

STATE, SUBJECT AND THE 'TEXT':

The Construction of Meaning in Television

Thesis submitted to
the Goa University for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

by

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Under the Guidance of
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
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STATEMENT

I hereby state that this thesis is a bonafide record of research work done by me under the guidance of Mr. S.R. Phal, Reader, Department of Sociology, Goa University, and Dr. Ashis Nandy, Director, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi. I further state that no part of the thesis has been presented earlier for any other degree, diploma or similar title of this or any other University.

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the Ph.D. thesis entitled "State, Subject and the 'Text' - The Construction of Meaning in Television" is an original work carried out by Anjali Monteiro under my supervision and guidance and that no part of this work has been presented for any other degree.




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Certificate

This is to certify that the Ph. D. thesis entitled "State, Subject and the 'Text': The Construction of Meaning in Television" is an original work, carried out by Anjali Monteiro, under my supervision and guidance and that no part of this work has been presented for any other degree.


Ashis Nandy

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PREFACE

The broad concern of the present work is with the negotiation of meanings and subjectivities that emerge from the encounter between the discourses of the State, as exemplified by Doordarshan, and a community of viewers situated within a specific socio-political space. Television has been chosen as the entry point for questioning the notions of subjectivity underpinning the development project of the State, and for counterposing these notions with the constitutive strategies and interpretative technologies that viewers might bring to bear on televisual discourse. The reason for this choice stems in part from the perception that, with the proliferation of technologies such as photography, cinema and television, 'seeing' has become increasingly the mode by which people relate to the outside world and to themselves. The 'ways of seeing' (Berger, 1972) that might inform the export of televisual technology from the First to the Third World, as part of a package of development, form the starting point for this inquiry. What new ways of seeing does this technology involve? What forms of subjectivity does it posit? How do the 'targets' of this package constitute their identities in relation to the televisual discourses of development?

These concerns impel this thesis to occupy a position outside the space of mainstream development communication

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research. The wide array of identities and interpretative strategies that emerge from the study of a specific community of viewers, in a working class neighbourhood in a port town in Goa, India cannot be subsumed under the rubric of many formulations of audience, such as the simple, traditional masses of early development communication theory (Lerner, 1958, Schramm, 1964), the myopic victims of the culture industry or western cultural imperialism (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1977, Flora, 1980), or the sovereign consumers of more recent 'marketing' development variants (Singhal and Rogers, 1989). The first two approaches attribute an awesome power to the media, denying agency and resistance to viewers, while the third focuses narrowly on audience 'uses' of the media, disregarding the implications of this for networks of power and ideological frameworks. What unites these seemingly disparate approaches is their instrumental view of the media, that elides the constitution of subjectivities and the construction of meanings by audiences.

The focus of this thesis is not on the discourses of television per se, but rather on the processes by which viewers relate to these discourses. While it problematises a specific conjunctural moment within the emerging public cultural space in a Third World society, its approach and findings would appear to have implications that extend beyond television or communication research. This work seeks to demonstrate that the study of this cultural space would involve, firstly, the recognition that it is

a constantly negotiated, fluid terrain of power flows, not institutionally or textually determined; secondly, an appreciation of the modes of resistance which the everyday life of its actors entails; and thirdly, a focus on the techniques of pastoral power, exercised by the Third World State (Foucault, 1986, Nandy, 1989).

The present work looks at certain aspects of these questions. In the first chapter: Television, Power and Resistance, it attempts to briefly map out the discourses of planners and media experts involved in the introduction and growth of television in India, and the theoretical underpinnings of these discourses. It also attempts a periodization of the development of television, placing this within a politico-economic context. In relation to this, it delineates the perspective being adopted in this thesis, and its relationship to other work on the media from structuralist, post-structuralist and cultural studies perspectives. Chapters two, three and four discuss various aspects of the construction of subjectivity vis-a-vis the ways of seeing posited by television, within the specific context of a multi-ethnic, blue-collar working class neighbourhood in a port town in Goa. Chapter Two: The Situated Spectator, explores the constitution of distinct ethnic identities in the Goan context and the ways in which these identities are affirmed by as well as mediate the readings of televisual discourses. Chapter Three: The Familial Spectator,

discusses various aspects of the construction of identity within familial networks of power. It relates the televisual discourses on the family to the struggles and aspirations of the working-class family, as a whole, as well as of its individual members - parents and children, men and women. Chapter Four: The Citizen Spectator, looks at the constitution of identities vis-a-vis the discourses of the 'public sphere' - the outside world and the State (as seen through the genre of news) and the market (as presented through advertising). The final chapter, The Spectator-Subject, attempts to synthesize the various aspects of the construction of subjectivity discussed in the previous chapters to delineate the strategies invoked by viewers as they constitute themselves as spectator-subjects.

CHAPTER I
TELEVISION: POWER AND RESISTANCE

Introduction

Every culture has its own 'ways of seeing', ways that are situated within and structured by, among other things, its systems of knowledge and belief, its networks of power relations, its technological and cultural practices and its affective formations¹. A way of seeing is a relation between the self and things, involving a certain reciprocity, for to recognize that we see also implies a recognition that we can be seen (Berger, 1972:9). The act of seeing is thus fundamental to the constitution of identity and subjectivity.

In different societies, at various points of time, there have been several image-forms, an image being " (...) a sight which has been recreated or reproduced (...) an appearance or a set of appearances, which has become detached from the place and time in which it first made its appearance and preserved - for a few moments or a few centuries" (Berger, 1972:9-10). These image-forms, involving acts of creation and interpretation embedded within specific ideological and institutional structures, have embodied certain ways of seeing.

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The Renaissance oil painting, with its conventions of perspective, realism and substantiality that situate the spectator as "the unique centre of the world" (Berger, 1972 :18) emerged in the context of the Age of Discovery where 'Man', specifically European Man was the centre of the universe, where new relations of power, economic, political, and epistemological, were emerging.

Unlike the earlier period, where many image-forms were confined to 'high culture' (the oil painting, the daguerreotype), the modern period has been characterized by a plethora of image-forms being integrated into popular culture, with even the previously exclusive forms becoming a part of the "culture industry"².

With the rise of technologies such as photography, the motion picture and television, 'seeing' has become increasing by the mode by which people relate to the outside world and to themselves³. These technologies are also enmeshed with the exercise of new modes of power, from voyeurism to advertising to surveillance. One sees a dual process at work here: a growing commodification of these image-forms, with the mass production and consumption of cultural products being organized on industrial lines (the film studio and the broadcasting company) and conversely, industrial capital making use of these forms to extend its markets, through the scientific management of

consumption (Webster and Robins, 1989).

Raymond Williams (1975: 21 - 22) relates the development of new technologies of social communication to the emergence of new political and social needs in a changing society. He traces the appearance of broadcasting, both radio and television, as marking a significant break with earlier forms in so far as "(...) radio and television were systems primarily devised for transmission and reception as abstract processes, with little or no definition of preceding content" (Williams, 1975:25). This makes them ideally suited for a parasitical borrowing from other cultural forms and events (sports, theatre, political events) and for use by interests with messages to propagate (advertisers, the State, the church).

A second distinctive feature of these forms is their consumption within the structure of the family, by no means technologically determined, but related to the emergence of the privatised home in industrial capitalist society. The need for the privatised family to maintain its connection with the outside world was met through new technologies (cars, telephones, radios).

The introduction of broadcasting technologies in the Third World, however, took place in quite a different context. The export of television technology from the First World to the Third

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in the post World War II period was intrinsically tied up with an ideology of development. What new ways of seeing did this technology (and the entire package of which it formed a part) involve? What forms of subjectivity did it posit? How did the 'targets' of this package constitute their identities in relation to the television discourse of development?

This chapter seeks to examine this ideology, as constructed in the discourse of media authorities and experts, in the first section, The Discourse of Development. The next section, The 'Power' of the Media, traces the underpinnings of this discourse in mainstream communications research. The third section, Development Communication Research in India, attempts to critically examine selected research endeavours of the early period of broadcast communication, including the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE). Resistance to the Dominant Paradigm, the fourth section, discusses the crisis in development communication in the 1970s and emerging approaches. The fifth, A Periodization of Television Expansion, attempts to delineate two distinct phases in the development of television in India. The next sections, 'Socialist' Development Communication and 'Marketing' Development and 'Limited Effects' Models, examine recent strands in the development communication discourse relating to television in India. This leads on to a discussion in the subsequent section, Media and Reality, Texts and Subjects, of the relationship between media/language and reality in these

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empiricist approaches, in contradistinction to structuralism. This section also briefly surveys structuralist, post-structuralist and cultural studies approaches to the study of film and television. The next section, Towards a Framework, moves on to the conceptual underpinnings of the present work, specifically its relation to cultural studies and Foucault's notion of power. It also discusses the methodology employed and the process through which the thesis took its present shape. The final section of the chapter discusses the salient features of the field, including the reasons for its choice, its history and a profile of respondents.

The Discourse of Development

Television in India was introduced as an experimental project in 1959⁴. Thirty-three years later, we are in the throes of an invasion from the skies, in the form of multinational satellite television networks that, some predict, heralds the demise of Doordarshan. From a pilot study in 'information for the masses' to an institution struggling to retain its hold through providing 'entertainment for the masses', the wheel has come full circle. There is a sameness, and a difference, to the policy pronouncements of the media authorities, then and now. The sameness stems from certain unchanging premises governing their discourse; the difference from the changed global and

national context.

In the writings of those who pushed for the expansion of the broadcast media network in the 1950s and 60s, television and radio were regarded as key elements of the package of modernization that was to propel India from underdevelopment into development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, a moving spirit behind the introduction of television described the nation's priorities as the "(...) leapfrogging from a stage of economic backwardness and social disabilities, attempting to achieve in a few decades a change which has historically taken centuries in other lands" (Sarabhai, cited in Government of India, 1985: 21).

Sarabhai and others regarded advanced communication technology as a means to achieve this collapsing of stages in the evolutionary path of development and as the answer to a host of problems in the way of national integration and rural modernization:

If India wants to reduce the overwhelming attraction of migration to cities, enrich rural life, integrate the country by exposing one part to the culture of the other parts, involve people in the programme of rural economic and social development, then the best thing is to have television via satellite (Sarabhai, cited in Dua, 1979:30-31).

Informing this placement of communication technologies at centre stage is "the communication approach to development" (Krippendorff:1979) which characterizes underdeveloped countries as stagnant societies steeped in traditional, other worldly, non-rational, authoritarian attitudes, values and practices, where development would involve mass 're-education' through the media, leading to a modern, rational, materialist, democratic culture.

A detailed analysis of the discourse⁵ of development communication, as posited by First World experts (Lerner, Schramm, Rogers)⁶ and reinterpreted by Third World planners is beyond the scope of this work. One can, however, attempt to briefly enumerate some of the premises that organize this discourse. These are premises about :

i) Development as a Social Darwinian movement through universal stages of progress from the primitive, simple non-western to advanced, complex western society : development as Westernization.

ii) Development as economic growth; a model of unlimited capital accumulation based on the exploitation of natural resources. This also involves the extension of economic rationality into every sphere of life: development as 'economization'.

iii) 'Underdevelopment', which lead to the formulation of problems and client groups. These draw on the discourse of science and reason, on theories of psychological attributes ('achievement ,motivation', 'empathy') and Weberian sociology to delegitimize all forms of local knowledge and subjectivity, labeling Third World subjects as 'abnormal' against the norm of western rationality : development as transformation of irrational subjectivities.

iv) The role of technology and capital transfers from the First World in overcoming the basic problems of the Third World: development as technologization.

v) The role of expert knowledge and institutional intervention in the development process: development as professionalization and institutionalization.

vi) The communication process as a linear causal chain, the mass media injecting modernity into passive viewers: a hypodermic model of development communication.

The foregoing analysis is indebted to the work of Escobar (1987), who has characterized the discourse of development as a "historical construction" that emerged in the post World War II period, problematizing a set of behaviours and contexts in the Third World, "originating a new domain of thought and experience"

(Escobar, 1987:12). Using the conception of power/knowledge, he demonstrates how this discourse, originating in certain sites in the First and Third Worlds (international bodies, expert in universities, .governments), created a set of objects (poverty, population explosion, malnutrition) to be classified, specified and managed through scientific study and professional intervention.

It allowed for the mapping of a country's economic and social life, constituting a true political anatomy of the Third World. The end result was the constitution of a domain, the expansion of which was to be dictated in advance by the very same rules introduced during its formative stages. It defined a perceptual field, a grid of observation, new modes of inquiry and registration of problems, new forms of assistance... (Escobar, 1987: 94-95).

The discursive space of development was thus generated from a set of statements, which constructed tradition/underdevelopment as the 'natural' antinomy of modernity/development. With 'tradition' being identified as the chief enemy, development strategies aspired to reinforce the legitimacy of a new set of discourses pertaining to the body, the family, the population, production techniques and the institutions of the State. In defining the Third World peasant as backward and lacking in all the attributes necessary for development, modernization theory posited a site

for the interventions of a range of development experts:

What came into existence with development was a way of conceiving of social life as a technical problem, as a matter of rational decision and management to be entrusted to that group of people, namely, the development professionals, whose specialized knowledge avowedly qualify them for the task. Rather than seeing development as a process to be rooted in the interpretation of each society's history and cultural tradition (...) these professionals sought to devise mechanisms and procedures to make societies fit a pre-existing model, namely, that embodied in the structure and functions of modernity (Escobar, 1987:110-111).

As already mentioned, television was regarded as a potent vehicle for the transformation of indigenous subjectivities, performing the functions of breaking down traditional values, disseminating technical skills, fostering national integration and accelerating the growth of formal education (Open University, 1977 b:56).

The 'Power' of the Media

The hypodermic model of development communication drew on the propaganda theories of the interwar years. In the 1920s and the 30s, the study of the mass media in the West was situated within a discourse of social control. Lasswell (1927), Doob (1935) and Lipmann (1934), among others, equate the use of mass

media with propaganda and concern themselves with the conditions determining audience response. The task of the media researcher is seen as the prediction of audience behaviour, the ultimate "utopia" being a situation where "the responses of great audience are so intensively and so continuously studied that every new response is promptly classified according to its significance in relation to the predispositions of the audience to respond in the future" (Lasswell, 1946:115). Lasswell also proposes the collation of large amounts of data to arrive at "world weather maps of public opinion", on the basis of which political scientists can practice "social psychiatry" and "preventive politics" (Schramm, 1989:404).

Underlying this vision of scientific social control is the presupposition of a 'mass society', taken for granted in widely varying theoretical discourses during this period. 'Mass Society', a society of rootless, alienated individuals, susceptible to propaganda and demagoguery, is seen as the result of the breakdown of traditional 'folk society' under the impact of industrialization and urbanization, further exacerbated by the rise of ubiquitous mass media such as radio and cinema.

The work of Lasswell and other media theoreticians thus takes for granted the omnipotence of the mass media, and explains media effects in terms of a stimulus-response model : "Who says what, in what channel, to whom, with what effect" (Lasswell,

cited in Schramm, 1989:404). The behaviourist notion of the individual underlying the study of propaganda and public opinion has been mostly clearly articulated by Doob (1948:32). "Man" is seen essentially as "a creature who responds to certain stimuli that are arranged in his internal and external environment. His responses are affected by these stimuli as well as by the drives, attitude, knowledge and skill which he himself possesses as a personality. He learns to seek rewards and to avoid punishments. The fruits of past experience are stored within him in such a way that they can be habitually evoked".

It is noteworthy that the conception of the communication process as a linear causal chain, where the omnipresent media trigger behavioural effects in passive receivers, was exported to the Third World at a time when mainstream theory in the First World came to regard it as a simplistic and inadequate account of communication in their own societies. The construction of Third World societies as simple, homogeneous and undifferentiated entities in the discourse on development and the sense of messianic mission of development made possible the adoption of the hypodermic model by communication experts.

A Survey of Development Communication Research in India

The following survey of research is by no means exhaustive. Covering work done during the 1960's and 70's, it aims at

delineating the discursive features of development communication research during this period. Early Indian studies in this tradition include Y.Y.L Rao's (1963) study of 'Kothuru' and 'Pathuru', the latter steeped in tradition, the former beginning to modernize. A road connecting Kothuru to an urban centre becomes, literally and metaphorically, the road to modernization, facilitating the inflow of new ideas and media, as well as the outflow of villagers. The new world view trickles down from the elite to the mass, signalling the gradual transition from tradition to modernity. The perceptual grid of modernization and diffusion theory informing this study determines what the researcher sees and concludes, the conclusions proving the efficacy of the theory and legitimizing a regime of truth regarding modernization and communication.

SITE (Satellite Instructional Television Experiment), conducted in 1975-76, covering 2329 villages of 6 states has been, by far, the most ambitious experiment in development communication. It involved that deployment of the NASA satellite ATS-6 for the period of a year to assess the viability of satellite-based television as an instrument of instruction and social change. The specific objectives of the programme were, primarily, to contribute to family planning, improved agricultural practices and national integration, and secondarily, to contribute to school and adult education, teacher training, to improve occupational skills, health and hygiene. The programme

was supported by a massive research effort, which generated 50 studies, conducted by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), the primary executive authority, the Planning Commission, the National Council for Educational Research and Training (NCERT) and other agencies. The studies were of four kinds, involving evaluation of context, input, and processing as well as summative evaluation¹¹. In its assumptions, objectives and strategies, SITE was situated within the discourse of development, questioning neither its legitimacy nor the political structure that dictated programme priorities¹². An analysis of the research output of SITE would facilitate an understanding of how the 'problem' (changing the rural masses) was constructed, classified and operationalized within networks of power/knowledge.

The context studies of SITE were of two kinds, audience profiles and needs assessment studies. Audience profiles involved the specification of the 'target group', based on primary observation and survey and secondary data, in terms of "language, level of education, the life cycle, food, dress, patterns of agriculture, etc." (Gore, 1979: 45). The needs assessment studies involved a detailing of needs as assessed by 'change agents', primarily government officers involved in field extension and development work. The conception of 'target group' informing these two kinds of research is one of ignorant peasants, who are likely to resist modernization. The audience profiles and needs

assessment are aimed at providing a map of audience attitudes beliefs and practices to guide producers in their production strategies to overcome these resistances. Further, the target group is regarded as unable to articulate its own needs. This must be done by experts in the field, who can provide authoritative and reliable information. Thus the 'needs' that emerge in this process are the 'needs' of the extension officials who have programme targets to meet. For instance, in agriculture, the 'needs' of the Kheda villagers were "facilities for irrigation" and "ready availability of inputs like seeds and fertilizers" (Gore,1979:47). The section of peasantry that might be able to relate to these 'needs' is obvious.

The input evaluation research included studies on the effectiveness of various formats, programme pretesting, and content analysis. In the first two studies, the emphasis is on providing guidelines to producers on "what works", for instance "real life portrayals" as more effective than animation, local folk forms as attention grabbing, the need to combine entertainment value with relevance, the need to have "specific behavioural objectives" in educational programmes, and so on. The concentration on form and pedagogy to the exclusion of content indicates the communication strategy: the 'content' is predetermined, the 'form' as a vehicle of this content to be made as effective as possible to persuade and educate the target group. The third study (Mody, 1977, cited in Gore,1979:55-80) is somewhat different from the

other two in that it attempts a critique of SITE programming (the National Programme produced by AIR and the regional programmes produced by ISRO) based on analysis of content and production structures. It points out that expediency was a determining factor of much programming, that extensive coverage was given to the Emergency and the 20 point programme in AIR programming and that development TV for AIR consisting of direct prescriptions in agriculture, health and other areas. In contrast, development TV for ISRO consisted of "a slice of drama that mirrors social processes". The study also highlights the fact that programmes were produced largely by supplementing the existing routine government structure for information and broadcasting, rather than by setting up a distinct, multidisciplinary development communication organization.

The critique cited above indicates that within the development communication apparatus of the SITE, there were broadly two approaches: one narrowly geared to communicating information to facilitate effective delivery of government programmes and to increase government credibility in the eyes of the rural masses and the other, constructing itself as 'committed' and 'radical', seeing development communication as giving "the poor man the know-how, the skills and the capacity for action to enable him to cut the shackles that keep him subjugated" (Gore, 1979:70). This approach also stresses 'participation'. The Kheda experiment, which continued as an offshoot of SITE, best illustrates this

approach. The discursive and non-discursive contexts for the emergence of this strand in the discourse on development will be discussed later in this chapter.

