possible without knowledge of others being there. But it might be objected that, as while ascribing states of consciousness to others one sees first the justification for doing so. This justification in turn is based on one's own experiences, and so it appears circular. To this Ayer replies that, one's belief in justification and one's really being justified can be distinguished. Just as one's belief in a proposition can be justified, irrespective of that statement being true or false. Ayer comments that MR. Strawson's argument needs a more stronger premise than what he states - to refute the argument from analogy.

Ayer defends another objection to argument from analogy. The objection is that as a result of argument from analogy, one is led to have good reasons to believe in one's own experiences only, if the physical criteria for any mental act in case of others do not constitute logically adequate criteria. Based on this logical inadequacy one may well claim that our ascription of states of experiences to others is useless.

This argument from analogy in turn is based on the assumption that as Strawson puts it, one's ascription of states of consciousness to others, is dependent on one's ascribing of the same thing to oneself. Ayer says that once this assumption is removed the objection can only be said to be with reference to interpretation of verification principle.

Strawson's distinction between P-predicates and M-predicates is open to criticism. The basis of this distinction is to be found in Descartes philosophy says B.A.O. Williams. Descartes

maintained that, "everything that we discover in ourselves, which we see could also be in completely in animate bodies, should be attributed only to our body; on the other hand, everything that is in us, which we could not conceive of as possibly belonging to a (physical) body, should be attributed to our Soul" .<sup>17</sup>

Descartes thought that they are really complex attributes and as such can be divided into its physical part and mental part.

In discussing the ascription of P-predicates Strawson uses the terms 'states of consciousness'. He introduces the terms to mean some subclass of P-predicates, but does not explain properly what are these, there is unclarity about what predicates are being discussed and also about the concept of a person. Williams points out the confusion, in the following: "a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and (Strawson's emphasis in both cases) predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics ... are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type"<sup>18</sup> .

There is unclarity not only in the distinctions between different types of P-predicates but also between P-predicates and M-predicates. As many P-predicates are highly corporeal, it is difficult to see which are really M-predicates. B.A.O. Williams critically comments that, "this initial unclarity in the distinction between the two sorts of predicates is not a matter merely of roughness or vagueness. Strawson lacks any criterion for the notion of 'same predicate' - in this connection. He can scarcely hold that it is a sufficient condition of the same

predicate's being applied to persons and to material objects that the same words are applied to both. If this were the condition, the distinction would fall in some odd places - thus 'walk' would seem to be a P-predicate, but 'run' would not'. Moreover, the class of P-predicates would be unacceptably small. A vast range of words which to persons, ascribe actions, can without any hesitation be applied to machines, which Strawson would Presumably count as material objects, with the development of computers, the range of words that can be so applied becomes notoriously more and more 'psychological'<sup>19</sup>. Williams comments that, Strawson should presuppose some position in the philosophy of mind, to make the ascription of predicates clear.

H.D. Lewis points out that in the very statement of the problem of ascription of predicates, there appears 'unwarranted assumptions'. Lewis questions the assumption that, is it the case that we ascribe, physical characteristics and states of consciousness, to the same thing? He says that, in case of ordinary purposes, for example, when one says 'I am writing', we do ascribe, physical characteristics and states of consciousness to 'I', as writing involves both the physical and the mental activity. In such cases Lewis says that, we do not distinguish between the physical attributes and the mental attributes "because the two activities are peculiarly closely linked and because it would be cumbersome and pointless to be always noting the distinction between them. It would be much too troublesome to say, for example - 'I was intending to open the door and my body moved towards it; It is neater and apter, for ordinary purposes, to say simply 'I went to the door' or 'I went to open the door'.

But while this is the best thing to say, as a rule, we cannot allow that to be decisive in philosophy, and I fear that is ultimately just what Strawson does" .

20

Lewis maintains that, strictly we cannot ascribe physical characteristics and mental characteristics, to the same thing. A person saying that, 'I am tall' is only saying something about his body and not saying anything about his mind, which may affect his mind in different ways. Mind cannot be said to be heavy or light, short or tall. It is only metaphorically, we may say that someone has a 'big mind' or 'small mind'. In this sense, one may observe that, Descartes was right in maintaining the view that our minds are non-extended.

The fact is that our physical bodies are extended in space, can be located as filling a particular space, help in specifying the location of a particular physical body. It is true that our experiences are conditioned in certain ways by our physical body, depending on its location. But, when someone says that, 'I am in this room' it does not follow that his 'mind' is also in that room. Neither we can say that, it is outside the room, since "to deny that I was here, in any sense that implies that I was elsewhere, would be absurd. But the strict truth is that my mind is nowhere, location simply does not apply to it. My thoughts are not extended, although they are affected in many ways by extended substances, including specially my body" .

21

Strawson insists that the identification of others is possible through the observation of their bodily movements. H.D. Lewis reacting to Strawson's views says that, identification of

others seems difficult if we do not consider the role of our knowledge about others, that is acquired in the ordinary way. Further Lewis points out that "if we allow this and if it is also asserted, as is done by Strawson, that we cannot identify or know ourselves except in a process which essentially and directly involves the identifications of others, then it seems impossible to ascribe experiences to ourselves at all except in ways in which our bodies have an indispensable part ... we cannot, in other words, conceive of ourselves at all except as beings with physical characteristics"<sup>22</sup> .

If the above mentioned Strawson's contention is accepted, the one finds it difficult to understand our functioning independent of our bodies. Moreover Lewis says, our mind, being causally dependent on our body it is implausible to hold that our mind can function independently of our body.

But Strawson may take these difficulties as superfluous, since in his theory, an attempt to conceive oneself independently of his body is not allowed on logical grounds. That is strawson makes the concept of person 'logically primitive', logically prior to the concept of mind or that of body.

Lewis says it is hard to discover Strawson's thought, that there is a temptation to think of a person as a compound of 'two subjects', where ultimately we take one as the subject and the other non-subject. Lewis says that our reference has always been to one subject and one non-subject. He says, we ascribe corporeal Characteristics to our body "but it is only in a highly elliptical sense that this may be described as ascribing them to myself"<sup>23</sup> . He further says that, our body is not a part of our

self but is something to which we are specially related. We do not think of the body, as a 'subject of experiences'. If this is not the way one should understand the notions of subject and non-subject, Strawson does not indicate, how it is to be understood in any other way. Strawson merely repeats that, a pure individual consciousness or pure ego cannot exist as a primary concept, in terms of which, the concept of person may be analysed. Lewis finds that this is merely a reaffirmation of Strawson's original statement. He questions, "if the additional argument pre-supposes the earlier one, what point is there in the reference to the 'two subjects' and so on beyond saddling those who sympathise with Descartes with an impossible, and perhaps ridiculous, position very far removed from what they really maintain?"<sup>24</sup>

Lewis finds Strawson's explanation of depression mystifying. He says that, it is true that in case of every day experiences, in the ordinary sense, we say that, we can observe other's depression. But in the philosophical sense it can be analysed further. According to Strawson, it is merely on the basis of physical behaviour that we infer the depression of a person. But depression as an experience does not belong to the behaviour of the person, such that we can observe. On the basis of the physical movements, we infer that a particular person will be or is in a particular mental state. Lewis says that this unavoidable logical wedge is hard to drive because of its obscurity in the language that we use for ordinary purposes. Strawson, in other words, does not distinguish between the two senses of language,

ordinary sense and philosophical sense and Lewis comments that the "linguistic convention becomes the head of the corner in his argument and is made to bear the weight of all the far-reaching contentions he makes in his book"<sup>25</sup>

Lewis questions Strawson's contention about ascription of predicates 'which involves doing some thing'. He asks, can one strictly know that he is going for a walk without observation? Lewis says that, what we know is our intention to go for a walk. It is only when we notice the position of our limbs alongwith other things, that one can know that he is going for a walk, according to Lewis. He further adds that, we learn about our intention only through the experience of intending. Lewis points out that, if we allow Strawson's contention, then it follows (for Strawson) that "in the case of bodily movement we have something which can be known only by observation and also without observation, and from this it is deduced that in observing the bodily movement of others we 'see such movements as actions', the force of this being, apparently, that in observing the actions of others we observe what they themselves know without observation"<sup>26</sup>. According to Lewis, the meaning of the word 'see' in strawson's argument can be questioned. It is only the physical movement, all that we can observe. On the basis of the observed physical movement, we learn about the private intention, that is inferred. Beyond this, Lewis says, "there is nothing in the situation to suggest that there is some one thing which is both visible movement and intention"<sup>27</sup>.

J.D. Urmson in his review of Strawson's Individuals,

comments that the Chapter on persons though most rewarding, is least conclusive. Strawson rejects Cartesian dualism and no-ownership theory, as he thinks that they are logically absurd. According to Strawson there can be the distinction of persons, "only if there are predicates which we can apply either (to others) on the basis of observation of behaviour or (to ourselves) without observation"<sup>28</sup> such that there should be things called persons who bear such predicates. Urmson calls the above argument, the transcendental argument, used to show that there are predicates which we can ascribe to others and to ourselves. Urmson criticising Strawson's criterion of ascribing predicates says that "it surely is intuitively obvious that there cannot be predicates P such that O (observation) can be sufficient condition of ascribing P and E (one's own unobserved experience) a sufficient condition of ascribing P but O is not in any way equivalent to E, except in an incoherent conceptual scheme. This is as intuitively obvious as that the other theories<sup>29</sup> are logically incoherent in their ways" .

Robert Hoffman points out that, the criteria given by Strawson to ascertain that, a particular body belongs to 'me' or oneself, does not work. To show this, Hoffman introduces the notion of 'putative physical body' and 'an out-of-the-body experience'. Hoffman explains that, "a person sometimes has what appears to him at the time he has them to be ordinary visual experiences of actual thing and persons (including his own physical body), from a point of view located in what he then takes to be the ordinary space-time continuum but outside his physical body"<sup>30</sup> . In this out-of-the-body experience the person

generally seem to be having a secondary body which is much more plastic and less ponderable. Further, Hoffman says that "on these occasions the person's main consciousness seems to be centered in the secondary body, in the sense in which it ordinarily is felt to be centered in his putative physical body. The person ostensibly sees his own putative physical body as it would normally be seen by a putative other-person whose physical body were situated where the secondary body is situated; and he does not see his putative physical body as if he were situated where it is. He also sees other things from the point of view determined by the position occupied by his secondary body and not by his putative physical body"<sup>31</sup>. Thus, Hoffman says that, on these occasions the three kinds of dependence, as related to one's visual experience, as shown in the above account, are shown by a body, that a person cannot take to his own physical body. Hoffman points out that, the dependence-condition, as laid down by Strawson, cannot be the criterion, with the help of which a person can ascertain that, a particular body is his own.

It may be said that the basis for Strawson's distinction between P-predicates and M-predicates, is to be found in Cartesian thought. One may observe that Strawson's concept of 'person' comes close to ordinary usage of the term. The term 'person' in the ordinary usage, is thought of as incomprehensible by scientists, with reference to the known laws of physics and chemistry. And in this sense, the term 'person' is indeed primitive and irreducible. Similarly Strawson's concept of 'person' is also irreducible. Secondly, the ambiguity in the

usage of the term 'person' in ordinary language also serves to define persons, in Strawson's theory, in the meta-physical sense. That is, in ordinary language, a person is a body, when he becomes a victim of a crime; a person is the appearance; is the self-conscious and rational individual; is one who takes certain roles and discharges functions, etc. For a layman, 'person' is a composite of mind and body. However, for Strawson, the concept of 'person' refers to an entity of which both body and mind are predicates. Thus, Strawson's theory of dual predication seem to depend upon dual language rather entities.

#### NOTES

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25. Ibid., p.160.
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## CHAPTER VI

### MINIMAL MATERIALISM - OVERCOMING ANTI-REDUCTIONISM'S FAILURES

Materialistic account aims at the reduction of the mind to the brain. The different versions of the identity theory - 'type-type' and 'token-token' correlation theories, - attempt to show that the 'mental' can be reduced to the 'physical'.<sup>1</sup> However, one type of materialistic theory (Donald Davidson's 'Anomalous Monism') accepts the irreducible nature of mental states. Therefore, this particular type of materialism may be perceived as a non-reductionist approach with regard to mental-physical relation.

Thomas Nagel was the first to raise doubts about the success of materialism in his discussion of "Armstrong on the Mind" when he questioned the type of materialism defended by Armstrong. He also criticises Armstrong's causal analysis of mental concepts. Nagel questions, "why should a materialist theory of the operation of human beings correspond closely enough to any mentalist picture to permit identification of items from the two theories?"<sup>2</sup> He maintains that, "even if some form of materialism is true, it will not automatically be expressible in the framework of common sense psychology. Currently available data about the central nervous system do not seem to me to encourage such a hope; and some of them positively discourage it".<sup>3</sup>

Nagel in his paper, "What is it like to be a bat?" argues for "subjective character of experience".<sup>4</sup> Nagel says that, without 'consciousness' the mind-body problem becomes

uninteresting and with 'consciousness' it (mind-body problem) becomes intractable. He comments that the reductionist theories are not even trying to explain the most important and characteristic feature of our conscious mental experience. Nagel explains 'subjective character of experience' saying that, "fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism - something it is like for the organism".

Nagel holds that this 'subjective character of experience' cannot be analysed in terms of any explanatory system of functional states, as it can be ascribed to a robot, an automata where 'experiencing' aspect is lacking. Again, he says that, 'subjective character of experience' cannot be analysed in terms of causal roles that our experiences play to bring about human behaviour, for 'experience' is present in animals though they lack language and thought and do not have any beliefs about their experiences. Nagel is not denying, the conscious mental states and events, as causes of behaviour or their being given functional characterizations. Nagel denies the reduction of 'subjective character of experience' as he maintains that it will exhaust their analysis. In the reductionist program, we find an analysis of the thing to be reduced. If the reductionist leaves something out that is to be reduced, then the reductionist programme is a failure. Nagel points out that, "any reductionist programme has to be based on an analysis of what is to be reduced. If the analysis leaves something out, the problem will be falsely posed. It is useless to base the defense of materialism on any analysis of mental phenomena that fails to

deal explicitly with their subjective character. For there is no reason to suppose that a reduction which seems plausible when no attempt is made to account for consciousness can be extended to include consciousness" .<sup>6</sup>

Nagel takes a realist position as far as the 'subjective'<sup>7</sup> aspect of our experience is concerned. He states: "My realism about the subjective domain in all its forms implies a belief in the existence of facts beyond the reach of human concepts. Certainly it is possible for a human being to believe that there are facts which humans never will possess the requisite concepts to represent or comprehend. ....there are facts which could not ever be represented or comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted forever - simply because our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type"<sup>8</sup> . Thus, dissatisfaction about the reductionist programme was expressed by Nagel, before Davidson developed his theory based on the same line, accepting the irreducible nature of the mental or psychological phenomena.

While Howard Robinson names Davidson's theory a 'Dual Aspect Theory' and not a genuine form of materialism for certain reasons, Armstrong considers Davidson's theory as 'functionalistic' in many respects although Davidson does not stress functional character of mental states. Davidson himself names his position as 'Anomalous Monism' saying: "I have resisted calling my position either materialism or physicalism because, unlike most materialists or physicalists, I do not think mental properties (or predicates) are reducible to physical properties

(or predicates), nor that we could conceptually or otherwise, get along without mental concepts. Monistic my view is, since it holds that mental events are physical events, but a form of materialist chauvinism it is not, since it holds that being mental is not an eliminable or derivative property" <sup>9</sup>. In brief, Davidson's position may be viewed as a reaction to J.J.C. Smart's and D.M. Armstrong's reductionism.

For Davidson, sensation is a brain process, but he denies that there are strict laws governing this process and also holds that reliable psycho-physical generalisations are incapable of being refined into strict laws. He agrees with functionalists as far as one-many correlations between the physical and the mental but denies strict causal laws linking these two. He also denies a causal relation between one mental event and the other. Davidson in his anomalous monistic theory holds that, all events are physical, though some possess an irreducible psychical aspect. Davidson argues that, that "what lies behind our inability to discover deterministic psycho-physical laws is this. When we attribute a belief, a desire, a goal, an intention, or a meaning to an agent, we necessarily operate within a system of concepts in part determined by the structure of beliefs and desires of the agent himself. Short of changing the subject, we cannot escape this feature of the psychological; but this feature has no counterpart in the world of physics" <sup>10</sup>.

Davidson accepts three principles:

- (1) he holds a causal interaction between the mental and the physical,

- (2) he holds the principle of nomological character of causality, and
- (3) the non-existence of precise and strict psycho-physical laws.

The three principles may be taken as constituting premisses of an argument. First premiss may be taken as that, psychological or mental events like perceiving and remembering something, "the acquisition and loss of knowledge, and intentional actions are directly or indirectly caused by, and the causes of, physical events"<sup>11</sup>.

Second premiss will be, when events are taken as causally related, they can be made to fit into "a closed and deterministic system of laws"<sup>12</sup> by giving an appropriate description of them. The third premiss may be constituted as, that there are no strict and precise causal laws correlating the psychological with the physiological.

Premises constituted as above, according to Davidson, imply monism. Monism, because Davidson maintains that a psychological event is a physiological event. Davidson says that it is not possible for psychological events to constitute a closed system. Many events affect the psychological, but the events themselves may not be psychological in nature. In other words they will be physical events. If so, then physical events and psychological events are causally related and by premiss two, there must be laws that govern them. In premiss three, it may be stated that laws are not psychophysical and therefore, they must be purely physical laws. In other words it means that psychological events can be described, taking one by one, in physical terms. This

shows that they are physical events. Davidson maintains that this position deserves to be called anomalous monism. He calls it monism because, psychological events are physiological events. He maintains that it is anomalous because of his insistence that events do not come under strict laws when couched in psychological terms.

Principles one and two mentioned earlier appear to conflict with the third principle. That is, Davidson wishes to hold a causal interaction between mental and physical events, and vice-versa. But simultaneously also holds that any event that is causally related to the other, fall under strict laws what he calls the principle of nomological character of causality. These two principles, which Davidson thinks are of great importance and the third principle of anomalism of the mental, appear to conflict. The problem may be posed thus: 'how can one hold the causal interaction view on one hand and yet maintain that there are no strict laws governing this two?'

Davidson seeks the solution of the problem by holding that a "particular cause and its effect are governed by a strict law only relative to certain descriptions of these events"<sup>13</sup>. Davidson illustrates through the example of collision of Titanic. Titanic's collision with an iceberg caused the ship to sink. This cause cannot be generalised in all instances of sinking of ships. Rather there is some true general description of the Titanic's collision and it is only under this description that the particular event takes place and that becomes a strict law.

In the same fashion, whenever there arises a certain desire

(desiring something is a psychological event) in an individual, in addition to that there are beliefs and perceptions and all this leads to movement of limbs which we can say is a causal sequence and so governed by a strict law. But it cannot be said a strict law under these or any other mental descriptions. It is possible to explain one's actions in mental terms by pointing out at one's beliefs and purposes. In order to understand the meaning of what a person says a good deal of knowledge about his beliefs is necessary. While interpreting verbal behaviour, that is, the statement made by the speaker, we should be able to tell, when he (speaker) holds the statement to be true. Because the truth of the statement, depends, partly on what he believes and partly on what he means by his words. Therefore, the interpretation of verbal behaviour involves the abstraction of roles of belief and meaning, based on the type of statements made by the speaker. This abstraction of belief helps in deciding the meaning of what the speaker says. But in this task, in order to get the meaning of what the speaker says, it is not profitable to take the constituents (words) one by one. Because, words get meaning only in a larger system of language as a whole, where the roles to be played by the words are specified. 'Believing' in something is a psychological phenomena. 'Believing' as a psychological state cannot be described fully in terms of physical concepts. That is, there is no precise law-like connection between a belief state and the corresponding physical states. This shows that the psychological system is not a closed system. In Davidson's words: "psychological phenomena are not, even in theory, amenable to precise prediction or subsumption under deterministic laws. The

limit thus placed on the social sciences is set not by nature, but by us when we decide to view men as rational agents with goals and purposes, and as subject to moral evaluation"<sup>14</sup> .

This type of explanation will include only rough and ready generalisations and these generalisations for Davidson are incapable of being refined into strict laws. In Armstrong's interpretation of Davidson's theory he (Armstrong) says, even if one attempts that, it will be "at the cost of completely deserting the mental vocabulary"<sup>15</sup> . Because in this task, Davidson believes, one has to look for vocabulary of theoretical physics and there are no strict correlations between that vocabulary and a mental one. For Davidson, therefore, "if we consider the way in which beliefs and desires issue in behaviour, then it can be rather easily seen that belief X and desire Y will issue in behaviour Z only against some mental background"<sup>16</sup> . If someone who wants to go for a drink perceives the public house before him and then thinking that his desire will be satisfied, has to step inside. But suppose that he believes, that his enemy is inside, and meeting his enemy is something more than his going for refreshment, his behaviour will be different. And similarly there may be many mental factors which can change the situation again and again and this is what makes it difficult to link the mental and the physical by virtue of strict laws.

Davidson tries to put the holistic realm of the mental apart from the physical as he accepts the view with causal theorists and functionalists, that mental plays a peculiar role in the explanation of behaviour and that one should attribute inevitably "a certain amount of coherence, rationality and consistency to

the person who has the states". Armstrong comments that, one may do so, by using the 'principle of charity'. This 'principle of charity' has no physical counter-part, and is not accepted in physical theory as it is considered as vague to some extent. Further, there may be various charitable interpretations, allowing only a partial interpretation of facts. This may be the reason why Davidson thinks that psycho-physical generalisations can never become precise laws to whatever extent psychology develops.

Howard Robison believes that Davidson's anomalous monism is not a genuine form of materialism. Davidson adopts a non-reductionist approach claiming that a human being is equal to physical plus mental. Therefore, a human being is not a material body only. Robison says that Davidson's 'dual aspect theory' makes man a mental object as much as a material one. Robison says that an attempt is made by modern materialist theorists to give a total world description in terms of physical science. Davidson allowing some non-physical, irreducible events in his 'anomalous monism' makes this idea difficult.

Robinson further say that, Davidson's theory, may create problems for the unity of scientific theory. If mental events are taken as causally influencing the physical, then new type of psycho-physical and psychological law will emerge which will be different from laws of the physical sciences. Related to this, objections can be raised against this dual aspect theory, as are raised against dualism (for example, regarding the interaction between mental and physical). This endangers the unity of

physical science.

Robinson not only names Davidson's theory, as a 'dual aspect theory' but also calls it epiphenomenalistic. Davidson espouses 'mechanism'<sup>18</sup> and holds it to be necessarily true, consistent with his second principle, namely, nomological character of causality. And therefore Davidson cannot hold that the mental can cause physical and upholding mechanism, he can say that the physical can cause mental but not vice-versa. Robinson points out that Davidson also accepts this but interprets it in an unnatural way. In his theory, every mental event has to be a physical event, "although mental states and properties are not identical with any physical states or properties. Hence mental events can cause physical events, because they themselves are physical event. Thus, if my feeling a pain in the leg is identical with brain event B, and brain event B causes my hand to reach for my leg, then (the event of) my feeling a pain caused me to reach my leg"<sup>19</sup>. Here the necessary and sufficient conditions for the action are physical and therefore mental becomes only an idle by-product of the physical system. But Davidson and others who bring this theory of event-identity and apply it to mental and physical events deny epiphenomenalism.

Davidson in turn accepts causal interactionism as one of the important principles. But the type of interaction supposed in the theory is entirely 'empty', says Robinson. There cannot be any interaction at all as the mental part does not bring about any effect. It means then, even if the mental had been absent, the effect would not have been different. Robinson points out that, if we call this an interaction, then by another argument one may

show that inert gases interact with other gases. In fact, an inert gas does not contribute anything in an ignition process. Therefore, it cannot be said to interact with other gases. The same thing is applicable to mental events in this theory. The fact that mental events and states are present is not sufficient to say that it interacts with physical.

Robinson critically comments that, "the Davidsonian claim that mental event make a contribution, when combined with admission that the mental state does not is fundamentally misleading"<sup>20</sup>.

According to Armstrong, the first two principles accepted by Davidson can be used to support 'Ontological physicalism'. The two principles are - the principle of causal interaction and the principle of nomological character of causality. Armstrong quotes Davidson to put forth Davidson's argument:

"Suppose  $m$ , a mental event, caused  $p$ , a physical event, then under some description  $m$  and  $p$  instantiate a strict law. This law can only be physical, ... But if  $m$  falls under a physical law, it has a physical description, which is to say it is a physical event. An analogous argument works when a physical event causes a mental event"<sup>21</sup>.

Armstrong points out that if one accepts the premisses of the argument and holds that the mental and the physical are identical, then it is obvious to assume the extra properties of the physical events in question, which go to constitute 'mental' and are of a non-physical nature. But he says that these extra properties should give causal power to the mental and in case if

this does not happen then this goes against the principle of causal interaction on the one hand and on the other if they do bestow the causal power, then those properties bestow a law governed power, leading to the conclusion that there must be precise psycho-physical laws which is contrary to one of the principles accepted by Davidson.

Davidson in his non-reductive materialism holds that mental supervenies upon the physical. Howard Robinson calls Davidson's theory 'epiphenomenal' and says that Davidson's claim about supervenience of the mental on the physical is useless to his non-reductive materialism. He says that one of the criterion to find out whether an event is epiphenomenal and is not interacting with other things, is to observe that in its (event's) absence, what causal consequences we would have, other things remaining the same. Robinson maintains that, "a interacts with b to produce c only if a causally explains c, ..." <sup>22</sup>. He points out that Davidson's theory upholding mechanism, the occurrence of mental states causally explains nothing. In other words it may be said that, in the absence of mental states, other things remaining the same, the world would remain physically the same. That is, there would have been no changes in the physical events. Thus he says that in Davidson's theory mental remains only a by product of the physical.

However, Robinson considers it important to examine the difference between the fashionable concept of supervenience and reduction. He says that, Davidson and Peacocke call themselves non-reductionists. For Davidson, it is the psychical nature of our experiences that is irreducible, while Peacocke maintains

that, "not merely are mental predicates irreducible, but that subjectivity is a sui generis non-physical phenomenon"<sup>23</sup> .

Robinson mentions two types of reductions. The translation reduction and the nothing but reduction. The 'nothing but' reduction is illustrated by the relation between the atoms and macroscopic objects. Some philosophers consider this 'nothing but' reduction as 'reduction' whereas some regard it as materialism without reduction. Davidson's and Peacocke's approach may be seen as 'nothing-but' reduction approach. Davidson attempts to avoid the form of strong reductionism whereas Peacocke attempts to espouse it and yet both regard themselves as non-reductionists.

The philosophers who say that mental supervenes on the physical maintain that "there cannot be a mental difference without a physical one"<sup>24</sup> . According to Davidson every psychological event is a physiological event. But he says that mental language (description of a mental act) cannot be translated into terms referring to physiological. One may be puzzled about this condition, because it raises doubts about the 'necessity' generated by the word 'cannot' in the above quoted statement. This 'necessity' cannot be a form of aposteriori type, given by kripke while arguing against the identity theory. In Peacock's theory, aposteriori necessity cannot be applied in order "to make the occurrence of the appropriate P-states without M-states impossible"<sup>25</sup> . Robinson says that we are forced here to look for a form of a priori necessity which would be compatible with the contention that mental language is not translatable into

terms referring to physiological conditions. And Robinson says that the only alternative is to go for topic-neutral analysis, where mental states and physical states are considered as necessarily equal.

Those philosophers who uphold the supervenience of the mental deny that mental descriptions can be translated into physical ones. Therefore they prefer 'nothing but' reduction to 'translation reduction'. But, Robinson says that, because of the incompatibility between the concept of the supervenience and the non-reductionist condition about the mental, they are forced to adopt a topic-neutral analysis. In topic neutral analysis there is no emphasis on the strict translation of mental description into a physical one and this (topic neutral) form of analysis is favoured by contemporary analytical reductionist. According to Robinson there is no great difference between the two forms of reductions. If this is true then Robinson says that, "supervenience relation does not give us a new way to an intuitively acceptable non-reductive form of materialism, but rather entails the modern sort of reductive or 'translation' materialism associated with such philosophers as J.J.C. Smart and D.M. Armstrong".

J.J.C. Smart comments that, Davidson does not seem to be interested in putting forth a wide sweeping meta-physical theory or to be concerned with the unity of science. He says that, Davidson's concern about mental is as narrow as his concern about "propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, hopes, and fears. Occurrent experiences such as the having of an itch, of a memory image, or of a visual sense datum are not obviously

propositional in nature. If Davidson's argument does not touch these occurrent experiences, then if it is taken to be an argument for materialism in general there is a serious lacuna in it. It is these occurrent experiences that have often been supposed to provide the greatest difficulty for the materialist"<sup>27</sup> .

Smart points out that Davidson's talk about 'psychology' is not about the 'Scientific Psychology' - which avoids reference to intentional states. Smart maintains that, there is something about our language of beliefs and desires such that, it will forever prevent the language to have "the character of determinate factuality that would be needed for there to be a nomological theory of these mental states"<sup>28</sup> . Smart is of the opinion that scientific psychology alone can make reliable predictions of human behaviour, avoiding reference to intentional states. It attempts to explain human action as not flowing from intentional states but will analyse human behaviour in various ways different from those of common sense. Smart's contention that this type of scientific psychology is different from 'psychology' as defined by Davidson is further upheld and supported by Kathleen V. Wilkes.

Wilkes says that, it has become a fashion in philosophy to talk in terms of 'common sense psychology' or 'folk psychology'. But philosophers, along with common sense psychology are interested also in scientific psychology. Some philosophers also talk about common sense psychology as a<sub>n</sub> would be scientific theory, for example, she mentions - P.M. Churchland 1981; P.S.

Churchland 1986; Stich 1983. Other philosophers and she mentions Davidson in this group, "think that we are struck with common sense psychology, but that it can never be tightened into a genuine science and that, therefore, psychology is not a science"<sup>29</sup>. A third group, she says consists of philosophers like J.A. Fodor, H. Field, Lycan W., who say that, "we have no reason to doubt that it is possible to have a scientific psychology that vindicates common sense belief/desire explanation"<sup>30</sup>. In other words it may be understood that, these philosophers expect that common-sense psychological concepts would provide a conceptual framework such that within that framework their 'theories' of action, perception and thought can be derived.

The first task Wilkes takes up is to distinguish between common sense psychology and scientific psychology. Wilkes points out that common sense psychology and scientific psychology are not in competition for certain reasons. She maintains that "common sense psychology is a quasi-scientific theory, and that an elaboration of it is both needed and would make it a genuine theory, CSP is not a 'theory' in any substantial sense of those terms and, hence, neither is it interested in the same phenomena as is SP nor is it subject to the same criteria for assessment as is SP"<sup>31</sup>. (SP = Scientific psychology and CSP = Common-sense psychology). Wilkes says that, scientific activity is distinct from the conversation that goes on in the street, does not matter how 'continuous' it may be. For she says that two entities far apart may be continuous: as bumps in her lawn and Himalayas. The fact that two elements are continuous, that is 'mere' continuity between two elements one should not take as implying that there

is no substantial difference between them. Wilkes mentions, that the continuum holds between common sense psychology and scientific psychology as far as both are concerned to explain and predict human and animal behaviour. But after this, 'anodyne point' she says the similarities end. She distinguishes between the two above by saying that, "SP attempts to explain and predict generally. CSP however is interested in explaining the particular. George wants to know why his daughter Georgina has become a skin head, a mathematics professor, or a born-again christain, rather than why teenagers are tempted to become skin heads, to take up mathematics, or to get way laid by fundamentalism. And, he would have a much better chance of finding a satisfactory explanation if he looked to the specificities of Georgina's individual history - which as her father he probably knows rather well - rather than if he resorted to his local university collection in psychology (which is not to say that he would not find indirect help there for his researches: more of that anon). CSP wants to know, roughly, why this X did exactly that action O at exactly that time and in this manner ...SP wants to know how it is that people do the sorts of things that people characteristically do <sup>32</sup>do.

Wilkes further mentions a methodological difference between common-sense psychology and scientific psychology.

The former is not 'methodological' whereas the latter traditionally has tried to be methodologically rigorous as natural sciences and Wilkes says that this methodological rigor is partly because of the German founding fathers of it like woundt

and Freud who were physiologists.

She says further, that common sense psychology framework is a 'multi-purpose tool' and that it "is not threatened or heartened by any advances in neuro-psychology or neuro-science because it is cheerfully independent of them. This means that in its eclectic manner - it can pick up whatever it wants from scientific theories, and generally of course (because it is the psychology of the laymen) prefers to pick up terms and ideas that are trendy enough to get discussed in glossy magazines" <sup>33</sup> .

Wilkes says that the theories of action and perception discussed by philosophers, with reference to common sense psychology are 'arm chair' theories of action and perception and therefore they "are and will be going nowhere" <sup>34</sup> .

Granting that Davidson argues successfully for the anomalousness of the mental, J.J.C. Smart says that it may be argued that Davidson's argument is circular by pointing out to the principle that he accepts. The principle may be stated as that, "when events are related as cause and effect, they have descriptions that instantiate a law" <sup>35</sup> . Smart says that, Davidson's theory being a dual aspect theory, it is not clear how Davidson accepts the second principle and to what use it can be put. Smart says that, he (Smart) being a materialist can accept the principle. But Davidson being a 'anomalous dualist' (as Smart calls him), it is possible that some philosophers might feel, that his argument is circular. Though Davidson's argument has a true conclusion (and Smart thinks that it has), those philosophers who actually use causal language, Smart says that, they may not accept it to be true. Smart expresses the

possibility of the development of causal language in an animistic context and says that, people believe in something that it happening, because they feel that some God or Spirit wants it to happen. Smart compares man with an analogue computer maintaining the view that human beings are mechanisms which can be explained by natural laws, along with the plans of our construction. But, he says that this is the very thing of which, those philosophers who need to be convinced by Davidson's argument, possibly might reject it.

Smart maintains that, "a truly scientific psychology cannot use the language of the propositional attitudes"<sup>36</sup>. He says that, from the above corollary, Davidson, most ingeniously argues for, irreducible psychical aspect of our experiences and yet upholds materialism. He says that, this type of materialism, what Davidson argues for, may be called minimal materialism<sup>37</sup>, as David Lewis calls it.

#### NOTES :

1. 'Type-type' and 'token-token' reduction: In the 'type-type' reduction the correlation may be 'one-one' or 'one-many'. 'One-one' correlation is tight and exceptionless, for example 'all women are daughters'. 'One-many' correlation is a rough correlation, for example, 'all soldiers are brave individuals'.

In a 'token-token' reduction the correlation is between the description of the object under which it falls. The theories discussing mind-brain correlation based on 'type' or 'token' form of reduction widely differ. To illustrate, all thoughts that, 'the chance of having a nuclear war is less now', in the 'type-type' way, the correlation, will be with the brain-processes of 'type-P' only. And in case of 'token-token' correlation, for the same thought there will be 'some' brain-processes correlating it, to the extent that, the same thought in different people and in the same person at different times will have different brain-states correlating it.

2. Thomas Nagel, "Armstrong on the Mind", Philosophical Review, Vol. LXXIX, No.3, 1970, p.398.
3. Ibid., pp. 398-399.
4. Thomas Nagel, "what Is It Like To Be a Bat?", Philosophical Review, Vol. 83, No.4, 1974, p.436.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 437.
7. Nagel holds that we are not incorrigible about our experience. He maintains that phenomenal facts are objective. That is, one person can know or say of another person, whatever the qualities of his experience are. But they (phenomenal facts) are subjective, "in the sense that even this objective ascription of experience is possible only for someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascription to be able to adopt his point of view -to understand the ascription in the first person as well as in the third,... The more different from oneself the other experiences is, the less success one can expect with this enterprise". - Thomas Nagel, "what Is It Like To Be a Bat?" Philosophical Review, Vol.83, No.4, 1974, p.442.
8. Ibid., p.441.
9. Donald Davidson, "Replies to Essays X-XII", in Essays on Davidson, eds. Bruce Vermazen and Merrill B. Hintikka, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985, pp.244-245.
10. Donald Davidson, "Psychology As Philosophy", in Philosophy of Psychology, ed. S.C. Brown, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1974, p.42.
11. Ibid., p.43.
12. Ibid.
13. D.M. Armstrong, "Recent work on the Relation of Mind and Brain", in contemporary Philosophy, Vol.4. ed. G. Floistad, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster : Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986, p.61.
14. Donald Davidson, "Psychology As Philosophy" in Philosophy of Psychology, ed. S.C. Brown, Macmillan Press Ltd., p.52.
15. D.M. Armstrong, op.cit., p.62.
16. Ibid., p.63.
17. Ibid., p.64.
18. Mechanism : the view that, if a physical event has a causal

explanation, then that explanation will be in terms of necessary and sufficient physical conditions.

19. Howard Robinson, Matter And Sense, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 10-11.
20. Ibid., p.11.
21. Donald Davidson, "Mental Events", in Experience and theory, eds. L. Foster and J.L. Swanson, London, University of Massachusetts Press, 1970, pp. 79-101.
22. Howard Robinson, op.cit., p.20.
23. Ibid., p.24.
24. Ibid., p.21.
25. Ibid., pp.28-29.
26. Ibid., p.29.
27. J.J.C. Smart, "Davidson's Minimal Materialism", in Essays on Davidson eds. Bruce Vermazen and Merrill B. Hintikka, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985, pp. 174-175.
28. Ibid., p.178.
29. K.V.Wilkes, "The relationship between Scientific Psychology and Common Sense Psychology" Syntheses, Vol.89, No.1, 1991, p.15.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
32. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
33. Ibid., p. 27.
34. Ibid., p. 16.
35. Donald Davidson, "Mental events", in Essays on Action and Events, Oxford, 1980, p.215.
36. J.J.C. Smart, "Davidson's Minimal Materialism", in Essays on Davidson, eds. Bruce Vermazen and Merril B. Hintikka, oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985, p.182.
37. David Lewis, "Radical Interpretation", synthese, 23, 1974, p.334.

## CHAPTER VII

### DUALISM RE-ADMITTED: PSYCHOPHYSICAL INTERACTIONISM

The idea to compare man and his functioning to a machine, an automata, is a very old one. According to Karl C. Popper the similarities which are observed in a functioning of a man and a machine, force the materialists to compare a man with a machine. But he says that, the similarities are so few and of little importance, that if one looks at the differences between them, he will be forced to think in an opposite direction.

Popper gives certain reasons for the above claim. He says that, the fact that a human being is irreplaceable is very important. It is true that organs of a human being can be replaced, like parts of a machine. The observed similarity here, is at the lower level, whereas in the case of organism as a whole, it is very different from a machine. This can be shown by another great difference between the two. That is a human being enjoys life, suffers and faces death consciously. Popper feels that human beings are ends in themselves and this aspect of human beings, raises their value immeasurably. Popper says, "machines are clearly not ends in themselves, however complicated they may be. They may be valuable because of their usefulness, or because of their rarity; and a certain specimen may be valuable because of its historical uniqueness. But machines become valueless if they do not have a rarity value; if there are too many of a kind we are prepared to pay to have them removed. On the other hand, we value human lives in spite of the problem of over population, the greatest of all social problems of our time. We respect even

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the life of a murderer" .

Therefore, to hold the doctrine that men are machines, is not only mistaken but also is something that lowers the dignity of a man as a moral man.

According to Popper classical materialism viewed matter as "something extended in space or occupying space (or parts of space), was ultimate; essential; substantial; an essence or substance neither capable of further explanation nor in need of it, and thus a principle in terms of which everything else had to be, and could be, explained" .

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He further states that, classical materialism is transcended by explanatory theories of matter in modern physics; Newton's gravitation theory and the very important discovery of an electron by J.J. Thomson and H.A. Lorenz, led to the view that even the tiny atom could be divided.

Matter is not 'Substance', since it can be destroyed and created and neither it is the possessor of properties in the sense of 'persisting' during the changes taking place. In the light of the above advances, there is some change in the earlier view that man is a machine, and has forced materialists to say that men and animals are 'electro-chemical' machines. The supporters of this view are U.T. Place, J.J.C. Smart and D.M. Armstrong in the debates in philosophy of mind.

Popper holds that 'matter' is real alongwith the forces, the fields of forces, the charges, the entities that we find in physics. These are abstract entities, but real, as they affect causally prima facie real things or can explain changes in the ordinary material objects in the world.

The biological view according to Popper, maintains that life must have originated from the chemical synthesis of giant self-reproducing molecules. Thus it proves that dead matter has got more potentialities, that is, besides producing matter it can produce life, mind, consciousness, language, etc.

According to Popper, a great role is played by the individual preferences and skills, in selecting the new environment in evolution. In Darwin's theory acquired characteristics are not inherited. In the theory of natural selection, evolution takes place through "an interaction between blind chance working from within the organism (mutation) and external forces upon which the organism has no influence" .

However, Popper disagrees with Darwin with regard to the above aspect of evolution, and holds that organism's preferences, skills, aims, activities are often decisive and it is not only this aspect that makes new adaptations more understandable but also lead to the evolution of that organism. In other words, the organism chooses its environment. And thus man 'chose' the evolution of his brain and mind, by choosing to speak. It is the interaction with language according to Popper, that lead to the emergence of human brain and consciousness of self.

Evolution from matteralist's point of view is a process through which all that is potential, or pre-formed becomes actual, Popper finds this view misleading and wrong. For evolution has brought into existence many unforeseeable things. Therefore, for him, evolution is creative.

It produced sentient animals with conscious experiences,

initially in an undeveloped state. leading to the conscious experience of a higher kind and creativity.

Popper while explaining his idea of creative evolution says that, it is a fact that at one time in the universe there were no other elements, other than for example hydrogen, helium, etc. Those who had knowledge about the operating physical laws, could not predict the properties of heavier elements nor could say that they will emerge. Therefore, Popper says, we can reach the conclusion that, something unforeseeable has emerged.

Popper holds that there are stages in the evolutionary process of the universe and that it has produced things, unpredictable and unforeseen at a prior stage. Popper tries to make it clear by introducing 'three worlds' --- world 1, world 2, and world 3 --- each world representing an aspect of life and environment. Thus world 1 according to Popper, is the world of physical objects, which is constituted by, hydrogen and helium, the heavier elements, liquids and crystals.

World 2, is the world of subjective experiences, consisting of man's consciousness of self and of death. Animal consciousness is also included in world 2.

World 3 is the product of human mind and creativity. It includes works of art and of science (including technology). Popper also classifies human language and theories of self and of death, as belonging to world 3.

According to the reductionist idea things at a higher level can be explained in terms of things at a lower level. Popper says that, reduction as a research programme is very important, but he doubts the possibility of achieving this 'reduction' to the lower

level. Popper comments that, the final success of the reductionist programme cannot be claimed, as claimed by Hilary Putnam and Paul Oppenheim.

Some philosophers think that, when we move from a lower level to a higher level, the principle of upward causation can be traced along with the belief that the higher forms cannot act on the lower ones. Society for instance, functions inspite of the death of different members of it. Popper reacting to the above contention says that, a strike in an essential industry, may affect the life of many. An animal can still survive with the death of some cells, in the body, even after removing some organs from body, but if the organism itself dies, then it means the death of all constituting organs. He cites these examples of downward causation, to show that the reductionist programme is difficult.

Popper, an exponent of 'emergent or creative' evolution, says that in the process of evolution different new things can occur whose prediction is not possible. One cannot predict the probability of their emergence, before they come into existence. Consciousness, mind, brain have emerged in the process of evolution. The 'emergent evolution' has been criticised by determinists, classical atomists and supporters of capacity or potentiality theories.

For a determinist nothing is unpredictable. Popper quotes Laplace to highlight the determinist viewpoint: "We ought ... to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its anterior state and as the cause of the one which is to follow.

Assume ... an intelligence which could know all the forces by which nature is animated, and the states at an instance of all the objects that compose it; ... for (this intelligence), nothing would be uncertain; and the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes" <sup>4</sup>.

Popper points out that Laplace, is one of those who accepted the view that because of subjectively insufficient knowledge, we do not know the precise nature of an object and that objective chance like events do not exist. Popper replies that "modern physics assumes that there are objectively chance like events and objective probabilities and potentialities" <sup>5</sup>.

While reacting to second criticism of classical atomists, Popper argues that in different bodies and organisms it is only the arrangement of atoms that we find new and this new arrangement can be predicted in principle, and that "new atomic arrangements may lead to physical and chemical properties which are not derivable from a statement describing the arrangement of the atoms, combined with a statement of atomic theory" <sup>6</sup>.

The supporters of the potentially argument may argue that, what is termed as 'emergent' cannot be so called in strict sense for there will be 'particles' or 'structures' which has the capacity to produce the thing what is 'emergent'. If it is possible for us to know the 'hidden' then evolution cannot be 'emergent'. The 'Uniformity' that we find in the Universe and the 'invariant' aspect of its law --- due to this we can say that Universe does not change.

Popper taking into account the above mentioned criticisms, claims that there can be 'emergence' or 'creativity'. Popper

points out that, "the system of invariant laws is not sufficiently complete and restrictive to prevent the emergence of new law like properties"<sup>7</sup>. He gives the example of the property of development and other properties which occur in the course of time and evolution.

All living organisms, being material bodies are subject to all physical and chemical laws, as they belong to the world of physical entities. The various processes, forces, fields of forces, in the Universe interact with living organisms. Besides this, Popper maintains, that there are mental states and they are real, as real as physical objects in the Universe: and they too interact with material bodies. A good example of this mental-physical interaction he mentions is that of a tooth-ache. One is naturally led to think of interaction between mental and physical from such examples and that it is in the same way Descartes thought of interaction between mind and body.

Popper talks of an interaction between World 1, World 2 and World 3. As explained above, World 1 stands for physical world, World 2 stands for mental states, including states of consciousness, psychological states or dispositions and unconscious states. World 3 consists of products of human mind. Such as theories of science, stories, scientific problems and works of art.

According to Popper, many objects of World 3, we find as material bodies and hence they also belong to world 1, for example, a book, but the content of the book is the product of human mind. World 3 objects have a reality and autonomy of their

own. Since they can further influence a man to bring about other World 3 objects and also can lead to inter-action with World 1.

The interaction and the relation between the three worlds as Popper maintains, can be seen from the following:

"The productive scientist as a rule starts from a problem. He will try to understand the problem. This is usually a lengthy intellectual task - a world 2 attempt to grasp a World 3 object. Admittedly, in doing so he may use books (or other scientific tools in the World 1 materialisations). But his problem may not be stated in these books; rather, he may discover an unstated difficulty in the stated theories. This may involve a creative effort: the effort to grasp the abstract problem situation; if at all possible, better than it was done before. Then he may produce his solution, his new theory. This may be put into linguistic form in innumerable ways. He chooses one of them then he will critically discuss his theory; and he may greatly modify it as a result of the discussion. It is then published and discussed by others, on logical grounds and possibly on the basis of new experiments undertaken to test it and the theory may be rejected if it fails in the test. And only after all these intellectual efforts and these interactions with World 1 may somebody discover some far-reaching application (electronics!) that changes World 1" 8.

Karl Popper in the above passage, attempts to show that although the theories are the products of human mind, through their influence on World 1, it is proved that they are objectively real and are autonomous. Many embodied objects constitute World 3, which is, result of human thought and efforts. Besides this there are unembodied things or objects, as Popper claims which also constitute World 3. A scientist usually is interested in understanding World 1, but for this purpose he makes use of World 3 as a tool (as theories are the product of human mind). Based on these theories, we get 'applied science' and the reality of unembodied objects in World 3 can be grounded in the above facts.