The process evaluation research consists of studies that provide 'feedback' to the SITE programme producers. The etymology of the word 'feedback' is significant. The concept is borrowed from electronics and automation, where it means "the returning of part of the output of a system to be reintroduced as input, especially for purposes of correction of control". As applied to psychology, it is "knowledge of the results of any behaviour considered as influencing or modifying further performance by the organism" (The Random House Dictionary of English Language). While context evaluation research objectifies and stratifies the target population, and input evaluation classifies programme formats and pedagogy, process evaluation ensures the smooth functioning of the human engineering system by constantly feeding back information permitting fine tuning of the output to ensure the desired results. The 'participation' of the target group in this feedback thus cannot be seen as a move towards a greater devolution of power and decision making, but as a relation of knowledge/power that renders more effective the control through communication. In the specific context of SITE, an ongoing feedback mechanism was evolved, providing indices of audience size, composition, regularity of attendance and ratings of interest and comprehension. The producers found this feedback

lacking in depth and qualitative information, which led to a refinement, where qualitative data were collected from the specific target groups of various programmes (eg. from farmers only about agricultural programmes). The utilization of this feedback was found to be limited by the pressure of production targets, the dictation of programme priorities by policy makers not concerned about feedback, as well as the diverse audience that a programme was expected to reach. The studies thus point to "the need to decentralize programme production and make it more responsive to regional needs and variations" (Gore,1979:129).

The summative evaluation studies, which constitute the bulk of the research, address themselves to the question: Was SITE a success? The research includes nine 'holistic' studies or village ethnographies, national level studies of the school programmes for children and the evening transmission for adults, which compare the "gains" of experimental and control groups and specialized studies, confined in terms of region and objective. As an example, one can consider the voluminous report "Social Impact of SITE on Adults", undertaken by ISRO (cited in Gore, 1979). The specific objectives of the study are related to, firstly, the nature and direction of change in attitudes, behaviour, awareness and knowledge, secondly, the demographic and social-psychological characteristics of the audience that determine the extent of this change, thirdly whether this change is related to the extent of exposure to TV, fourthly to compare the State-wise clusters,

fifthly, to find out the extent of exposure, the determinants of this extent and the reasons for non-viewing. The objectives, methodology and conclusions of this study reinforce the observations made earlier about the relations of power/knowledge that inform the SITE research effort. The concern of any 'experiment' is with replicability and predictability. The audience is stratified in terms of age, marital status, number of children, education, religion, occupation, house type, material possession, village population, land holding, other mass media exposure and urban contact. A stimulus (the independent variable) is introduced in the form of exposure to TV and the response, in terms of changes in awareness, knowledge, attitudes and practices, is sought to be measured and compared for various strata and for control and experimental groups in order to arrive at a series of conclusions about the nature, direction and stratification of the desired change. The indices of modernization used are uncritically adopted from the modernization theories of First World experts: Lerner's "empathy" and Inkeles and Smith's "overall modernity scale", for instance. There is little thought given to the ethnocentric assumptions informing the construction of these indices .

The results of the SITE, as measured by research, are not equivocal. While the ISRO studies regard the experiment as a qualified success, the Planning Commission study sees it as a failure. The diametrically opposed conclusions perhaps arise

from differences in perspective and criteria. The moot point is that even those who would view it as a success realized that change through development communication was far from the linear, unproblematic postulation of modernization theory, that the 'gains' were mediated by a host of other conditions, including availability of infrastructural and extension services, jati, class and gender inequalities and so on. Sinha (1985:122) concludes, on the basis of an ethnography of a Bihar village:

For landless labourers, the moving pictures were like fairy tales, not helping towards a better living (...) For the small cultivators in the village, most of the agricultural practices and innovations were capital intensive, meant for rich and large cultivators (...) The opinions of rich cultivators were characteristically opposite to this view. They viewed television as an instrument of instigation of the poor against the rich (...) In a nutshell nobody seemed to be satisfied.

Resistance to the Dominant Paradigm

It was during the late 1960s and through the 1970s that the discourse of development communication underwent a state of crisis. The results of the SITE and numerous other experiments pointed to the conclusion that the hypodermic model had failed to

deliver the goods. Moreover, all over the Third World, development had led not only to increased production, but had also entailed tremendous social costs: impoverishment, displacement and migration of large sections of the small peasantry and indigenous tribal peoples, widening disparities between the rich and the poor and growing unemployment. In both the First and Third Worlds, there were student revolts and peasant movements challenging the established order, often from a Marxist perspective. Concomitantly with these non-discursive changes, a new strand in the development discourse emerged, the neo-Marxist dependency theory¹⁴. This discourse constructs "underdevelopment" as a structural relationship of neocolonial domination between the First and Third Worlds, the export of communication models, structures and programming to the Third World being seen as part of this imperialist strategy. The communication models of modernization theory are regarded as specific to societies "where individuality was predominant over collectivism, competition was more determinant than cooperation, and economic efficiency and technological wisdom more important than cultural growth, social justice, and spiritual enhancement" (Beltran, 1976:23).

The focus on persuasion of individuals, which is a result of this orientation, is seen as irrelevant to Third World societies faced with structural constraints arising from their colonial past. The relevant questions in this context could be:

Who owns the media today and to which interest groups are they responsive? Are there ethical limits to persuasion proficiency? Must feedback forever remain no more than a tool for securing the intended response? Does the state exert any control over North American communication interests overseas? (Beltran, 1976:26).

The cultural dependency orientation problematizes the discourse of development, and the place of the media in it, focusing attention on questions of ownership and control of the media, in the context of power relations at the international and national level. It demonstrates how these interests determine the nature and strategies of development, as well as the distribution of costs and benefits. In two respects, however, it tends to be in consonance with the dominant paradigm of media and modernization. Firstly, it attributes to the media an awesome power, albeit destructive. Where the dominant paradigm sees the power of the media as liberating, the neo-Marxist approach sees it as an expression of exploitation and domination. Secondly, while the capitalist underpinnings of 'development' are laid bare, the legitimacy of the concept itself is not fundamentally questioned. In most formulations, the need for underdeveloped countries to develop, albeit following an alternative, socialist path, is taken for granted.

The discourse of development communication, faced with failure to live upto its promises on the one hand, and the critique from the left, on the other, has taken new forms, adopted new strategies, within the confines of its discursive space, retaining intact its basic ways of seeing and acting:

After four decades of "new knowledge", we still hold to the same basic tenets. The forms of power that have appeared act now not so much by repression, but by normalization; not by ignorance, but by controlled knowledge; not by humanitarian concern, but by the moralization of issues. As the conditions which gave rise to it become more pressing, it can only increase its hold, refine its methods, extend its reach even further (Escobar, 1987:112).

The resilience of the discourse is proved by its ability to incorporate its critiques and emergent alternatives such as "participation for liberation", "basic needs", "integrated rural development" and so on ¹⁵. Singhal and Rogers (1989:22) describe the "new development paradigm" as possessing the following features:

1. Greater equality in distribution of development investments, information and benefits.
2. Popular participation with a view to self-development.

3. Self-reliance and localized development.
4. Integration of traditional and modern communication systems to facilitate development.

This 'new' version should be understood in the context of the widespread legitimacy, the 'naturalness' that the discourse on development has achieved in the 40 years of its currency. The objectives of the modernization package (improved agriculture, family planning, national integration) have already become the norm, in so far as any departure from them would be regarded as deviant. Du Bois, speaking of population control's regime of truth draws attention to this "normalizing power of objective science":

There is now an "ought" floating around villages and shantytowns that governs the way people think about the family. The strength of this "ought" - its degree of congruence with societal standards for the production of truth statements - forms the basis for the authority by which state, intergovernmental, or nongovernmental apparatuses are able to plan family and population sizes (Du Bois, 1991:17).

In such a situation, "participation", and "self reliance" become strategies for making more effective the reach and penetration of development. The liberal recipe of "a blend of traditional and modern systems" is prescribed for a context where the

"traditional" has, by and large, already been subordinated to the market economy and the nation state.

A Periodization of Television Expansion

If one were to attempt a periodization of the development of television in India, one might come up with broadly 2 stages : the period upto the early 1980s, and the subsequent period. The first stage is marked by a consensus in the discourse of experts and planners on 'development' as the raison d'être of television expansion; on television production being directly or indirectly under the aegis of the State; on community television in the rural areas as the basis of dissemination and on programming being largely educational and instructional in nature, judiciously sprinkled with wholesome entertainment and geared to a rural viewership. This orientation also reflects the dominant national credo of the 1960s and the early 1970s: self reliance, 'socialism' and progress through technological revolution. This stage is also marked by limited viewership, the reach prior to the introduction of INSAT-IB in 1983 being 210 million (28 % of the population) and the viewership 30 million (4 % of the population) (Singhal and Rogers, 1989:66).

Already, after SITE, one finds a dissonance emerging between the stated objectives of television and the actual direction of television dissemination and programming, which is becoming more

urban, middle class and entertainment oriented. The introduction of colour television for the 1982 Asiad, the liberalization of television imports during the same period, coupled with the installation of INSAT-IB marks a significant change. At the level of dissemination, the emphasis shifts from community television to the proliferation of privately owned television sets. The introduction of commercial sponsorship of serials in 1980 and of the private software production in 1984 marks a boom in entertainment programming with a proliferation of genres (Mitra, 1992) and private production units. The old development paradigm is thus jettisoned in favour of a 'commercial' variant, involving changes at the level of production structures, modes of reception and programming.

These changes appear to be situated within a more general redefinition of the national agenda. The 'India of the 21st century' is conceived of as a regional power in South Asia, a technologically advanced and growth-oriented nation. There is a movement away from the era of Nehruvian socialism towards a more laissez-faire model, where paradoxically the dismantling of licensing, import and other economic controls coexist with increasing State intervention in the familial and cultural space. The State begins to play a more active role in the construction of new cultural and national identities through the use of television, festivals of India, patronage of traditional art forms and so on.

The change in Doordarshan's thrust in the 1980s is also ideologically justifiable with the emergence of a 'Marketing' variant of development communication. There is also a 'Socialist' variant, represented, for instance, by some of the SITE work mentioned earlier and by what is popularly called the Joshi Committee Report (Report of the Working Group on Software for Doordarshan, 1985). However, over time, this strand begins to get increasingly marginalized.

'Socialist' Development Communication

The Joshi Committee Report begins its first chapter with a quote from Jawarharlal Nehru, which sums up the perspective it adopts:

I feel that freedom from ignorance is as essential as freedom from hunger... The mass media which are very useful have an element of danger in them in that they may be distorted for private gain... The rich group or rich nation can flood the country and the world through the mass media with its own view of things which may or may not be the correct view.

The presuppositions underlying this perspective are:

"Ignorance" and "hunger" are natural facts, to be overcome

by development initiated by those who know.

The media are neutral tools which can be used for good or evil, depending on the intentions of the user.

If the users have vested economic interests, they may distort the media for personal profit.

Opposed to this 'distorted' view, there exists an objective 'correct', scientific view of society.

While focussing on "participation", "decentralization", "area specificity" and so on, the modernist conception of the 'masses' continues to inform this discourse:

Unfolding before our very eyes is the exciting Drama of a predominantly peasant country entering, albeit belatedly, the scientific and industrial age. The phenomenon of the peasant, hitherto the object or the victim of history being transformed into a subject or a maker of history is a unique phenomenon of our times; in it lies the quintessence (sic) of the Indian or the Asian situation (Joshi Committee Report 1985:49, emphasis in original).

The rhetoric of this post-Enlightenment discourse of liberation through science and reason extends to the construction of the new communication technologies. The report sees these technologies, divorced from their historical-social context, as potentially liberating:

An integrative, interactive and participatory model of communication which is required by Indian conditions is permitted and facilitated by the very flexible and dynamic character of modern communication technology (Joshi Committee Report 1985:25, emphasis in original).

The relationship posited between the media and 'reality' is one of 'reflection', the metaphor of the mirror being used. Thus, the task of the communicator is "(...) to raise the quality of programmes in terms of authenticity to such an extent that an average peasant can say: my life is reflected here, it is my Doordarshan!" (Joshi Committee Report 1985:59) This is the realist presupposition, of a 'reality' existing outside constructions of it, that can be apprehended as such. In addition to the rhetoric of science and realism, the Report also employs the rhetoric of socialism, castigating the newly rich for hijacking the communications revolution, and using television to further their acquisitive and hedonistic interests. To remedy this aberration, the Report recommends a network of decentralized production centres and a proliferation of facilities for community viewing in the rural areas. Throughout the Report, a secular, scientific, humanistic and committed 'we' is invoked as the agency that can bring about the desired change:

We shall be set on the path of evolving our own version of the Communication Revolution only when socially sensitive

persons seeking the solution of Indian problems and wedded to the economic uplift and cultural enrichment of the Indian people address themselves to the planning of the communication technology, and when communication experts begin to seek creative fulfillment in utilizing technology as a means of mobilizing the common people for a richer life both economically and culturally (Joshi Committee Report 1985:29).

The relations of power/knowledge between the emancipated 'we' and a 'they', in need of upliftment and enrichment, mark the fundamental feature of the development discourse, old or new. Whether 'participatory', 'integrated', or 'empowering', development is always constituted in terms of the 'lack' of the other as opposed to the plenitude of experts. The 'dialogue' between 'people' and 'experts' is always about the problems of the former, never of latter. While both might change in the process, the former have to transform themselves and their situation, the latter only their preconceptions of the former. This dividing practice, at the core of the discourse, characterises all its reincarnations. Interestingly, a similar dividing practice emerges in the discourse of urban, working class viewers. The implications of this for development communication is discussed in Chapter III.

'Marketing' Development and Limited Effects Models'

Singhal and Rogers' (1989) discussion of the television soap opera Hum Log is employed here to explore the features of the dominant strand in current development discourse : the 'marketing' of development. While the definition of development (as a participatory process of community self-development) is common to both the 'socialist' and 'market' variants, the strategies adopted, the sites from which these strategies emerge and the 'problem areas' at which they are targeted differ. Firstly, in the discourse of 'marketing' development, the notion of people's participation and decision-making is often interpreted in the sense of consumer sovereignty: the marketing agency sells development, the consumer has a choice of whether to buy it or not, and the agency is forced to tailor its strategies to ensure consumer satisfaction. Thus, for instance, the tremendous audience response to Hum Log and its 'parasocial' involvement with the characters, sometimes forcing the makers to alter the storyline, is read as a measure of participation. Secondly, the interests of commerce and development are seen to dovetail in three senses: at the level of common strategies and techniques, at the level of commercial sponsorship of development programmes and, most importantly, at the level of development creating a culture conducive to the extension of the market. Thirdly, while the programmes devised are area specific, and are evolved by national agencies,

international development organizations play a key role in disseminating approaches and models. Fourthly, the family appears to be a key site for the targeting of development messages. There is an attempt to link programmes having a geopolitical dimension (for example, population control) to the welfare and liberation of the family (for instance, women's emancipation). More generally, the changes in the values, norms and practices of the family that this discourse aims at, would lead to a greater integration of the family with the market economy and the State's programmes of welfare.

All these features emerge from Singhal and Rogers' account of Hum Log. The authors trace the origins of the serial to the 'pro-development' Latin American soap opera. The form was 'accidentally' invented when a Peruvian soap opera Simplemente Maria, a rags-to-riches story of a poor migrant girl and her Singer sewing machine, achieved tremendous popularity, resulting in a boom in the sale of Singer machines. The form was subsequently adopted by Mexican television producers to promote adult literacy, family planning and the like. The Centre for Population Communications International, in New York, played a key role in disseminating this form to other Third World countries, including India. Hum Log, the first pro-development soap opera was produced by Maggi noodles. The story of a lower middle class family, it attempted to influence familial values in the areas of family planning, status of women, family harmony and national

integration. The 'success' of Hum Log in selling its development messages as well as Maggi noodles prompt Singhal and Rogers to conclude:

The entertainment component of such messages helps overcome audience barriers/resistances to the educational content (...) and moves the audience further down a hierarchy of effects (...) towards behavioural change. The large audiences achieved by entertainment educational messages makes them very attractive to commercial advertisers. While development communication efforts are usually a budget expense to a government treasury, entertainment-education is often very profitable. So the entertainment-education strategy represents a 'win-win' situation for both mass communication sources and their audiences (Singhal and Rogers, 1989:118).

Singhal and Rogers see the marketing of development messages as well as of Maggi noodles as having a "pro - development" effect:

The serial's impact in promoting sales of Maggi noodles might be viewed as an indirect pro-development outcome by arguing that individual - level adoption of Maggi noodles freed Indian women from the stove (Singhal and Rogers, 1989 :110).

In a country where the majority of "Indian women" lead a hand to mouth existence, unsure of the next meal, the remark above almost appears tongue-in-cheek. The fact that it is not, is a measure of the marketing approach's distance from the struggle for survival of the 'beneficiaries' of development. That the urban middle class family is chosen as the site for demonstrating the behavioural models of the 'new' development paradigm, eliding survival issues (displacement, impoverishment, migration, ecological degradation), speaks volumes for the interests represented by the marketing approach.

Hum Log marks a turning point in television programming, its success demonstrating, firstly, audience receptivity to the use of the family as a site for working out problems and presenting messages and models. Secondly, Hum Log underlines, in the Indian context, the commonality of interests and strategies between development and marketing and the feasibility of using marketing strategies for effective development communication.

The State's strategy of 'going commercial' with television has been regarded by many researchers as a dilution of its development goals (Chowla, 1985). However, it is precisely this strategy that has made possible the entry of the State into the familial space, in the process redefining the viewers' relationship to both the public and private spheres. The marketing

approach used for development communication was also extended to the political arena where, for the first time in the 1984 General Elections, the Congress and other parties relied heavily on media campaigns designed by advertising agencies. The televisual presentation of politics in terms of human interest drama can be seen as an extension of the State's entry into the family and the use of marketing strategies. The first portrayal in this genre that captured the popular imagination was the funeral of Indira Gandhi in 1985. For two days, families sat glued to their television sets, experiencing a sense of 'being there', of bearing witness to the making of history as members of the nation-as-family. 'Media events,' such as this, involve a ceremonial dimension:

These broadcasts invite the television audience to participate in the process of ritual transformation of the hero from one status to the next, as the mysteries of traditional ceremony harness and canalize the forces of nature, assuring the continuity of society (Katz and Dayan, cited in Chari, 1986:7-8).

In a situation where the State was facing a legitimation crisis, where the ruling party's involvement in the post-assassination communal massacres could have seriously eroded its credibility, television concentrated on constructing the myth of the martyr and her courageous successor (Chari, 1986) in the

process attempting to resolve this crisis. The potential of television for political consensus formation and legitimation, which had been an important factor in the decision to invest in a satellite television network (Mody, 1987:156), was reaffirmed.

With the growth of cable television and multinational satellite networks in the recent period ¹⁶, Doordarshan has intensified its strategy of going commercial. The change in programming, with more time being allotted to feature films and entertainment serials, the increase in programming hours, the leasing out of the metro channel to private sponsors: all these are being seen as inevitable if Doordarshan is to survive the competition from its new challengers. At the same time, the State continues to drag its feet on the Prasar Bharati Bill, involving the setting up of an independent broadcasting authority .

The crisis in development communication, leading to the predominance of the marketing variant, is paralleled in mainstream mass communications research in the U.S., where the 'propaganda' theories of the interwar years gave way to 'limited effects' formulations in the 1950s. The discourse of limited effects, exemplified by the "two-step flow" of Lazarsfeld and Katz ¹⁷ defines "effect" in terms of the measurable success of persuasive messages on the opinions of individuals in the short run (Katz, 1989:492). This strategic definition arose at a juncture when American academic sociology increasingly began to

direct its research endeavours to serve the needs of corporate industry and the democratic state. This was also the period of the cold war, where McCarthy and the communist bogey dictated the realms of the thought and the unthinkable. Behaviourism became the dominant discourse in academia. Democratic freedom came to be equated with consumer sovereignty, in a society " in which voting and soap buying, movie choice and political opinion, become more than methodological equivalents as objects of study: they become similarly manipulable and marginal acts that promise much while they deliver mostly preservative stuff "goods" that flatten the ability to taste" (Gitlin, 1981:113).