For a scientist using World 3 as a tool it is possible to understand World 1 only through the intervention of their makers, that is through the human grasping which is a World 2 process. Because of this typical inter-acting relation between World 1, World 2 and World 3, we are forced here to admit the reality of World 2 and World 3. The illustration of capacity and need to learn a language is cited. One's capacity and the strong need to learn a language is something a part of our genetic set-up. Whereas the actual learning of a language motivated by unconscious needs is not a natural process, but a cultural one which belong to World 3. Our need to learn a language interacts with our conscious process of exploring and learning, which has its basis in the cultural evolution. This is how the interaction takes place between World 3 and World 1, through World 2.

An individual, can be said to be a product of World 3 to some extent. Our personality development takes place through our interaction with the material World, the environment and its mastery, with other individuals in the society. The ability to learn and to understand helps an individual in mastering the environment, and most of these processes belong to World 3 are cultural processes.

In Popper's psycho-physical interactionism between the three worlds, world 2 is of crucial importance. It is in this world 2, Popper includes subjective experiences, ideas about 'self' (and ideas about 'self' are equated with ideas about 'mind'), consciousness, etc. Popper accepts the existence of the 'self' but avoids what is 'questions about' 'self'. For, Popper thinks that "what is questions about self are connected with the idea of

essences - leading to essentialism" .

Popper holds that we are not only aware of our self but also aware of identity of self, throughout our life in spite of breaks due to sleep and unconsciousness. He considers memory and capacity to recollect as very important requirements of self-awareness.

The individual who feels, hopes, fears, enjoys, dreams, etc. is a 'self'. Each 'self' experiences the above processes and the others can only infer or guess their occurrences since these processes can only be experienced by that person alone. Popper here strongly contradicts with Wittgenstein's views on private sensations. Wittgenstein maintains that our subjective experiences are in no way 'private'.

Popper agrees with Ryle as far as the denial of Cartesian substance is concerned but he still accepts the platonic idea of 'mind' piloting the ship.

Popper maintains that our self is, "linked with what is usually called character or personality. It changes: it depends in part on a person's physical type, and also in his intellectual initiative and inventiveness, and on his development. Nevertheless, I think that we are psycho-physical processes rather than substances"<sup>10</sup> .

In explaining how we learn to be 'selves' Popper seems to advance a socialistic type of a theory. He says that with an inborn interest in the human face, people around (parents) there is the beginning of one's learning to be a self. This 'interest' leading to the 'understanding' of other persons, creates the

consciousness of the self in the child. The child uses the people around as the medium, the mirror in which the child sees the reflection of his own self, other people's consciousness of his self. Thus child get's the idea of his self through an interaction with the people around.

Individuation of the self, Popper holds as the necessary requirement for the evolution of the self. Individuality of a human organism is different from that of a piece of metal. They are 'closed' systems with regards to their material particles, whereas a human being is an 'open' system, as there is the exchange or replacement of material particles. They react to the environment and hence are dynamic processes and yet they are identifiable individuals. The self controlling aspect of the human being corresponds to the biological functioning of the human mind that is the brain or the highly centralised nervous system.

According to Popper a new born baby cannot be called a 'person' in the fullest sense. It is just a developing human body with the capacity to experience pain and pleasure. From this he concludes that our body comes first and then the mind - piloting the ship. Popper holds that our mental integrity and the self identity, is centered in the brain.

Popper accepts the analogy of brain and the computer as far as the biological functioning of mind is concerned, but he points out the helplessness of the computer without the programmer. He maintains that, "the brain is owned by the self, rather than the other way round. The self is almost always active. The activity of selves Popper says as, "the only genuine activity we know. The

active, psycho-physical, is the active programmer to the brain (which is the computer) it is the executive whose instrument is the brain. The mind is, as Plato said, the pilot. It is not as David Hume and William James suggested, the sum total, or the bundle, or the stream of its experiences: this suggests passivity. It is, I suppose, a view that results from passively trying to observe oneself, instead of thinking back and reviewing one's past actions".

"I suggest that these considerations show that the self is not a "pure ego" ... that is a mere subject rather it is incredibly rich. Like a pilot it observes and takes action at the same time. It is acting and suffering, recalling the past and planning and programming the future, expecting and disposing. It contains, in quick succession, or all at once, wishes, plans, hopes, decisions to act, and a vivid consciousness of being an acting self, a centre of action. And it owes this selfhood largely to interaction with other persons, other selves and with world <sup>11</sup> 3" .

Locke considered mind as a 'tabula rasa' an empty sheet, empty chamber and maintained that all knowledge is through our experiences in the life-time. Popper not only disagrees with this but also further adds that the large amount of information that we get through our experiences in life, is very small when compared with the inherited potentialities in the ten thousand million neurons of our cerebral cortex, and "some of them (the cortical pyramidal cells) each with "an estimated total of ten thousand" 'synaptic links', as Eccles mentions <sup>12</sup> .

According to Popper, the inborn ability to use the acquired information and knowledge is more important alongwith the inherited potentialities and knowledge.

World 3 consists of the acquired knowledge and World 2 consists of the psychological (subjective experiences) processes and hence Popper holds that, 'fully conscious intelligent work' is the result of the interaction between the above two Worlds.

According to Popper, one's intellectual grasp of the problem and a conscious solution of that proves one's consciousness. However, empiricists have said of sense-perception as only paradigm of conscious experiences.

As far as the biological functioning of consciousness and the resulting intelligent activity is concerned, Popper argues that: "The evolution of consciousness, and of conscious intelligent effort, and later that of language and of reasoning - and of World 3 - should be considered teleologically, as we consider the evolution of bodily organs as serving certain purposes, and as having evolved under certain selection pressures" <sup>13</sup> .

Popper while arguing for consciousness says that the solution to the routine problems comes unconsciously, it is the problem of non-routine type that demand conscious activity. Further, criticising, selecting, unexpected or new theories need consciousness or are the things to be done consciously. Again, consciousness is very important in the process of taking decisions or choosing an aim, or purpose when there are alternatives to be tried.

For Popper however, consciousness cannot be strictly indentified with self. For the self is continuous whereas

consciousness is interrupted by periods of sleep - the 'unconscious "parts" of the self', without disturbing the continuity of the self. The unconscious parts of the self are very important or play an important role in the unity and continuity of the self. We try to recall what happened in the immediate past - before unconscious part begins - and the things which are in the unconscious are brought at the level of consciousness.

Popper through his biological approach illustrates the unity, continuity and the individuality of the self - all put together, he thinks that, it throws light on the understanding of human consciousness of the self. Popper believes although in animals self-preservation is an instinctive behaviour they are unaware of their death and most important thing is, unlike man they do not have power to reflect and revise critically.

Returning to Popperian three world schema, one observes that world of things that is, of physical objects, is the world 1. The second world consists of our experiences, world 3 consists of theories, which is the product of human mind. A book although is material, belongs to world 3 because its content is the creation of human mind. World 3 objects have a reality and autonomy of their own. In other words world 3 cannot be reduced to world 2 and world 2 in turn to world 1. For instance when we are recalling a picture or a painting, efforts are made to bring the picture before our eyes. We can distinguish between "(a) a real picture, (b) the process of imagining, which involves an effort, and (c) the more or less successful result, that is, the imagined

picture. Clearly, the imagined picture (c) belongs exactly like (b) to the second world rather than to the third ... the imagined picture may be said to be the content of the process of imagining"<sup>14</sup>. And therefore is considered to be mental and belongs to world 2.

But contents are parts of thinking process and "one man's thought processes cannot contradict those of another man; or his own thought processes at some other time; but the contents of his thoughts - that is, the statements in themselves, cannot stand in psychological relations: thoughts in the sense of contents or statements in themselves and thoughts in the sense of thought processes belong to two entirely different "worlds""<sup>15</sup>.

It is in this sense the books, journals, letters and the theories belong to the third world. The physically non-observable message that is coded in the book, in a theory, is decoded by the reader and is real, in the sense that it can act upon material objects and which can be acted upon by material objects. That changes are brought about not by the physical aspect of the book, but mainly by the information, the message that is conveyed through the theory. The decoding of the message by the reader is a mental process and belongs to world 2 and it is through this world 2, world 1 and world 3 can interact indirectly.

Popper is then a realist believing in the reality of theories, as they are capable of exerting their influence. Again, the third world is autonomous because of "unintended and unforeseen consequences"<sup>16</sup> like the production of prime numbers, square numbers and other things in the third world itself. In other words the third world consists of "the inventions of human

mind. Thus, whatever is created by human mind, will have its own laws, and therefore autonomous, and it is this, through which unforeseen consequences are possible.

It is with the help of this world 3, Popper adopts a biological, evolutionist approach to the mind-body problem. The approach is taken as dealing with both, our subjective states of consciousness and our selves. Mind is understood as, "highly developed bodily organ"<sup>17</sup> contributing to the organism as a whole. Popper explains thus: "... we regard the human mind first of all as an organ that produces objects of the human third world (in the more general sense) and interacts with them. Thus I propose that we look upon the human mind, essentially as the producer of human language, for which our basic aptitudes .. are inborn; and as the producer of theories, of critical arguments, and many other things such as mistakes, myths, stories, witticisms, tools and works of art"<sup>18</sup> .

According to Popper language is first to emerge as it is the basis of the capacity to imagine and to invent and thus, there is the emergence of the third world.

The speech centre, constitutes the physiological basis for the emergence and development of language which is the highest in the hierarchy of control centres. Popper reviving the Cartesian problem of seat of consciousness in the brain, conjectures that the theory might be testable in case of split brains.

Popper says that, men and animals both are conscious that is in general 'consciousness' which can be distinguished from highly organised states of consciousness. Consciousness emerges before

the emergence of language. But the fullest consciousness of ourselves emerge only through the emergence and development of language. That is when we learn that there are other beings similar to ourself, when we are consciously aware of our bodies as extending in space and time and in becoming aware of continuity of our bodies and ourselves irrespective of breaks during sleep.

Language and the objects of the world 3, Popper holds, can account for the emergence of self. Language leads to the production of world 3 and is open of modification through a feedback coming from world 3.

In our intense mental states (for example, the mental state of a person who is engrossed in solving a problem, understanding a theory) the person forgets himself as his mind is engaged, with utmost concentration, in grasping or producing a world 3 object.

It is because of this grasping or producing a world 3 object we best serve the biological purpose. We cannot think of a physical organ responsible for our utmost concentration, responsible for our linguistic development, anticipation, inventiveness except mind. Thus the concept of mind contributing towards the development of organism as ourself seems indispensable.

This theory, as Popper says is an interactionist theory, where there is the psycho-physical interaction. Physical organs interact with each other and also interact with mind. Popper while explaining interactionism, holds that non-physical entities do influence the physical and therefore physical world is not closed.

Popper being an exponent of 'Emergent evolution' says that there can be novel (new things) occurrences in the evolution process. Popper holds that consciousness and mind has evolved in this way. In his psycho-physical interactionism he maintains that, the non-physical entities may influence the physical world. And therefore he is convinced of the fact that the physical world is not causally closed. His view that the physical world is not causally closed has its basis in Darwinism. According to J. Van Rooijen Popper reasons as follows. Popper maintains that mental experiences must have emerged during evolution. According to Popper, Darwin's theory explains the emergence of anything only if it (the emerging thing) makes a difference. This means that, the mental can influence the physical. So Popper concludes that the physical world is not causally closed.

Rooijen says, if Popper's reasoning is correct, then it shows that there is a contradiction in ethology. Ethology is a branch of biology, a biology of behaviour, in which the assumption of interactionism in evolutionary theory is discussed.

Lorenz and Tinbergen, the founders of ethology emphasise scientific attitude and "a strict observance of the epistemological discipline"<sup>19</sup>. J. Van Roojan attempts to show that there is no such contradiction between evolutionary process and the assumption that the universe is causally closed. In turn if interactionism is allowed, then it will lead to contradiction between interactionism and whatever is stated in ethology on the one hand and with biology and other natural sciences on the other.

Roojan says that development of natural sciences took place

only when non-physical entities were left out or thrown out. The same is true in the case of ethology. But in the later development of ethology, there is a tendency to consider non-physical entities as the causes of behaviour. Since, mental events as private experiences exist and are seen as influencing the material. Roojan points out, "that we tend to see mental events as causes or effects of physiological processes"<sup>20</sup>. This he says according to Lorenz, the founder of ethology, "due to the fact that in daily life we are sometimes more familiar with the psychological and sometimes with the physiological side of events out of a chain of events. As an example he mentions that we say that a severe disappointment causes a heart disorder. Physiological processes belong to the objective world ... psychological phenomena are observable by introspection and therefore only accessible to one person. Such phenomena belong to the subjective world"<sup>21</sup>. Secondly, we believe that higher animals along with human beings have mental experiences. Thirdly, we believe in individual's enjoying freedom, where mind is considered as an entity. Roojan explains further, that mental experiences are seen or taken as adaptations. He says that these mental experiences are adaptive features, which are to be considered as secondary properties and they should be understood as adaptively neutral that is, they make no difference. If the characteristic that emerges is not because of 'logical consequences of a structure', then that characteristic can be called an adaptation. The brown colour of the feathers in many birds, which may help them to protect themselves against the

predators, can be called an adaptation.

Rooijen points out that "the brown colour of the liver is an example of a case in which it is not justified to use the term adaptation... This brown colour is the logical consequence of the presence of biliary ducts and blood vessels... In a similar way mental experiences may well be a logical secondary (non-adaptive) feature of a structure, which evolved because of adaptive properties. Because it is not correct that only things that make a difference have emerged during evolution there exist no contradiction between evolution and the assumption of a causally closed Universe. Although the assumption of a causally closed Universe is not necessarily correct this conclusion implies that Popper's argument for interactionism does not hold" <sup>22</sup> .

Tom Settle reacts to van Rooijen's criticism of Popper. Settle expresses the possibility of Rooijen's misrepresenting Popper's views.

For Roojan, maintains that the introduction of interactionism in ethology will go against the history of science. But Settle points out that Rooijen should note, Popper talks about interactionism in his scientific philosophy and not in ethology. Secondly, it is not necessary that whatever historical method of science is there, it should be followed in future, that is changes are possible in scientific method and its assumptions. Moreover today we see laws of science are not strictly deterministic except in few cases like 'mass effects'. They are all stastical, all probabilistic. Therefore the success of science cannot be attributed to its method alone.

Popper wants to assert that science cannot rule out

interactionism. In Popper we observe interaction between three worlds (the physical, the subjective experiences and the products of mind), which includes the mental physical interactionism. But Popper nowhere explains what is fundamental, in the process of interactionism. Or how the interaction takes place, within a person, that is, how his body and mind interact?

According to Popper World 3 plays a significant role in explaining the interactionism as world 2 is affected dynamically by world 3. Settle comments that, although it is true that world 3 objects are necessary for thought - they can contribute as causes without being dynamic, for example, we see the collapse of social institutions when people stop supporting them.

Settle argues against interactionism, and says that it is not acceptable for certain reasons. According to him, interactionism considers only consciousness and leads to the fragmentation of the mind. The most important reason he says, he cannot accept interactionism lies in the "distaste for the bifurcation of myself into real, parallel (though interacting parts). This is not how I experience myself, nor, I fancy, how anybody else (or any animal) experiences himself or herself... Mind has all the air of a theoretical construct, abstracted from some intriguing, but fleeting, characteristics of reality"<sup>23</sup>.

According to Settle, interactionism is an unsatisfactory theory, as it is not explaining an 'organism' as a whole. He suggests that, in Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy of organism, there is room for the 'specialities' of an organism. Settle favours Whitehead's view, because he feels that, Whitehead

explains what is fundamental than body or mind. Settle puts forth Whitehead's views on what is fundamental as, "that our concepts of both body and mind abstract from a more subtle and unified underlying reality"<sup>24</sup> .

Popper as an interactionist is against the view that human beings are 'physico-chemical' machines, a view advanced by materialists. A particular device is called a machine on the basis of how it functions, operates, changes its states and so forth. Something being called a machine is not dependent on the material out of which it is made - whether it is a TV set or a steam engine or a computer. They are all machines - the matter out of which the machine is made is unimportant. Davor Peonjak points out that, "the configuration of the matter would be totally unimportant. There is not only one configuration of matter that can be called a machine, and that everything that is dissimilar to it is not a machine. From the dissimilarity of the TV-set and the steam-engine we can conclude that, let's say, the steam-engine is not a TV-set, but not that it is not a machine. So, the steam engine, refrigerator, TV-set, formula one V-8 engine can be called machines despite the fact that they differ<sup>25</sup> in configuration of matter very much" .

If this is true then, it may be questioned, 'why should we use the notion of configuration of matter in deciding whether or not humans are machines'?

Popper will be in worse position if we take into account the possibility of the successful functionalistic computational programmes for describing and explaining human psychology and behaviour. A functionalistic computational programme is not

dependent on how it will be realised. In other words, a program can be realised by various physical devices, having different dissimilar configurations of matter. To the extreme that, their realisability is possible by non-physical things also.

Davor Peonjak upholds the view that man can be compared with a machine. Reacting to Popper's views he says that, "if certain functionalistic programmes were to be successful in describing human psychology and mind, it would follow that programme can be realised by various other devices including physical ones, such as computers. But we call computers machines. If the same programme can be performed by computers and human beings, why shouldn't we say that human beings are machines also? It is said that programmes can be realised by non-physical things also. So even if the human mind is not physical, it can nevertheless be a machine".

Thus, even if we assume mind as non-physical, we can still be for determinism and hold that determination is possible in non-physical spheres. In that case the non-physical entities will be subject to non-physical laws and causal relations. From the non-physicality of mind we cannot establish indeterminism as far as mind and mental events are concerned.

Popper rejects determinism in order to allow his emergentism. A distinction can be made, between emergence in the sense of unpredictability, and emergence as involving basic indeterminism. Herbert Feigl and Paul E. Meehl accept that precise prediction, both physically and logically is impossible, even in classical physics along with the special and general

theories of relativity. But it is insisted that this should not be counted as arguments against determinism. That is, "the familiar examples of the impossibility of predicting the properties of complexes (e.g., chemical compounds; organisms; social groups) on the basis of the properties of their constituent parts or components (e.g. chemical elements, cells, individual persons), do not establish an argument against the possibility of deterministic theories that would explain the properties of the "organic wholes"<sup>27</sup>. Thus, the emergence of unpredictable events does not lead to the denial of determinism.

Further, evidence suggests that chemistry in principle can be reduced to atomic and quantum physics and biology to 'molecular structure of nucleic acids'. And genuine emergentism is incompatible with such type of reductionism. In the sense, whatever new changes taking place at a higher level cannot be explained with the help of lower level laws. But there are instances of prediction of novel things with the help of laws at the lower level, for example, prediction of new chemical elements along with their properties and their compounds, "predictions of the phenomenal characteristics of organisms on the basis of theory of genes, etc."<sup>28</sup>. If the antecedent conditions and the consequences of emergence of novel features, are observed then empirical laws can be framed (statistical laws as far as genetics is concerned) allowing a certain degree of indeterminacy.

In the context of the mind body problem it is the sapience, the sentience and self hood that is discussed. Among these three it is the 'sapience' - concerning the human intellectual capacities and activities occupy an important place. Popper

rejects psychological determinism as far as the rational (sapience) aspect of the self is concerned.

On the contrary against Popper's psychological indeterminism, it may be said that predications with high degree are possible even in case of non-experimental situations. It may be pointed out, for example the person who has studied logic, rules of syllogisms, when presented an invalid argument, will point out at illicit distribution of the terms. Thus the degree of prediction in human 'rational' behaviour is higher than in other activities and behaviour as in the case of disliking a particular leader, or somebody's falling in love.

Related to the reductionist deterministic view of psychology, is the issue of conflating reasons with causes. That is "a complete causal account, formulated in terms of microlevel (e.g., electrical and chemical events at neural events)" is seen as incompatible with "our intuitive conviction that our beliefs and actions are influenced by reasons"<sup>29</sup>. But even on the assumption of 'a valid reason', stating it, hearing another person giving a reason, expression of it in a propositional form, all are events which belong to the causal order. Thus, "when one gives a complete causal account of a physical process at a certain level of analysis, he does not thereby claim in making a meta-claim to "causal completeness", that he has asserted everything true that could properly be asserted about the system. In other words, it is the difference between telling the truth and telling the whole truth"<sup>30</sup>.

But Popper is relating and fusing -"Compton's problem"<sup>31</sup> and

"Descartes' problem" and conflates reasons with causes. Compton's question, 'How can I be rational and purposive if determined?' is a philosophical problem. This becomes a crucial problem along with mind-body dichotomy when, "the determining (and determined) events are all set in a purely physicalistic ontology" . It is rather bad to say that our 'mind' is determined and it is still worse to say that it is determined by something non-mental.

Popper thus arguing for interactionism, re-admits dualism. However, he rejects mind as a substance, as an entity. Taking an evolutionist approach to the mind-body problem, Popper understands mind as 'highly developed bodily organ' contributing to the organism as a whole. Popper may be called a non-reductionist, as he accepts the existence of mind and self.

#### NOTES

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9. Ibid., p.100.
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## CHAPTER VIII

### MINIMAL MENTALISM: A CASE FOR DUALISM

The three philosophers - Herbert Feigl, U.T. Place, and J.J.C. Smart - responsible for the development of identity thesis — showed their sympathy to physicalism but did not maintain an ontological distinction between the two realms - the mental and the physical.

The materialists supporting this view along with the above three were convinced of the fact that any talk about mind and mental must be done strictly in the light of neurophysiological researches and understanding of the functioning of the brain.

As opposed to this we find philosophers expressing doubts over the success of such research programmes and maintain that 'mind' is beyond all this - that 'mental' cannot be identified with the 'physical'. Saul Kripke, for example, proposed a thesis in semantics to show the failure of identity thesis.

Kripke, however, does not seem to be taking a clear stand, as no suggestions are made regarding mind-brain relation. As Armstrong observes that he (Kripke) "confines himself to his critique of materialism"<sup>1</sup>.

While criticising materialism, Kripke may be said to be arguing for non-reducibility of mental - not in the sense of Cartesian mind-substance. Dale Jacquette says that Kripke "explicitly disclaims Cartesian substance dualism in"<sup>2</sup> his Naming and Necessity. Dale Jacquette thinks that, "Kripke's quasi-Cartesian refutation of materialism is not meant to provide an explication of Descartes reasoning, ... Kripke does not subscribe

to Descartes' ontic or mental-material substance dualism, but seems to accept a less controversial property-aspect dualism or non-reductive materialism"<sup>3</sup>. Hence, Kripke's position may be interpreted as a case for dualism.

Cartesian dualism is evidenced by the possibility of the conception that mind can exist separately from body (and vice versa). Secondly, our "better knowability of mind than body, and the divisibility of body and non-divisibility of mind or ineliminable unity of consciousness"<sup>4</sup> also are taken as supporting the dualist claim that mind and body are non-identical. The above claim is supported by Kripke in his discussion of the common sense observation that when a person dies it is possible for the body to exist without the mind. As Kripke points out:

"Descartes, and others following him, argued that a person or mind is distinct from his body, since the mind could exist without the body. He might equally well have argued the same conclusion from the premise that the body could have existed without the mind. Now the one response which I regard as plainly inadmissible is the response which cheerfully accepts the Cartesian premise while denying the Cartesian conclusion. Let 'Descartes' be a name, or rigid designator, of a certain person, and let 'B' be a rigid designator of his body. Then if Descartes were indeed identical to B, the supposed identity, being an identity between two rigid designators, would be necessary, and Descartes could not exist without B and B could not exist without Descartes"<sup>5</sup>.

One can notice from the above that Kripke is arguing for the non-identity between mind and body which he deems as logically possible. Through the novel thesis in semantics, which involves the use of 'rigid' and 'non-rigid' designator, Kripke argues against the identification of mental-states with the brain-states. Kripke's argument can be presented systematically in five

steps:

(1) Kripke distinguishes between 'rigid designators' and 'non-rigid designators'.

A rigid designator is an expression "which designates the same object in every possible world. Proper names and general names, are, for the most part, rigid designators. For instance, 'Hesperus' (the Greek name for the Evening star), 'Phosphorus' (the Greek name for the Morning Star), and 'heat' are rigid designators"<sup>6</sup>.

Further, "... a non-rigid designator can be used to fix the reference of a rigid designator. For instance, we could introduce a name 'F', and use it to designate rigidly whatever person is actually designated by the non-rigid designator 'the inventor of bifocals'<sup>7</sup>.

In case of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' example - this heavenly body, appearing at a particular time in the evening with certain features - are non-rigid designators.

(2) Pre-supposing a connection between rigid and certain non-rigid designators to establish the identity in question is the second step of the argument. 'Phosphorus' and 'Hesperus' are rigid designators whose reference is fixed by non-rigid designators (this heavenly body, appearing at a particular time in the evening with certain features).

(3) Kripke's view that a true identity thus formulated with the help of rigid designators is metaphysically necessary - may be taken as the third step in the argument. According to Kripke a

necessary statement, "first, is true, and second, that it could not have been other wise. When we say that something is contingently true, we mean that, though it is in fact the case, it could have been the case that things would have been otherwise" .

If 'Hesperus' is a rigid designator, then 'phosphorus' is also a rigid designator. And we know that the Evening star and the Morning Star is one and the same thing. It is true that 'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'. Since in every possible world 'Hesperus' designates the same object and in every possible world 'Phosphorus' also designates the same thing and therefore, it is a necessary truth. That is, 'Hesperus' is necessarily 'Phosphorus'.

(4) Although it is a necessary truth, that 'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus' it is established only through an empirical observation on investigation and hence aposterioristically known.

Type-type materialism, holds a contingent identity between the 'mental' and the 'physical' in which 'pain' is taken to be identical with the firing of C-fibres. On the application of Kripke's ~~semantic~~ <sup>semantic</sup> argument the identity cannot be contingent for if 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are rigid designators, so will be 'pain' and 'firing of C-fibres'. And therefore the statement that 'pain is identical with the firing of C-fibres' becomes a necessary truth although aposterioristically known because of scientific investigation.

Kripke distinguished sharply between the ~~epistemological~~ <sup>epistemological</sup>

notion of an a priori truth and the ontological notion of a necessary truth. Although the knowledge that we get that 'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus' is a posteriori, it is still a necessary truth according to Kripke. However, it inspires "in us a very strong illusion of contingency"<sup>9</sup>. Kripke says that, the fact that they are a posteriori is not enough to explain why they appear to be so, and concludes that it can be explained only by specifying a 'contigent associated discovery' which involves non-rigid designators.

In the 'Hesperus' example, if 'Hesperus' is not 'Phosphorus', then there should have been two distinct heavenly bodies with distinct descriptions and appearances. In that case there would have been epistemological distinction between the two. But in case of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' the descriptions and appearances were the same, even before the establishment of an identity between the two. People designated 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' with preliminary designators such as, "this heavenly body, presenting such and such an appearance, at this time, from this place; that heavenly body..."<sup>10</sup> and these preliminary designators are non-rigid ones. The truth, that the two designated bodies are identical, appears contingent. It is the contigent associated discovery which explains the illusion that it is a contingent truth that 'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'.

The second example illustrates the identity between 'heat' and 'motion of molecules'. Through our sensation of heat we know the presence of heat. We discover that the external phenomenon which produces this sensation in us through our sense of touch, is in fact the molecular agitation in the thing that we touch.

Kripke says, "it might be thought, to imagine a situation in which heat would not have been the motion of molecules, we need only imagine a situation in which we would have had the very same sensation and it would have been produced by something other than the motion of molecules"<sup>11</sup>. Thus, similarity between an 'imagined' situation and the 'actual' situation may be introduced. By introducing the non-rigid designator to refer to heat, we would say that "that property of physical objects which characteristically produces these sorts of sensations in us" refers to same thing, that is, the 'motion of molecules'. And therefore, this "contingent associated discovery"<sup>13</sup> explains the contingency and establishes an identity between 'heat' and 'molecular motion'.

Kripke advances similar argument against identity theory, as mental and physical are considered as identical. The argument is against three main claims: "first, .... that each person is identical to his or her body; second, ... that each particular mental event or state is identical to some corresponding particular physical event or state; and third, that each "type" of mental state is identical to some corresponding "type" of physical state"<sup>14</sup>.

If 'mental' and 'physical' are identical then it must be necessary truth. That 'pain' is identical with the firing of C-fibres, is a necessary truth. In that case the materialist is required to find a 'contingent associated discovery' which can explain the 'illusion of contingency'. In that there should be the description of possible situation which is epistemically

indistinguishable from the actual situation before hand, the identity between 'pain' and 'firing of C-fibres' is established. Then the non-rigid designator must pick out something which is epistemically indistinguishable from 'pain' and ultimately this something turns out not to be the firing of C-fibres. When the contingent fact is explained away, the 'illusion of contingency' in the necessary truth would be satisfactorily explained.

(5) Taking the example of 'pain' as seen to be identical with firing of C-fibres in the brain, Kripke maintains that it is not possible for a materialist to show a contingent associated discovery with the help of a non-rigid designator which turns out to be the firing of C-fibres. Therefore, the 'illusion of contingency' is not explained.

Kripke criticising the contention of the identity theory says that the so-claimed identity between mental experiences and brain states cannot be a contingent one. It has to be essentially a necessary identity. To say that the identity is necessary, the illusion of contingency is to be explained. Kripke says that the identity theorists cannot meet this simple requirement. The identity theorists maintain that a mental state is a brain state. They hold that the 'causal role' makes a brain state into a mental state as it tends to produce certain behaviour, for example, pain behaviour, intentions producing action etc. If we assume that the relation between brain states and its causes and effects as contingent, then 'such-and-such-a-mental state' becomes the contingent property of the brain state. If we suppose that X is a pain, then in the casual role identity theory, (1) X will be a brain state and (2) X will be analysed, in a rough sense, as

the fact that X is produced by certain stimuli and produces certain behaviour. The fact mentioned in (2) if regarded as contingent, then it may be said that brain state X well exists but may not produce the appropriate behaviour in the absence of other conditions. Thus one might say that a certain pain X might have existed, yet not have been a pain. This, Kripke says is self-evidently absurd. Because one cannot imagine any pain that it itself could have existed, yet not have been a pain.

According to Kripke, the so-claimed identity between the mental state and the brain state, should be necessary and not contingent. Kripke explains: "If  $X=Y$ , then X and Y share all properties, including modal properties. If X is a pain and Y the corresponding brain state, then being a pain is an essential property of X, and being a brain state is an essential property of Y. If the correspondence relation is, in fact, identity, then it must be necessary of Y that it corresponds to a pain, and necessary of X that it correspond to a brain state, indeed to this particular brain state, Y. Both assertions seem false; it seems clearly possible that X should have existed without the corresponding brain state; or that the brain state should have existed without being felt as pain. Identity theorists cannot, contrary to their almost universal present practice, accept these intuitions; they must deny them, and explain them away. This is none too easy a thing to do" .

Kripke claims that the materialist cannot meet this challenge. For the simple reason that in the possible or imagined situation, the epistemically indistinguishable situation from

actual situation, before the identity is sought between 'pain' and the firing of C-fibres, is the one in which we are actually in pain. As Kripke argues: "In the case of molecular motion and heat there is something, namely the sensation of heat, which is an intermediary between the external phenomenon and the observer. In the mental-physical case no such intermediary is possible, since here the physical phenomenon is supposed to be identical with the internal phenomenon itself... To be in the same epistemic situation that would obtain if one had a pain is to have a pain; to be in the same epistemic situation that would obtain in the absence of pain is not to have a pain ... Pain is not picked out by one of its accidental properties, rather it is picked out by the property of being 'pain' itself, by its immediate phenomenological quality. Thus pain, unlike heat, is not only rigidly designated by 'pain' but the reference of the designator is determined by an essential property of the referent"<sup>16</sup> .

Although Kripke's way of attacking the identity theory is ingenious and novel, counter attacks by the supporters of identity theory, has made it doubtful whether Kripke's argument against identity theory holds in general or against a particular type of it. In general he is not successful in showing that 'pain' cannot be identical with the firing of C-fibres.

'Pain' is taken to be a rigid designator in his argument. According to functionalist doctrine it is not, as for them 'pain' will be anything that plays a functional role. A functionalist holds that it is possible for many things to play such a role and, hence, 'pain' ceases to be a rigid designator. It is argued

that what we call 'pain' might not be pain and on the other hand the firing of C-fibres can take place in the possible world but not be the 'pain'.

Michael Levin, while arguing against Kripke, insists that the reference of 'pain' can be fixed by some other way, other than the 'pain-sensation'. Levin takes the help of 'Australian descriptions', which hold contingently of pain. He adds further, that, though 'pain' is necessarily identical with 'firing of C-fibres' cannot be shown as in case of 'heat' which is equal to 'molecular motion', "but perhaps over concentration on this example has made him" (Kripke) "over look the other ways to fix reference than by causal effects on the human sense"<sup>17</sup>.

'Australian descriptions' of the form "what goes on when (Public event)" takes place Levin claims, "are best understood as ways of identifying pains by contingent descriptions utilising only a public vocabulary"<sup>18</sup>. 'Public event' refers to events such as 'burning of the finger', 'damaging of the skin', etc., which are publicly observable.

Topic-neutral account is a candidate analysis of a sensation word. As is pointed out by the critics of the topic-neutral analysis that "what goes on in me when I am stuck by a pin is not synonymous with 'pain', nor even with 'pin prick pain'. The contingency of the connection between pain and laceration is patent"<sup>19</sup>. In case of people (possible world) whose neural set up is different from ours, will add something different, different from what we experience when our skin is damaged. Therefore, the statement of the form "what goes on in me when my skin is

damaged' should be taken as expressing only a contingent property of pain. Kripke himself rejects the analysis of 'pain' "in terms of the characteristic stimuli (e.g. pin pricks) which cause it and the characteristic behaviour it causes"<sup>20</sup>. Kripke in other words understands topic neutrality as a candidate method of analysis.

Understood and framed this way, according to Levin 'Australian descriptions' can provide a contingent associated discovery to explain the 'illusion of contingency' in the identity between 'pain' and the 'firing of C-fibres'. First by using a non-rigid designator 'what goes on when my skin is damaged' the reference of the rigid designator should be fixed. We can imagine then the possibility of a world which epistemically cannot be distinguished from our world, but it is not sure, that pains in this world, are not hurtful sensations. In this possible world then what goes on when any human skin is damaged is not 'pain' and neither there are any brain-states. In other words, what is singled out by EEG readings when their skin is damaged, would be something different from our case, that is, what EEG readings single out when our skin is damaged. An empirical investigation thereafter should suggest 'what goes on in us when our skin is damaged', that is whether it designated 'pain' or something else.

It may be objected that, the topic-neutral description of the external 'pain behaviour' is not equivalent to 'Pain'. Damaging of the skin is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the felt 'pain'. But, this is the only way, 'pains' can be described as that coming from a pinch or coming from the

gripping of a tennis racket for a long time. 'Australian descriptions', describe the way a 'pain state' can be communicated. Thus the topic neutral account of the form 'what goes on in me when (public event)' can be used as a non-rigid designator to fix the reference of a rigid one. Levin claims that, that it always fixes the reference of sensation words, "follows from two lemmas:

- (a) If rigid reference to sensations is secured by description at all, it is fixed by 'Australian description' even for the subject of the sensation, since the only facts we know about pains are circumstantial.
- (b) Wittgenstein's private language argument, correctly understood, shows that rigid reference to sensations must be fixed by description"<sup>21</sup>.

Referring to the first Lemma, it may be said that, not only external topic-neutral account can be used as a reference for a rigid designator like 'pain' but also the subject, experiencing 'pain' is forced to use 'Australian description' for sensations experienced. In other words the descriptions that others will give of A's 'pain' - fixing the references of A's 'pain' and A's internal perspective of his being in 'pain' - the description of that pain-state, will be in ~~terms~~<sup>terms</sup> of 'Australian descriptions'. For example, in case of a finger-burn and the resulting 'pain' in A. A's description of his own pain and other's description of A's pain - involve the use of pain-designators such that it will show that there are other minds. This is connected with the second Lemma, that, "rigid reference to sensations must be fixed by

description" .

As Wittgenstein maintains ~~and~~ that, when somebody says 'I am in pain', he refers to his pain, with the help of description, to which he initially referred as 'pain'. And this generates a regress - as each time the person will refer to the present 'pain' based on the initial description. And this in turn will violate Kripke's condition that, "for any successful theory (of reference), the account must not be circular. The properties which are used (to determine the referent of a word) must not themselves involve the notion of reference in a way that it is ultimately impossible to eliminate" .

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It is not, when we try to understand 'pain' that we decide to refer to 'pain' by saying to oneself that 'this is what hence forth, I will call pain'. In other words 'pains' cannot be identified with the help of references, in turn we can do so by a description, where pains are not referred to as something. Therefore, Kripke should maintain that, 'pain' cannot be fixed by any designator at all.

William G. Lycan while analysing Kripke's argument points out, that pains are not necessarily identical with C-fiber stimulations. Such a belief is based on an argument from imaginability, deriving from Descartes and Hume. Lycan puts the argument from imaginability as follows: "If A and B are distinguishable (i.e., if it seems to us that we can easily imagine A existing in the absence of B or vice versa), then it is possible that A ~~=~~ B" . According to Lycan, Kripke does not accept this argument as it stands, since he (Kripke) admits that

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it is possible to imagine heat in the absence of molecular motion and vice versa, even though he maintains that heat and molecular motion are necessarily identical. The reason why Kripke is not accepting the argument as it stands, is that, he wants to account for the 'distinguishability' of heat from molecular motion in the face of their necessary identity. Then Kripke points to the contingent truth, which we know and is closely related to the identity of heat with molecular motion. It is the falsity of this contingent truth that we are really imagining when we seem, to be imagining the falsity of the identity itself. Thus, we observe that heat cannot be distinguished from molecular motion and that the contingent truth was illusory.

William Lycan mentions that the analogy of genes with DNA molecules, as suggested by D.M. Armstrong to explain the mind-brain identity, has a structure, different from other analogies. Kripke maintains that, if pain and C-fibre stimulation are necessarily identical, then one should be indistinguishable from the other. Lycan, mentioning the gene - DNA analogy, says that genes and DNA molecules can be distinguished, despite their necessary identity. They are not distinguished on the basis of some third item, mediating between the external phenomenon and the observer, for example, a sensation-of-gene. At this point one can imagine Kripke pointing out that whatever experiential phenomena one takes to be the evidence for the existence of genes could have been produced by something other than genes (= DNA molecules), and that genes could have existed without producing those experiences.

Lycan says that, these are not the possibilities what we are

really imagining, when we seem to be imagining the separability of genes from DNA molecules. He maintains that "imagining, anything about our having experineces of such-and-such a kind; we are imagining, in a specific case, simply that the role (in the mechanics of heredity) by which a certain gene (=DNA molecule) was originally picked out is being filled by something other than the relevant DNA molecule (= the gene), or that the DNA molecule is failing to play a genetic role. (These imagined situations are compatible with the necessary identity of the gene with the DNA molecule)" <sup>25</sup> .

Lycan points out that "Kripke's "imaginability" argument is of a notably fragile and ephemeral sort. The unimaginabilities that we associate with some thing's essence are traditionally the first to go when the relevant science advances in new directions, .... suppose, in particular, that a number of reputable psychologists, etc., have (as identity theorists tell us is the case) come to accept the theory or some relevantly similar materialist view. Suppose further that, as is inevitable, this prevailing materialism filters down to ordinary people, so that it becomes quite common to talk of one's own CFS interchangeably with talking of one's own pain. It seems to me we would immediately find it easy to imagine the possibility (however minute) of some pain's occurring but failing to present itself to the awareness of its owner. We would begin to think of pain as a physical phenomenon having its cognitive qualities only <sup>26</sup> contingently" .

Kripke explicitly does not make any suggestions regarding

his position in case of mind-body problem. He argues strongly against the contention of the identity theory through a thesis in semantics. He says that a necessary identity one can observe in case of water and H<sub>2</sub>O molecules, rather water is essentially H<sub>2</sub>O molecules. And H<sub>2</sub>O is the essence of water, regardless of what superficial properties the H<sub>2</sub>O may or may not have. In case of mental events and brain states, Kripke maintains, a necessary identity, is not observed as is observed in case of water and H<sub>2</sub>O molecules. Therefore, he argues against the reduction of mind to body. Since Kripke adopts a non-reductionist approach, it may be interpreted that he accepts dualism. However, he rejects Cartesian mind as an entity, as a substance. He accepts Cartesian assertion that mind is distinct from the body and argues for it in a novel way. Therefore, Kripke may be called a neo-dualist.

#### NOTES

1. D.M. Armstrong, "Recent Work on the relation of mind and brain", in Contemporary Philosophy, vol. IV, ed. G. Floistad, Dordrecht: Martins Nijhoff Publishers, 1986, p.70.
2. Dale Jacquette, "Kripke and the mind-body Problem", Dialectica, vol.41, No.4, 1987, p.297. In the foot note Jacquette writes that in Naming and Necessity, Kripke "explicitly disclaims Cartesian Substance dualism", in note 77, p.155.
3. Ibid., p.297.
4. Ibid., p.296.
5. Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980, pp.144-145.
6. D.M. Armstrong, op. cit., p.65.
7. Ibid.
8. Saul Kripke, "Identity and Necessity", in Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, ed. Stephen P. Schwartz, London: Cornell

University Press, 1977, p.84.

9. D. M. Armstrong, op. cit., p.67.
10. Ibid.
11. Saul Kripke, "Identity and Necessity", in Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds, ed. Stephen P. Schwartz, London: Cornell University Press, 1977, p.95.
12. D. M.—Armstrong, op. cit., 68.
13. The Contingent associated discovery: Kripke concedes that, the truths, Hesperus is Phosphorus and heat is motion of molecules, create in us a strong illusion of contingency. He says that, although they are necessary truths, they appear to be contingent. He assumes that, a-posteriori knowledge of such truths, is not sufficient to explain the illusion of contingency. Kripke maintains that this illusion of contingency can be explained by a 'contingent associated discovery', may be through an empirical investigation. The phrase, contingent associated discovery, is adopted by Michael Levin, in his article "Kripke's Argument Against The Identity Thesis", Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXXII, No.6, pp.149-167.
14. Fred Feldman, "Kripke on the Identity Theory", Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXXI, No.71, 1974, p.665.
15. Saul Kripke, "Identity and Necessity" in Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds, ed. Stephen Schwartz, London: Cornell University Press, 1977, p.99, see the foot note.
16. Saul Kripke, "Naming and Necessity", in Semantics of Natural Language, eds. D. Davidson and G. Harman, Dordrecht: Reidal, 1972, pp.339-40.
17. Michael Levin, "Kripke's Argument Against The Identity Thesis", Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXXII, No. 6, 1975, p.155.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p.156.
20. Saul Kripke, "Naming and Necessity" in Semantics of Natural Language, eds. D. Davidson and G. Harman, Dordrecht: Reidal, 1972, p.336.
21. Michael Levin, "Kripke's Argument Against The Identity Thesis", Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXXII, No.6, 1975, p.158.
22. Ibid.

23. Saul Kripke, "Naming and Necessity", in Semantics of Natural Language, eds. D. Davidson and G. Harman, Dordrecht: Reidal, 1972, p.283.
24. William G. Lycan, "Kripke and the Materialists", Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXXI, No.71, 1974, p.678.
25. Ibid., p.681.
26. Ibid., p.685.



## CHAPTER II

### ELIMINATING DICOTOMY: AN ARISTOTELIAN FRAMEWORK

A functionalist theory of mind based on Aristotelian framework argues for a naturalistic conception of 'Person', that is 'person' without any immaterial mind. It also argues that the so called mind and other mental qualities are nothing but results of the structural complexity of our brains.

It is natural to distinguish between a stone and a seed, between animate and inanimate objects. Although outwardly both the things, the seed and the stone look hard, but they are quite distinct with regard to their potentialities. The seed has got the potentiality to become a tree and produce more of its kinds, due to nutrition and reproduction.

This potentiality the sign of life is attributed to its complex physical structure and not to any immaterial element in the seed.

Thus the question, what is crucial for life? is answered in the naturalistic conception in the following way: "a thing counts as being alive if it has certain potentialities, primarily those for nutrition and reproduction... in order to account scientifically for the potentialities of living things, it is not necessary to postulate any non-physical entities or processes. What makes a living thing alive is not an immaterial component or the presence of 'vital spirits', but the appropriate complexity of the organisation of its physical micro-components"<sup>1</sup>.

A plant and animal - although both have got life - can be distinguished on the basis of the complexity of their physical

structure. Animals can perceive the environment and respond to it; they are capable of locomotion. Whereas plants cannot carry out certain functions which animals can.

In the functionalist theory perception plays an important role giving information on the basis of which we frame our beliefs. Peter Smith and O. R. Jones maintain that while responding to the environment it is natural to acquire beliefs and movements according to one's desires. Beliefs and desires are psychological states which constitute a simple mind. An animal then, has the capacity for interaction with the environment. An animal with a mental life has still more capacity based on its more complex physical structure.

According to Smith and Jones to have a simple mind is to have potentialities and capacities. But these potentialities and capacities should not be postulated as immaterial entities just as to run a mile is in no sense an extra immaterial element in the body. One can provide similar functionalist explanations for desires and beliefs. The mental capacities of higher animals are to be attributed to the complexities of their neuro-physiologies. And the same can be said about human beings, with regard to their potentialities and capacities. Our capacity for rational thought and feelings (i.e. all our mental capacities) is dependent on our biological make-up. In analysing of mind, one should refer to the capacities that a person has, capacities which constitute a mind.

Peter Smith and O.R. Jones depend upon Aristotle's theory of form and matter to ground their functionalism. A substance for Aristotle is a particular individual entity. It is the compound of matter and form. Matter, is simply the stuff out of which it

is made of. The form is not however the shape that the object has, but it is crucial in determining an object of a particular kind. Arranging the matter in a proper form determines the object of particular type or what it should be like. For Aristotle's account, natural bodies are substances, as "every natural body which has life in it is a substance. But since it is a body of such a kind, viz. having life, the body cannot be soul; the body is the subject or matter, not what is attributed to it. Hence the soul must be ... the form of a natural body having life potentially with it"<sup>2</sup>.

Aristotle says that the psyche, the soul, is the form is the actuality, and is different from the body, which is the matter. It is by virtue of the 'soul', what that body is 'what it is to be what it is'. It is the form in the sense of 'capacity' related to the substance. Just as an eye, which has the capacity for sight, which is its essence, and if eye loses that, then it is no more an eye in the real sense and which will be equivalent to a painted eye. Likewise a dog's psyche is responsible for the dog's capacity, characteristically of a dog's life. The same is true in case of a man having a soul, which determines his capacities for various abilities including rational.

One notices in Aristotelian approach certain advantages over Cartesian one. First, one-many minds controversy does not arise. Secondly, it is consistent with the evolutionary theory. And thirdly, since there is no interaction of a material body with immaterial mind, problems with regard to interactionism do not arise.

According to Aristotle, a man's psyche determines his capacities for various abilities, including his ability to reflect. It is this that distinguishes man from animals. No animal can weigh the consequences and then choose to do the act. Our thinking and reflecting is the processing of information that is sent in through our perception. The appropriate bodily movements as a response to the stimulus comes in the form of our behaviour. Thus, the reflecting stage is the connecting stage between the perception and the behaviour.