It was during this period that scientific management, concentrated in the earlier period on rationalizing production (Taylorism and Fordism), now of necessity extended to the system of consumption, given the capitalist requirement of expanding markets. This was the period of the "scientific management of need, desire and fantasy, and their reconstruction in terms of the commodity form" (Webster and Robins, 1989:334). Social scientists increasingly took on the role of consumption engineers, using scientific procedures (psychological tests, topologies of audiences and so on) in the surveillance and prediction of consumer behaviour (both economic and political).

In this context, communication theory and research became inseparable from "an administrative point of view rooted in

academic sociology's ideological assimilation into modern capitalism", a "marketing orientation in which the emphasis on commercially useful audience research flourishes" and a "social democratic ideology" (Gitlin, 1981:92). Thus, the limited effects model constructs the audience as consumers, 'active' in so far as corporations and political parties have to tailor their persuasive campaigns to meet their 'needs'. A similar orientation in the 'marketing' strand of the development communication discourse where 'participation' is conflated with 'consumer sovereignty' is discussed earlier in this section.

Both 'limited effects' and 'marketing development' invoke a pluralist understanding of the operation of power: power as "a kind of freely flowing market place commodity in a situation of equality" (Gitlin 1981:82), where every individual has equal opportunity to influence every other, and media professionals are on par with other individuals in their exercise of power. The fact, that it is in a situation characterized by growing concentration of ownership, centralization of functioning and widening reach of the mass media that this conception of power gains currency, is a measure of the extent to which communication researchers focus on 'useful' empirical findings, bracketing out the entire structure and language of the mass communication apparatus.

Media and Reality. Texts and Subjects

The approaches discussed thus far, whether in their Third World or First World incarnations, are premised on an unproblematic relationship between media/language and reality. The epistemological basis of these discourses lie in naturalism/realism, which postulates the existence of an external reality that can be objectively apprehended through the method of science¹⁸. This empiricist notion has a dual consequence: firstly, in so far as it is premised on the existence of an objective language/theoretical artifact that can describe reality, it is oblivious of its own implicit framework and categories¹⁹. Secondly, since it takes for granted both its own underpinnings as well as a given external reality, it tends to conceive of the media as "passive transmitters" of messages (Curran et al, 1987). One version of this is the notion of the media as a 'mirror to reality', which provides competing interest groups, within a pluralist version of society, a forum to air their views, as well as distinguishes between 'facts', and 'opinions' in portraying an objective, unbiased picture of reality. Since the media themselves, or the institutions in which they originate are regarded as unproblematic, the emphasis is on evaluating the influence of the media on individuals and groups in society. Hence liberal-pluralist theories of the media, 'based' on empirical studies have tended to define media effects in narrow terms, eliding the role of the

media in reproducing and constructing reality.

Ironically, certain strands of Marxist theorising have used the mirror of reality metaphor for the media, albeit in an inverted manner: the media as distorted, class-biased versions of an objective reality (Curran et al, 1987:70). Since the 1970s, the influence of structuralism and phenomenology on Marxist media theory as well as on mainstream media research has resulted in a jettisoning, or at least a qualification, of the earlier position on the relationship between media and reality.

Structuralism's point of departure, in inverting the positivist/naturalistic relationship between language and reality (reality as prestructured by language, rather than language as descriptive of reality), has had significant implications for a critical perspective on media and society, a perspective that focuses on the constructed nature of the media and its role in defining and framing reality.

The work of the structural linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure, marks a critical break between empiricist and structuralist approaches to language and the media. While Saussure's work is restricted to language, he envisages the possibility of a larger project, semiology "a science that studies the life of signs within society" (Saussure, 1966:16). Roland Barthes is a key figure in the actualization of the semiological project. In his earlier work, Barthes critically examines the products of bour-

geois culture (from toys and detergents to the 'presence' of film stars) as systems of signs, in order to explore how they appropriate meaning in the form of myths that transform the culturally and the historically specific into 'nature' that appears obvious and unproblematic²¹. In a world permeated by this naturalness of the bourgeois order, critical practice or subversion would involve unmasking this 'givenness', revealing its constructed nature. Following Barthes, there has been a growing body of structuralist analyses of the media and popular culture. These approach media artifacts as texts, attempting to categorize the polarities underlying their construction, their narrative structure, the conflicts which they might symbolically resolve, the values they affirm in the process and their insertion into the dominant ideology (for instance, Eco, 1981, Fiske, 1984, Dorfman and Matellart, 1975). The present work has drawn on this body of media analysis in its discussion of specific television serials in Chapter III.

The British journal Screen has been an influential forum in the development of semiotic approaches appropriate to the study of film and television. Apart from inventing more flexible categories (for instance, the notion of codes) with which to approach the heterogeneity of cinematic texts²², an important contribution of 'Screen theory' (the term is used to categorize the work of writers such as Stephen Heath, Laura Mulvey, Paul Willemen, Edward Buscombe, among others) has been its work on the

question of the 'subject'. While structuralism displaces the Cartesian subject as the source of meaning, it has no alternative conception. Screen theory fills out the absent subject of early semiotics by drawing on the Lacanian notion of the constitution of the subject to draw parallels between this process and the processes of identification and representation in cinematic texts²³. The focus is on the codes and conventions of realism, which are seen to reproduce an empiricist relation to knowledge, a relation already inscribed in the subject positions formed by the entry into language²⁴.

While the focus, on the subject positions posited by the text, is a seminal contribution to the analysis of visual texts, the limitations of Screen theory cannot be ignored. Firstly, its formulation of the subject is in universal, trans-historical, trans-social terms, which both elides the specificity of particular ideological and cultural contexts as well as constitutes ideology as monolithic and seamless (Hall, 1980 a). Secondly, it tends to slip into a textual determinism, disregarding the moment of actual reading as productive of meaning.

Given the present study's focus on the specific modes by which viewers constitute their subjectivity vis-a-vis the discourses of television, the general theory of the formation of the subject, discussed above, appears to have limited usefulness.²⁵

Cultural studies (the work of the Birmingham Centre for Contem-

porary Cultural Studies), in particular the recent work of Stuart Hall, David Morley and others, has constituted texts, readers and subjects in terms that undermine both sociological and textual determinism.

In Hall's "Marxism without guarantees" (Hall, 1986), the notions of culture, ideology, language and the subject are divested of elements of determinism and rigidity and are regarded as terrains of struggle, where meanings and effects emerge in specific conjunctural contexts. Thus, for instance, while cultural studies is indebted to structuralist conceptions of the text and language, the meaning of a text is not seen to lie in the text itself, but emerges from its articulation in a social field, its interplay with other elements, its incorporation into specific practices²⁶. While the text may privilege certain subject positions and readings, the meanings constructed will depend on the discourses that are brought to bear in a specific reader - text encounter²⁷. These discourses cannot be regarded as determined by the social position of the reader; rather, factors such as class, gender and age structure or limit the range and repertoire of the performance codes and discourses available to the reader.

Towards a Framework

The present work regards research as engagement (Morgan, 1983), the choice of method implying implicit or explicit

conceptions, on the part of the researcher, of the field being approached. This section attempts to explore the network of assumptions and practices that mediate this researcher's relationship to the study of Doordarshan in a field situation. The logic or strategy of this study can be discussed at three levels: its constitutive assumptions, its epistemological stance and its methodology (Morgan, 1983:19).

This study draws on the cultural studies reinterpretation of Marx to view all human practices (including the present work) as struggles to "make history, but in conditions not of our own making". This view has place for both human agency and structure, regarding television viewers as actively drawing on their repertoires of interpretative strategies to relate to televisual discourse. The structure of the discourse may privilege a dominant reading; however, this is only one among the possible readings that viewers might make. While viewers are situated within certain hegemonic systems of meaning, these systems are terrains of negotiation and struggle. The researcher is not situated outside this terrain of power flows, with a bird's eye view of events and processes : "a two-dimensional model of power" (Lukes, cited in Hall, 1982:64). The researcher is also a co-viewer, with perhaps a somewhat different repertoire of interpretative strategies. The difference is one of degree, not of kind, for viewers possess critical abilities that they bring to their bear in 'reading' television. Moreover, like other viewers, the re-

searcher too experiences intense involvement and is drawn into the narratives of television. Many of the insights that have been discussed in this thesis initially emerged out of a reflection on the researcher's viewing practices, which were then explored in conversations with co-viewers.

Implicit in the stance of research as engagement is a further expectation of the research process: research as a means of empowering human beings (including the researcher) to take responsibility and control over their lives; the research process as one where we "make and remake ourselves as human beings" (Gadamer, as paraphrased in Morgan, 1983: 373). This project thus attempts to adopt a critical stance, problematizing not merely the discourses of Doordarshan, but also 'ourselves' as we constitute our subjectivities in the process of engagement with these discourses. While the study is situated in a working class community, it is as much about 'us', as about 'them'; it purports to explore strategies to interrogate one's own constitutive practices; for the self is regarded not as a given, but as a construct, formed in and through relations of power. This formulation of the subject draws on the work of Michel Foucault.

Foucault rejects all forms of theoretical totalizing and concerns himself with the specific systems of discourse/practice by which, in modern western societies, individuals are "made subjects"²⁸. As opposed to a juridical, repressive notion of

power, that underpins some of the Marxist and psychoanalytic writings, Foucault sees power as productive, for it is in and through relations of power that 'subjects' are constituted. These relations of power are intrinsically tied up with knowledge: knowledge as a form of power, and conversely, as an essential feature of the exercise of power .

The present study draws on this notion of power, as constitutive of subjectivity and intrinsically related to knowledge, in conceiving of the place and effects of development communication in general and Doordarshan in particular. As discussed earlier in the chapter, the introduction of television was inextricably tied up with a modernization project that attempted to survey the resistances, beliefs and attitudes of 'traditional' viewers, in order to change these through programming aimed at creating a modern mindset. In this context, the State's exercise of pastoral power (Foucault, 1986) is of particular relevance. The notion of pastoral power underlies the stance taken by this thesis in looking at the discourses of Doordarshan, particularly where they impinge on the norms relating to the family and the self (Chapter III), and also where they construct political institutions in the idiom of the patriarchal family (Chapter IV). The emphasis in this thesis on the notion of subjectivity stems in part from its perception that the question of identity/subjectivity has increasingly become central in India today, with struggles, ethnic/religious, caste

or gender-based, being fought around it. Hence, it becomes crucial to regard Doordarshan, which attempts to posit a pan - Indian identity, in terms of what constitutive practices viewers bring to bear on it.

Power is conceived of not as originating from a unified monolithic source, but as a "complex strategical situation" (Foucault 1984:93) in any society, actualized from numerous sites, implicit in all relationships, economic, epistemological and sexual. It is generated at the level of the smaller orders of the hierarchy, such as the familial and the communal. The larger orders of power, such as the State, are the effect of configurations of these local orders. The relations of power are marked by resistance, for these relations stay in an eternally unstable equilibrium. The channels of resistance are also multiple, never extraneous to the forms of power exercised.

This conceptualization of the micro-level relations of power and resistance is productive in attempting to understand how viewers, situated in networks of power within the family and the neighbourhood, make sense of television, for it is in the terms of these immediate relations of power that viewers invoke television as a resource, construct their identities and make sense of the larger orders. Moreover, resistance to television discourses also tends to be exercised at the level of the most proximate power flows. The notion of resistance not as a

totalizing category (for instance, class struggle), but as localized practices, is fruitful in understanding the modes in which viewers resist television, while simultaneously being drawn into its hegemonic discourses.

Foucault (1986:208) identifies three "modes of objectification which transform human beings into subjects": the "sciences", which constitute the subject as an object of inquiry; the dividing practices, wherein divisions such as mad/sane, sick/healthy, criminal/law-abiding are used to objectivize the subject; and technologies of the self, whereby individuals turn themselves into subjects. This thesis invokes the concepts of dividing practices and technologies of the self to account for the modes by which viewers construct their subjectivity in relation to televisual discourse.

To sum up, it is in relation to four aspects - the characterization of the discourses of development communication, the nature of the State's exercise of power through television, the situation of viewers within local networks of power and resistance, and the modes of constituting subjectivity - that this thesis is indebted to Foucault's notion of power. This relatively nascent endeavour is not unproblematic, given that the Indian socio-political-cultural context cannot be conflated with that of modern, western societies. This study does not purport to use this category of power in an all-encompassing,

trans-historical fashion to examine all orders of power relations, for instance, within the extended family, the jati/caste hierarchy and so on. Rather, we deem it strategic to employ this category to interrogate the corpus of knowledge and practices pertaining to development, that have been transposed onto the Third World, and which have informed the introduction and expansion of television in India. This regime of truth about modernization accords a central role on its agenda to the transformation, through the mass media, of irrational indigenous subjectivities, located in simple societies placed at the lower end of a social Darwinian scale. Foucault's work, with its focus on the construction of subjectivity in and through relations of power/knowledge thus appears relevant to the present study.

Given the constitutive assumptions and interpretative stance of the present study, the method of participant observation was chosen, supplemented by a structured, open-ended interview guide ³⁰. An iterative approach was adopted. In the first four months, certain broad questions were explored through interaction with residents in the neighbourhood. At this stage, thirty-three relatively unstructured conversations were held, with men and women, male and female youth of the various religious/ethnic communities in the area. Two group discussions were also conducted. These conversations were recorded and transcribed. The themes which emerged through these discussions, as well as reflection on the author's participation in the everyday

life of the community (documented in a daily diary), were incorporated in a structured, open-ended interview schedule that was used in the second stage of the project, that is, the remaining 6 months, during which 88 interviews were conducted (Appendix I contains a copy of the schedule). The original plan was to conduct 90 interviews to cover men and women of various ages and religious groups, as indicated by Table 1.1.

Table 1.1

Distribution of Proposed Sample by Religion, Gender and broad Age Categories

	Hindu	Religion Catholic	Muslim	Total
Men	10	10	10	30
Women	10	10	10	30
Male Youth	5	5	5	15
Female Youth	5	5	5	15
Total	30	30	30	90

Various contacts were used, during this second phase, to cover as many areas of the neighbourhood as possible. The contacts included those who had already been interviewed as well as the anganwadi workers of the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) who were spread out over the entire colony.

Each household was visited a minimum of twice, once to explain the project and elicit the respondent's participation and a second time to conduct the interview. Only one respondent from each household was interviewed, though in some cases, other family members also participated in the discussion. In a few cases, the interview was spread out over two sessions. Each interview took a minimum of one hour, some interviews taking upto two hours. In most cases, the families would offer tea and snacks, so that the interview became an extended visit, with a

lot of informal conversation in addition to the interview proper. In a few cases, the researcher became a family friend and had occasion to visit a number of times, including on festive occasions and celebrations. The actual number interviewed in the various categories is indicated in Table 1.2.

Table 1.2

Distribution of Actual Sample by Religion, Gender and broad Age
Categories

	Hindu	Religion Catholic	Muslim	Total
Men	9	10	5	24
Women	10	8	13	31
Male Youth	6	5	5	16
Female Youth	5	7	5	17
TOTAL	30	30	28	88

The composition of the group, which has fewer men, particularly Muslim men, reflects the difficulties faced in finding respondents of this category who were willing or available to be interviewed. As many Muslims were small businessmen and self employed, it was difficult to find them at home during the daytime or evenings. Even when at home, a few were reluctant to be interviewed, saying that they did not watch television. Perhaps the characterization of television as haraam by the religious leaders as well as reservations about being interviewed

by a woman were behind this reluctance.

To briefly trace the process through which this thesis took its present shape, the researcher moved into the field, after a period of watching television programmes of various genres and identifying certain broad trends in programming, which could be studied from the standpoint of viewer reception. The overall presumption was that Doordarshan, as a cultural intervention of the Indian State, is attempting to extend an ideology of modernity: the rationality of nation state and the market economy, in the process restructuring the discursive space of popular culture. The dynamics of this process in an urban working class community were sought to be explored, on the assumption that it would constitute an interesting complex of dominant mass cultural discourses as well as subaltern discourses, arising from its social position and cultural background. At this stage, the objectives of this study of working class reception were broadly specified as follows:

1. To understand the meaning and significance of television owning and watching in the context of viewers' everyday lives.
2. To understand how viewers approach the range of television programming in a familial setting, in terms of watching, discussing, criticizing, ignoring, switching off and so on.
3. To analyze the construction of discourses present in the programmes most frequently watched, specifically in relation to the themes of family, gender, the state and the market, and to

identify the interpretative strategies and discourses that viewers bring to bear in their readings of programmes.

4. To relate these strategies and discourses to the social and material circumstances of viewers, specifically, to examine how gender, linguistic and religious background and age mediate the repertoire of interpretative strategies.

5. On the basis of this case study, to arrive at tentative formulations about how television might be restructuring the discursive space of urban working class popular culture.

The perspective informing the objectives outlined above was drawn from cultural studies.

In the first few months after moving into the area, several "points of breakdown" (Agar, 1987:20) appeared to surface, where the researcher was 'surprised' by the insights occasioned by the field experience. Firstly, the sharp ethnic-religion differences in cultural practices and modes of relating to television put to question any notions of a 'working-class culture'. To account for these differences involved an attempt to understand the processes involved in the construction of ethnic identities in the Goan context. The thesis began to take on a much stronger local flavour than initially envisaged. Another unexpected finding was that most blue-collar working class families regard themselves as belonging to the 'middle class'. Television appeared to be a resource in their struggles for upward mobility, as well as a constitutive strategy that they could use to

reiterate the difference between 'us' and 'them'. Thirdly, the theme of the powerful woman, the wronged heroine seeking revenge, emerged as one of the most evocative themes in the course of viewing and discussing serials and films with viewers, bringing up the problem of accounting for its popularity in a situation where the exercise of overt power by women is seen as unwomanly and is contained in various ways. Fourthly, the credibility of television news and the televisual presentation of the State was far higher than anticipated. The explanatory frames that viewers use to account for the discrepancy between their perception of local politics and the televisual presentation of the political scenario became an area for exploration.

These are some of the core breakdowns, calling for "resolution" (Agar, 1987:21), that emerged in the first four months of fieldwork. The remaining period was spent in exploring these and other ideas further, through informal conversations, participation in everyday viewing and structured interviews. By the end of the ten months of field work, what emerged were several insights, necessitating a rethinking of many categories, such as ideology, hegemony and articulation, which appeared to be inadequate for understanding the specificity of the field. A part of the problem perhaps lay with the researcher's initial concern to arrive at generalizations about popular culture. The field experience forced the researcher to move away from totalizing categories towards a greater acceptance of the

'messiness' of the insights and a gradual, uneven movement towards coherence. It was in the course of this movement that the researcher rediscovered the work of Foucault, and the notion of the construction of subjectivity with relations of power began to emerge as a central focus of the thesis. Even so, it took a long time of constant retroactive reading between the texts generated in the field and other texts before the thesis took its present form. The attempt has been to articulate the field experience, without becoming merely descriptive, on the one hand, or attempting to strait-jacket it into alien constructs that divest it of its specificity.

The Field

Various considerations informed the choice of the field. Firstly, being a Goan, I would have privileged access to the people, culture and language of the area, as well as an opportunity to incorporate, within this work, insights arising out of personal experiences³¹. Having lived predominantly outside Goa, yet with 'roots' in Goa, I am both an 'insider' and an 'outsider'. Secondly, Goa is of interest because of its unique history. One of the most recent entrants to the Indian Union, it has had to contend with rapid economic change, massive immigration from other parts of India³² and a new political order in the post-liberation period. Its assertions of regional identity, in the face of perceived threats of merger and

homogenization, have been enacted in complex ways,* reinforcing ethnic differences, and, in recent times, marked by ethnic tension. Television was introduced in Goa in the early 1980s. Television programmes are controlled by 'outsiders' (which is resented by certain sections) given that at the time of the study, all programming originated from either Bombay Doordarshan or the National Network and was in Marathi and Hindi, not in Konkani, the local language. In this context, it would be of relevance to understand how different ethnic groups within Goa, both local and migrant, define their identities in relating to the discourses of television.

The major ethnic groups of Goan origin are the Hindus, the Catholics and a small Muslim section³³. Migrant groups are predominantly from the neighbouring states of Karnataka and Maharashtra³⁴. They are mainly Hindus, with a section of Muslims from Karnataka. The migrants from Maharashtra are predominantly middle class and blue-collar working class. A large section of the Kannadigas occupy the lowest rung in the hierarchy, being unorganized manual workers, largely belonging to the scheduled castes and the nomadic tribes. They are contemptuously referred to as 'ghantis' (literally, 'from the ghats') by the local population.