Smith and Jones discuss the causal theory of perception, and reject the same as inadequate. It may be interpreted that, in this theory, the person who claims that he sees the cat, must be 'visually locked into it'. Similarly when X says he hears something he must be 'auditorily locked into it'. According to this theory, the thing that is perceived must exist and should make a difference to the perceiver. If there is no difference among the things perceived or heard then, there will not be a visual locking of the thing and hence no perception. In other words, the cat must causally affect Jack to have certain visual experiences. This is the necessary condition to have a perceptual experience, but not a sufficient condition. In order to perceive something one should have a perceptual experience such that it should be 'caused in the particular kind of way by the thing in question'. The causal chain begins with the object seen and ends with one's having a visual experience.

In another version of 'inner object theory', visual experience is believed to be the awareness of the inner object (or objects) in one's own mind in some way. If one introspects,

that is, looks at what is going on in one's own mind when one sees something, one finds that there is a sort of visual 'impression' or 'idea' of the object in the mind. These ('ideas' or 'impressions') are often termed as mental pictures and have no independent existence outside one's mind.

The third theory in the discussion, namely, the representative theory according to Smith and Jones, is the result of combination of the causal theory and inner object theory of perception. In this theory the perception a cat involves being aware of something other than a cat, namely some mental impressions (or whatever) which in some sense is understood as representing the cat. That is we perceive a cat via an intermediary representation of the cat. According to this theory what one is immediately aware of are the mental impression in ones mind. In other words those mental impressions make you perceive a cat. In this case, it is difficult to understand, how, from one's inner experiences one can conclude about the existence of things in the outside world.

The authors give following passages from Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding to suggest that Locke upheld a general representative theory for all kinds of perceptions:

- \*1) Wherever there is sense or perception, there some idea is actually produced, and present in the understanding.
- 2) It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them... the mind... perceives nothing but its own ideas.
- 3) It is therefore the actual receiving of ideas from without that gives us notice of the existence of other things and makes us know that something does exist at that time without us which causes that idea in us<sup>3</sup>.

George Berkeley attacked the causal theory of perception while accepting the representative theory arguing that in one's perceptual experience one is aware of ideas in the mind, imprinted by God.

The most consistent empiricist David Hume also accepts the representative theory of perception. He considers that in our every experience we are aware of quick succeeding ideas of objects in our minds. The impressions in the perceptual experience exist for a very short period. The theory also had supporters like G.E. Moore holding the view that what we are immediately aware of in the perceptual experience, is some coloured patch, which is a mental object. Smith and Jones consider this as versions of 'inner object theory', and analyse the various arguments for the 'inner object theory'.

The first argument they consider is from science. In this argument an eye, is compared with a camera. But this analogy cannot be further stressed, as it does not explain what happens to internal images on some internal screen in the brain at the end of the visual process.

Another argument from science the supporters of the theory put forth is with reference to the time that is taken by light to travel from the object to the perceiver. It is understood that, if somebody is looking at a star right now, his 'seeing' does not exist now, but existed eight minutes ago. Therefore, what the person is aware of is existing sense-datum different from actual star.

Yet another argument that is given is from contemporary

physics. We know that a table is made up of atoms which in turn can be understood as molecular structures, with a nucleus, and positive and negative particles revolving round it. The fundamental building blocks of atoms are said to have properties such as mass, electric charge 'spin' - but atoms are colourless particles in ordinary sense of the term. The object occupies space and has weight, size, etc. When number of atoms come together. But the particles which are basically colourless, cannot be said to be giving a particular colour when they are grouped together. But in the case of table, it appears coloured. There must be something in the colourless particles affecting our visual equipment and thus one is forced to say what we are immediately aware of in our perceptual experience is not the colourless table but the sense-datum, representing a table, which is an internal phenomena. This argument appears to move from the agreed premise that the atoms which constitute a table are colourless to the conclusion that the table itself is colourless. It seems to rest on the earlier mentioned principle that if the constituents do not possess a certain property, the object itself cannot be said to have it. Smith and Jones point out that this principle cannot be applied to all the properties, such as, a person will not say, since one cannot swim in a water molecule, and water is made up of water molecules, one cannot swim in water. Thus, this argument appear to be based on absurd principle. But the supporters might come with a further complicated version of the above argument. He might point to the scientific principle that, in case of the surface of the table, there are gaps in between the colourless particles and hence the

table is not coloured all over the surface but a small region of the table, containing few molecules. But, a small region of the table, containing few molecules, makes little sense to suppose that it is coloured. Therefore, the brown colour of the table is the property of the appearance or sensedatum presented to the mind, rather than the property of the table itself. The authors point out, that the supporters of the inner object theory deny that the table is brown all over. If they accept this, then they are forced to say that every region of the table whatever is chosen is brown. They overlook the facts at the microscopic level and hence the argument is a failure.

The second argument for the inner object theory comes from the relativity of perception namely, things appear to have different colours, and shapes when seen from different angles and in different condition (such as in different lights or on wearing blue or red spectacles, etc.). The supporters of the theory maintain that, at least some of the properties, which, things when placed in different conditions appear to have, are relative to the conditions in which they are placed. And therefore, what one is immediately aware of in perception are rather changing appearances than the stable objects themselves.

Bertrand Russell argues for the inner object theory. It is true he says, that the table is colourless but when seen under different artificial lights, the table will appear to have different colours. Therefore, colour is not 'inherent' in the table and thus all the statements with regard to colour will be right, in a particular condition. Table for him is colourless,

but what we are immediately aware of are coloured sense-data which represent the table. Similarly, that a penny looks different from different angles shows that our sense-datum varies.

The third argument for the inner object theory, is from hallucinations. It is claimed that in introspection one is aware of inner objects that are in our minds. In hallucinations people experience and perceive objects, even when the objects are not there actually existing in the outside world. In case of hallucinations then, they already have some sense-datum in their minds. In case of actual sense-perception, there is the sense-datum as an internal experience, which represents the outside objects. In short internally both the experiences will be of the same intrinsic quality and due to this it is possible to mistake one for the other. If the fact that there is some inner object, in case of hallucinations exist in the mind it is true then, it must be true also in case of genuine experiences. Therefore, in either case, there is an awareness of mental object.

Smith and Jones construe the 'inner object theory' as a form of dualism in the broad sense, since it talks about inner object, mental object, or impressions, ideas - all relating to mind. As this involves the question regarding the causal relation between the sense-datum or mental object in the mind, and the actual physical object in the outer world. This is analogous to the problem that is faced with regard to the relation between mind and body.

The supporters of the inner object theory think that, immediate awareness of sense-datum or mental picture helps to

know the object that is perceived. This is as good as saying that the outside world is understood with reference to or by looking at the mental counterpart of the world in the mind. But if there are difficulties in understanding the outside world, then it implies that there will be also corresponding difficulties in understanding the mental world. By saying that to perceive means, to have immediate awareness of sense-datum or using other mental vocabulary, the problem cannot be solved. One can still ask, what is the meaning of perceptual experience, when one says that it is immediate awareness of sense-datum. This is as unclear as the earlier question, what is involved in sense-perception.

The authors maintain that perception is the prime link between the input of knowledge that is the information about the world and its objects through our sense-organs, and our actions. Sense organs respond to different stimuli because of 'causal mechanisms' in proper working conditions in them, involved in perception of the world. It is through perception that the distinction can be made between different objects with regard to their properties like colour, shape, etc.

It is through information, through perceptual process, that we come to frame beliefs about the objects in the world. In other words we acquire beliefs through perception. As Smith and Jones puts it, "perception consists in the acquisition of beliefs via receptors which provide a sufficiently reliable information transmitting interface between the believer and the world"<sup>4</sup>.

There is of course a distinction between initial and derived beliefs. Initial beliefs are first beliefs (forming the basis of

any additional derived beliefs) which are framed about an object and which give rise to other beliefs. For example, after perceiving something written on the paper (which is the first belief that we visually acquire) and after reading whatever is written on the paper (since we can understand the meaning of the words), we frame many other beliefs which are derived ones. Different senses give different initial information as in the case of eyes, the sense of sight, for instance, produces the beliefs about the colours of the objects. In case of sense of touch the belief that is initially produced is about the temperature of the object.

The 'belief acquisition theory' has two parts: the first one is the causal aspect that is in perception, namely the object perceived causally affects the perceiver in an appropriate manner; the second is the effect aspect in the perceptual process, and in this theory it is the belief or set of beliefs framed about an object.

Smith and Jones claim that this theory has certain advantages over the representative theory of perception. It does not have to explain the perception of outer world objects by referring to something like internal images of those objects in the perceiver's mind. And secondly, beliefs are not the mental images perceived on the mental screen, thus avoiding the difficulty faced by representative theory.

Smith and Jones further say that to find out whether a child is sighted or blind a mother will observe the way the child reacts to the environment, for instance, how the child describes the things they are in normal conditions and so on. That the

child picks up information through perception is enough evidence to state that the child is sighted. In the representative theory, the mother, to find out the same, has to know the mental images on the mental screen of the child. This is impossible, and therefore one cannot decide whether the child is sighted or blind.

The 'belief acquisition theory' does not make any mystery of perceptual experience as is done in the representative theory. The 'experiential' involved in perception is explained as a "function of our capacities for understanding and our background beliefs (e.g. our expectations about what we are going to see)"<sup>5</sup>. For example in case of a puzzle picture the perception of that picture identified as a human face or something else, depends on one's capacity to understand that along with his past knowledge and past beliefs.

The neo-functionalists authors, namely Smith and Jones find that the general belief acquisition theory although fares better than the representative theory has some defects which they try to overcome. In this theory it is maintained that we acquire beliefs through perception, alongwith our capacity to understand the thing based on prior beliefs in general and with reference to human beings. But when it is applied to the perception of animals, the question that is faced is, do they acquire beliefs in the same way? To answer this query, the authors suggest that a rather thinned-down version of 'belief acquisition theory' is to be adopted. They say that, animals acquire information through perception and they take it that there is an object in their

visual field.

Secondly, perception is a passive process, that 'happens to you'; while belief acquisition is voluntary process, and therefore is not equal to perception. But the authors point out that except our sophisticated political and religious beliefs many of our beliefs are based on what the facts are. The authors to support their theory, at this point, quote. Hume who says that, in general our belief, "depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principles, of which we are not masters"<sup>6</sup>.

The third difficulty posed for the theory as authors maintain, is with regard to a static scene that is perceived. In the beginning through seeing he will acquire beliefs. But not after a little time since the scene has not changed he will still see the scene but will not acquire new beliefs. This leads to saying that seeing is not belief acquisition. This difficulty the authors say can be set aside, by saying that whatever beliefs are acquired in the beginning, they continuously hold until that scene changes. With the new perception new beliefs will be acquired, as a particular object causally sustains a particular belief.

Thus in the 'revised belief acquisition theory' it may be stated that, "perception involves (at least) the acquiring of various propensities to have appropriate beliefs. In other words, the change produced in you in perception may not be a change in your beliefs, but only a change in your propensities to believe various things about your environment"<sup>7</sup>. Even David Armstrong the defender and supporter of belief acquisition theory believes that

perception leads to the acquiring of propensities to believe.

Peter Smith and O.R. Jones maintain that this revised version of the theory helps to account for those cases where the sense-organs are causally affected and the correlated internal state occurs but the appropriate belief is not the result. In these cases there is perception without beliefs. And with regard to wrong beliefs, the propensity to believe exist but the appropriate belief does not result.

The 'belief acquisition theory' with this improvement can account for the changes in colour or shades of a bus in different conditions. For example, under sodium lights and otherwise, as one will say that bus looks khaki under sodium lights because there is the propensity to believe in whatever perceived and the person probably accepts that otherwise, bus in front of his eyes looks red.

Perceptual process as Smith and Jones point out, involves one's having perceptual experiences which have a particular intrinsic 'phenomenological quality'. Perception is equated with belief acquisition in belief acquisition theory. But in acquiring beliefs the genuine 'experiential character' is not there. Therefore, it may be objected that belief acquisition as a theory of perception cannot account for the perceptual process as involving 'experiential character'.

The authors raise the above doubt with a view of modifying the theory. They hold that although the acquiring of belief does not involve experiential character it does not follow that picking up the belief is still 'non-experiential'. They maintain

that, "acquisition is an event which initiates a state"; and what is true of ensuing state will not necessarily be true of initiating event".<sup>8</sup> One's being on a moving train may be unexciting but jumping on the moving train is exciting.

The supporters of the belief acquisition theory reply that it is difficult to hold that on the one hand to acquire beliefs, even beliefs about one's own state of mind and to hold on the other hand, there is nothing experientially involved in it. There can be no distinction between belief acquisition or propensities to believe and 'experiential character' as a distinctive mark of perceptual process.

The authors point out that the analysis of perceptual process is important to understand the working and the nature of 'mind', since it is through perception, the 'information input' is supplied of which action is the output. Obviously all the movements that are done cannot be termed as actions, in the proper sense of the term. An action according to the authors is that which is done with some purpose or intentions in one's mind, intention thus becomes crucial in one's action.

An action is the result of an internal cause - a mental cause - where one's mind plays an active role in doing certain actions, becoming itself a necessary condition for that action. Mental cause constitutes only a necessary condition of a genuine action. For example, in raising one's arm as an action the muscles will contract only on some nerve impulse within the body. If it is otherwise, that is because of some external factor, then it is merely a bodily movement.

But it may be said that in all cases, where movements are

caused by internal causes cannot be termed as 'actions' for example, jerk reflexes, trembling of hands when one is anxious, etc. Because reflex actions occur or happen irrespective of whether one want it to happen or not.

Smith and Jones while developing the theory say that when one makes effort to find out the constituents of a mental antecedent, one very obvious finding will be that of a desire. We do things because we want to do them. But some of our desires are even beyond our control, like that of feeling thirsty or hungry. Like wise, we acquire beliefs through perception, in which there is the causal influence, from the object to the perceiver. Actions, if we say are the results of our desires influenced by our acquired beliefs then, the action becomes the outcome of those factors over which we cannot exercise any control. In this case there is no intervention on the part of the individual and therefore may be taken as implying that our actions are not intentional.

The authors introduce the term 'volition' or 'act of will' as the immediate mental cause of any of our action. The authors give different accounts of 'volition' by various philosophers, in the light of which the meaning of the term may be understood.

According to Thomas Reid, a desire is not a volition. Reid maintains that a volition is an act of will and when we wish or will to carry out an action, the volition is accompanied with our effort, to execute that, what we wish or will. Thus, we have here a three-dimensional view of our action, in which first comes the desire alongwith our beliefs that influence the will but do not

causally determine its activities. Second, there is volition or our will acts and third, the efforts are made to produce the action (activity of the muscles). Thus, it is the volition that initiates the mental causation and the authors say that this popular volitional theory is upheld by Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume.

Thomas Hobbes mentions that "in deliberation, the last appetite, or aversion, immediately adhering to action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the WILL; the act, not the faculty of willing"<sup>9</sup>.

Locke distinguishes between desiring and willing and asserts that, "we must remember that volition or willing is an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it"<sup>10</sup>.

Berkeley states that, "I never use an instrument to move my finger, because it is done by a volition"<sup>11</sup>. Hume maintains that, "when a person is possessed of any power, there is no more required to convert it into action, but the exertion of the will"<sup>12</sup>.

It may be stated that, it is not possible to know the 'volition' because one cannot know just by reflecting over what is going on in his mind, just before the 'action' takes place. The authors say that, the difficulty lies in understanding exactly how the 'act of willing' can be identified among other mental activities which may be going on simultaneously in one's mind. Peter Smith and O.R. Jones uphold a view similar to Rylo, that of namely that introspection and observation cannot reveal or help pointing out his or her 'act of will' in volition. They

say that the questions raised by Ryle go unanswered.

The authors point out that some mental events merely passively happen, which we cannot choose either to do or not to do. If bodily actions and other passive happenings are distinguished, then it should also be possible to distinguish between mental actions and passive mental happenings. One cannot presuppose an act of will or mental action as the cause of an act, as it will lead to infinite regress we cannot assume that any action requires us to perform that act mentally.

The authors, Peter Smith and O.R. Jones state that the popular volitional theory fails to provide an account of the antecedent of action. They critically comment that, "we cannot pre-suppose the notion of a mental action for that simply raises the question 'what's the difference between performing an act of will and merely finding that one's will has undergone a certain change?' Plainly, we can't say that acts of will are distinguished by being caused by yet further mental acts, for that would be to set off an entirely vicious infinite regress: if performing any act requires us already to have performed a prior act, how could we even get started? In short, then, appealing to inner acts in the theory of action is no more explanatory than appealing to inner perception in the theory of perception"<sup>13</sup>.

The authors point out that 'trying' cannot be the intervening factor, as we do many actions without trying. Again, we 'try' only in case of some difficult performance or in cases where 'doubt' involves. With regard to 'intention' as the intervening factor, we know that many actions that we do are

without any deliberate intentions but not without a purpose. Our behaviour on the spur of the moment are without any settled intentions, yet they are actions.

The authors maintain that intention plays an important role in ones deciding to act in a particular way. They adopt Elizabeth Anscombe's distinction between intentional acts and rest of the actions. Anscombe thinks that questioning 'why' the particular act was done and its positive answer, should give a reason for the action that is done, explains the action. The authors adopting Anscombe's distinction maintain that reason, alongwith relevant desires and beliefs, explain the appropriate action that is done. In simple and ordinary circumstances, the belief part may be taken for granted stressing only the desire for the appropriate action. In circumstances where, merely desire cannot explain, the action, a complete explanation by referring to one's beliefs is required.

But all our actions need not necessarily arise out of desires in the strict sense. The authors suggest the term 'Pro-attitude' (a wider term which covers ones moral views, urges and values as the person understands, and those are things which direct the person when placed in particular situation), can be used in place of desires.

In order to explain someone's action, it is not enough that we point out to his desire and beliefs, but that his action should be because of those desires and beliefs. The authors mention that we have different 'packages of beliefs and desires' and a particular set of desires and beliefs may go to explain a particular course of action. Only the full-fledged explanation of

those beliefs and desire which are - 'actually operative' in bringing about that action will explain the action. In the causal theory of action the mental cause of behaviour which is treated as intentional action is simply belief and desire. When a belief is acquired that belief is believed to be true and the authors say that the same is true of a desire, as when one desires something, he 'desires-it-to-be true'.

Only declarative sentences which are propositions can be termed as either true or false. To believe in and to desire something makes sense only when they are expressed in the declarative sentences like X 'desires-it-to-be true that P' or X 'believes-it-to-be-true that P'. Therefore, Smith and Jones maintains that beliefs and desires can be termed as 'basic propositional attitudes'.

Smith and Jones comment that Hume's distinction between belief and disbelief is superficial, because if one is given two different language reports of the same events, the ideas produced in the mind will not be changed. The authors point out that Hume's ideas about mental images and impressions are unclear, in the sense they (ideas) do not explain in what way they are causally related to the outer world. According to Hume ideas have fleeting nature. If beliefs are treated as ideas in the mind, then they also appear and disappear like ideas in the mind. On the contrary Smith and Jones maintain that beliefs are more or less settled in our pro-attitudes and it is not necessary that we should be aware of it every moment.

The next theory the authors discuss is Ryle's theory of

beliefs as dispositions.

The authors raise an objection against Ryle's view. It is not explained, they say, as to how having just a belief can explain the particular behaviour that results. To believe in something, involves a number of 'iffy' statements about one's behaviour and one 'iffy' behaviour cannot become the cause of other 'iffy' behaviour just as Descartes could not explain how a mental event can cause a physical one, in Ryle's logical behaviourism talk about 'beliefs' is just talk about the 'iffy' behaviour, cannot explain the resultant behaviour. That is, when belief statement is substituted by 'if statement' it becomes uninformative. As the authors illustrate in the example below:

\*  
"(E) It is true that, if circumstances <sup>A</sup> were to obtain, Jack would get in the washing, because Jack believes that it is about to rain"  
14

On substitution of the 'if statement' in place of 'Jack believes it is about to rain' we get,

"(E) It is true that, if circumstances A were to obtain, Jack would get in the washing, because, if A were to obtain, Jack would get in the washing, if circumstance B were to obtain, he would take his umbrella, if circumstances C were to obtain he wouldn't start watering the garden, and so on"  
15

These two statements are into equivalent. The first one is informative, the second one is not.

The second objection they raise is in the form of asymmetry argument. It is clear and natural to hold a distinction between the way, a person knows his beliefs and the way he knows that

another person has got certain beliefs. In Ryle's view there is no such distinction. As according to him, to possess a belief means the 'iffy claims' about ones behaviour. Without referring to one's internal states. Therefore, nothing special is involved in knowing one's beliefs as they will be available to other people along with oneself. Peter Smith and O.R. Jones say that Ryle's view is wrong, as each one of us, we have a direct access to our beliefs and our other internal states which can be known by others only indirectly.

The regress argument against Ryle's view is a very serious objection to his theory of belief. To repeat the example of Jack, he believes that it is about to rain, therefore he should get his washing in. But in turn, what if Jack did not know that his washing is out? This shows that Jack further believes that his washing is out. Thus a belief gives rise to 'background' beliefs and desires, these will involve in more and more 'iffy' statements and therefore 'beliefs' as just the talk about 'iffy' behaviour cannot be accepted.

When it comes to desires the similar difficulties are faced as "beliefs are to be analysed in terms of 'iffy' propositions which mention desires, and desires are to be analysed in terms of 'iffy' propositions which mention beliefs" .

16

The authors find that both the theories of belief cannot explain the nature of belief playing a crucial role in understanding 'mind'.

The Rylean reductionist account of cashing out beliefs into simply behavioural patterns is attacked first and then altered by the authors supporting more Armstrong's views on mind. Armstrong

comments that "it goes profoundly against the grain to think of the mind as (mere patterns of) behaviour. The mind is rather what stands behind and brings about our complex behaviour"<sup>17</sup> .

Contrary to Rylean analysis of belief, a causal role is assigned to beliefs which 'underlie behaviour'. Armstrong further says that "a mental state (is) a state of a person apt for producing certain ranges of behaviour"<sup>18</sup> .

The authors earlier views on 'propensity' and definition of it 'as someone has a propensity to be, if he is in a state such that he will be' is compared with and found similar to 'Armstrongian disposition'. That is, a particular neuro-physical state of a person resulting into a particular behavioural pattern. Since beliefs are not simple 'propensities' or 'dispositions' as giving rise to a fixed pattern of behaviour since they can be 'manifested' in various ways, they can be termed as 'multi-track dispositions' as suggested by Ryle.

A particular belief state can be explained with the help of or by referring to other mental states, which causally explains the resulting behaviour. To repeat the example, Jack's getting in the washing, his behaviour can be explained by referring to his beliefs and desires to get his washing dry, that if it is kept out, it will be wet and so on. Unlike Ryle's theory there is no reduction of one's beliefs to one's behaviour and the explanation of the 'iffy' facts about a particular behaviour, thus avoiding the difficulty that Ryle's theory faced.

Another objection raised against the Ryle's theory that in the form of asymmetry argument that is, there is distinction

between first person and third person account of knowledge of beliefs does not apply to the new Armstrongian theory as the distinction between two accounts is accepted in the new theory. That is one's knowledge of belief states in case of oneself is through one's 'looking inside' whereas in case of others it is only based on the external observable behaviour.

The new theory also escapes the explanation argument advanced against Ryle's theory as belief states, are distinct from the behaviour that results and thus explain the behaviour.

The belief states are both the mental as well as physical states - they are neuro-physiological states, which are responsible for a particular behaviour. In Smith-Jones' language: "To identify a state as a belief state is to identify it by way it causally functions in co-operation with other states to produce behaviour. Physical states which are, neuro-physiologically speaking, of different kinds can still play the same functional role at different times or in different people. So we can't identify believing that it is about to rain (for example) with a particular type of physical state, picked out in neuro-physiological terms. That is, we can't assume that everyone who believes that it is about to rain must always satisfy one and the same neuro-physiological description. But this does not mean that belief states are not physical states: it only means that different particular instances of believing that it is about to rain can be constituted by instances of different kinds of physical state"<sup>19</sup> .