The port town of Vasco da Gama is the only town in Goa with a large concentration of workers, both local and migrant, and

hence, the most suitable location if one wants to look at the interface of television and working class culture. Secondly, in Vasco, the tensions between locals and migrants as well as between Marathi and Konkani protagonists, have been particularly intense, leading to riots in 1982 and 1986. The post-liberation pressures and the resulting local dynamics are sharper here than in other parts of Goa.

The access to the working class communities of Vasco was made possible by a Catholic priest and the trade union at the public sector Goa Shipyard Ltd. Having visited various colonies, I finally decided on Kamgar Nagar (a pseudonym) for various reasons. It was the most heterogeneous in terms of ethnic communities both local and migrant, categories of workers and income groups. All the other colonies were fairly homogeneous, consisting either of workers from one industry/sector or else of the same ethnic and income group. Moreover, when compared to other colonies, there was a greater proliferation of television in Kamgar Nagar. One of the reasons for this is that most of the residents, even the migrants, have permanent jobs, regard themselves as settlers, and hence, would choose to invest in household durables. As opposed to this, migrant unorganized workers would choose to invest in land, gold or productive assets:

Our people don't give much importance to TV: If they have money, say 10,000 rupees, they would say - we can get four acres of land with that. What's the use of buying a TV? There is no income from a TV. That's what our wives say: "Instead of buying a TV to see programmes we can't understand, why don't you make some gold jewellery for me or for your children, or something for yourself?" People prefer to save up for the future...buy some land, build a house, dig a well back home. After all, this is not our place (Contract Worker, 25, Kannadiga Hindu).

I contacted a trade union activist living in Kamgar Nagar and through him began to establish contacts with workers from various communities. A couple of weeks were spent doing some preliminary interviews and looking for accommodation in the area.

During the 10 months (August 1988 - May 1989) of stay in Kamgar Nagar, I lived as a paying guest with a Catholic family and, over time, was accepted almost as part of the family, eating meals with them, helping with domestic chores and, for a period of time when there was a family emergency, even managing the household and children. I participated in all family celebrations and events, developing close ties with the extended family and relatives from other parts of Goa. The other Catholic families living around also accepted me as one of them, and I would often join the women when they would sit together chatting. Given this level of rapport and involvement, as also my ethnic

origins, the study is able to focus, in greater depth, on the Goan Catholic community in Kamgar Nagar, than on the other communities. I also established close ties with a group of Hindu families, some Goan, some Maharashtrian. I was accepted by them perhaps partly because I was not a 'typical' Catholic and spoke fluent Marathi. Also the fact that I was a woman doing her Ph.D gave me a certain amount of recognition and respect, and many of them, particularly the youth, went out of their way to assist me with contacts and access to new areas. A few Muslim families too accepted me and helped me in my work, though relative to the other two communities, I was unable to develop very close personal ties and just 'hang around' with them.

My daily routine was generally as follows:

Mornings: Transcribing interviews and writing notes.

Afternoons and evenings: Interviews and visits to families.

Late Evenings: Participation in domestic chores, playing with the children, chatting with family and neighbours, watching TV with them.

Nights: Making notes or watching video with the family.

Among shanty towns in Vasco, there is a hierarchy, the slums of Baina and Mangor being at the lower end. Kamgar Nagar is a shanty town at the upper end of the spectrum, occupied by the middle and upper ranks of the working class, both local and migrant. These are predominantly permanent, blue-collar workers

from the public sector Goa Shipyard, the Mormugao Port Trust, the railways and private companies. Prior to 1965, Kamgar Nagar was a semi-barren plateau, consisting largely of comunidade lands³⁵, with a small portion belonging to private landlords. In the late 1960s, the president of the Mormugao Municipal Council, a leading industrialist, allowed unauthorized construction by a few of his employees in this area. The comunidades and the local government moved the court, but the demolition was stayed, allegedly through political influence. This opened up the area for other workers in need of housing. The CITU leader³⁶ of the dock workers gave the go-ahead to his workers, assuring them that they would not be evicted. The area came to be popularly known as "Phukat Nagar"³⁷. Land grabbing, illegal sale and boundary disputes were rampant. Many of the recent settlers have, in fact, bought the land from others:

People call this place Phukat Nagar, but that's not true. We had to buy the land. We paid maybe not full ticket, but half ticket - not Vasco to Bombay, but Miraj to Bombay (wife of shipyard carpenter, 50, Goan Muslim, 3 children).

By 1975, there were approximately 200 houses, and a Kamgar Nagar Samiti was formed, to regulate disputes and negotiate with the authorities³⁸.

For about 10 years, till the late 1970s, Kamgar Nagar had no amenities. Even water had to be carried from wells at the bottom of the hill. Many of the older women complain that they have back problems because of this. There was no electricity, road or sanitation. In the late 1970s, the municipality laid a line for water supply to the Housing Board tenements which it had constructed at one end of the Nagar. The residents of Kamgar Nagar would break the water pipes at night to take water. The municipal authorities were unable to check this, despite patrol jeeps.

At that time it was Shashikala's government. The people said at election time - we will vote for you, but first give us water. We told them - until we get water, we will keep breaking the pipes, we'll make mincemeat of them. So finally they gave us water (wife of shipyard carpenter, 50, Goan Muslim, 3 children).

Thus, using their clout at election time, the residents of Kamgar Nagar were able to obtain water supply and electricity around 1978-79. The water supply is very inadequate. Roads and buses came later. There is still no sewage or drainage system.

Today, Kamgar Nagar is a flourishing neighbourhood with a population estimated at around 8 to 10,000³⁹. It is on the outskirts of the main town square of Vasco. The road from Vasco town winds steeply up the hill, past newly constructed multisto-

reyled apartments, a sign of the rise in land values in the area .⁴⁰ At the top of the plateau is a small Sai Baba temple, then an open rocky space used as a playground by local youth. Beyond this is the main intersection of Kamgar Nagar, with a chapel and shops, including a video parlour, provision stores, a beauty parlour and an electrical repair shop. On either side of the arterial main road are a number of offshoot lanes, flanked by tiled roof houses. The houses near the main road on the plateau are medium-sized bungalows with concrete walls, often with a compound wall. A cross or a tulsi plant in the front compound marks the religion of the owner. These are the houses of the early settlers, predominantly Goan blue-collar workers and a few small businessmen. These households often take in tenants, generally migrant workers with or without their families. Some of them also run little provision stores or bars, giving them a supplementary source of income. As one moves further away from the main road, the houses get smaller, but are still permanent structures. These belong to the later settlers, many of the them blue-collar workers from Karnataka and Maharashtra who migrated in the late 1970s. There are also some Goan families, less prosperous than the earlier settlers, living in this area. Further down, on the slopes, the tarred lanes give way to mud tracks and the bungalows to one-room cottages. These belong to the most recent entrants to the colony, normally younger workers with their nuclear families, who have migrated in the 1980s. While there is no clear demarcation of Hindu and Catholic areas,

there are sometimes clusters of houses of one community, and one lane called Gaudovaddo, where Catholics of the Gaudi community live. Most of the Muslims live in one section of the colony, around the mosque and consist of both Goan Muslims and migrants from Karnataka.

Structures in Kamgar Nagar have come up in a haphazard fashion, as and when land was occupied and the area is a confusing maze of lanes, with no sequential numbering of houses. It is impossible to locate any house from its number; one needs detailed directions, the main landmarks being the four temples, the chapel and the mosque. It takes a while to find one's way around (for a rough map of the area, refer to Map 3).

In addition to private housing, there are 3 Housing Board Colonies, one of them (two-room tenements) for municipal employees (mostly sweepers and conservancy workers), one (single-room tenements) built for migrant, contract workers and the third, an ownership scheme for workers. The residents of the first two Housing Board colonies are classified as 'ghantis' by the remaining settlers.

With the exception of the high-rise apartments and the Housing Board colonies, all the other housing in Kamgar Nagar is illegal. There has been litigation to vacate the land for years. During my stay, some households received eviction notices. This

was universally regarded as an election ploy, providing politicians an opportunity to intervene to 'save' people from eviction.

Kamgar Nagar has three secondary schools, one municipal, one owned by a Hindu trust and another private; four temples (Sai Baba, Maruti, Ganesh and Rashtroli-Santhoshi Ma), a mosque and a chapel. Local organizations include the Kamgar Nagar Samiti, formed around 1975 to arbitrate disputes, allocate land and represent the residents. The Samiti does not appear to be active at present. There is also a Kamgar Nagar Youth Association, formed around 1987, which has taken up civic issues relating to water supply, bus service and playing grounds. In addition, there are temple, chapel and mosque committees and around ten youth sports clubs.

There are no figures available from the Census data regarding the population of the area. Neither are the voters' lists useful, as the municipal wards limits do not coincide with the boundaries of Kamgar Nagar (which consists of two and a half wards). However, as the area was covered by the ICDS (Integrated Child Development Scheme), the data from the registers of the 10 anganwadi workers in the area were tabulated religion-wise, as per Table 1.3.

Table 1.3

Distribution of Population and Households by Religion as compiled
from ICDS records

	Hindu	Religion Catholic	Muslim	Sikh	Total
Households	1079	192	218	1	1490
Population	5215	1013	1250	2	7480
% of households	72	13	15	-	100
% of population	70	13	17	-	100

The data presented above do not cover the entire area. The central, more affluent part, populated largely by Catholics, has been excluded from the survey. My own estimate of Catholic households would be around 275. This is on the basis of the fact that the statue of Our Lady, which spends one day in each Catholic household, takes 9 months to complete a round. Table 1.4 indicates a reasonable estimate, on the conservative side.

Table 1.4
Estimated Distribution of Households by Religion

	Hindu	Religion Catholic	Muslim	Total
Households	1105	275	220	1600
% of households	69	17	14	100

There are no data available for the proportion of migrant and local population; prima facie, it appears that the migrants would constitute a sizable majority, at least around 60 %, if not more, since most of the Muslims and a majority of the Hindus would be migrants. As regards the ownership of television, with the help of the anganwadi workers, a rough survey was conducted in two areas representing the lower and the middle ranges (as we have seen, the colony can be geographically divided in broad groups, in terms of quality of housing and level of income). In the municipal workers' Housing Board colony, there were 30 TV sets for a population of 170 households, which would mean about 18 TV sets per 100. In the middle range houses, there were 116 TV sets for 186 households, or approximately 62 sets per 100. The relatively more affluent part of the colony would have 80 sets per 100, or more, as all house owners and most tenants would have their own TVs.

Table 1.5 to 1.15, reproduced in Appendix II, contain data describing the 88 respondents who were interviewed. A large majority of respondents (nearly 82 %) were in the age group below 40, with approximately 41 % in the two age groups from 15 to 25 and 26 to 40 (Table 1.5). There were slightly more women (54.5%) than men (Table 1.6) and fewer Muslims (30.7%) than Catholics (35.2%) or Hindus (34.1%) (Table 1.7). The occupational profile of respondents (Table 1.8) shows that around 45 % were blue-collar workers, either skilled or semi-skilled, while 18 % were

students (mostly children of blue-collar workers) and 9 % white collar workers. A majority of respondents (51.1 %) have either been to secondary school or passed their S.S.C., while 24 % have studied beyond S.S.C. (I.T.I diploma, H.Sc or Bachelor's Degree). Only 8% of respondents were illiterate (Table 1.9). A comparison of the respondents' and their fathers' educational level (Table 1.11) indicates a distinct upward educational mobility, for around 44 % had fathers who were either illiterate or literate with no formal schooling, and only around 15 % had fathers with secondary schooling, with 7 % having completed high school. The occupational profile of the respondents' fathers (Table 1.10) demonstrates that around 40 % were blue-collar workers, approximately 19 % were traders or shop keepers and only 20 % were farmers or artisans. This indicates that a substantial number of respondents came from an urban or semi-urban background and were not first-generation town dwellers. The distribution of the reported monthly income of households (Table 1.12) indicates that the largest number (38.6 %) fell in the bracket Rs.1,000 to Rs.2,000, the next largest (18.2%) in the Rs.2,000 to Rs.3,000 income group. Table 1.13 indicates that most households (61.4 %) had one earning member, with 21.6 % having two earning members. 86.4 % of the respondents had their own accommodation, the remaining living in rented accommodation (Table 1.14). 56.8 % of the respondents were local in origin, the remaining being migrants (Table 1.15). Of the migrants, 29 % had lived in Goa for over 20 years, 23.7 for 16 to 20 years, with only 5.2 coming in


the past 5 years (Table 1.16). In terms of the length of TV set ownership, most respondents had acquired their sets fairly recently, 70.4% in the past five years (Table 1.17).

The modal profile which emerges from this data relating to the 88 respondents is of a middle income, blue-collar working class nuclear family, with a permanently employed male head of household, having its own accommodation, upwardly mobile in terms of education and occupation and either of local origin or migrants of long tenure, having bought a TV set in the recent past .

The discourse of development communication, which informed the introduction and expansion of television in India, forms the starting point of our inquiry. An examination of the relations of power/knowledge which underpin it, leads to the conclusion that at the core of this discourse, is a dividing practice that constitutes a modern, rational, expert 'us' versus a 'them' in need of change, with television being conceived of as an instrument of this transformation of subjectivities. This discourse is not monolithic and consistent; it has responded to changing circumstances, proliferating into several positions that would regard each other as antagonistic. The changing face of Doordarshan can be related to the growing influence of the 'marketing' of development strand, to the marginalization of other strands. This understanding of Doordarshan forms the backdrop for a field study in a working class neighbourhood in a

port town in Goa. Drawing on Michel Foucault's notion of power, this study focuses on the construction of subjectivities that emerge in the encounter between the discourses of Doordarshan and a heterogeneous group of viewers. These subjectivities relate to several spheres of power relations, ranging from gender and age-specific familial identities to the identities of the consumer and the citizen. The constitution of ethnic identities, a crucial aspect, mediating the construction of all other identities, will be taken up for discussion in the next chapter.

Map 1: Map of India
Showing Location of Goa



Map 2: Map of Goa showing
(a) Talukas
(b) Old and New Conquests




Source: Census of India, 1981

 OLD CONQUESTS

 NEW CONQUESTS

Map 3: Diagrammatic Representation of Kamgar Nagar showing Major Landmarks



CHAPTER - II

THE SITUATED SPECTATOR

Introduction

This chapter explores the notion of 'identity', focussing on what has been variously called ethnic identity, basic group identity or primordial identity . The first section, Ethnic and National Identities: Some Perspectives, surveys a selection of literature on national and ethnic identity, with reference to India. The subsequent sections examine the processes of identity constitution in a specific field: a heterogeneous working-class neighbourhood in a port town in Goa. The constitution and reproduction of group identities, both in everyday life and in relation to the discourses of television, are situated in the context of, firstly the specific socio-cultural past of Goa, which imbues it with a sense of uniqueness in relation to the rest of India; secondly, post-liberation industrialization and migration which have contributed to social and communal tensions in the 1980s. These two aspects are discussed in the section: The Goan Identity. Vasco da Gama. The Town is the section devoted to the history of Vasco and Kamgar Nagar, attempting to put into perspective the communal riots that took place there in 1982 and 1986. The final section, The Goan Spectator, discusses how

Hindus, Catholics and Muslims in Kamgar Nagar relate differently to certain aspects of the televisual discourse, in the process reaffirming distinct subjectivities.

Ethnic and National Identities: Some Perspectives

In the past two decades, there has been a renewed interest in the study of ethnicity, in the face of a resurgence of ethnic politics. This is in contrast with the earlier period, when the sociologists of modernization "confidently pronounced ethnicity to be a legacy of primordial social relations which deserves a bleaching treatment by appropriate modern social action. In this sense, ethnicity was viewed not merely as a categoric marker of collectivity differentiation but mostly as a pejorative property of unwanted persistence" (Dasgupta, 1975:466).

The renewed theoretical interest in ethnicity, in some cases, views the phenomenon as an objective social fact, to be accounted for, analyzed and classified. Thus, there is work on the reasons for ethnic revivalism (Bell, 1975), on shifting ethnic boundaries (Horowitz, 1975) and on the constituents of basic group identity (Isaacs, 1975)¹. Identity, in some definitions, appears as a fact, an attribute of a person (a taken-for-granted object). Bell (1975:171) questions the notion of ethnicity as "a primordial phenomenon in which deeply held identities have to reemerge"

and instead views it "as a strategic choice by individuals who, in other circumstances, would choose other group memberships as a means of gaining some power and privilege". This thesis chooses to view ethnic identity neither as a basic attribute of the person nor as a conscious choice, but as a collective historico-cultural terrain, inhabited by the subject-construct, establishing its connectedness in time and space.² Identity, in this sense, is a process of constant affirmation, redefinition and resistance, being worked out within relations of power and at several levels. Identities are multi-layered and contextual (Horowitz, 1975:118). The subject is the site of several identities: caste-based, religious, linguistic, regional, and national. The specific identity invoked in a particular instance will depend on what is perceived as the threat, the 'other', for identities are relational.

The construction of identity, in the context of the modern nation-state, involves the creation of communities "imagined" through language (Anderson, 1983)³ and a "new imagination: a new vision of calendrical time (linear, teleological history), a limited but generalized space, occupied by homogeneous and equal 'citizens', who are the protagonists of this new drama of the 'movement of history'" (Smith, 1986:169). These 'masses' are integrated into the nation through "the new modes of communication and (...) the new cognition, Science"⁴. Paradoxically, however, the new sensibilities of the national identity are built

up on a premodern "ethnic core" of myth, memory, symbol and value⁵. Thus, the construction of the modern state, based on a national identity involves a dual contradictory movement: the invocation of a unified mythic ethnic time and space towards the creation of a political community on the lines of the Western territorial and civic model⁶.

In a multi-ethnic country such as India, the process of forging a homogeneous national identity is fraught with tension: which of the identities get represented in the 'national' identity? Which alternative traditions and local cultures get suppressed?⁷

It becomes impossible to talk about a common culture in the fuller sense without talking about who is defining it, within which set of interdependencies and power balances, for what purposes, and with reference to which, outside culture(s) have to be discarded, rejected or demonified in order to generate the sense of cultural identity (Featherstone 1990:11).

In this process of trying to create a homogeneous national identity, the post-colonial Indian State begins to enter every domain of life, legitimizing a "pan - Indian, urban, middle-class culture" (Nandy, 1989) that views the plurality of traditional cultures as pathologies, and with its secular rational

scientific ideology, sets itself up as the arbiter of ethnic tolerance. This process, however, is not smooth, and the ruling elite face several dilemmas arising out of the imposition of Western political structures onto indigenous ethnic cores.

Firstly, the creation of a coherent nation calls for recourse to myths; the political myths of its recent history may not move people deeply. On the other hand, appeal to traditional myths would add to fissiparous tendencies, given the polyethnic character of the nation (Smith 1983: 126). For instance, the nationalist movement in India owed much of its populist appeal to the invocation of Hindu myths and symbols by Tilak, Aurobindo and others. The contradictions of a 'secular India' built on a mass base of 'Hindu Rashtra' continue to bedevil our polity, as bitter ethnic battles are waged over the reinvention of history and definitions of national identity.

Secondly, the preservation of the territorial integrity of the nation calls for a centralized administrative and coercive apparatus. However, winning the hearts and minds of the populace, which is just as crucial to nationhood, calls for popular mobilization, education and politicization which, given the tenuous nature of national unity, could threaten stability by fuelling ethnic and other divisions.

Moreover, the very processes of modernization and

centralization give rise to their obverse - the politicization of ethnic groups as they struggle for a fair share of the national cake, staking their claim to economic and territorial resources.

Thus, the state's project of cultural homogenization (in which television features prominently) is met with resistance at various levels and struggles over definitions of cultural identity .
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(...)state and nation are at each other's throats, and the hyphen that links them is now less an icon of conjuncture than an index of disjuncture (...) At the level of any given nation-state it means that there is a battle of the imagination, with state and nation seeking to cannibalize one another. Here is the seedbed of brutal separations, majoritarianisms that seem to have appeared from nowhere and micro-identities that have become political projects within the nation-state (Appadurai, 1990:304).

The Goan Identity

Goa, the twenty-fifth state in the Indian Union, is a small territory of 3702 square kilometers (Census of India, 1981:1), situated on the west coast, south of Bombay (Refer to Map 1). It is distinguished from the rest of the subcontinent by the fact that it was a Portuguese enclave for about 450 years, until its

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incorporation into India in 1961.