Thus, the functionalist theory which has the origination in Armstrong's theory and Ryle's dispositional theory lays

emphasison the 'functioning' of the brain states under different neuro-physiological conditions.

The problem of 'iffy' claims about belief which is causally responsible for a particular type of behaviour, on the new theory is rejected by introducing some 'common-sensical general principles' to show and explain the interaction between the beliefs and desires resulting in behaviour.

The fundamental principle may be stated thus: "if someone desires that P, and believes that P will come about only if he does X, then in the absence of countervailing desires, he will as a result usually do X"<sup>20</sup>. And the consequence principle may be stated thus: "in that people normally believe the most obvious and immediate logical consequences of their other beliefs"<sup>21</sup>.

Thus the two principles can link one's belief to one's action as in the example Jack desires that his washing should get dry and that is possible only when he brings it in. And also believes that it will get wet if it remains out and there is nobody to bring it in, results in bringing the washing inside.

The general principles in common sense explanations help to understand the behaviour of each other. The fundamental and the consequence principle belong to folk psychology which are common sensical generalisations about one's desires and beliefs, the perceptual principles relating their perceptual environment. But these principles are not absolutely precise ones. Since there can be sudden neuro-physiological malfunctioning because of various factors and therefore it can be stated that a person normally would do things in a particular situation instead of saying that

he will definitely do.

In the functionalist theory a belief state and a desire state are both physical brain states. But what gives rise to one's behaviour is not the 'intrinsic physical constitution' but the function that is carried out along with other interacting states.

A belief state can be distinguished from a desire state, in the sense that "beliefs are states of a class many members of which can be picked up by perception, whereas desires are states of a class some members of which can be engendered by deprivation. Putting it crudely beliefs are the sort of things you get when you look at the world, desires are what you get when you go without things you need like food or sleep" <sup>22</sup>.

Functionalism, like behaviourism, can be split into hard and soft type. Armstrong's view is a hard functionalist one, since every mental concept must mean the 'physical behaviour'. The theory that is expounded by, Smith and Jones involving the principle of folk psychology is soft functionalism, where the interpretation of beliefs and desires as relating to one's action that is 'behaviour proper' must fit well.

Based on the Aristotelian framework and supporting the naturalistic theory, the authors Peter Smith and O.R. Jones, discuss sensations, perceptions, actions, beliefs, thinking and freedom within the purview of functionalist approach.

The Cartesian 'two component view' is criticised and the naturalistic conception, "which maintains that a person is an organism without any immaterial components or additions, and which regards the mind as being (in some sense which needs to be

further explained) grounded in the structural complexity of our  
brains"<sup>23</sup> is upheld. While doing so, clear distinction is not  
made between conceptual questions and scientific questions. A  
sharp division between science and philosophy may or may not be  
done, but surely a distinction between the two would be an  
important one, especially because of the misunderstandings.  
Traditional Cartesianism and scientific naturalistic conception  
are formulated as two options, in the philosophy of mind, which  
may be 'potentially dangerous'.

David Cockburn criticises this version of functionalism  
saying "the 'naturalistic view' sounds too much like a piece of  
science. The danger lies in the fact that one might accept  
naturalism, as thus explained, and yet still hold on to what the  
authors identify as the fundamental philosophical confusion in  
Cartesian dualism, namely, the idea that 'the mind is a component  
of a person' - special kind of entity - namely, the brain"<sup>24</sup>.

Moreover, the scientific naturalistic conception of the  
'person', may make one to feel that it leads to the denial of a  
'value', a unique value, which a human being had before the  
advent of science. This sort of degradation cannot be accepted as  
we believe that, science can never 'misplace' our attitudes which  
express our ideas (for example, that person has a unique kind of  
value).

The authors, Peter Smith and O.R. Jones aim at presenting a  
theory of mind through the conceptual analysis. They maintain  
that "something counts as an-animal-with-a-mental-life if it has  
the capacity for some rather more complex sorts of interaction

with its environment" . In the light of above statement, without any hints or warning there is the possibility of, in the light of above statement, thinking of another person "as a system which has the capacity for complex interactions with its environment"<sup>26</sup> . Along with this possibility the questions that arise are: How do we explain or can account for our attitudes and reactions towards other people and in a slightly different sense towards animals? Is it the mere increase in complexity of our brain structure, responsible for the feelings of gratitude, remorse, pity, respect or love?

Smith/Jones' theory of mind is based on the Aristotelian framework, namely the distinction between form and matter is used to illustrate the mind-body relation. The authors accept that ".... the mental capacities constitutive of the soul are dependent on the immensely more complex structural arrangements of brain-matter"<sup>27</sup> . It is true, as has been established by science, that mental capacities are 'dependent' on complex brain-structure. But there is another sort of 'dependence' as has been argued by many philosophers, that our capacity and ability to think is dependent on our possessing something, which may be called as human form. The authors give more importance to the former (scientific) type of 'dependence' than the later.

In physicalism an attempt is made to give a complete physiological account of our behaviour, involving the use of scientific terms. But Peter Smith's and Jones' theory of functionalism does not involve the use of scientific terms. Rather the authors resort to every day action description in their functionalist theory. An action is taken as a bodily

movement. But the two may be different because, the factors that explain a bodily movement may not explain an 'action'. By emphasising naturalistic conception, although the authors have not positively encourage science, to determine what a human being, a person is, they have not discouraged it either.

#### NOTES

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## CHAPTER I

### GOING BEYOND THE DEBATE - ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM

In Richard Rorty's 'eliminative' theory of mind, there are no minds and mental-processes, no sensations but there are only brains. Rorty's philosophy of mind is influenced by his pragmatist and hermeneuticised philosophy of science. Rorty finds the common sensical and intuitive distinction (that mind is a real entity existing separate from the body) as the basis for mind body relation problem. He attacks "incorrigibility" along with the other "marks of the mental"<sup>1</sup> and the doctrine of the given. Rorty defends 'disappearance theory' (one form of materialism) and subscribes to functionalism.

The 'disappearance view', that there are no minds and mental processes, no sensations, but there are only brains, was advocated by Paul Feyerabend, a decade before, Herbert Feigl, J.J.C. Smart and U.T. Place expressed their views. It is this that is defended by Richard Rorty. Rorty feels, the view that there are no sensations, is a plausible view to hold because the developments in the neurophysiological theory, possibly might be successful in giving a complete scientific account of the human being.

Rorty perceives, Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey <sup>and</sup> finding new ways in constructing new set of Philosophical categories. Each one in the trio found the earlier set-up as "self deceptive"<sup>2</sup>. As seen in Chapter II, Wittgenstein attempted to build a new theory of representation going away from mentalism. Heidegger's attempt to set up new philosophical

categories which has nothing to do with science and epistemology.  
And Dewey offering a "naturalised version"<sup>3</sup> of Hegelian approach to history. The feature that is shared by all the above mentioned three philosophers is that they keep aside the intuitions about the Cartesian mind - its location, its nature and its processes.

Rorty thus is influenced by their spirit and efforts, and sets to attack the notion of Cartesian mind. Incoherent views, discussions and arguments in philosophy of mind, Rorty thinks has paved the way for a 'Scientific Psychology'<sup>4</sup>. Therefore, one who is interested in understanding mind should study Cognitive Science.

One may observe Rorty arguing, "that it is not only consistent but inevitable that philosophers face the 21st Century with a science based not on epistemology but on hermeneutics and that human beings will be in principle, understood completely by a scientific account"<sup>5</sup>.

Thus employing science to play a prominent role in philosophy of mind, Rorty questions the common sensical and intuitive distinction (i.e. mind as an entity existing separately from the body) as the basis for mind-body dichotomy. These intuitions help Cartesian dualism to survive with the notion of mind as entity, which 'some how' can linger on even if body were destroyed.

Non-spatiality cannot be the criterion of mental states, since beauty and fame can survive bodily death but are not mental states. Thus, Rorty thinks the primary task is therefore knowing the meaning of the word "mental", as "... our so called intuition about what is mental may be merely our readiness to

fall in with a specifically philosophical language-game".

The term 'mental' for Rorty, cannot be defined as intentional because pains are not 'intentional' and they are not representing anything. 'Mental' cannot be defined as phenomenal as beliefs are not feelings and they lack phenomenal properties.

According to Rorty, the basis for treating 'intentional' as non-material is the fact that any amount of inspection of the brain stuff cannot reveal the 'intentional' and therefore to be treated as non-material. In other words any functional state which can only be known by finding its relation with other elements in a larger set up is treated as non-material. The denial of appearance - reality distinction accounts for, the reason why phenomenal is treated as non-material. <sup>7</sup> Therefore, phenomenal properties cannot be physical properties. It is this epistemic privilege that we have which is incorrigible (about how things appear to us). This epistemic distinction reflects an ontological distinction which has been attacked by Wittgenstein and Ryle.

In making phenomenal immaterial, universals are hypostatized. For example, instead of discussing what is the cause of one being in pain - the 'painfulness' in general (that is, what is essential for something being pain) is discussed.

Rorty interprets the physical-mental distinction as parasitic on universal - particular distinction. He supports the 'nominalist view' to dissolve the mind-body problem. Not recognising 'mental' as having any ontological status, 'pain' and other terms (used as referring to immaterial mind) need not

appear strange. These words will not have any more ontological importance if we take words for what a person feels.

But before 'dissolving' the problem, Rorty explains how certain misunderstandings and confusions have led to the mind-body problem. The major source of the problem is plato's and Locke's unfortunate mistake of treating adjectives as nouns.

The terms such as 'phenomenal', 'functional', 'intentional' along with certain 'features' which are regarded as the 'marks of the mental' form the vocabulary of recent discussions on mind. Rorty lists the following as 'features' that 'mark the mental' for the dualists: " (1) ability to know itself incorrigibly ("privileged access"), (2) ability to exist separately from the body, (3) non-spatiality (having a non-spatial part or "element") (4) ability to grasp universals, (5) ability to sustain relations in existent ("intentionality"), (6) ability to use language (7) ability to act freely, (8) ability to form part of our social group to be "one of us" and (9) inability to be identified with any object "in the world" .

Dualists according to Rorty, attempt to bridge the gap between the 'intentional' and the 'phenomenal' by referring to 'incorrigibility' - the privileged access that we have to our experiences. It is this incorrigibility, which is deemed as the essential feature of mind by the dualists which is the cause of mind-body dichotomy.

Rorty observes that Ryle's attempts to dissolve the mind-body problem are based on 'analysis of meanings' and language is considered as behaviour. A particular behaviour, in such a approach Rorty feels, can be considered as satisfying necessary

and sufficient conditions for the ascription of raw feels. Since what is stressed upon and is the language it amounts to saying that our language licenses the inference to the presence of raw feels and this type of interpretations resisted Ryle's logical behaviourism alongwith other drawbacks of the theory.

Like Ryle, Wittgenstein also made an attempt to dissolve the mind-body problem in the discussion of 'sensations' when he argued, "...that sensations are private non-dispositional accompaniments of the behaviour by which they are naturally expressed"<sup>9</sup>. But Wittgenstein refused "to recognise those accompaniments as processes that can be named and investigated independently of the circumstances that produce them and the behaviour by which they are naturally expressed"<sup>10</sup>.

According to Rorty, behaviourism and Cartesianism share a basic premise, that is, the doctrine of the 'naturally given'. Cartesians take mental process as immediately present to the consciousness whereas behaviourists take the states of physical objects as 'directly present' to consciousness. The behaviourist view that some things can be known directly than the other, falls back on Cartesian epistemology. Philosophers on both the sides claim what can be best known "and knowing a process means either knowing it that way or else showing that it "really is nothing but" something else which is known that way"<sup>11</sup>. And thus, Rorty claims that the problem is not dissolved inspite of lengthy debate.

Thus Cartesian intuitions about mind claims Rorty, are such that they make materialistic and naturalistic theories about

mind-body dichotomy useless. These features create a wide, unbridgeable gulf - Ontological, epistemological and linguistic - such that with whatever the materialists laboriously try to fill that it falls short of because of these varied features the separation between mind and body has been argued in various ways.

The diversity in the treatment of mind-body problem is well brought out by Rorty in "The Antipodeans" depicted as materialists. On the one hand what the materialist can see is only a brain process and nothing else. On the other hand the dualists on the basis of 'incorrigibility' and the phenomenal properties claim the mental experiences, internal experiences like feelings and pains as different from the brain states creating the ontological gap between the two.

The materialist philosophers think of an identity between the 'mental' and the 'physical'. The materialists, for Rorty, may be divided into two groups - one of reductive materialists and the other of eliminative materialists. J.J.C. Smart and D.M. Armstrong are reductive materialists offering a topic neutral account or analysis of mental terminologies and assign them causal roles. But the success of this topic neutral account is doubted by many philosophers. Another difficulty for materialists identification of sensations with brain processes is that sensations appear to have properties which corresponding brain processes lack and therefore, by Leibnitz's law, they cannot be identical. Herbert Feigl realised this major difficulty in his position.

In eliminative reductionism there is the denial of sensations - more explicitly, there is the denial of existence of

mind. According to this view there are no minds - there are only brains. The eliminative reductionist view advocated by Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty and Quine, is that there exist only 'neural states' what we misleadingly call sensations. 'Eliminating' thus, is 'explaining away' without offering any revisionary explanation of the terms reduced. In one sense, according to eliminative reductionists, there are no sensations, yet in another sense what we term a sensation, i.e., a 'neural state' does exist. A strict Leibnitzian identity is not claimed by eliminative reductionists, between the mental and the 'physical' allowing the claim that whatever is true in case of one need not necessarily be true in case of another.

Rorty believes that brain processes are not sensations - these processes are the things which are (wrongly) called 'sensations'. If one were to say 'brain processes' and 'sensations' are same, it would mean that, there is no 'pain sensation' as is experienced, but there is only a brain state. As Rorty argues :

"There is is an obvious sense of 'same' in which what used to be called 'a quantity of calorific fluid' is the same thing as what is now called a certain mean kinetic energy of molecules but there is no reason to think that all features truly predicted of the one may be sensibly predicated of the other. The translation form of the theory holds that if we really understood what we saying when we said things like 'I am having a stabbing pain' we should see that since we are talking about 'topic-neutral' matters we might, for all we know, be talking about brain processes. The disappearance form holds that it is unnecessary to show that suitable translations (into 'topic-neutral' language) of our talk about sensations can be given - as unnecessary as to show that statements about qualities of Calorific fluid, when properly understood, may be seen as topic-neutral statements" 13.

But, it is possible to recognise the pain sensations in terms of - 'less painful' or 'more painful' for the person one who is experiencing pain. It is this 'pain-sensation' that Rorty wants to deny and says that what we are aware of, non-inferentially is a brain state.

It appears absurd to say that the person who is in pain, experiencing pain sensation is wrong as far as certain determinate features that can be recognised by that person. Secondly, any amount of empirical and scientific evidence that could be given to doubt the existence of such experiences is not sufficient compared to the 'direct awareness' of such experiences by the person. Thirdly, since most of the information that we get is through our sensations, and if sensations are treated as fictitious, the whole programme of theorising becomes fictitious.

The above three consequences not only makes Rorty's position strange but also help to raise objections against his theory of eliminative materialism. Along with Rorty, Paul Feyerabend also defends the disappearance view or eliminative reductionism.

Feyerabend says that "a new theory of pains will not change the pain; nor will it change the causal connections between the occurrence of pains and the production of 'I am in pain', except perhaps very slightly. It will change the meaning of 'I am in pain'. Now it seems to me that observational terms should be correlated with causal antecedents, not with meanings"<sup>14</sup>.

Feyerabend's above explanation of 'pain' excludes the experiential aspect of pain. What we find is (1) the occurrence of pain; (2) the person making a statement 'I am in pain', (3) the meaning of the statement; and (4) the cause, stimulus, what

made him to utter that and response to it.

In the case of mentalistic theories the occurrence of pain and its experiencing, is the same thing. According to eliminative reductionism there is nothing over and above the occurrence of pain, the mentalistic 'sensation' element is abolished and pain is identified with the brain process. If existence of the brain states is not dependent on its being experienced, one may ask ".... what is that brain state's being experienced, over and above its occurring. There is nothing intrinsic about a brain process that can be identified with the feeling of a pain - 'hurting' is not a property to physical theory; thus we want to know what it is about this brain state which is its hurting" <sup>15</sup> .

Thus to whatever extent the eliminative reductionist goes in eliminating mental experiences and sensations, he cannot do so. That such states are ineliminable, can be seen from the fact that there is a stimulus or causal antecedent and an appropriate response to that stimulus. Thus in the eliminative view, the things which are there to be explained are neglected. The dissolution of the mind-body dichotomy problem, the possibility of which Rorty talks about, seems to recede further, as the materialists await for the overthrow of 'incorrigible' mental states. Evidence that will be obtained by electroencephalograms about the nature of mental states along with a powerful brain-theory is materialists' 'hope' of winning the battle.

To win the battle they look forward to science. Rorty in particular, wants science to play a prominent role in philosophy. Rorty feels that the recent discussions in philosophy of mind

have led to the view that, if one wants to understand 'mind' one should study 'Scientific Psychology' or cognitive science or neuro-psychology. But, as Furlong points out, "any science is a specialised, well entrenched type of hermeneutic discourse. Therefore Scientific Psychology is a form of hermeneutics"<sup>16</sup>. And, how can hermeneutics be scientific?

Rorty discards the traditional distinction between hermeneutics and epistemology as opposites and argues that the distinction is one of degree and not of kind. As he puts it :

"The difference is purely one of familiarity. We will be epistemological where we understand perfectly well what is happening but want to codify it in order to extend, or strengthen, or teach, or "ground" it. We must be hermeneutical where we do not understand what is happening but are honest enough to admit it, rather than being blatantly "Whiggish" about it. This means that we can get epistemological commensuration only where we already have agreed upon practices of inquiry..."<sup>17</sup>

This pragmatist view leads Rorty to assume that all inquiry and research in physical sciences and 'human sciences' is on the same footing. He "views science as one genre of literature - or put the other way around, literature and the arts as inquiries, on the same footing as scientific inquiries. Thus it sees ethics as neither more 'relative' nor 'subjective' than scientific theory, nor as needing to be made scientific. Physics is a way of trying to cope with bits of the universe; ethics is a matter of trying to cope with other bits"<sup>18</sup>.

In other words, according to Rorty, a certain 'pragmatic tolerance'<sup>19</sup> is to be shown as far as the casual inconsistencies

and the imprecise use of technical terms are concerned (in ethics, arts and different disciplines).

But there seems to be a serious inconsistency in his views as far as his philosophy of mind and 'hermeneuticised science' is concerned. He would have been consistent, if he had observed, the distinction between the 'mental' and the 'physical' as only 'conventional' resulting in some form of monism. In other words, saying that 'mind-talk' and 'brain-talk' is on the same footing and remaining 'neutral' as far as the materialistic theories about mind are concerned. Reduction of mind-talk to brain-talk would have only pragmatic value.

But, inconsistent with his, pragmatized and hermeneuticised science, Rorty favours and accepts 'functionalism' because he believes it to be a more satisfactory theory. He believes that "functionalism comes down to saying that anything you want to say about persons will have an analogue in something you can say about computers, and that if you know as much about a person as a team consisting of the ideal design engineer and the ideal programmer know about a computer, then you know all there is to know about the person"<sup>20</sup>.

Again it would have been consistent with his hermeneuticised science, if Rorty, had not eliminated the ascription of desires, pains and beliefs to oneself and others (whatever is included in folk psychology) because it is useful in social practice. There is no guarantee that the elimination of such a talk in folk psychology would help more accurate predictions.

But Rorty makes the ascription of desires, beliefs, and

pains to oneself and others, as functional states. He discards in a catalyst fashion, folk psychology, talk about intuitions, beliefs, desires as groundless and insignificant in a scientific explanation. One finds Rorty employing science to play a confused and ambiguous role in his philosophy of mind. According to him, whatever mind-talk fits in the 'explanatory scheme' is appropriate, what cannot be integrated in the scheme becomes a wheel which does not play any role in the machine.

The principal thesis of Rorty in, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, is to show that 'mind is an ontological entity' is a misleading cartesian 'invention'. A sub-topic from the book 'The Antipodeans' depicts the materialists in the form of a science fiction story. The story begins with the Antipodean's important features:

"Far away, on the other side of our galaxy, there was a planet on which lived beings like ourselves - ..... wrote poems and computer programs. These beings did not know that they had minds. They had notions like "wanting to" and "intending to" and "believing that" and "feeling terrible" and "feeling marvelous". But they had no notion that these signified mental states - states of a peculiar and distinct sort - quite different from "sitting down", "having a cold" ..."21.

"Neurology and biochemistry had been the first disciplines in which technological breakthroughs had been achieved and a large part of the conversation of these people concerned the state of their nerves. When their infants veered toward hot stoves mothers cried out, "He'll stimulate his C - fibers" ... Their knowledge of physiology was such that each well formed sentence in the language which anybody bothered to form could easily be correlated with a readily identifiable neural state"22.

The earth philosophers visiting the Antipodeans, in their conversation with them, talk about mind and other mental experiences what the Antipodeans cannot understand.

Assuming that the term "science" in the illustration will have the similar meaning, as what we understand by science (science of neurology and biochemistry), since it is presented by Rorty as (earth man) and not by any creature so called anti-podean. The Anti-podean observation of nerves then, will be similar to our actually perceiving a nerve as a neuro physiologist might do, while observing a patient or we may refer to the inferred causal generator or the observations that a physiologist has. The illustration cannot stand because if we assume that the Anti-podeans observe their own neural processes then they observe both, the brain-state as well as the resulting sensation, may be pain, which is something difficult to understand and believe in, as it is unlike our own experience.

According to Rorty, it is a completely different experience. But it is not the difference in the experience, rather the language that they use to refer to their experiences. In their talk about a person's C-fibres being stimulated, they are speaking of the event not as they observe it, but as they have learned to understand it. It is much as we, having learned some rudimentary anatomy, would say under certain conditions, "my nerves are on edge" or "my stomach is upset"<sup>23</sup>. Moreover, the Anti-podean child has to learn the neural terminology. Unless he learns that, the statements about neuron firings, he will have no meaning. The earth child can refer to his stomach, in case he is asked about his stomach ache. But before he could reply, he should learn to associate the meaning with the organ. In case of an Anti-podean child, to what he will apply the words 'C-fibers'? The child then has to presume that there is C-fiber stimulation

on the basis of something that is directly observable to him, and on the basis of that correlating C-fiber stimulation. The obvious question that can be raised, is that, what is directly experienced by the Anti-podean child?

When the Anti-podean child learns what the C-fibers are and their stimulation, it is possible that, he may explain his 'pain experience' in terms of C-fiber stimulation. He will understand both the stimulus and response, in terms of neural terminology, that is he will use different neural referents. It is obvious that he should notice, that the 'original' referent escapes the physiologist's observation, with the help of which he inferred the stimulation of C-fibers.

Thus, the C-fiber stimulation itself is not awkward or unpleasant - at least to the physiologist observer - it is neutral, as other fiber stimulation in the brain. The physiologist does not find C-fiber stimulation unpleasant because this feature is not presented by C-fiber firing to the observer. The feature that is present in our experiences is missing in the neural terminology. Rorty's suggestion of Anti-podean's describing their experiences in a different way because of their advanced neurology and biochemistry, cannot yield to Rorty, what he expects. In other words, what Rorty awaits for is the advancement in neurology, revealing the nature of mental experiences. But to whatever extent it advances, in case of pain it is true that, the unpleasant feeling which is experienced by the person who is observed, is absent in the observer. The distinction one can make, is only in terms of feelings, namely,

'my feelings' different from 'your feelings' the difference between observed and the observer.