Goa was divided into two regions with distinct characteristics: the Old Conquests, consisting of the concelhos (talukas) of Bardez, Ilhas and Salcete, occupied by the Portuguese between 1510 and 1543, and New Conquests, occupied by the Portuguese only in the 18th Century. The Old Conquests were under Portuguese rule for 450 years and the New Conquests for only 173. The former were colonized at a time when the Inquisition was at its peak. As a result, the Old Conquests have a relatively larger Catholic population and the colonial influence is more intense and apparent. The New Conquests were spared from the Inquisition, and at the time of their occupation, the Portuguese granted the local population the freedom of religious and cultural expression. Thus, this area has a small Catholic population and is culturally closer to the neighbouring state of Maharashtra. It is also less developed economically.

The historical, geographical, political, social and cultural differences between the Old Conquests and the New Conquests have given rise to the idea of 'Two Goas' (D'Souza, 1975:97).

In the discussion on colonial impact and the constitution of ethnic identity, which follows, we will be restricting ourselves primarily to developments in the Old Conquests.

The Goan Hindus and Catholics have distinct ethnic identities, shaped in part by Portuguese colonial policy which, unlike its British counterpart, was informed by religious zeal, in addition to commercial and political considerations. In 1541, the Inquisition was established in Portugal to control the heretical practices of the New Christians (forced converts from Judaism). By 1560, it had made its way to Goa, where it was vigorously implemented to regulate the practices of converts from Judaism, Islam and Hinduism. The horrors of the Inquisition in Goa have been reconstructed from archival sources (Priolkar, 1961). What concerns us here is how this alliance of church and State worked towards the destruction of native identities, in the process creating distinct 'Catholic' and 'Hindu' identities ¹⁰.

The Portuguese created a system of coercion and incentives to 'win souls'. Widespread destruction of temples and shrines, the proscription of Hindu rites and ceremonies, the exile of Hindu priests, depriving Hindus of their ancestral rights, the baptism of orphan Hindu children - these were some of the coercive measures which compelled large numbers of Hindus to flee from Portuguese occupied territory. As an incentive to conversion, there was discrimination in favour of converts - in access to public posts, education, rights in village communities and so on. Consequently, entire villages were converted to Catholicism. The Church kept a close watch on these new converts, attempting to exterminate every vestige not only of

Hinduism, but also of indigenous cultural practices. Between 1567 and 1606, in obedience to the decree of the Council of Trent, the church organized five provincial councils (Thekkedath, 1982). These councils passed a number of regulations to "contain immorality", which included the proscription of several customary practices.

The 'Edict of the Inquisition of Goa, April 14, 1736' (reproduced in Camilleri, 1986: 224-230, translated in Priolkar, 1961:97-107) is a vivid illustration of the colonial project of reshaping native subjectivity. It catalogues, in precise detail, all prevalent rituals and practices pertaining to births, marriages and deaths - concerning which Camilleri (1986:1991) remarks tongue-in-cheek: " il faut d'ailleurs feliciter le Saint Office pour ses remarquables qualities d'ethnographe"¹¹. The edict then goes on to proscribe all customary practices. At the level of the familial, it attempts to undermine the traditional structures of kinship and authority by banning the participation of traditional clan leaders in the rites of passage and other ceremonial occasions (Clauses, 2, 5, 6, 8, 12, 16, 19, 23, 24, 32, 48, 50). Underlying this attempt at delegitimising kinship ties is perhaps the prevalent European notion of the 'family'. The perspective informing these proscriptions would see native beliefs and customs as 'superstitious', in contradistinction to the rationality of the Western, Catholic belief system. For instance, clause 8 states that convenience should be the norm,

rather than auspiciousness or custom, in making marriage preparations:

These preparations should be started at such opportune time as may be convenient to expedite things and with the participation therein simultaneously of as many persons as may be necessary without any order of preference, or respect for any custom so far observed (Priolkar, 1961:99).

The edicts sought to alter people's understanding of and relationship to their habitat by banning the use of flowers and auspicious foods (coconut, betel-leaves, areca nut, rice etc.) in marriage (4, 9, 11, 12, 14, 18, 26, 27) and birth festivities (28); the growing of auspicious plants, like tulsi (46); the observance of auspicious days based on the phases of the moon (41, 42, 43, 44). The customary modes of expression and celebration were severely restricted through the proscription of indigenous musical instruments (1); songs (6, 7); feasts on the appearance of new crops (38), on auspicious days (42, 43) or in memory of the dead (36, 37); customary gifts (5, 21, 23); native modes of dress (45), food habits ¹² (39, 40) and games (47).

The Inquisition also destroyed all literature in native languages, and made an attempt to replace the vernacular with Portuguese (Priolkar, 1961:177), regarding the former as a means by which Hinduism continued to hold sway:

Since they cannot speak any other language but their own vernacular, they are secretly visited by Botos, servants and High Priests of Pagodas who teach them the tenets of their own sect... This would not have happened had they known only the Portuguese language; since they being ignorant of the native tongue the Botos, Grous and their attendants would not have been able to have any communication with them... (Proposal of an Inquisitor, cited in Priolkar 1961: 177-178).

In all this, one sees the working of a project to reshape all aspects of native subjectivity, from relationships with significant others, to modes of expression, to the minutest details of everyday living. The attempt is to mould a 'Christian Subject', who would not only accept the constant surveillance of the Church and State, but would internalize this surveillance in the shape of a 'conscience'. The sacraments of the church (eg. Penance) would help to reaffirm this internalized surveillance, the gaze of the 'subject' on itself, in deference to the 'Subject' (Althusser, 1971). Foucault terms this mode of control of subjectivity as pastoral power, wherein the Church/State assumes responsibility for its subjects' well being.

In the Indian context, colonialism, with its forms of religious and state power, perhaps first introduced this mode of domination. However, in the Goan situation, the attempt at

redefining subjectivity was far more brutal, intense and all pervasive than in British India.

The native reaction to the Portuguese project of Lusitanization involved a complex combination of resistance, accommodation and acquiescence. The degree of assimilation of colonial culture was related to status within the caste hierarchy.

During the 450 years of Portuguese rule, there were over 40 revolts (Esteves, 1986:26). Some of these revolts were by educated Catholics, particularly priests, doctors and army men protesting against the Portuguese policy of racial discrimination. These sporadic revolts, with little popular base, were easily crushed. A more formidable challenge was posed by the Ranes of Satari, from 1755 to 1912 (when they were finally defeated). The Ranes operated in the border areas of the New Conquests and were outside the political and cultural hegemony of the Portuguese. The exploits of the Ranes captured the popular imagination and have been celebrated in local folk music (Kamat, 1988:234).

For the majority of the populace, however, militant resistance was not a feasible alternative. One finds varying degrees of accommodation of colonial hegemony. At one end of the spectrum, the land-owning, upper caste converts (Brahmins and

Chardos) identified with their colonial masters, attempting to adopt their language and culture, accepting the Portuguese version of Goa Dourada (Golden Goa).

Goa Dourada is a most compelling image for many Goans of all walks of life who believe theirs is a special land not an Indian land but of India, not Hindu but really Catholic, a tiny piece of Catholic Portugal transplanted into tropical soil (Ifeka, 1985:182).

This Goa Dourada image was sustained by several processes. Firstly, the Catholic elite regarded themselves as an integral part of the Portuguese Empire and their culture as a harmonious synthesis of the East and the West. Their access, however limited, to higher education in Portugal, government jobs and to the electoral process strengthened their attachment to the colonizers. This myth of harmonious interdependence had no place for the violence of the Inquisition or the rigid hierarchies of race, religion and caste:

The old country houses of well-to-do families in Ilhas, Bardez and Salcete, the elegant rosewood furniture in rococo style, the verdant gardens aflame in bougainvillea speak more strongly than mere words. Several generations of colonados and their descendants enshrined for posterity in a Portuguese family name, country mansion and town house,

their image of the Goan happily adjusted to life in a plural society where continuity not change, consensus not conflict, became the dominant Weltanschauung (Ifeka, 1985: 185).

The syncretic cultural forms emerging out of the imposition of Lusitania on Goa have been eulogized by elite Goans (and today packaged and sold by the tourism industry) as representing a more refined, sophisticated culture (in relation to 'Indian' music, dance, food and so on) replete with beauty, love and harmony. For instance, the ¹⁶mando has been described as "(...) the very voice of an age and a culture with its slow motion and rich resonance registering truthfully the spaciousness of the bygone days and ways in Goa" (Rodrigues, 1974:23).

The space enjoyed by the elite, however, was not for all. The absence of a means of livelihood forced thousands of Goans to migrate, to India, East Africa and to Portuguese colonies. This was a second process influencing the perpetuation of the Golden Goa image:

Migration and exile for thousands of families and more thousands of single men created and sustained a nostalgic longing for a beautiful but perhaps imaginary Goa that was talked and sung about from Kampala to Macau (Newman, 1989:3).

Thus, the Golden Goa image created a mythology of a harmonious society where all races, religions and castes accepted their allotted station happily, where the 'Goan personality'¹⁷, in tune with the lush, beautiful surroundings was sossegado (easygoing, acquiescent, hedonist)..

However, one finds gaps and omissions within this dominant mythology of Golden Goa and the sossegado Goan. Firstly, within the forms of elite Goan culture itself runs a subterranean strand of protest and nostalgia for native roots. This schism in identity, the complex interplay of the colonial and the indigenous, the romantic fidalgo (aristocrat) and the traditional native, the acquiescence and the resistance, is perhaps most poignantly expressed in the folk music of the elite. The mando symbolizes the ethos of Goa Dourada, speaking of romantic love, of yearning, unrequited passion and parting. Yet there are also lesser known mandos that narrate the events of their times, that speak of popular uprisings and colonial repression (Kamat, 1988:231-233). The dulpod strings together short, robust verses pertaining to the everyday life of common people, their relationship with the landed gentry and the colonialists, their work, joys and struggles. Here, one finds more direct reference to elite and colonial domination: the landlord's son pursuing the tenant's daughter (Tea fantea parari Regina tum khuim go gelolem...)¹⁸, the Portuguese soldier as an object of fear (Ede ratiche pakle bountai)¹⁹, a womanizer (Modgavan touvager...)²⁰.

the Ranes fighting the Portuguese (Farar far zatai ranantum...) and so on. The dekhni celebrates indigenous traditions from a viewpoint of Catholic nostalgia, "a symbol of poetry, dreamily evoking a distant past, while entangled in a wild fantasy of the old and the sensual" (Pereira and Martins, cited in Kamat, 1988:230). It is in the dekhni perhaps that the subliminal desires of the converted native find their fullest expression. In the popular dekhni Aum saiba poltodi vetam²², a woman pleads with a boatman to ferry her across the river for a Hindu marriage, where the temple dancers (kollvont) are performing. She begs him to show her the way, for she is lost, and offers him her ornaments in return, which he spurns. She speaks of wearing flowers in her hair and of distant mountains with swirling streams. The song ends with her pleading; she does not reach the other side. This yearning for the other, for the proscribed native culture, is the underlying thematic of many dekhnis.

Secondly, in the customs and practices of lower caste Catholics, the resilience of tradition in the face of persecution and proscription is vividly demonstrated. Camilleri (1986) and Gomes (1987) document how a number of marriage rituals proscribed by the Inquisition are practiced even today. The lower castes remained Konkani speaking, despite all the attempts of the Portuguese to impose their language. It was only the Catholic elite who spoke Portuguese in their homes. The very fact that the caste system adapted itself to Catholicism and continued to

survive speaks of the resilience of traditional structures. Despite the fact that though, at an obvious level, Catholics identified with the colonial culture and saw themselves as superior to the Hindus, subaltern culture retained much of its indigenous character.

Many people in the past and today think they are Portuguese Christians when in reality they often behave and think in ways that indicate they are Indian Christians. Christian Goans see no contradiction in this, nor did they in the past, for being blind to one's enacted (as distinct from one's self elected) identity is part of being human and is an essential aspect of the real Goa, Goa Indica (Ifeka, 1985:193).

Siqueira (1991) traces how tribal religious forms adapted to new religious hegemonies first Hindu, then Catholic. Some of these syncretic forms of worship continue to flourish today²³. For instance, the goddess Shanta Durga, a composite of the tribal mother goddess Santeri and the Hindu Durga, is worshipped by both the Hindus and Catholics and is regarded in popular myth as a part of a pantheon of seven sisters, one of whom is the Our Lady of Miracles at Mapusa. As the myth goes, of the seven sisters, some were converted and some were not (Newman, 1989). There are many such examples which point to the tenuousness of the Goa Dourada image within subaltern culture.


The third gap in the Golden Goa myth arises from the exclusion of certain groups from its ambit, an exclusion based on religion and caste. There was an attempt by the elite to incorporate outcaste groups such as the Gaudis or Kunbis (tribal groups considered to be the original inhabitants of Goa) into the dominant mythology by constructing them as "primitive, unintellectual, or of a happy disposition" (Siqueira, 1991:3), with Kunbi song and dance becoming a part of the elite repertoire. This romanticizing of the Kunbis did not, in any way, alter the harsh conditions of their subservience and their marginal place in the hierarchy.

The Hindus were, as already discussed, systematically discriminated against in every aspect. This pushed them closer to the culture and language of Maharashtra and the myth of a glorified past (Newman, 1989: 4). After 1910, when the official policy of religious discrimination underwent a change, upper caste Hindus managed to rise in the hierarchy and aligned with the Catholic elite in supporting colonial interests. The majority of Hindus, contemptuously referred to by the Catholics as Konkno (a connotation of uncultured Hindu), continued to exist outside the purview of Golden Goa.

The ruling elite equated its political dominance with the Catholic faith and so identified subordinate sections with

the Hindu religion (although of course the majority of the Catholic population belonged to relatively powerless lower castes, which were also subordinate). Political inequalities were, therefore, 'authorized' in terms of religious differences, so that the ideological line of cleavage between dominant and subordinate section was drawn between superior Catholic families and inferior Hindus. The dominant cleavage in Goan society in the past - and in attenuated form today was thus religiously instituted (Ifeka, 1987:325).

To sum up this discussion on the changes in identity wrought by colonial intervention, a new hierarchy based on religion was superimposed on the traditional caste hierarchy. Distinct 'Catholic' and 'Hindu' identities were created in the process, with the upper castes of both communities identifying with their respective 'classical' cultures and languages (Portuguese and Marathi). The lower castes of both communities continued to speak Konkani and shared many aspects of a common culture, though seeing themselves as distinct from the other. Schematically, the position of various groups in relation to hierarchy and cultural identification could be represented as follows:



The creation of identities in the recent period, along religious, caste and linguistic lines, can be related to the world-view that was a legacy of colonialism:

(...) the Portuguese saw India (...) to be a land lacking in 'cohesion', i.e. without a tradition of ethnically based nation states usually having a single religion. They were victims of their own basic premise that homogeneity was the norm and that real nations were not heterogeneous (Newman, 1989:13).

With the entry of Goa into the Indian Union, there emerges a 'Goan' identity, as distinct from being 'Indian'. The various caste/religious groups relate differently to this Goan identity. In specific situations, different identities have been invoked leading, for instance, at one juncture to tensions between 'Goans' and 'outsiders' and at another to conflicts between sections of Hindus and Catholics on the language issue (Konkani vs. Marathi). In order to be able to understand these complex dynamics, one needs to look briefly at, firstly, the period prior to liberation, secondly, the period of transition to Indian rule

and, thirdly, the political and economic developments of the past 25 years.

The Goan economy under colonial rule was stagnant, with little industrialization or opportunities for employment. Consequently, from the mid nineteenth century onwards, as new labour markets were created in British India and colonial Africa, migration became a crucial mode of sustenance for Catholic Goans of various castes. Many Sudras took up domestic service (what is jocularly referred to as "A B C s": ayahs, butlers and cooks) and the Brahmins and Chardos, clerical and other white-collar jobs. Being relatively 'westernized,' Goans had an edge over other communities and were able to find jobs providing domestic and entertainment service to the British. The employment opportunities and the new income brought by migration had an impact on caste hierarchy and identity²⁴. It permitted a degree of upward mobility to the lower castes. With a view to their children's future, the migrants who could afford it invested in English education for their children. Women withdrew from agricultural workforce to concentrate on improving their children's educational and other skills (Mascarenhas-Keyes 1987:88, 1989:248).

The newfound prosperity of the lower castes also facilitated their appropriation of life-styles of the upper castes.

Migration thereby broke the hold of the 'Golden Goa' ideology on the upper castes and dispersed it over a wider section of Catholic society, particularly the migrant sudra and their families back home (Siqueira, 1991:6).

Migration provided, particularly for the Catholic Sudra, an access to a new world view which takes the West (Britain and recently, America) as its point of reference, with emphasis on acquisition of western goods, language, food habits and modes of dress. Consumption of 'foreign' commodities and lavish expenditure at village festivals became, for the migrants and their families, a significant expression of their status and identity. Further, unlike migrants from other parts of India, Goan migrants maintained a distinct identity ("Goan, not Indian") and saw their sojourn abroad not as a contingency, but as a way of life:

The prospects of long term, relatively secure and better paid employment encouraged many to remain 'out' for their whole working life, returning to retire in old age (Mascarenhas-Keyes, 1989:246).

Coupled with the opportunities provided by migration was a mining boom in the 1950s²⁵. Around this time, India declared an economic blockade of Goa. To counter the increasing pressure from within and without, the Portuguese artificially boosted up

the economy, drastically increasing government salaries²⁶,
permitting duty-free import of foreign luxury goods, in the²⁷
process attempting to create a picture of colonial prosperity .

During the last four decades, Portuguese vainglory sought to invest Goa with the splendour of bygone days and create a world of fantasy in which to project the illusion of the renaissance of the fidalgo. By means of a linguistic fiction, Goa was transformed from a colony into an overseas province, ruled by a Governor General.... The incongruities were pathetic: Luxury cars on bullock cart roads, ultramodern school buildings in primitive hamlets, Cidade de Goa (as Panjim, the capital of the Estado do India was renamed) without a drainage system...(Rodrigues, 1974:11-12).

However unsustainable this show of prosperity, the fact remains that it significantly coloured the perceptions of people, particularly sections of the Catholic Goan community.

With the old complex of cultural superiority and individuality, a new strong sentiment grew. Cheap foreign luxury goods and high salaries became indispensable ingredients of the typically Goan way of life (Ribeiro, 1966:81).

With the liberation came a disruption of this "Goan way of life". There was unemployment caused by closure of colonial

institutions, a fall in ore production, shrinking opportunities for migration and the import of commodity inflation from India (Laud, 1966:54-55). This economic impact "created in the popular mind the identification of liberation with despair. Goans had been used to low customs duties on imported articles and the consumption of these had come to be identified in their minds with their own personality" (Ribeiro, 1966:77).

Apart from the economic impact, the change in government structures, now managed by deputed civil servants from neighbouring states, with little sensitivity to local feelings, caused widespread resentment among people (Rubinoff, 1983:186).

For the landed Catholic elite, liberation thus meant a shrinking of their sphere of economic and social influence and an awareness of their distinct identity in the face of a perceived threat from the other - the outsiders and the tenants (particularly the low caste Hindus). With the democratization of politics and the implementation of land reforms, this group found political and economic power being wielded by 'upstarts' from the lower castes.

While transition from Portuguese rule was traumatic for the Catholic elite and middle class²⁸, for "the masses of agricultural and maritime producers and labourers, the end of Portuguese rule meant an end to a system whose social structures

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kept them permanently in a subordinate position" (Newman, 1984: 437).

The transformation of Goa from colonial feudalism to bourgeois capitalism brought in land reforms, educational opportunities and industrialization, providing mechanisms for the Sudras to rise in the economic and social and hierarchy, and to make their presence felt politically. However, the pattern of development reproduced the basic inequalities: the regional disparity between the Old and New Conquests, the concentration of economic power in the hand of a few families, who now came to control politics, education and the press (Newman, 1984: 439). Industrialization and mechanization, while creating limited employment opportunities, also dispossessed many traditional workers in the mining, fishing and agricultural sectors. In the wake of industrialization, there was an influx of migrants from neighbouring states, many of them taking up menial, labour intensive jobs disdained by Goans. These rapid changes had their repercussions on the issue of identity.

By the late 1970s and early 80s, there was growing feeling among Goans that they had become outnumbered and disadvantaged in their own region. They began to demand that places for native Goans be reserved in the public service industry (Newman, 1984:433).

In this context of shifting power equations, it is pertinent

to consider how the nascent 'Catholic', 'Hindu' and 'Goan' identities formed during the colonial era crystallized and found political expression in the post-liberation period.

The Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP) exploited the anti-Brahmin, anti-Catholic sentiments of the 'Bahujan Samaj' (low caste Hindus), victims of caste and religious discrimination. This party, formed in 1963 prior to the first General Elections, took a pro-merger stance, holding that Goa was a part of Maharashtra, with no distinct language or culture. It saw Konkani as a dialect of Marathi and any assertion of the separate identity of Goa as an attempt by the Catholics to perpetuate colonial domination (Rubinoff, 1983:188-189). In response to this 'threat', the Catholic elite formed the United Goans Party (U.G.P). Thus, from outset the question of identity was centrestage, with parties being formed on communal/linguistic lines .

While the merger issue was settled with the Opinion Poll of 1967³⁰, which gave a clear, if slim, verdict for Union Territory status (54 % vs. 43 %), the questions of language (Konkani vs. Marathi) and of migrants (locals vs. outsiders) continue to haunt Goan politics upto the present day.

The language issue, at the outset, was tied up with the

assertion/denial of a distinct identity for Goa and the Goans, the polarization being on caste and religious lines. The issue was precipitated by a resolution of the Congress in September 1985, seeking to make Konkani the official language of Goa (UNI, 1986). In the struggle which followed, the Goan Catholics aligned with the Saraswat Brahmins, forming an umbrella organization called Konkani Porjecho Awaz (Voice of the Konkani People), while the MGP formed the Marathi Rajya Bhasha Prathishtan Samiti (MRBPS), with the support of the remaining Hindu castes. The battle cut across party lines, with the Congress completely split on the issue³¹. In July 1986, the Goa, Daman and Diu Language Bill, 1986 was introduced in the Assembly making Konkani with Devanagiri script the sole official language, with safeguards for Marathi. There were violent protests, both within and outside the Assembly, by the MRBPS. As the issue gained momentum, with the rival groups flexing their muscles, it brought to the fore the discontent of certain sections of Goan society (predominantly the Catholics) who felt marginalized by the post-liberation developments. The demand for a recognition of the Goan identity concretized in the demand for statehood. The KPA, along with its associates, like the Gomant Lok Pox (GLP) and the Goa Congress, called for an agitation on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of Goa's liberation (Row Kavi, 1987:11). They made references to Assam and Mizoram, calling for open confrontation:

We have to radically alter the image the country and New

Delhi have of us as a peace loving people. That is why we are taken advantage of... over and over again, we have seen that the only language that New Delhi understands is violence (GLP activist, cited in Fera, 1987:34).

The ensuing agitation paralyzed life in most parts of the Old Conquests, particularly South Goa (Tiswadi, Salcete and Mormugao talukas) leading to arson, violence and deaths in police firing and group clashes. There were fears of a communal blood-bath, and the leaders of the agitation claimed that matters were beyond their control (Pillai, 1986:4). The situation was defused with the Goa Congress changing its stance and calling for statehood as the first step, the language issue now taking a backseat. A compromise was reached and a modified bill passed in February 1987, making Konkani in Devanagari script the sole official language, with acceptance of the use of Marathi for all official purposes (Indian Express, 1987). In May 1987, Goa became the 25th state of the Indian Republic. With this official recognition for Goan identity and language, the issue has been for the moment resolved, but the underlying feelings and sentiments continue to smoulder, and to define the way in which Goan Hindus and Catholics view themselves and each other.

Aside from this Hindu/Marathi vs. Catholic/Konkani divide, another manifestation of ethnic identity has been the locals vs. outsiders issue. The rapid influx of outside labour in a

situation of limited infrastructural facilities and restricted employment opportunities (particularly of the white-collar kind) has led to growing resentment among sections of Goans (largely Catholic) against 'outsiders', and fears of being outnumbered by the migrants. This situation reached flash point in Vasco, in late 1982, leading to attacks on Kannadiga labourers, the easiest targets, given their poverty and marginal status. A detailed discussion of this issue is taken up in the next section, on Vasco.

Vasco da Gama. The Town

Vasco da Gama, in Mormugao taluka (originally part of Salcete taluka) is situated in the Old Conquests. The village of Mormugao, with its natural harbour, accessible in all seasons, was regarded by the Portuguese as having strategic importance, and they built a fortress there, in 1624 (Pereira, 1978:113). Proposals to shift the capital of Goa to Mormugao in the late 17th century did not materialize, and Mormugao remained a village until the beginnings of the railway and harbour construction work in 1882 (Pereira, 1978:57). By 1888, the entire railway line upto the frontiers of British India had been laid. From 1885 onwards, ships began berthing at the Mormugao Harbour.

In 1917, the municipal committee of Mormugao was formed with

a mandate to undertake the necessary construction activity to build the town of Vasco da Gama. However, it was only in 1920 that the work was begun, with the construction of roads, public services, a bank and so on. Vasco gradually developed into a port town with a working class population. The docks, the railways, the shipyards and barge repair works provided the major avenues of employment. The port handled the export of iron and manganese, transported by barge down the river. As mining was not mechanized, the volume of trade and consequently, employment opportunities, were limited. Workers were recruited largely from the neighbouring villages and vaddos (wards) of Vasco.

While iron ore mining in Goa began in 1910, it became commercially viable only in 1947. With this, the volume of port traffic increased rapidly: from 0.54 lakh tonnes in 1889, to 2.78 lakh tonnes in 1973-74. Iron ore exported through the harbour constituted 50 % of total exports from India (Pereira, 1978:220). The mining boom in the post-liberation period, facilitated by mechanization, created a demand for labour in the docks, construction activity and other ancillary industries. The growth of industry, with the establishment of large units like the Zuari Agro Chemicals, in the vicinity of Vasco, further increased the labour requirements.

The low-paid manual jobs created by this process of industrialization did not substantially attract local workers who

had their sights set on more lucrative opportunities in the Middle East. The demand for cheap, unorganized labour was met by migrants from the drought-prone districts of Karnataka. These migrants were often from the scheduled castes and nomadic tribes and were assigned to the lowest rung in the hierarchy.

With the rapid influx of migrant labour, the population of the Mormugao Municipal Area increased from 6,483 in 1960 to 44,065 in 1971, a stupendous growth rate of 579.70 % for the period 1960-71 (Govt. of Goa, n.d.(a):46). By 1981, the population had increased to 69,684, a growth rate of 58.14 % for the period 1971-81 (Govt. of Goa, n.d.(b):33). Neither the municipal authorities nor the employers provided any substantial facilities for housing and civic amenities. Shanty towns mushroomed on vacant lands within and adjoining Vasco, with the support of local politicians with an eye on vote banks. The local population regarded these slums as a source of filth, crime and nuisance, an ugly reminder that Goa was being 'taken over' by non-Goans. When the slum dwellers organized themselves, in November 1982, with the support of some radical Catholic clergy, this assertion was not tolerated by the local lumpen Catholic youth and other disgruntled elements (Sorab, n.d.:42). A rally was attacked, followed by arson, looting and violence in slum colonies. Kannadiga workers fled Goa in panic, bringing construction and other activity to a halt (Deccan Herald, 1982:1). The issue threatened to develop into a regional conflict, with

attacks on buses from Goa in Karnataka, but was eventually defused after high level political negotiation (Singbal,1982).

The Vasco riots dispelled the myth of the sossegado, peace loving Goan and focused attention on the extent of anger and frustration that had built up among the local populace, particularly among the Catholics. Allegedly, the anger was directed more against the Keralites, who were believed to have taken over a substantial portion of white-collar jobs immediately after liberation; these were the jobs coveted by Goan youth, not the menial jobs of the Kannidagas. However, given the class and geographical factors, it was not possible to directly attack the Keralites, and hence, the relatively powerless Kannadigas who lived in slum pockets became the scapegoats (Sorab, n.d.:51).

Kamgar Nagar, the field, is a 'sensitive' area, given its multi-ethnic character. It was affected during the 1982 and 1986 riots. During the anti outsider riots in 1982, Goan Catholic youth from other parts of Vasco went on a rampage and attacked the Housing Board Colony occupied by migrant labour. Most of the workers fled and some never returned. Their rooms were occupied by others.

During the language agitation in 1986, there were clashes between Hindus and Catholics in the area. Hindu workers returning home from work were beaten up and robbed, Catholic bars

were attacked and the residence of the municipal counsellor stoned. A major clash between two local groups armed with lathis and other weapons was somehow averted. It is alleged that a local Catholic politician, known for his muscle power, brought a mob of 500 Catholic youth to attack Hindu households, but was dissuaded from carrying out his threat .

The riots have caused a polarization between the Catholics and the Hindus, with each group having its own version of events, as well as stereotypes of the other group. Each side blames the other for starting the attacks.

The Hindus started it. They used to come at night and make a noise outside our houses and throw stones: for 2-3 days we sat quiet. Then we decided to do something. All of us, men and women, went with soda bottles and all shouted outside their houses. We threatened the instigators of the trouble. They got scared. So the representatives of the Hindus came and said they wanted to resolve matters. A meeting was called at the Chapel. Lots of our youth gathered. The Hindus got scared and didn't turn up. After this, everything was quiet. We could do this because in our vaddo there are mostly Catholics - in other vaddos it's all mixed. After this trouble, they wouldn't talk to us, but now things are back to normal. We even send each other

sweets for feasts (Goan Catholic, 45, wife of shipyard supervisor, mother of 3) .

However, most people feel that things have changed after the riots. According to a Hindu youth (20, shipyard apprentice, Maharashtrian):

Since then, there is no unity, there is no feeling of being one community. Many more gangs and goondas have become active. Each side blames the other, and justifies their actions by saying that the other group started the trouble, so they were forced to answer back. The elders used the opportunity to settle old scores... There are new groups now - Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Hindu Sanskriti Raksha - the same people are in 2-3 groups. They don't do anything.

The riots appear to have contributed to a process of lumpenization of youth. Unemployment, and consequent frustration is high particularly among the Catholic youth, who are often less successful academically than their Hindu counterparts, sometimes dropping out of school. Youth clubs tend to be formed on communal lines, as the following discussion with the secretary (Maharashtrian Hindu, 18, shipyard apprentice) of a club indicates:

Q: Are there Catholics and Muslims also in your club?

A: We tried hard to get some Catholics, otherwise people

will say our club is only for Hindus. There are a few, but they don't participate. We try so hard to involve them, but they keep us at a distance. So finally we said - let them be - we will have our own activities, for Hindus.

Q: Why do you think they don't take part?

A: They are like that. They always keep to themselves, don't trust us. They have their own gang. These Catholic boys - 80 % of them are goondas. Anything happens, they come to fight. You won't find so many Hindu goondas.

The feeling of being different, and superior to the other, existed even in the past, given the colonial construction of religious identity. To illustrate, each community tends to see the other as 'dirty' ³³. Some Catholics in Kamgar Nagar feel that the Hindus do not keep their surroundings clean, that they throw garbage outside and see nothing wrong in having an open gutter near their front door. As opposed to this, they think that Catholics are particular that their houses should look good, particularly the front of the house. In turn, some Hindus feel that the Catholics are dirty in terms of personal hygiene and because they eat pigs bred on excreta and garbage. Most Hindus would not eat anything cooked in a Catholic household. Even when sweets are exchanged, the Catholics generally buy them from the market to give to the Hindus. At most Catholic marriages in Kamgar Nagar, the Hindus are given a little packet, with a banana, some sweet and savoury items, all bought from outside.

Until the language riots, these feelings of difference and exclusion were never a source of communal tension. However, during the period of my field work, which started a year and a half after the riots, while at an individual level, relationships were often harmonious, at a more general level, there was a mistrust of the other community and a tendency to talk in terms of stereotypes.

The Goan Spectator

The Goan Catholic families in Kamgar Nagar are all Sudras or Gaudis (with the exception of the municipal counsellor who was a Brahmin). The first level of identity is expressed in terms of caste. The family I was living with, a Sudra family, had certain perceptions about Brahmins: for instance, Brahmins look down on Sudras and often act superior, they are less emotional and more calculating in their behaviour, they have a different sense of propriety, for instance, they do not wail and cry at funerals. Gaudis were regarded as less cultured, uneducated but upwardly mobile and having 'improved' their culture and status.

Nowadays you can't make out who's a Gaudi. They all dress in style and live in posh houses. They have really come up in life (Goan Catholic, 45, wife of dock supervisor, 5 children).

The second level of identity is that of being a Catholic.

One finds a high level of religiosity, both in terms of beliefs and practices. For instance, most working class Catholic families say the rosary everyday (sometimes adjusting the timing to accommodate television viewing), attend Sunday masses, make frequent novenas and send their children to the church for Sunday School.

There are two important devotions that are practiced: the worship of Our Lady of Vailankanni, in terms of daily prayer, the celebration of her feast and pilgrimages to Vailankanni³⁴. Many households have installed her icon. The other practice is the circulation of the image of saibin (Our Lady). This begins sometime in November, when the statue is taken out from the chapel. It then moves from house to house, spending one day in each house until all the Catholic households have been 'visited', after which the statue returns to the chapel around May. The home where the statue is kept becomes the venue of a ladainha (the Portuguese word for litany), a religious and social event when all neighbours, relatives and friends congregate to pray and sing the Litany of Our Lady and partake of drinks and snacks.

The ladainha was a kind of folk oratorio. The devotion consisted of singing and recitation, hymns and prayers. The village Choirmaster or local fiddler conducted the singing, while a local elder conducted the prayers. A couple of strained high-pitched boys' voices alternate with a chorus

of gruff old timers, to the lone screeching violin played with bravura by the choirmaster... Everyone knew everything by heart, as the whole oratorio had been rehearsed for generations (Rodrigues, 1974:27) .

The saibin devotion occupies a considerable portion of the cultural life of the Catholics, particularly as saibin approaches the neighbourhood, and there are ladainhas to be attended every evening. Television viewing has made no dent on ladainha attendance, except that children are often impatient to finish off and get home if there is an interesting 9 p.m. serial.

Television, in fact, plays a fairly marginal role in the social and cultural life of a majority of adult Catholics ³⁵. There appear to be a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the Catholics have a large number of devotions and ceremonies centred around the church. For instance, the family I lived with was from Vasco itself, and a part of a large, closely-knit community (others from the ancestral vaddo, distant relatives etc.). Almost every second day, there was either a mass for the departed ³⁶ to be attended or a baptism, a marriage, a feast of a popular saint, a first Friday mass and so on. During saibin time, almost every evening was booked, as the family had to attend ladainhas both at their Vasco vaddo, as well as in Kamgar Nagar. Every night, the family would say the Rosary in front of the oratorio - a little altar, with the images of Jesus and Mary, lit by a

coloured bulb and decorated with plastic flowers. This altar was in the front room, just as one entered the house. Given this cohesiveness and ritual completeness of everyday life, there is little room for television.

Secondly, and more importantly, adults feel excluded by the televisual discourse because of linguistic and cultural differences. As discussed earlier, many Catholics feel marginalized by the new order, particularly those displaced by industrialization and mechanization, who find themselves and their children unemployed.

There are no jobs for Goans; Goans have become slaves of outsiders. These Kerala people, they come here, they're ready to do anything. Not like our people who feel ashamed to do manual work... These are difficult times for us. I manage with odd jobs -even selling coconuts in the market. In the old days, pay was less, but everything was cheap and we could manage (dock worker, Goan Catholic, 55, prematurely retired, currently unemployed).

They attributed their changed circumstances partly to the fact that 'they' (the Hindus, the outsiders) are in power and partly to their own easy going nature, which has resulted in their losing out in the competition with non-Goans and Hindus for educational and employment opportunities.

Look at her, she is a Lamani ³⁷ - who will say that. After coming to Goa, even ghantis become human beings. Everyone improves, becomes decent. Only we don't improve, our feasts - sannas ³⁸ and pork - that's all we're good for. They think of the future and save money. We only celebrate feasts (wife of dock supervisor, 45, Goan Catholic, 5 children).

Television was seen as 'their' medium, using 'their' languages (Marathi and Hindi) and presenting an alien, inferior culture. It was identified with a State which is insensitive to the demands of Catholics. The main grouse of almost every Catholic interviewed was that they were subjected to Marathi programmes and that Konkani programmes were rarely shown. There was a strongly articulated demand for Konkani, English and 'Catholic' programming. Many Catholics saw me as someone who would voice their demands to the State, and would ask me to "tell them to show Konkani programmes".

They show nothing about our religion, except on Christmas and Good Friday. There are three main zatis - Hindus, Muslims and Christians. They show programmes for all the others - Muslims, Sikhs. Now that the British and Portuguese have gone, there is nothing for Christians (...). We don't like Ramayan and Mahabharat. Even big sahibs don't watch it. They never show anything about Jesus Christ and

the saints. Only about Mahatma Gandhi. But how much trouble Jesus took for us - do they show it? In the Gulf, they show English, Hindi, to keep everyone happy. These people show only their own things. Again and again. I don't watch TV - only the Sunday picture (retired dock worker, 59, Goan Catholic, 5 children).

The older generation of Catholics, most of whom do not know Hindi, feel alienated by the bulk of programming and attribute the negligible coverage of their own language and culture to a deliberate attempt to keep their community marginalized.

In the whole of India, Goa is top on the music scene, but they don't show it on TV. May be they are jealous. Instead they put on that "aa-aa-aa" (reference to Indian classical music) (seaman, Goan Catholic, 43, 4 children).

The following discussion of the day's programming between three Catholic women makes the same point:

H: They should have shown a film. Everyone was at home. Instead they showed some bhajans... that 'aa-aa-aa' at Thiruvayur.

C: They only show such things.

I: Yesterday they didn't show football.

C: Why do they do that? They purposely don't show programmes for us.

Television viewing for this group is reduced to watching visuals which cannot sustain their interest.

There is no benefit of buying a TV. Only the light bill has increased. All the programmes are in Hindi, Marathi and English. How can we understand them? Now if there were Konkani programmes, we would have followed everything. The children tell us sometimes what is going on. We - we only look at the faces (Goan Catholic, 38, wife of toddy tapper, 4 children).

The adults are often dependent on their children to explain and interpret programmes to them. Unlike the adults, children are avid television watchers and can relate more easily to the language and lifestyles portrayed. In fact, one finds a major difference in the use of television in child rearing, when one compares Catholic and Hindu families. While many Catholic adults are indifferent or hostile to television and rely on their children to interpret it for them, most Hindu parents consciously use it for child rearing.

Thus, while in many Catholic homes in Kamgar Nagar, children are often the interpreters of television for their parents,

controlling the duration and nature of programmes viewed, in most Hindu households, parents are both interpreters and regulators of television viewing. They see television as a resource that they must use to teach their children desirable moral lessons, modes of behaviour and food habits; to expose their children to new information and knowledge about the world; in brief, to make their children 'smart' and obedient.

Foucault's notion of pastoral power can be fruitfully evoked to understand the distinction between the way the Catholics and Hindus of Kamgar Nagar relate to television, a distinction that cannot be explained merely in terms of linguistic and cultural distance or closeness. For working class Catholics, the exercise of pastoral power still rests with the Catholic Church, as it did in colonial times, there being no institutional church other than the Catholic. They would look to the Church and its teachings for guidance, reassurance and absolution in all matters of morality. From the moment of baptism, when the infant becomes a 'subject' in the eyes of God and Church, she/he enters a reassuring world of injunctions, rituals and interpretations, with little scope for any ambiguity.

In the case of most Hindus in Kamgar Nagar, the exercise of pastoral power appears to be more diffused, given the multiplicity of interpretations, the ambiguities and the absence of an institution similar to the Catholic church that could be

sustained by the smaller/local orders of power . It perhaps becomes easier for the Hindus to relate to the State's exercise of pastoral power through television. Television is viewed not merely as a source of entertainment, but also as a source of morality, a resource that helps one to draw lessons about the world and one's place in it. This expectation of television was voiced most strongly by the Hindus:

Because TV is something kept at home, they should show things that are good for children - how the family stays together, how children should behave with parents and each other. If we see something like that, we can improve (shipyard carpenter, Goan Hindu, 37, 4 children).