Rorty maintains that the language that we use to communicate our pain-experience can be replaced without any detectable loss by language about neural states. And in case of Anti-podeans, Rorty says "their knowledge of physiology was such that each well-formed sentence in the language which anybody bothered to form could easily be correlated with a readily identifiable neural states"<sup>24</sup>. An Anti-podean thus can alternatively say : "It looked like an elephant, but then it struck me that elephants don't occur on this continent, so I realised that it must be a mastodon" or "I had G-412 together with F-11, but then I had S-147, so I realised that it must be a mastodon"<sup>25</sup>. In other words, according to Rorty, our thoughts can be reported in terms of neural states. Kenneth T. Gallagher objects to Rorty's claim that Rorty's Anti-podeans already cannot correlate any sentence or thought with a neural state. He says nobody including Rorty will deny the possibility of infinite number of sentences in a language. It is this very possibility which suggests that the correlation between every sentence, every thought and the neural state is impossible. Correlations cannot be given in tabulated form and on the spot correlation, by Anti-podean cannot be imagined, since it will require some scientific means. If the correlation is discovered by scientific means, then it cannot be made by any speaker with regard to the novel sentences that he has just pronounced. Further, in order there to be a correlation of thoughts with neural states, a thought should be available as well as a neural state should also be available. Granting that

the ordinary speaker might take somebody's (scientist's) word for the neural state, Rorty cannot talk about the correlation of thoughts with neural states. The neural state should be directly available, in which case, the ordinary speaker would not have to rely on somebody's word, as it (somebody's word) cannot be the correlating neural state. Kenneth Gallagher maintains that one cannot learn about one's thoughts on the basis of empirical observations of one's neural states. Our thought experience is not an indirect experience, such that others around us can tell what thoughts, a particular person is experiencing.

Further, criticising Rorty's correlation of thoughts with neural states, Gallagher says that the process of 'correlating' itself, will be a thought. If so, then for that thought one has to look for a neural state, which cannot be listed in the tabulated form. Nor, on the spot correlation is possible, on the assumption that we cannot observe our own neural states.

Even if it is maintained that, later we could find out this correlation, it generates another correlation, which cannot be expressed, leading to infinite regress. It shows the impossibility of our every thought to be correlated with neural states. Thus, Gallagher comments that the Anti-podean illustration does not seem to be doing what Rorty intended it to do.

Rorty attacks the traditional epistemology on the ground that research programmes based on this have failed. Therefore, instead of epistemology, a form of hermeneutics should be pursued. According to him, hermeneutics helps to overcome the

incommensurability of various discourses. Knowledge has social agreement as its basis. Knowledge, then is "the sort of statement which can be agreed to be true by all participants whom the other participants count as 'rational'" <sup>26</sup>. Rorty's Philosophy is thus therapeutic and aims at edification. In his revision of the world there is "the project of finding new, better, more interesting, <sup>27</sup> more fruitful ways of speaking" .

Peter Blum, aptly sums up Rorty's objective when he writes:

"Rorty means this project to stand in stark contrast with the Cartesian/Kantian project of finding ultimate foundations and adjudicating truth claims in terms of them. Rorty's notion of "better" ways of speaking is elaborated in terms of pragmatic considerations rather than epistemic ones. The place of philosophy qua hermeneutics in the human conversation is that of informed participant, and not that of judge or referee.... To put this yet another way, Rorty's "post philosophical" philosophy has no set goal other than helping to ensure that no one becomes <sup>28</sup> too entrenched in any particular way of thinking" .

On the other hand "with whom Rorty repeatedly likes to trace his own philosophical lineage", Heidegger for example, for him (Heidegger) 'the end of philosophy' has a different meaning. In general, according to Heidegger, 'the end of philosophy' means the completion of meta-physics. For Heidegger, "the development of philosophy into the independent sciences, which however, inter dependently communicate among themselves, even more <sup>29</sup> markedly, is the legitimate completion of philosophy" .

The meaning of the phrase 'end of philosophy' for two philosophers differs. While Heidegger perceives the philosophy's

triumph in finding its place in scientific attitudes whereas Rorty's hermeneutical pursuit in philosophy and Mirror of Nature, seem to aim at deconstruction in philosophy. According to Henry Veatch ".... the thesis of that book boils down to the contention that it is singularly wrong headed for philosophy to try to be, much less to go on any longer claiming to be, anything like a mirror of nature. And what is this if not an effort at deconstruction on Rorty's part, and of deconstruction with respect to one of the most ancient and honorable theses of western Philosophy - the thesis viz., of what might be called a traditional Aristotelian realism and empiricism?"

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In Rorty's philosophy of mind, he employs science to play an ambiguous and confused role, which leads to serious inconsistencies in his position.

Consistent with Rorty's hermeneuticised science one may draw certain features of his philosophy of mind. One may consistently think that Rorty will be a monist and a non-reductionist. Since he upholds pragmatism, one expects Rorty to remain 'neutral' as far as materialistic approaches about 'mind' are concerned. Again, one expects Rorty to be soft on folk psychology as it is useful in social practice.

However, one finds that, this extra-polated version is inconsistent with Rorty's actual philosophy of mind. One observes serious inconsistencies in Rorty as he adopts a reductionist approach and favours a particular materialistic approach, namely, functionalism. He is also seen as inconsistent in his views with regard to folk psychology and ascription of

beliefs and desires to oneself and others are concerned. He eliminates the talk about folk psychology in his theory.

Rorty maintains that there are no sensations but here are only brains. Thus in Rorty's eliminative reductionism, he attempts to eliminate 'mind' in case of mind-body problem, instead of explaining the relation between the two and thus he goes beyond the debate in mind-body problem.

### NOTES

1. Richard Rorty, The Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, p.35.
2. Ibid., p.5.
3. Ibid.
4. John Furlong, "Scientific Psychology as Hermeneutics? 'Rorty's Philosophy of Mind'", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. XLVIII, No.3, 1988, p.491.
5. Ibid., p.492.
6. Richard Rorty, op. cit., p.22.
7. Anybody can be mistaken about attributing a physical property to anything but one cannot be mistaken about how the pain feels one who has the pain.
8. Richard Rorty, op.cit., p.8.
9. Allan Donagan, "Wittgenstein on Sensation", in Wittgenstein; The Collected Works of George Pitcher, New York, ~~1966, p.350.~~  
*Reflections of Critical Essays, ed. George Pitcher, New York, 1966, p.350*
10. Ibid.
11. Richard Rorty, op. cit., p.106.
12. "Ontological Gap" between two entities such that the two entities cannot be identified by empirical means.
13. Richard Rorty, "Mind-Body Identity, privacy and Categories", The Review of Metaphysics, vol.XIX, No.17, 1965, pp. 26-27.
14. Paul Fayerabend, "Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem", The Review of Metaphysics, Vol.XVII, 1963, p.58.

15. Howard Robinson, Matter and Sense, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982, p.84.
16. John Furlong, "Scientific Psychology as Hermeneutics? Rorty's Philosophy of Mind", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.XLVIII, No.3, 1988, p.491.
17. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, p.321.
18. Richard Rorty; Consequences of Pragmatism, Minneapolis - University of Minnesota Press, 1982, p.Xliii.
19. Pragmatic tolerance: The faults like "minor disputes in exegesis, the causal inconsistency, the occasional imprecision in the use of technical terms" --- according to Rorty should be tolerated so that there would be no inhibition in the "Conversation of Mankind". John Furlong, "Scientific Psychology as hermeneutics? Rorty's Philosophy of Mind", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.XLVIII, No.3, 1988, p.489.
20. Richard Rorty, "Contemporary Philosophy of Mind", Synthese 53, 1982, p.335.
21. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, p.70.
22. Ibid., p.71.
23. Kenneth T. Gallagher, "Rorty's Antipodean's: An Impossible Illustration?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vo.XLV, No.3, 1985, p.451.
24. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, p.71.
25. Ibid., p.72.
26. Ibid., p.320.
27. Ibid., p.360.
28. Peter Blum, "Heidegger and Rorty on the 'The End of Philosophy'", Meta-Philosophy, Vol. XXI, No.3, 1990, p.233.
29. Ibid., p.226.
30. Henry Veatch, "Deconstruction in Philosophy", Review of Meta physics, vol. XXXIX No.2, 1985, p.307.

## UNDERSTANDING PERSPECTIVES: A SYNTHESIS

The present chapter attempts a three-fold task: review the major arguments analysed in the critical studies preceeding this chapter; suggest a methodological framework to study the varied perspectives, and justify why functionalism is the most acceptable position within such a framework.

(A) Dualism upholds the view that mind is distinct from the body and that mind is a real entity. This two component view seems to be going against the contemporary scientific view, according to which every human behaviour in principle can be explained without referring to any non-physical entity. A man is subject to physical, chemical and other bio-chemical laws as are other things in the world. His behaviour therefore, is causally determined and one need not postulate a 'free-will' to account for actions.

The attractive dualist version of mind-body turns out to be highly problematic when confronted by questions such as: what precisely is meant by a non-physical entity? Where is it located in the body? What is its nature? What is its relation with body? The problems regarding identification of mind, existence of one mind in one body, continuity of the mind in a body etc. remain unsolved.

It is a scientific fact that from simple more complex has evolved. Dualism gets a serious blow when number of questions go unanswered. If evolution is true then there are no gaps in between the two extremes, say animals on the one hand and human

being on the other. The chain is filled by various other species of organisms. If this is true then a dualist has to answer where and what stage mind evolves. Further, one cannot say, in case of chimpanzees there is no mind at all and all of a sudden in case of man it exists. Such sharp demarcations at any level of evolutionary process are ruled out and therefore a dualist cannot account for his claim that only humans have got minds. Again, a dualist cannot hold that in case of evolution of physical things there are no gaps, but in case of evolutions of non-physical entity like 'mind' there is a 'sudden-jump'. Interactionism, as a relation between mind and body, as maintained in the dualist thesis is also objected. Mind being immaterial and body material, the two distinct entities, one observable and the other abstract, poses a serious difficulty, as to how this two can interact and where do they interact.

A dualist as he maintains that physical events have immaterial causes goes against the scientific principle that this world is 'causally closed', neural events in the brain are responsible for all our behaviour. In turn, these mental events, as per dualist account, are caused by mind or immaterial principle. But 'closure-principle' does not allow for any immaterial event to be the cause of a physical event.

The inadequacy of Cartesian dualism to provide a satisfactory solution to mind-body problem, serves as a background with reference to which each perspective is developed in various reductionist and non-reductionist interpretations of mind.

(B) In order to grasp the nature of mental phenomena, Wittgenstein considers that, understanding and analysis of language is very important. The discussions of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind includes the discussion of quite general issues about the nature of mind rather than the discussion of particular mental states like beliefs, thought, emotion etc.. In Philosophical Investigations he often discusses the term sensation and the treatment of this term is understood as applicable to other mental phenomena, thus ignoring the distinctive features of various mental processes.

Wittgenstein's claim that sensations are communicable through outward responsive behaviour (reaction to some sensation) forced many philosophers to call him a 'linguistic behaviourist'. J.J.C. Smart Comments that "inspite of his own disclaimer, Wittgenstein is in fact a sort of behaviourist"<sup>1</sup>. One may find Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind unsatisfactory as he has not been able to address himself to the specific question 'what is mind'? His Philosophical Investigations appear to be 'dogmatically negative', since every attempt made to analyse fundamental mental states is disposed off alongwith the refusal to admit that there exist private phenomena.

Don Locke critically comments that, although Wittgenstein refutes the sceptic's claim (that the sceptic only can know whether he is in pain), Wittgenstein himself commits the same mistake. Wittgenstein, at the initial stage, to argue against the possibility of private language, accepts that if 'pain' is understood as a private sensation, then only the person who is experiencing that 'pain' can know that he is in pain.

Wittgenstein does not notice that, it is on the basis of above assumption, a sceptic argues for his claim. Wittgenstein's failure to notice this is partly because of his basic desire to show that philosophical puzzles arise from the misunderstanding about how language works and partly because Wittgenstein fails to distinguish between the two claims: that 'pains' and similar things which only one person can feel and the claim that 'pains' and similar things which one person can know.

In refuting scepticism Wittgenstein neither argues that it (scepticism) is absurd because it is based on a 'mistaken theory of language nor he says the theory of language is mistaken because it leads to an absurd sceptical conclusion and therefore thinks that the theory of language which commits us to it must be mistaken. One may observe Wittgenstein as mistaken in his thinking that it is the theory of language which commits us to scepticism about other minds.

Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of 'private language' and 'memory' as a criterion cannot escape from severe criticisms levelled by various philosophers, in their discussion of Wittgenstein's 'beetle's argument' and 'diary argument'.

Wittgenstein repeatedly remarks that nothing can be said about the mental. Norman Malcolm interprets Wittgenstein as considering the mind as neither something 'inner' nor 'outer' and further holding the view that whichever way one chooses, it is not without objections. Based on Malcolm's interpretation, it may be said that Wittgenstein does not seem to be taking either reductionist or non-reductionist perspective.

(C) Gilbert Ryle, understands 'mind' in terms of appropriate behavioural responses given as the actualisation of a disposition. Disposition, the key term in Ryle's philosophy of mind means the tendency to behave. Thus mind and other psychological concepts are reduced to 'dispositions' or 'tendencies to behave'.

Ryle's approach of providing clarification in case of language confusions has been objected to, as only one-sided solution. All problems in philosophy need not necessarily be, because of language confusions. Therefore, linguistic analysis can be only a method to solve certain philosophical problems and should not be treated as the sole aim of philosophy.

Ryle can be criticised for his identification of the 'meaning' with the 'method' of verification with reference to the term 'intelligence'. The meaning of the term is sought in the activities done. Positivists with the verification method emphasised 'facts' of life whereas Ryle without going to the 'facts' of nature which are essential to understand the meaning of the words we use in language, seeks meaning only to find out to what use they can be put.

Although Ryle talks about the category mistake he does not bother to define, in his Concept of Mind, what a category is. Warnock critically comments that Ryle is not entitled to employ the term category, because "if one is not prepared and indeed is deliberately unwilling, to say what a category is, and what categories there are, can one really be entitled to employ the term category?" .

Though Ryle says that he does not want to increase our knowledge by introducing a new theory of mind, yet he does so by introducing theory of dispositions. His account of dispositions can be questioned: can there not be a disposition which is not manifested in overt behaviour, but by virtue of which that person has private experiences, private experience of a certain type?

Again, Ryle's criteria of certifying the presence of any ability in a person is fallible although it is true to some extent that the presence of any ability is manifested in at least some of his acts. The 'leap' in Rylean inference from one's overt behaviour to the presence of ability in a person is not as guaranteed as Ryle thinks. Besides, Ryle has not distinguished between human dispositions and dispositions of other non-living objects. When difficulties arise while reducing psychological concepts to dispositions, Ryle is forced to term them 'semi-dispositions' which cannot replace mind.

Ryle's attempt of replacing consciousness by dispositions result in absurd consequences. Thus an intelligent man's body is disposed to behave intelligently under certain conditions, without that man's being conscious of his intelligent doings which is absurd and unacceptable. Ryle's contention that we are not aware of our mental life through consciousness can be questioned, if consciously experienced mental processes, are not able to reveal the 'hidden' how can our outward behaviour expose the mental? Ryle's inquiring into the logical behaviour of words in sentences containing mental concepts, adopts a reductive approach, to reduce mental concepts to dispositions.

H.P. Rickman criticises Ryle saying that his criticism

implied in the 'ghost' metaphor does not hit the target. Rickman comments that the ghost metaphor misdescribes and misrepresents dualism. This is, because Ryle misread the nature of dualism, according to Rickman. He says that "the derisive thrust of Ryle's metaphor lies in the word 'ghost' because most of us consider belief in ghosts a superstition"<sup>3</sup>.

According to him a 'ghost in the machine' theory shifts the problem of mind-body dualism to two tier materialism. Rickman points out that just as ghosts are understood as comprising of thin matter since 'mind' is compared with a ghost, mind is also a kind of thin matter.

(D) The supporters of the identity theory maintain that it is possible to give a physicalist account of human beings and their actions. In identity thesis, an identity is sought between brain-processes and mental states. It is asserted that there is the correlation between the brain events and mental events. Though there is a great dependence of mental processes on brain functioning, the assertions of the identity theory that there is a correlation between mental experiences and brain events go beyond the evidence provided by empirical research.

J.T. Stevenson objects to the 'strict-identity' saying that the supposed identity falls short of evidence. That is, there is no exact correspondence between the mental experiences and brain-processes such that from observation of a person's brain states one can arrive at the knowledge of his experiences.

Roland ~~and~~ Pucetti treats the materialistic interpretation of mind as fallacious. According to him our mental states can

always be distinguished from physio-chemical processes going on in our brain. He firmly believes that irrespective of advanced scientific research and knowledge the distinction between the mental and the physical will remain. An argument based on mental structure is put forth by J.J. Clarke to maintain the distinction between mind, as an integrated whole and brain, physically functioning organ, like a machine. Multiple thoughts, feelings, experiences go to make up a person's mental life. Although individual perception and experiences are distinguishable, they are only episodes in one integrated whole.

Armstrong's thesis is criticised by W. Keneale for supporting Place-Smart's view even after observing that they have paid little attention to the analysis of mind.

The identity thesis may be observed as inconsistent. Those who claim an identity between the mental and the physical, do not consider an individual as identical, under the light of two different descriptions, but consider as two different kinds of things.

The identity theorist's usage of philosophical terminology can be questioned because of their claim that the identity is contingent and can be understood only through scientific researches.

Thomas Nagel criticising materialism in general and Armstrong's theory in particular says that, mental states are assigned the causal roles without giving an account of their intrinsic nature which is necessary since we experience them directly.

A materialist denies mental experiences and after-images, what we normally accept as taking place. Because of his denial of mental experiences he is like an unconscious person who is not aware of anything, a materialist while giving a materialist account of the mental experiences, sensations etc., must pretend to be anaesthetised. If he is conscious he would comment that the theory is false. Therefore, we may say that a materialistic theory is not correct inspite of strong arguments that may be advanced in favour of the theory.

The identity thesis may be questioned that, how can one hold an identity between two different things belonging to two different categories? Mind belongs to one category and is unobservable whereas body is observable. In order to identify both the things, we should be able to pick out both the things. One cannot pick out 'mind' as it is not a physical organ or something concrete. In turn the identity thesis may be taken as suggesting positively, that there is mind.

Jerome Shaffer contends that our mental experiences cannot be located. He says, when there is a 'pain' in the leg, the state of awareness that he is in pain, is neither in the leg nor in the head. Therefore, he doubts the contention of the identity theory as it cannot meet the "co-existence requirement"<sup>4</sup>. Though the materialists uphold the 'closure principle', in their reductionist account of the mental experiences like after-images, they face the difficulties, which shows that our subjective experiences are irreducible.

Popper comments that the identity between a mental state and a brain-state based on gene - DNA analogy is not only unwarranted

but even misleading. For the latter has the empirical evidence in its support whereas in case of former, the corresponding physical change in the brain is not sufficient to explain some triggered behaviour in an organism.

Thus, the identity theory rejects 'mind' as an ontological entity only to reduce it to physico-chemical brain processes.

(E) Strawson maintains that the concept of 'Person' is logically primitive. That is, it is not to be understood in a certain way --- as considering it a secondary entity to both the concepts --- concept of a body and that of a mind. In other words, concept of 'persons' is not the compound of the mind and the body.

If we accept Strawson's contention that the concept of 'person' is not the compound of the mind and the body, then strange consequences follow. That, the physical characteristics will be attributed to the 'person' as well as the material body. And we are forced to say that John Smith and his body have identical physical characteristics which is nonsense. This difficulty can be avoided if Strawson either accepts dualism or abandons his view that the concept of 'person' is logically primitive.

A person has conscious experiences as well as it will be a material entity. In Strawson's theory, the material body is not a part of the person, therefore, Strawson has to specify in what sense can we say of a person as having a material body.

Criticisms can be raised against Strawson's distinction between P-predicates and M-predicates. B.A.O. Williams observes

that the above distinction is rooted in Descartes' thought the division of complex attributes into the physical and the mental. Further, as many P-predicates are highly corporeal, it is difficult to see which are really M-predicates. Hence, Williams criticises Strawson's ascription of P-predicates and M-predicates as unclear.

Strawson's contention that personal identity can be held through the retaining of one's experiences -- that is memory, cannot be accepted --- as it is well known that memory of a person is not sufficient for the above purpose.

H.D. Lewis points out that in the very statement of the problem of ascription of predicates there appear "unwarranted assumption"<sup>5</sup>. Lewis maintains that for the ordinary purpose we do ascribe states of consciousness and physical characteristics to the same entity, but we cannot allow this to be decisive in philosophy as is done by Strawson.

Strawson's contention that identification of others is possible through the observation of their bodily movements is objected to by Lewis. He points out that if we accept above mentioned Strawson's contention, then one finds it difficult to understand one's functioning independent of our bodies. Lewis further comments that Strawson's explanation of 'depression' is mystifying. Lewis criticises Strawson for his failure to distinguish between the two senses of language, ordinary sense and philosophical sense, such that the linguistic convention becomes the head of the corner in Strawson's arguments and is made to bear the weight of all his far-reaching contentions in

his book.

J.O. Urmson criticises Strawson's criterion of ascription of predicates saying that the observation of other's which involve doing something is not a sufficient criteria for ascription of predicates. Strawson's assertion and criteria to identify one's own body from the other bodies is also criticised. It may be observed that Strawson's usage of the term 'person' comes close to ordinary usage of the term which also invites criticisms.

(F) Davidson upholds 'mechanism' and at the same time maintains that our subjective experiences are irreducible." For Davidson, sensation is a brain process, but he denies that there are strict laws governing this process. Further, he holds that reliable psycho-physical generalisations are incapable of being refined into strict laws. Davidson names his position as 'anomalous monism'.

Davidson accepts three principles: (1) he holds a causal interaction between the mental and the physical, (2) he holds the principle of nomological character of causality and (3) the non-existence of precise psycho-physical laws.

Armstrong contends that the three principles accepted by Davidson are incompatible. <sup>He says that</sup> Davidson asserts an identity between the physical and the mental, and should also assume that the extra properties of the physical events in question go to constitute mental and are of a non-physical nature. But these extra properties should give causal power to the mental and in case if this does not happen then this goes against the principle of causal interaction on the one hand and on the other, if they

do bestow a causal power, then these properties should bestow a law-governed power, leading to the conclusion that there must be precise psycho-physical laws which is contrary to one of the principles accepted by Davidson. In an objection to Davidson's theory, Howard Robinson not only names it as a 'Dual Aspect Theory' but also calls it 'epiphenomenalism', since the necessary and sufficient conditions should be only physical. Consequently, the 'mental' becomes an 'idle by-product' of the physical system.

Robinson critically comments that the interactionism supposed in the theory is entirely 'empty'. There cannot be any interaction at all as the mental part does not bring about any effect. It means then, even if the mental had been absent, the effect would not have been different. The fact that mental events and states are present is not sufficient to say that it interacts with physical.

Robinson further observes that Davidson's claim about supervenience of the mental on the physical is useless to his non-reductive materialism.

J.J.C. Smart points out that Davidson does not treat occurrent experiences seriously. Experiences such as, having of an itch or a memory image, these occurrent experiences are not touched upon by a materialist and Davidson being a materialist, if his argument is taken for materialism in general, then it will have a serious lacuna in it. Since it is these occurrent experiences are understood as providing greatest difficulty for the materialist. Again, Smart points out that Davidson's talk about 'psychology' is not about the 'scientific psychology' --- which avoids reference to intentional states.

K.V. Wilkes comments that in philosophy it has become a fashion to talk about 'psychology'. Further, she critically comments that the theories of action and perception discussed by philosophers, with reference to common sense psychology are 'arm chair' theories and therefore they "are and will be going nowhere"<sup>6</sup>. Davidson argues for irreducible psychical aspect of our experiences and yet upholds materialism.

(G) Karl Popper accepting the existence of the 'self' says that the individual who feels, hopes, fears, enjoys etc. is a 'self'. He maintains that we get the knowledge about self when we learn, react, experience and observe world 1, world 2 and world 3. According to Popper the changes in self are dependent on physical as well as on one's intellectual ability to invent and to develop. Popper understands individuals as the product of psycho-physical interactionism which takes place between the three worlds.