The Catholic perception of television programming can be exemplified by considering the response to the serial Ramayan⁴⁰. The serial was more popular than most other serials among Catholics, the main reasons being that they could follow it even without understanding the dialogues, because the story was known, the serial had a strong element of spectacular visual effects, and the style of acting and narration was close to a familiar genre - the Hindi film. The serial was also much discussed. My landlady (C) would often exchange notes on the serial across the backyard wall, with her Hindu neighbour(H). They would commiserate with Sita (then in the process of being exiled), who was seen as noble and strong because of her capacity to suffer.

The neighbour would then narrate what was going to happen next. The following discussion took place after the episode where Ram goes to a sage for advice and Sita comes to hear the opinion of common people about her.

H: Did you see Ramayan? So much suffering! Next time they will send Sita to the forest. There will be one more big fight afterwards.

C: One more fight...

H: Yes, when those sons grow up - Lav and Kush.

C: But he shouldn't have sent her to the forest.

H: Yes he shouldn't. He listened to people - you know what people are like.

It is apparent from this exchange, that the serial is being discussed as if it were any other story. Even the Catholic neighbour questioning the course of events does not create any feelings of threat in her Hindu counterpart. There is little trace of any assertion of religious identity. This illustrates the way most people, whatever their religion, related to Ramayan. It was, in the main, seen as a story about the past, sometimes exciting, sometimes boring (Uttar Ramayan evoked displeasure and boredom among Hindus, Catholics and Muslims alike), a story with a good moral. There was little evidence of an aura of sanctity surrounding the serial. Hindus were often critical of the way the story had been presented and used the occasion to assert their own knowledge of the original text .

More than any other serial, Ramayan created a community of viewers that cut across religious lines. It became a topic of conversation, like the weather or the price of fish, and nobody wanted to be left out:

The reason for Ramayan's popularity is this - in the beginning, it was not given much importance. But afterwards - the TV is on - people began to watch it, more and more people. There were discussions... one could not take part if one had not watched it. So one watched the next programme. That's how everybody began to see it (Goan Hindu youth, 19, I.T.I student).

However, given the prevalent atmosphere of latent tension between Hindus and Catholics (exacerbated by the December 1986 riots) the serial did provide an opportunity for an assertion of religious identity, though this was a marginal response:

People saw it as entertainment. Some people criticized it - "Your God is like this, like that". People of other religions. "Ram is your God. How did he get caught in nagpash - didn't he have the strength to come out of it?" They would criticize. Watch and criticize - it was a chance for them. This was my experience. At work someone asked me this.

Q: What did you answer?

I avoided an answer. Those who don't know - particularly

those of a different religion - no matter how much you explain, they won't accept it (marine fitter, 31, Maharashtra Hindu).

Even Catholics who watched, enjoyed and discussed the serial did at times invoke the notion of religious identity, as the following conversation between two Catholic women demonstrates:

L: Many Catholics don't like Ramayan. Mahabharat so much.

C: Actually, according to our faith we should not like it. It is about their Gods. But we simply watch it, because we have nothing to do.

When asked about the main message of Ramayan, 11 out the 30 Catholics interviewed (Table 2.1) felt that it had a positive moral to impart:

Even though Ram is king, he is humble, not proud. Ravan is proud, that's why he is finished. If we are humble, we too will be rewarded (retired driver, 57, 3 children).

We can see what Ram and Laxman did. It is thought provoking. A true story, not 'bundal' (fictitious). They have made it in such a way that people will accept it (retired worker, 63, 3 children).

It teaches a good lesson. Similar to our Bible. We didn't know about their Gods - now we've come to know (wife of dock worker, 36, 3 children).

Sita's role is very good... so sad... She goes into the forest leaving everything because of her husband (retired dock worker, 55, one son).

Among the remaining Catholic respondents, 14 were indifferent to the serial, either not watching, or not following the story, 4 felt it was an interesting story with no moral implications and 2 thought it was harmful.

Table 2.1

Distribution of Catholic response to Ramayan by Gender and broad Age Groups

Groups	Responses				Total
	Moral	Story	Indiff- erent	assertion of relig- ious identity	
Men	5	-	4	1	10
Women	2	-	6	1	9
Male Youth	-	4	1	-	5
Female Youth	4	-	3	-	7
Total	11	4	14	2	31

Note: Definition of 'youth' - unmarried respondents between 16-25

Only in 2 out of 30 Catholic respondents did the Ramayan evoke a strong assertion of religious identity: •

It's interesting, their dress and customs. I'd read about it, but not seen, their...(laughs) we notice the difference. Their Gods fight with each other. God takes a bow and arrow and kills people. Children watch this. They don't know better. They feel - if God is doing this, then why not us? It has happened, children immediately begin to practice... But they should show it. People have thinking power. They can see and judge for themselves which religion is true. Our God never fights. When the disciple cuts the policeman's ear, Jesus says no (clerical worker, 39, 2 children).

The aspects of the Ramayan that these Catholics found objectionable relate, firstly, to the depiction of 'God'. Given their conception of an omnipotent, perfect Deity, the Hindu conception of a multiplicity of Gods, more human than divine, at times fallible and amoral, seems blasphemous. Secondly, the fact that there could be different versions of a sacred text, and controversies over the 'true' version seems to bear out their belief that the Hindu texts are false and misleading. Their interpretation of Christianity would see ambiguity and multiplicity as a threat to truth itself.

The reactions of the Hindu and Muslim respondents to the

serial are summarized in Tables 2.2 and Tables 2.3. Table 2.4 compares the responses of the 3 groups. While both the Catholics and the Muslims are less likely than the Hindus to draw lessons in morality from the Ramayan, the greater indifference of Catholics to the serial can perhaps be explained by the relatively greater linguistic and cultural alienation from the televisual discourse, which also makes for a greater indifference to television as such. In all three cases, only a very small section perceived the serial in terms of a threat to religious identity.

Table 2.2

Distribution of Hindu Response to Ramayan by Gender and broad Age Groups

Groups	Response				Total
	Moral	Story	Indiff- erent	assertion of reli- gious identity	
Men	6	2	-	1	9
Women	7	2	1	-	10
Male Youth	3	1	2	-	6
Female Youth	5	-	-	-	5
Total	21	5	3	1	30

Table - 2.3

Distribution of Muslim response to Ramayan by Gender
and broad Age Groups.

Groups	Response				Total
	Moral	Story	Indiff- erent	assertion of reli- gious identity	
Men	1	4		-	5
Women	6	1	4	1	12
Male Youth	1	3	1	-	5
Female Youth	3	2		-	5
	11	10	5	1	27

Table - 2.4

Comparison of Responses of the three Religious Groups

Groups	Response				Total
	Moral	Story	Indiff- erent	assertion of reli- gious identity	
Catholics	11	4	14	2	31
Hindus	21	5	3	1	30
Muslims	11	10	5	1	27

The relationship of the three religious groups to the discourse of patriotism and national integration tends to be distinct. With a few exceptions (mostly among educated youth), the more articulate among the Hindus take 'national unity' very seriously, perceiving threats to it and interpreting it in terms of one language, one culture.

If you are doing your work on 'social' subjects, then there is one thing you must say - I don't think it is there in any book. The most important thing is language. One flag, one language. That should have been done right at the beginning, at the time of independence. But our leaders didn't bother - each one for his own selfish interests. That's why today we have so many problems because of language trouble (Goan Hindu, electrician, 45, 5 children) .

In another instance, after I had interviewed a Maharashtrian Hindu worker, (shipyard fitter, 36, 3 children) he remarked :

I'm not saying it about you, but nowadays one can't have trust in people. Some are connected with politics. Some may come to convert... people are often not what they say they are.

I assured him of my bona fides, and then he added :

I get very angry with this conversion business. Actually these Christians were Hindus before - They forget that. Where were there Christians originally in India? Even in Goa it has started. Sometime back there were riots over Konkani and Marathi. Who can believe that? Actually they were fights between Hindus and Christians.

The construction of 'patriotism' in the mainstream televisual discourse is such that a large section of Hindus can, perhaps, constitute their identities as 'patriotic nationalists.' Given the recent attempts to communalize political issues and to equate nationalism with a dominant pan-Indian upper caste cultural invention, there is a growing belief that patriotism is the prerogative of the majority community and that the onus of establishing their patriotic credentials lies with the religious minorities; their nationalist interests are suspect unless proven otherwise. The Catholic response to this pressure tends to be lukewarm. At times, they would not seize upon the dominant patriotic reading of a film and make an altogether different sense of it. For instance, I watched a Hindi film Dard Ka Rishta with a Catholic family. The story is about a doctor who gives up a successful career abroad to return to India to work selflessly for patients in his country. The family used this to comment on the futility of such an enterprise:

B: In India, such medical treatment is not possible.

C: Abroad, see how good everything is!

H: What equipment! Where can you get such things in India?

While this might be the response of an average Indian, coming from the members of a minority community, such statements begin to take on 'anti-national' dimensions. Among the Muslim respondents, this concern with being seen as unpatriotic was more acute. Some Muslims felt that the Muslim contribution to the freedom struggle had been deliberately sidelined:

S: If you watch what they show on TV, on Independence Day... Now, people of all religions - Hindus, Muslims, Christians - all fought for our country's independence. But on TV, they show only the Hindus. Have you ever seen a Muslim freedom fighter on TV?

Q: Maybe something on Maulana Azad...?

S: That's very rare. Almost by mistake! We also have sacrificed for our country. If you don't show that, people will think that Muslims did not fight. They should show it - it will be an inspiration to Muslims. We are not Pakistanis. We are as Indian as anyone else (Goan Muslim, 60, retired driver, now shopkeeper, 3 children).

Doordarshan's policy of having programmes related to the cultures of religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Sikhs,

tends to reinforce the feeling of their separate identity . For instance, the serials like Amir Khusro, Mirza Ghalib and Guftagoo⁴² , telecast at prime time are not watched by non-Muslims because they do not like "that Muslim programme". People feel that prime time is being "wasted" on such serials.

Q: Do you watch Amir Khusro ?

Mrs. M: No.

Q: Why?

Mrs. M: Why? (laughs) I don't like that type of thing!

Q : You can't follow the language?

Mrs. M: Can't follow the language, and those songs of theirs. I can't understand them that much. They sing-those qawalis (laughs). I don't like to see that (Goan Hindu, 36, wife of skilled worker, 2 children).

Though at an all-India level, Catholics and Muslims are religious minorities , the Catholic respondents did not appear to regard themselves as a minority, nor did they express any desire to conform to the mainstream. What came across was a sense of pride in their distinctiveness and a demand for adequate representation on their own terms. This can, perhaps, be attributed to their relatively dominant status under colonial rule. While there is a resentment at being displaced from that position of favourable discrimination, the sense of being a threatened minority is not evident . In comparison, the Muslim respondents articulate a greater linguistic and cultural affinity with the

mainstream, at times tinged with the fear of being seen as anti-national :

Here, they blame everything on Pakistan. It is not good to create enmity. My husband works in a bank. When Zia died, the others - not Christians, some chamars ⁴³ - started saying "Zia is dead, you mustn't eat food today". As if we are Pakistanis and not Indians. It's not good to do that. All should stay together, united (wife of a bank clerk, 33, Goan Muslim, 2 children).

Ethnic identity, thus, is a specific construct that emerges through relations of power, the manifestations of which relate to specific historical conjunctures. The reassertion of ethnic identity (be it on a religious, linguistic or regional basis) in the Goan context can perhaps be related, firstly to the colonial 'moulding' and 'sustenance' of distinct Catholic subjectivities, in contradistinction to the Hindu, held in place by political, economic and cultural configurations of power; and secondly to the rapid transformations in the post-liberation period, which revised these flows of power. The tone of resentment that Kamgar Nagar respondents appeared to articulate can, perhaps, be attributed to the threat that these transformations were seen to pose at the levels of cultural identity, economic survival and political representation; the pan-Indian identity that Doordarshan attempts to project being seen as part of the same

processes of transformation and installation of ever-new relations of power that need to be countered with resistance or negotiated acceptance. At the level of the familial, these relations of power and resistance take on different modes; this is the thematic of the next chapter.

CHAPTER III
THE FAMILIAL SPECTATOR

Doordarshan's entry into the familial space is marked by certain sets of constitutive practices and relations of power. This entry alters the relationship of the familial space to the larger socio-cultural space, in addition to offering a new site in relation to which identities and power equations are constantly redefined and reproduced¹. The first section, The Redefinition of the Familial, discusses certain aspects of this change, and the technologies of the self that it brings into play. The dividing practices that work towards the construction of an 'us', in complicity with television's gaze and the pastoral power of the state, will be discussed in the second section, The Middle Class Family. The third section, Childhood and Parenthood, deals with the notions of parental discipline and childhood that underpin the middle class family. The ways in which children might make sense of television, their modes of resistance and of objectification are taken up in the fourth section, Viewing Strategies of Children. The construction of 'masculine' and 'feminine' identities and the relations of power and resistance immanent in this construction are discussed in the last two sections, Gender Specific Dividing Practices and Flying Kites: Aavhan and Udaan.

The Redefinition of the Familial

The very act of purchasing/owning a television becomes an act of self-definition on the part of the family, an assertion of its identity as a respectable middle-class, nuclear family. In the early 1980s, owning a television in Kamgar Nagar signified the membership of a small, privileged group as, there were few television sets in the community. It was a customary practice for non-TV owners, particularly children, to watch important programmes such as the Hindi film and Chayageet at their neighbour's place. The sense of pride constituted by owning a television and having other people come over to watch is expressed in the following account :

The first ever TV set in Goa was in our house. I brought it from Bombay in 1981. When I went there, to my sister's place, I saw that everyone had TV sets. I felt - we too should have one. There was no station in Goa at that time. I came back to Goa, then returned in a week's time to Bombay to buy a TV. I didn't tell my family - wanted it to be a surprise. I put up the antenna and we saw the first picture: Amhi Rahto Amcha Gay - it was a Saturday. Word went around - M has a TV. Many people came over to see it. Even the big officer of the Port Trust, he himself came to see it, because he could not believe it. He came and saw all the people sitting and watching the Sunday picture (Goan

Hindu technician in the Port Trust, 55).

As time passed, in the latter part of the 1980s, the ownership of TV sets proliferated, and having people over to watch began to be seen as a nuisance.

There's no benefit (from owning a TV) only loss. You write about it (in your thesis). I had to spend 4000 rupees for replacing two sofas. Lots of people would come and watch. They broke the sofas, just sitting around. Who will pay for that? It's only a loss! (retired worker, Mangalorean Catholic, 63, 3 children)

Moreover, as Kamgar Nagar grew, with more and more non-Goan migrants coming in, the complexion of the community changed, from a small, predominantly Goan working class neighbourhood where everybody knew everybody else to a more anonymous, heterogeneous locality, with a turnover of tenants. While the older families have stronger neighbourly ties, the newcomers are often completely isolated. Television helps to fill the void, particularly for women, who bear the brunt of this isolation.

It was difficult to pass my time at home. I used to get bored. Then I would feel depressed and angry. That's why my husband bought it for me. Now (after buying a TV) I feel nice. The bad feelings have gone. I feel lighter, I get to

improve myself, learn new things. I finish my work quickly and sit to watch. There's no time to think (Kannadiga Muslim, 24, wife of a barge worker, recent migrant).

With the changes in the neighbourhood and the proliferation of television, the meanings associated with the ownership of television changed. While earlier, ownership of TV signified a position of economic power, today not owning a TV is a sign of deprivation, a source of shame. The major reason cited for buying a TV relates to this. A woman worker, Maharashtrian Hindu, in her late fifties, grandmother of three children, traced the compulsions that went into her family's decision to buy a TV:

My grand children would go to other people's houses. Sometimes these people would say - why do you come here? And they would throw them out. The children would return home crying. I felt bad about it, I told my son - somehow, we must get one. Even if there is no money, take a loan and get it. Now every evening, the children sit at home and watch.

Thus, television becomes a significant totemic marker of the familial space in a dual sense: firstly, it marks the family's entry into the world of 'haves', it defines the family as one and that need not subject itself to the humiliating position of watching TV at the neighbours; secondly, television is regarded as some kind of magnet that would keep the family at home, watch-

2
ing . A Goan Muslim housewife, 23, felt that one of the main benefits of TV was "because of TV, men come home early and sit with the family. Otherwise, they roam here and there, that's all they're fit for". However, keeping up with the Joneses to keep one's family at home is an uphill task:

First, everyone had black and white TVs. Our children used to go to other people's houses to watch. So we bought a black and white TV. Now everyone is buying colour TVs. So now our children want a colour TV. They go to the neighbours to watch in colour. If I buy a colour TV, then they will ask for a video. How can we afford it? (dock worker, 43, Goan Catholic, two children)

There is a third, and perhaps most crucial sense in which television becomes a marker of the familial space. This is in terms of the norms it sets, in relation to which new sets of dividing practices and technologies of the self come into operation as individuals redefine their identities vis-a-vis the discourses of television.

A comparison of people's relationship to and perception of television, as opposed to cinema, would delineate the space that television has begun to occupy within the working class family in Kamgar Nagar. Firstly, unlike watching a film, which is marked by the deliberateness of having to choose and pay for it, the

images of television stay in an eternal readiness, like water or electricity, waiting to be consumed. Television appears as an essential commodity, a raw material to be used in moderation. As viewers perceive it, both under and over utilization have their disadvantages. What is paramount is the viewer's discretion in consumption. This comes across in a discussion held with a youth group (all males, Goan and Maharashtrian Hindus in the age group 18 to 25).

P: It can have harmful effects if one becomes an addict...then one keeps on watching everything, whether good or bad. But if we decide that we will not depend on TV - that we will use it to the extent that we benefit - if we decide this, then the question of harmful effects does not arise.

Q: Is that how it is?

Chorus: Yes !

S: For those who understand, maybe. But the general view is that TV is there, so it should be watched.

Q: What do you feel about yourselves?

P: I feel I can control my watching. This my experience.

G: I watch only programmes that interest me. Even if TV is on at home, I watch only when I want to.

Thus, most viewers would constitute themselves as individuals who can exercise their personal discretion and

rationally adopt appropriate viewing practices. The fact that, in most households, television remains on as a background flow from 7.30 p.m. onwards, does not change this feeling of freedom and choice vis-a-vis television³.

Moreover, television comes across as objective and representing reality, as opposed to cinema, which is seen as using techniques to sell itself, and hence, sensational, fantastic and far from everyday reality. People's expectations of the medium relate to the fact that television watching is a family event. By entering the home, television becomes subject to a different set of norms and rules in contradistinction to cinema:

They should show programmes with a lesson, a moral, because TV is a thing that... there is a difference between TV and (the cinema) theatre. They should not show on TV what they show in the theatre. On TV they should show special programmes, because it is within the family, within the house. Everybody sits together and watches - parents and children. So the family should learn a good lesson from it. If they show anything, the family can be badly affected, it may cause them to go their separate ways, rather than bringing them together (retired driver, now small shopkeeper, Goan Muslim, 60, 3 children).

More than any other theme, it is the televisual discourse on

the family that evokes the strongest response' from adults, particularly women. Television serials are generally divided by viewers in Kamgar Nagar into four broad types: 'storical', detective, comedy and historical. The word 'storical' is a local coinage, first used to classify films which have a clear story line, usually to do with love, sentiment and the family, defined in opposition to 'fighting' films with an emphasis on action, the story being subordinate. As extended to television, storicals are narratives with a family theme, spread over several episodes, the longer the better⁴. Most viewers see such serials as a source of learning and reflection on family situations and relationships:

We come to know what are the consequences of certain actions. We are poor, we have experienced both sadness and joy, so we can feel sympathy for other people. Not like the rich - they don't know what is suffering and they couldn't care less what happens to others. Those who have experienced suffering - they will like storicals (retired driver, 57, Goan Catholic, 3 children).

The storical, in portraying family reality⁵, offers a bird's-eye view into families different from the viewers' own and thus an opportunity to think about familial norms:

We like to see what happens in a family. About dowry. How

the son smokes dope. It's good for us to know. We get to learn something. What to do, what not to do. How the family should be (Goan Catholic, 21, clerical worker, unmarried).

For many adults, the reality of the serial is the yardstick by which it is evaluated, some serials being dismissed as being unrealistic and some commanding a high degree of involvement :

When I watch, my mind keeps on working. Long after I finish watching, my head remains in a whirl, my thoughts churning, as if there were ants crawling inside. If the children disturb me then, I get angry, I shout at them. When I watch a story, I feel it must be true. I ask, "Where did it happen? Why did he die?" The children laugh and say, "It's only a picture!" (manual worker, widow, in her late 50's, Maharashtrian Hindu).