It may be said that, allowing Popper's psycho-physical interactionism in science is detrimental to the progress of Science. Since the success of science is attributed to its method, the assumption of non-physical entities, if not contradicting science, at least will initiate a change in its method leading to stastical and probabilistic laws.

Popper's view that all processes in living organisms are in accordance with the laws by physics and chemistry, makes his theory as a type of physicalism where the notion of 'organism' is not properly explained. That is, there is no room for the "specialities"<sup>7</sup> of an organism.

Tom Settle comments that although it is true that, World 3 objects are necessary for thought in Popper's psychophysical interactionism, they can contribute as causes without being dynamic, for example, we see the collapse of social institutions when people stop supporting that. Settle arguing against interactionism says that it cannot be accepted as it bifurcates a human being into interacting parts, And we do not experience ourselves as bifurcated into a body and a mind.

Objections are raised against the Popperian claim that man is not a machine. It is said that the matter out of which the machine is made is unimportant. A particular device is called a machine on the basis of how it functions, operates, changes its states and so forth. If this is true, then a man can be called a machine. Further, the possibility of the successful functionalistic computational programs for describing and explaining human psychology and behaviour, may prove fatal to Popper's view that man is not a machine.

It is said that a computational programme can be realised by various devices including non-physical things also. And if the same programme is performed by a computer and a human being, possessing a non-physical mind, then human beings can also be called as machines.

Popper's view that the physical world is not causally closed, leads to the conclusion that there is a contradiction in ethology, in which the assumption of interactionism in evolutionary theory is discussed. J. Van Rooijen points out that there is no such contradiction between evolutionary process and

the assumption that the universe is causally closed. Rooijen explains that, though mental events are seen as influencing the material, they are understood as causes or effects of physical processes. Rooijen explains further, that mental experiences are seen as adaptations, as secondary properties and are adaptively neutral. Rooijen in his critical comments says: "Because it is not correct that only things that make a difference have emerged during evolution there exist no contradiction between evolution and the assumption of a causally closed universe. Although the assumption of a causally closed universe is not necessarily correct this conclusion implies that Popper's argument for interactionism does not hold" .

Popper's rejection of the deterministic view of psychology is criticised by saying that even though mind is considered as non-physical, one can still hold determinism. In that case non-physical entities will be subject to physical laws. And that 'non-physicality' of mind cannot be taken as establishing indeterminism as far as mental events are concerned.

Herbert Feigl and Paul E. Meehl, criticise Popperian contention about the 'closure principle' and Popper's rejection of deterministic principle. Feigl and Meehl point out, Popper's contention that, it is impossible to predict the properties of the complexes based on their constituent parts, cannot be taken as an argument against the possibility of deterministic theories.

Interactionism thus presupposed in the three worlds includes the mental and the physical interaction. But Popper may be criticised, for not explaining what is fundamental in the process of interactionism. Or how it takes place within a person, that

is, how his mind and body interact?

(H) Kripke accepts the Cartesian intuition that mind is distinct from the body and argues for it in a novel way. Kripke adopting a non-reductionist approach maintains that the mental cannot be reduced to the physical. However, he rejects mind in the sense of Cartesian substance.

Kripke arguing against the identity thesis maintains that, claimed identity between the mental and the physical cannot be a contingent one, but it has to be a necessary identity. Further, he claims that it is impossible for the identity theorists to show that the identity is necessary. Since they cannot provide a 'contingent associated discovery' Kripke concludes that mental is not identical with the physical.

Kripke's argument involve 'rigid' and 'non-rigid' designators. Kripke's assumption that a 'pain' is a rigid designator can be doubted. Since in the functionalist doctrine a 'pain' will be anything that plays a functional role and it is possible for many things to play such a role, 'pain' ceases to be a rigid designator.

Michael Levin argues against Kripke's contention that the reference of pain can be fixed only by 'pain-sensation'. Levin maintains that "Australian descriptions" which hold contingently of 'pain' can be used to fix the reference of 'pain'. He critically comments that "over concentration on this example has made him" (Kripke) "over look the other ways to fix reference than by causal effects on the human senses" .

William G. Lycan points out that Kripke's view of necessary

identity is based on an argument from 'imaginability'. Lycan says, Kripke does not accept the argument as it stands and that his 'imaginability' argument is of a notably fragile and ephemeral type.

Lycan mentions the analogy of genes with DNA molecules and says that they are distinguishable, though they are necessarily identical, against Kripke's view that, the two things if they are necessarily identical, then they are indistinguishable.

Against, criticising Kripke's assumption that 'pain' is a 'rigid' designator, we may say that, we cannot decide to refer to 'pain' by saying to oneself 'this is what henceforth, I will call pain'. In other words, we may say that 'pains' cannot be identified with the help of references, in turn we can do so by a description, where 'pains' are not referred to as something. Therefore, it may be said that 'pain' cannot be fixed by any designator at all.

Colin McGinn finds that Kripke's argument holds against 'type-type' identity, but it does not hold against 'token-token' identity. McGinn maintains that in the case of 'token-token' identity, the required criteria of epistemic counterpart clearing the illusion of contingency is possible. Thus McGinn not only thinks that the challenging requirement put forth by Kripke can be met in 'token-token' materialist theories but also that these theories are rather strengthened by such considerations.

(1) Peter Smith and O.R. Jones develop a functionalist theory of mind on the basis of Aristotelian framework. In this theory, perception plays an important role, since, it is through

information, through perceptual processes, that we come to frame beliefs about the objects in the world. A belief state is a physical state in this theory. But what gives rise to one's behaviour is not the 'intrinsic physical constitution' but the function that is carried out along with the other interacting states.

It may be objected that, since any 'functionalism' aims at reduction of the mental to the physical, Smith and Jones' functionalism is a form of physicalism according to which we are entirely composed of 'physical stuff'.

David Cockburn criticises this version of functionalism saying that this 'naturalistic view' appears too much like a piece of science. He further says that Smith/Jones have not clearly distinguished between conceptual questions and scientific questions, a distinction that is rather important. Cockburn feels that this "naturalistic alternative to dualism is degrading; that it commits us to the denial that human beings have the kind of 'value' which, before the advance of modern science, we might have supposed them to have" <sup>11</sup>.

Smith and Jones in their functionalist approach give more importance to the 'scientific' type of dependence (mental dependent on physical as maintained by science) rather than another sort of 'dependence' as has been argued by many philosophers, that our capacity and ability to think is dependent on our possessing, something called as human form. It may be objected that Aristotelian form-matter distinction has not been properly applied to human beings.

This theory does not explain, how mere increase in complexity of our physical brain stuff, can affect our attitudes, feelings of love and emotion. Again, in this theory, an animal will have a mental life if it has got the capacity for complex interactions with the environment. The problem however remains regarding our attitudes and reactions towards other people and still different towards animals as they are marked off in our thought from other portions of nature.

This functionalist theory may be criticised as not maintaining a distinction between an action and a bodily movement. All bodily movements may have physical causes, but all bodily movements are not actions because the factors that explain a bodily movement may not explain an 'action'. This form of functionalism can be criticised for their enforcing the view that it is the business of science to determine what a 'person' or 'mind' is.

(J) Richard Rorty's philosophy of mind is influenced by his pragmatist and hermeneuticised philosophy of science. Consistent with Rorty's pragmatic and hermeneutical approach one may draw certain features of his philosophy of mind. One expects that Rorty will be a monist and non-reductionist in his philosophy of mind. Since Rorty upholds pragmatism that he will be neutral as far as materialistic approaches about mind are concerned, John Furlong says that consistent with his pragmatism Rorty will be soft on folk psychology "since social practice is the form and utility is the telos of human endeavour, it would be inconsistent to urge throwing out the set piece of social practice --- the

ascribing of beliefs, desires, pains and mental images to oneself  
and others" <sup>12</sup> .

However one finds that this extra-polated version is inconsistent with Rorty's actual philosophy of mind. One may observe serious inconsistencies in Rorty as he adopts a reductionist approach and favours a particular materialistic approach namely, functionalism. Rorty in his eliminative theory of mind maintains that there are no minds and no mental processes, but there are only brains. Rorty would have been consistent if he had maintained the distinction between 'mental' and the 'physical' as only 'conventional' resulting in some form of monism. Again Rorty in his real philosophy of mind accepts functionalism because he maintains that it is the "pragmatical attitude towards persons and minds" <sup>13</sup> . Furlong criticising Rorty says that, Rorty cannot plead for functionalism on the ground that it has a superior fit with reality, even 'psychological reality', though Rorty's Anti-podean thought experiment in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature comes close to it. Furlong says that the Correspondence is out, and therefore, is the availability of the most powerful arguments for functionalism.

Rorty shows inconsistency in his thought by eliminating the ascription of desires and pains, to oneself and others. One may find Rorty employing science to play a confused and ambiguous role in his philosophy of mind.

Kenneth T. Gallagher criticises Rorty's Antipodean thought experiment, saying that there cannot be the type of correlation between the brain processes and mental experiences as Rorty

expects. And that Rorty's Antipodean thought experiment remains only a fiction.

Rorty maintains that a form of hermeneutics should be pursued instead of epistemology. Criticism of Rorty can best be summed up in Furlong's words: it (hermeneutics) "wins on the analysis of grounds and loses on the analysis of its favourite phenomenon"<sup>14</sup>. And it is this that brings about a contradiction between Rorty's philosophy of science and philosophy of mind.

x                      x                      x

The debate concerning mind, seen in the above critical studies, has varied frameworks within which the perspectives be understood. Our option regarding the kind of metaphilosophy adopted, namely, defensive rather than aggressive<sup>15</sup>, reveals to us that there are three frameworks within which inquiry has been conducted by various exponents. There are those who are committed to a conceptual analysis and for whom the question of paramount importance is what do we mean when we use the mind vocabulary and concepts. Secondly, there are those whose primary concern is to know how do we know 'mind' exists. In other words, theirs is a commitment to an epistemological inquiry regarding mind. And finally, there are those who address themselves to variety of questions but are committed to an inquiry regarding the nature and status of entity called mind. Theirs is an ontological concern. In short, the ontological perspective is an inquiry into the existence or reality of entity called mind. The conceptual perspective inquires into the reducibility or irreducibility of the concept of mind. The epistemological perspective is an inquiry into the satisfactoriness of the

explanation of 'mind' in mentalistic terms.

These three perspectives or frameworks within which the inquiry is articulated, although distinguishable may not be separable in a particular tradition. But one can and does observe the primariness if not exclusiveness, of the concern in the above critical studies. One, however, observes great deal of confusion regarding the perspectives in individual thinkers. This coupled with philosophical polemics purported to be refutations of a particular theory lead to serious 'category mistakes'.

Many of the polemics or 'lines of arguments' are noticed to be illegitimate shifts, i.e. an argument in the ontological is regarded as refutation of the conceptual analysis and vice-versa. Similarly, attempted conceptual analysis and clarification has conclusions which reject the epistemological approach and vice-versa. Again, epistemological articulation has claimed rejection of ontological concerns and vice-versa.

The 'perspectives on mind' is a scenario full of arguments and counter arguments, logical and non-logical refutations, linguistic and conceptual disputes, epistemic arguments and fallacies, ontological presuppositions and illusions. The resultant maze is really complex --- not necessarily insoluble. What is attempted in the present study is not final solution but a direction in which a plausible solution is available. The confusion among the 'perspectives' is due to acceptance of a framework and method and the ontological/epistemic/conceptual commitments of the philosophers in the debate which can be known if the problem presented are delineated and their presuppositions

highlighted.

Dualism (particularly Cartesian type) concentrates on the ontological perspective when arguments are put forth to support the view that mind exists in the body and is real. The exclusive emphasis on the ontological perspective leads to an inadequate account of mind-body relation and the justification for the existence of other minds. Karl Popper does not discuss the problem from the conceptual or epistemological point of view. However, he accepts the existence of self. Popper talks about an interaction between psychological and physical in a 'scientific' style, readmitting dualism. He avoids discussing 'what is' questions about mind, which for him is the product of evolution. He does not enter into an ontological inquiry regarding the reality of entity called mind. he simply accepts it.

The identity theorists and physicalists ('reductionists' in general) find their epistemological framework explanation of 'mind' or mental processes in terms of concepts referring to physical things, quite satisfactory. One notices, however that both J.J.C. Smart and D.M. Armstrong seem to work at two levels -- conceptual and epistemological. There, however, seem to be an unjustified leap from the epistemological to ontological framework when they deny any non-material status of 'mind'.


Wittgenstein begins with the conceptual analysis in order to clear the linguistic confusions and misunderstandings about mind and mental processes. For him mind is a name given to all mental capacities of a person which are revealed in our linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour --- it is not mysterious something. Although Wittgenstein's inquiry begins as a clarification of

linguistic concepts, it ends up rejecting epistemological approach to mind. Gilbert Ryle, like Wittgenstein begins with the clarification of concepts when he analyses mind and associated concepts such as intelligence, consciousness and introspection. His concluding reductionist account of mind, in terms of disposition to behave, results in both epistemological and ontological conclusions. Saul Kripke rejects the perspective of conceptual analysis in case of mind-body problem. He doubts the success of 'reductionist' programme. He places mind beyond all this and strongly attacks the identity thesis. He maintains that although a 'capacity' can be said to be housed in a particular body, it is neither identical with the body nor it can be realised in the same body. Kripke's 'minimal mentalism' provides a conceptual analysis to reject conceptual approach to mind-body problem.

Davidson, like Strawson and other analytic thinkers, begins with a conceptual perspective. His rejection of 'type-type' reduction and strict psycho-physical laws governing brain processes help him assert that although all events are physical, some processes have irreducibly psychical aspects. The question however, remains whether Davidson's 'minimal materialism' is conceptual or ontological. Strawson's 'dual predication' instead of resolving the problem of dichotomy, seems to reintroduce it at a different level. He seems to introduce dual language of speaking about human beings.

Peter Smith's 'functionalism' as a theory of mind is an attempt to eliminate the dichotomy of mind-body, and takes the

perspective of conceptual analysis. Using Aristotelian framework, he claims that mind is constituted of capacities which are dependent on highly complex brain structure. Although a belief state is a neuro-psychological state, what gives rise to behaviour is not the internal brain-stuff but the function that is carried out along with other interacting states. Thus functionalism reduces mind to capacities and functions of the physical. It rejects the view that mind is an entity and is real. Smith's functionalism although has similarities with Ryle's definition of mind (mind is the way the body functions), avoids the 'strayings' observed in Ryle. Richard Rorty 'explained away' 'mind' and 'mental processes' by saying there are no 'brain-sensation' but 'brain-state'. Rorty's 'eliminative reductionism' subscribes to some form of functionalism. He employs science to play an ambiguous and confused role in his philosophy of mind which leads to inconsistency in his position.

The different perspectives in the philosophy of mind reminds one of the traditional story of an elephant and the five blind men who formed their opinion from their individual experiences. That each of the blind man arrived at 'some truth' but not the 'whole truth' is paradigmatically important for the debate in the philosophy of mind. Each perspective is a significant contribution to the understanding of the phenomenon --- 'mind'. There seems, however, a significant difference that may compel a philosopher of mind to believe that the debate regarding 'mind' will always remain inconclusive. 

If the five blind men in the story were to recover their sight they would correct themselves and commit no fallacy of

composition. However, in the case of perspective of mind there seems to be no way of analysing the perspectives in terms of 'some' and 'whole' truth. And it may be due to this that some philosophers believe that irrespective of the advances and researches in scientific psychology and neuro-physiology, it will never be possible to reveal the true nature of mind. As Joseph Margolis puts it: "there is no reasonable sense in which we may claim straight forwardly to discover what we should correctly pose it as 'mind', 'self' or 'person'. We seek a reasonable and manageable convenience, hospitable to what we suppose to be the most fruitful lines of inquiry regarding very large, promisingly, coherent accounts of the central questions of epistemology, the methodology of science, psychology, the cognitive sciences the human and social sciences, linguistics and the various interpretive discipline"<sup>16</sup> .

Philosophically significant difference between the blind men-elephant story and philosophy of mind should not be regarded as a licence for laissez-faire philosophy regarding the problem of mind. That the final word regarding 'mind' has not been said does not mean that all perspectives<sup>17</sup> are equally acceptable. Larry Laudan while discussing the problem of truth in science has pointed out that although we do not know what the truth is and we cannot claim that science is approximating the 'truth', progress consists in solution of increasing number of important problem. In philosophy of mind, a perspective or theory that has capacity to overcome the largest possible problem, deserves greater consideration.

Among divergent perspectives one should accept an approach that would explain the mind-body problem most satisfactorily. Taking a cue from the discussions on theory in philosophy of science one tends to conclude that 'functionalism' is the best available theory to explain the complex human activities commonly attributed to 'mind'.

It may be said that the functioning of a living being (human being as well as animals) is grounded in the complexity of our physical brain structure. One may observe that in the evolutionary process the capacity to carry out different functions in the evolving beings is dependent on the degree of complexity of their brain-structure. Thus the complexity of brain-structure directly determines one's capacity to carry out functions. In this sense even animals are to be attributed with a mind as opposed to Cartesian thought that animals are mere automata.

This version of functionalism may be accepted because it helps avoiding difficulties faced in the Cartesian approach. First, the question whether mind is an entity does not arise and the related problem of knowledge of other minds which may lead to solipsism can be avoided in this theory. Secondly, it is consistent with the evolutionary theory showing a superior fit with reality. And thirdly, since there is no interaction of a material body with immaterial mind, problems with regard to interactionism do not arise. The functionalist approach seems to be the most acceptable one, though it has got certain drawbacks. In a functionalist theory memories, beliefs, desires, pains <sup>are</sup> ~~and~~ characterised in terms of their causal relationships among

themselves and are understood as 'abstract functional states'. K.V. Wilkes expresses the functionalist approach as follows: "Functionalism can be seen as 'reiterated behaviourism': It opens up the black box -- to put inside it a postulated system of smaller black boxes. Each of these is treated just like the behaviourists big black box: one does not go inside them but explain their output in terms of the states they are in and the input they receive. Each box is an abstractly characterised function that transforms input into output; the input may be a stimulus from outside, or the output of another box in the network... The system as a whole, receiving input from outside and giving as output certain kinds of behaviour as a complex products of several internal functions"<sup>18</sup> .

Human behaviour then is the output of the sensory input (for example perception) as well as the output of network of each of 'mini-boxes' -- desires, memories, intentions, --- causally related to each.

This theory in general would not explain 'mind' as either reducible or irreducible, unlike what we find in conceptual analysis. Since in this theory the "mental states types consists not only in relations to sensory inputs and behavioural outputs but also in relations to other mental states"<sup>19</sup> .

Two different versions of functionalistic approach can be given (1) 'weak' functionalism and (2) a version that can be named 'new dualism'. 'Weak' functionalists are happy with the assertion that it explains 'what mental states are' they do not aim at either reduction or explanation. But the terms pain, and

perception puts a 'weak' functionalist in trouble. Although a machine sensitive to different light waves may discriminate between different shades without experiencing, whereas we human beings experience that. 'Weak' functionalism cannot explain the 'experiential' aspect of the mental.

'New dualism' is a popular version of functionalism insisting that mental states are 'multiply-realizable' and should not be reduced to physical as such a reduction will be 'parochial' and 'chauvinist'. Type-type correlations are denied as it is maintained on this version that mental states correlate with various physical states of the brain.

The supporters of this version are dualists in so far as they believe that psychological generalisations with regard to the study of the 'mental' should be independent of research in neuroscience as these generalisations hold whatever the hardware may be and researches in neuroscience does not contribute much to psychology and therefore psychology should be autonomous.

By looking at the different perspectives that are taken in the philosophy of mind one finds that people beforehand stipulate that such and such objects will be called minds and then consider what these objects are. For instance, it is often thought that mind is an agency responsible for inner performance. 'Mind' is the name that we give to that agency. But the question remains unanswered whether that is what 'mind' is.

At present, the conception of mind, does not refer to the conceptual aspect as to which entities are minds but emphasises empirical aspects as to which entities explain our abilities to do various things. But the basic difficulty in understanding mind

still remains. As J.F.M. Hunter put it: "we give various lists of the putative functions of mind, and we will generally, conclude a list with 'and so on'. This covers up the fact that none of us knows how to complete the list --- certainly not in such a way that we might say that to be a mind, anything must explain all of <sup>20</sup> these, and only these, capacities" .

Thus, in a world of conflicting theories in the varied perspectives, the theory that has greatest explanatory power tends to be the most acceptable one.

#### NOTES

1. J.J.C. Smart, Materialism in The Mind-Brain Identity Theory, ed. C.V. Borst, London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1970, p.168.
2. G. J. Warnock, English Philosophy since 1900, London: Oxford University Press 1958, p.96.
3. H. P. Rickman, "Exorcising the Ghost in the Machine", Philosophy, Vol. 63. No.246, 1988, p.491.
4. Jerome Shaffer maintains that, if consciousness is to be identified with brain-process, then both must be located in the same place. However, in the identity theory, this "co-existence requirement" cannot be satisfied, because, our 'pain' is in the leg but it is not the case that our state of being aware of our pain is in the leg. Jerome Shaffer, "could mental states be brain processes?", in The Mind-Brain Identity Theory, ed. C.V. Borst, London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1970, p.115.
5. H. D. Lewis, The Elusive Mind, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969, p.150.
6. K.V. Wilkes, "The relationship between Scientific Psychology and Common Sense Psychology", Synthese, Vol.89, No.1, 1991, p.16.
7. Tom Settle comments that Popper's psycho-physical interactionism does not accomodate what is 'special in organisms. He feels that the metaphysical space between physicalism and vitalism cannot be fully filled by interactionism (as it bifurcates a human being into two components) and there is still room for 'organismism'. That is, certain features of human beings can be explained in a

better way, if a human being is understood as an 'organism' as a 'whole'.

8. J. Van Rooijen, "Interactionism and Evolution: A critique of Popper", The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 38, No.1, 1987, p.91.
9. Australian descriptions: is a 'topic-neutral' explanation of our experiences. In this type of explanation one can say that, there is something going on and that it (something) can be described only in terms of the sort of stimulus which characteristically brings it (something) about.
10. Michael Levin, "Kripke's Argument against the Identity Thesis", The Journal of Philosophy, vol.LXXII, No.6, 1975, p.155.
11. David Cockburn, "Reviews: The Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction by Peter Smith and O.R. Jones, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986", Philosophical Investigations, vol.11, No.1, 1988, p.89.
12. Jon Furlong, "Scientific Psychology as hermeneutics? Rorty's Philosophy of Mind", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. XLVII, No.3, 1988, p.495.
13. Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982, p.335.
14. John Furlong, "Scientific Psychology as hermeneutics? Rorty's Philosophy of Mind", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. XLVIII, No.3, 1988, p.498.
15. Aggressive metaphilosopher, as L.J. Cohen (The Dialogue of Reason, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) would point out, propounds reasons for 'finding fault' with all current philosophical positions within his intellectual community and formulate a new programme ostensibly full-proof.
16. Joseph Margolis, "Minds, Selves and Persons", Topoi, Vol.7, No.1, 1988, p.41.
17. Larry Laudan, Progress and Its Problems, N. D: Ambika Publications, 1978, pp.126 ff.
18. K.V. Wilkes, "Mind and Body: Some forms of Reductionism", in An Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. G.H.R. Parkinson, London: Routledge, 1988, p.408.
19. Derk Pereboom, "Why A Scientific Realist Cannot be A Functionalist" Synthese, vol. 88, No.3, 1988, p.341.
20. J.F.M. Hunter, "The Concept, 'Mind'", Philosophy, vol.61, No. 238, 1986, p.449.

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\* This bibliography is not a comprehensive list of books on the subject. it is merely a list of books and articles referred to in the present study.

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