These expectations of 'reality' and 'learning', combined with the ubiquity and feeling of choice associated with the televisual image, give the medium a unique place within the familial space. In viewers' accounts, television comes across both as a mirror and a window: a mirror that permits self-conscious reflection, a window that reveals new familial realities, in relation to which one redefines the familial space and one's place in it. In comparison to cinema, where characters

are larger-than-life and fantasy the expectation, television invokes a reality that has direct implications for the self; that calls forth an objectification of the self. More than any other medium, television evokes the 'need' to look at oneself from the outside, the 'desire' to mould oneself and others to become what one is not :

When I see some programmes I feel I wish if I had done that. Tanuja, Rajani...programmes on social workers. I feel like being like that. "Have to do" means "have to do". "Must" means "must". I am not yet like that, but I got some feelings. Something is there. We can do. No one is helpless (verbatim transcript of interview in English, unemployed widow, 30, Goan Catholic, 2 children).

While television as a source for self-improvement is a recurring theme, some see the effect as direct and dramatic:

So many programmes on fighting between husbands and wives... (lowers her voice and looks around) I'm telling you this because he is not here. They show, how husbands drink and beat their wives. That used to happen here also. But now, after he watches such programmes, there's an improvement. He gets a good example from them. Even my daughter was saying, "Daddy has become better after watching TV!" From TV one comes to understand everything (wife of a blue-collar

dock worker, 36, Goan Catholic, 3 children). •

The construction of subjectivity viv-a-vis the televisual discourse on the family takes place at several levels, ranging from the individual gender and age-specific constitutive strategies to the identity of the family as a unit within the community and society. Viewers, in the main, tend to constitute themselves as members of a normal, middle class family for whom television becomes a source of general knowledge, of access to preferred lifestyles, of insight into family dynamics and morality.

The Middle Class Family

The 'normal middle class' family is the effect of a configuration of dividing practices operating at the level of the televisual discourse and viewer strategies. An important site⁶ where this notion emerges is the social awareness advertisement, be it on family planning, immunization, status of women or health practices. The following break-up of an advertisement spot on family planning bears witness to these dividing practices:

Visual

Establishing long shot of a woman sitting on the floor of

Audio

"I went on my own to the hospital and told the doctor

her home, using a sewing machine. Her clothes and the surroundings establish a North Indian, Muslim, urban working class, basti environment. The woman looks at the camera and speaks.

Mid long shot of the woman's husband, in home attire, sitting on the floor with his daughter (around 8 years old) on his lap, next to his son, a little older, who is reading a school book. While the son is busy, the daughter stares passively into space.

Close up of school book, tilt up and zoom out to boy studying.

Mid close up, husband smiling

Mid long shot, woman working-bending and swabbing floor, carrying a bucket

Mid shot, woman looking at camera and speaking, zoom out

that, I have two children and want to get myself operated I don't want any more children".

And I want to educate these two children well...

...educate them and make them into big officers.

My husband agrees with me on this.

After the operation I have no problems. I can work as before.

You see, I'm happy and so is my little family (laughs).

Montage of husband,
children, woman, all laughing

(song) Our life a beautiful
dream/Fill it with happiness/
Only two flowers in the
garden/Let the garden of life
be filled with fragrance.

The advertisement is shot in cinema verite style, with long takes and clumsy zooms, as if the camera were capturing reality as it unfolds. The woman and her family too appear to be 'real-life' people and not actors; in fact, the adults have sheepish grins and giggle, betraying their camera-consciousness. Thus, the viewer sees a real, Muslim family, poor, yet respectable, aspiring to the middle class, with family planning and education providing the means to make it. This 'ideal' modern family is different from other poor, traditional Muslim families which are illiterate and fast-breeding.

The dichotomy modern/developed vs. traditional/developing lies at the core of the set of dividing practices invoked and evoked by the advertisement. The viewers can, by and large, unambiguously identify with a modern, televisual 'us' that forms the norm against which the traditional 'them' can be evaluated as inferior and lacking in all progressive attributes. Schematically, this particular advertisement, and the bulk of social awareness advertising, is generated from the following

binary system of classification:

'Us'	'Them'
Modern	Traditional
Middle class, aspiring to the middle class	Poor
Urban	Rural
Literate	Illiterate
Fertility-conscious	Fast-breeding
Rational	Superstitious
Healthy	Unhealthy
Tolerant to women	Oppressive to women

The Muslim woman with her 'operation', her two children (one son, one daughter), her sewing machine, her husband who stays at home and teaches their children, has all the attributes to enable her to make the shift from 'them' to 'us'. While on the screen we see a smiling woman and her family, two other images, not shown, form reference points - the 'typical' basti family - drunken father, overworked mother, too many children, too few resources and the 'officer' family - a life of ease and leisure, the kind of life shown in the product advertisements.

This advertisement in particular and the family planning media campaign in general are based on a set of assumptions. Firstly, the reproductive strategies of the poor are regarded as

a matter of public concern and the target of State intervention. For instance, a middle-class woman or man talking on screen about the methods of contraception they use would offend notions of privacy in a way that this woman talking about her 'operation' does not; the implication being that State can and should enter the sphere of intimate relationships in the case of poor citizens. This is in the public interest, as it is assumed that the poor are a fast-breeding species who will rapidly consume the country's scarce resources. Secondly, population control is seen as the main solution to poverty, both at an individual and a national level. Conversely, 'overpopulation' is the main cause of poverty. The solutions to the nation's pressing problems are thus technological. Sterilization, immunization, and other such interventions can ensure a better life for the 'starving millions'. The woman's 'operation' is like a magic key that will enable her to educate her son and make him an 'officer'.

The advertisement invokes a regime of truth regarding population growth and its scientific study and control⁷. These discourses, originating in the First World, aspire to establish scientifically the phenomenon of Third World population growth as an issue of global concern and the main cause of underdevelopment. These epistemological enterprises, in turn, set the norms for the reproductive behaviour of the Third World subject. The thrust of the attendant campaign has been to equate individual 'benefits' at one level with the collective good at the other.

The social awareness advertisements attempt to work either through identification with the norm, as represented by the Muslim woman, or through rejection of the abnormal: mothers-in-law who blame their daughters-in-law for the birth of female children, mothers who feed their sons more than their daughters, parents who marry off their daughter early, couples who have too many children and so on. In both cases, the viewers bring to bear the dividing practices that differentiate the progressive 'us' from a backward 'them'.

We Goans have fewer children. But these outsiders, these ghantis, what do they think? They keep having children (Goan Catholic, 30, wife of a welder, 2 children).

In a few cases, religious minorities are identified with 'them':

Muslims don't go in for operations. They should see such ads and follow them. If only we Hindus practice family planning and they don't, their population will increase. The power will rest with them and this will destroy Hindu society. The government should put equal restrictions on all. They should pass stringent laws, cutting off rationing and employment if people have too many children (Maharashtrian Hindu, 35, wife of welder, 3 children).

The regime of truth that identifies population control with development as well as the contraceptive practices of individuals

with the national good is taken by most viewers as self-evident:

They should show such ads, so that our people get educated. Our population is increasing. That's why there is unemployment and people don't get enough food to eat (Goan Catholic, 23, unemployed, son of foreman in the docks).

Some people have too many children. That's why they remain backward. After seeing this on TV, they will improve (Kannadiga Hindu, 30, wife of an electrician, 2 children).

Except for a small minority (only 3 out of 88 people interviewed), the legitimacy of the State's intervention to control family size is accepted. The resistance could be on religious grounds or because of the dissonance between one's practice and the State's norms:

Family planning... the Pope says it's a crime. It's not allowed for us (retired dock worker, Goan Catholic, 59, 5 children).

Is the government bringing us up or what? Why should they tell us how many children we should have? (shipyard welder, Kannadiga Hindu, 34, 4 children).

Most viewers 'project' and 'relay' these advertisements for 'someone else out there', for everyone seems to think that they

already have the relevant information :

They should advertise more in the rural areas. There people are illiterate, they don't know about family planning. But most of them don't have TVs. Those who have TVs already know all this (Goan Catholic, 21, college student, daughter of small businessman).

Amazingly, the dividing practices invoked by the 'receivers' seem to coincide with those of the 'senders'. The strategies employed by the media experts find an echo in the viewers, who identify with the normal middle-class television owning 'us' vs. a 'them' who require to be brought into the ambit of family planning and other equally 'modern' practices. This relay of messages to a no-man's land seems to be the fate of all social awareness advertising, their efficacy being confined to their ability to effect ever-new relations of power rather than 'triggering targeted transformation'.

Resistance to family planning advertising takes place, not at the level of questioning the State's pastoral power, but in terms of its immediate effects. The larger relationships of power are rarefied and refracted through the immediate modes of power, the ones that impinge on viewers' lives. The most immediate and pervasive forms of power being the familial,

viewers tend to resist any intervention that impinges on these forms of power. Family planning, with its connotations of sexuality, opens up a dangerous, taboo area, a topic on which there can be little or no dialogue between parents and children:

I don't like it. When the whole family is sitting together, they show everything, openly and in detail. Instead they should have a special programme, four or five times a month, late at night. Then parents can restrict their children (from seeing these programmes). These days, our children have started repeating what they hear and we have to give them a pinch to keep them quiet. They know all the ads by heart. A third person might say, "Look at their children, what all they are saying" (shipyard carpenter, 37, Goan Hindu, 4 children).

Some viewers also fear the effect that such information may have on the morals of adolescents, particularly the information on spacing methods :

Tablets are bad for health, they are dangerous. That thing they put inside causes cancer. It's not for us, married women. It's for those college girls who go around falling in love. Married women can have three children, then go straight for an operation - that's best, no bother (Mangalorean Catholic, 45, wife of motorcycle taxi driver, 4

children).

These feelings are reiterated by an unmarried Muslim girl who adds a dimension of class to the morality issue, seeing "rich" college girls as more prone to err:

Some of these ads are bad. College girls see them and get ideas. Girls from rich families.... they go to college, and then, that's the end, they're finished. They shouldn't show details. In a Marathi programme... on Saptahiki they showed it... girls were asking a doctor about the menstrual cycle and all. They were talking openly, shamelessly. I don't like all that, never watch such programmes (Kannadiga Muslim, 21, daughter of retired supervisor).

Even a social awareness advertisement on national integration can have latent sexual connotations, as the following discussion with Mrs. W, (40, Goan Muslim, wife of clerk, 5 children) indicates:

Mrs.W: That programme where they run with torches...

Those players ...

Q: Ah - Sunil Gavaskar...

Mrs.W: (lowering her voice, and glancing sideways at her brother-in-law sitting nearby) There is a girl there, she's pretty, and when she runs, everything shakes. (gesturing, indicating breasts) It looks very bad. And children - this youngest one and the one before her, they

come running to see (giggles), "Look..look, dudus! (child's word for breasts)"... They should not show such dirty things...(gesturing) bouncing up and down. Otherwise, it's okay. They should remove that shot, the one with the girl.

Thus, to sum up, in the main, the social awareness advertisements on television bring into play dividing practices that constitute the modern, middle class family within the field of pastoral power, at once individualizing and totalizing; the individual adoption of progressive practices becomes equated with the collective good of the modern nation state⁸. Conversely, the problems confronting the nation are traced back to incorrect practices of individual family units. However, there are points where this logic breaks down - these are moments when the most proximate power relations, the familial, are impinged upon. At such points, viewers would cease to constitute themselves primarily as modern citizens, but, as responsible parents, would seek to mediate and filter their children's viewing practices.

Childhood and Parenthood

The father comes home tired from work. The little daughter watches concerned. The mother asks the father if he wants tea or coffee. The father refuses. The child knows: Papa doesn't want coffee or tea. He wants Rasna. The parents look on fondly. The

little moppet lisps at the viewers, "I love you Rasna!"

This scenario, from the popular Rasna advertisement, represents several aspects of childhood and parenthood as constructed by television and construed by viewers. There appears to be a change in the parameters governing the child-subject. The child must be 'smart' and 'cute'. An object of adult survey and admiration, she/he must learn to perform a range of acts on demand. Adult recognition is tied up with this. It is the duty of parents to mould their children into smartness, to encourage them to become good performers. The standards of performance are set by the Rasna girl, so much so that mothers would notice the little details that add up to being 'smart'.

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S: Yesterday's Adalat was really good. That girl from Rasna Badmash uncle (laughs) "Badmash uncle tum sachmuch badmash hai"

Q: And in the end, "I love you..."

S: "Police uncle, I love you"... she's really sweet. Her eyes and hair... It's the first time she's coming in a serial. She's in many ads. And that's her brother. I looked at the names. Ankush and Ankita Jhaveri (Maharashtrian Hindu, 28, wife of skilled shipyard worker, 2 children).

The advertisements become an important resource in moulding children in this direction:

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We try things we see in the ads. Like Complam . Then when they see it on TV, they imitate it... "I am a Complam Boy... I am a Complam Girl". They see that and drink it properly. TV has had a good effect on their eating. We tell them, "Didn't you see it on TV... those children?" It also gives us something to scare them with... that ad about leafy vegetables...
 12 we tell them, "If you don't eat properly, that will happen to you too".

Interestingly, the advertisements are seen by most viewers as providing learning material which make children smart, active and intelligent.

G: Children know the ads by heart. Even a 2-3 year old child... when the first part of the ad comes, "ting-tang", he knows what follows.

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R: That ad... Colgate ka chota packet... All children know it by heart. Like poems, they learn it by heart.

Q: (laughs)

R: Small children feel they themselves are doing that. That's why they like ads.

G: I feel small children improve because of TV. Not students, but small children. Even those who are stupid, they watch TV and become clever. They become active.

P: Yes, active.

Q: Do they become active, or do they just sit and watch?

P: They become active.

Q: How?

G: They repeat things while watching TV. Learn things by heart. When an advertisement appears, they know what the jingle is going to be. It is in their heads...and that's how they become intelligent (discussion with a male youth group, Goan and Maharashtrian Hindus, ages 15 to 25).

The father of a two year old son sees the educational potential of television as one of the main advantages of owning a set:

The small fellow learns new words from TV, from the ads. When he hears the music, he knows what will come next... he understands the 'signal'. Children become smart. The atmosphere at home changes with TV. Simply telling them things is of no use. They don't learn that way. When they see the picture, it stays in their minds (clerical worker, 39, Goan Catholic).

'Smartness' involves not only appropriate behaviour and linguistic skills, but also 'general knowledge' and problem solving, which television is seen to encourage.

It has no effect on studies. On the contrary, they take more interest. They watch Quiz Time and Prashna Manch¹⁴ and answer the questions. From Paramvir and Karamchand¹⁵,

they learn how to think. They get ideas for plays and acting (Kannadiga Muslim, wife of a motor mechanic, 36, 2 children).

'Middle class' parents see themselves as having to play an active role in interpreting televisual discourse for their children.

They ask questions - what is this for, why does that happen, what is an earthquake, how do they send rockets up ... they ask and come to know... we have to explain everything to them (Maharashtrian Hindu, skilled worker in shipyard, 38, 2 children).

The parents' construction of childhood and the place of television in it is a consequence of how they define their own identities as parents. The modern, upwardly mobile, 'middle class' parent sees him/herself as playing a crucial role in moulding the child, making parenting a self-conscious exercise. Mediating the influence of television is regarded as part of this role:

There are a lot of benefits from TV for children, provided we control it properly. We should not keep it on too long, when it is time for them to study. If we show them things

that are meant for them, they become smart (Kannadiga Muslim, 28, wife of bakery owner, 3 children).

Disciplining the child becomes a matter not of physical control or coercion, but of encouraging the child to aim high and perform well:

We can't force children to become anything nowadays. My son wants to become a policeman - with a jeep and a pistol. Since he saw Udaan, he wants to join the police. I encourage him. His ideas may change later. When he passes his SSC, we will see. We can't force anything on them. It's no use forcing them to study. Fortunately, both my children stand first in class (skilled shipyard worker, 38, Maharashtrian Hindu, 2 children).

The 'middle class' family of televisual discourse redefines gender roles in relation to child rearing. In the Rasna advertisement cited earlier, the father-daughter relationship is one of familiarity. What makes the daughter 'cute' is that, small as she is, she can play the 'little wife', anticipating her father's needs. Their emphasis is on the father-daughter relationship, the wife being relegated to the background. In the middle class family, the father relinquishes his position of distant patriarch and actively involves himself in disciplining and educating the child. Since the child's performance in the

outside world assumes prime importance, the father's 'superior' knowledge and social skills qualify him for this task. While the routine, tedious chores of childcare continue to remain the mother's responsibility, the inculcation of smartness and discipline becomes the father's domain.

The serial Udaan (to be discussed elsewhere in this chapter) delineates this conception of fatherhood, as articulated in a discussion with a school teacher (R), 50, Kannadiga Muslim, and his teenaged daughter (F):

R: To keep her father happy, she (the heroine) puts up with difficulties and goes for recruitment. She has to do high jump and all, which is difficult. But when she remembers her father, she perseveres and is successful.

F: The best role was the father's. He used to encourage her so much. She would remember him and take the next step.

R: Nowadays, only those who have courage can live happily. And those who live in fear, have to face a lot of difficulties. In Udaan - the girl is so courageous and daring. I have two daughters, no son. I tell them - you should be courageous, you should not have fear, only then you will be happy in your life ahead.

Shared parenting involves consensus between husband and wife

on the norms for child rearing. Parents express this need for a common regime of discipline:

S: There was a nice episode in Adha Sach - Adha Jhoot .¹⁶
 About a husband and wife, with one daughter. The husband is a non-vegetarian and the wife a vegetarian. He wants her to be a non-vegetarian but his wife wants the opposite. He wants her to eat omelette, she... shira. The girl can't do both. It has an effect on her mind. Then they reach the verge of divorce. Then finally, someone comes and makes them understand - if you continue like this, your child will suffer. The girl becomes dumb. Then they realize that they should not behave like this, they should understand each other.

Q: Did you discuss this with your husband?

S: Not much discussion, as such. But we felt - it is right, it can happen. The mother says one thing and the father another. The girl finally becomes dumb... It has an effect on the children (Maharashtrian Hindu, 28, wife of skilled shipyard worker, 2 children) .

The construction of childhood and parenthood discussed thus far is the norm among younger, more educated parents. Linguistic and cultural identification with the discourses of television also plays a role, the alienation of many Goan Catholic parents from television colouring their perception of its relevance in child rearing. For instance, a mother of 4 children feels

that all that television does is to increase the "light bill". She cannot understand the language and is dependent on her children to interpret for her. Given her indifference and hostility to TV, she cannot see it playing any positive role:

Because of TV they don't study. They learn to fall in love and all that from the examples they see. We have never shown our children anything bad. But on TV, they get to see all that stuff. When we see it, we feel shy, but they like it. They (TV) should show children what they should do, what they shouldn't. But it's not like that. Nowadays, children get spoiled when they are young, they get ideas after seeing all those pictures (Goan Catholic woman, 38, wife of a toddy tapper).

In such families with older, less educated parents, notions and practices of parenting differ from those discussed earlier. My close association with the Goan Catholic community makes it possible for me to delineate some of the differences in this specific cultural context. The family I lived with, Alba and Dominic, are a childless couple, looking after the 4 children of Alba's brothers. The children have lived there from the time they were of school-going age, as their parents live in a small village with no proper schooling facilities. As I lived with this family as a paying guest for a year, I was able to get a

feel of familial relationships and dynamics. Dominic is a winchman on contract jobs in the Gulf, and hence away for long periods of time. However, he returned a few months after I moved into their house and was there till I left. The arbiter of discipline in the household is clearly Alba. Dominic is viewed by the children and neighbours as a gentle, harmless soul, who does not interfere in domestic affairs. The regime of discipline in the household centres on correct behaviour before elders and conformity to rules, rather than performance and success. Children are expected to obey certain do's and don't's: they should be seen and not heard, they should not idle and gossip or act boisterous, they should not eavesdrop when the adults are in conversation, or retort if reprimanded by an adult; they should help in domestic chores, spend a fixed number of hours studying and attend catechism classes. Apart from these rules, the children are left to their own devices. They have their own world and interact minimally with the adults (I was an exception). The adults make no conscious attempt to encourage ambition and performance in the children. For instance, 'showing off' the children in front of visitors, by praising them or exhibiting their work (report cards, handicraft work) is not done. The children themselves never expressed any career ambitions or goals. On one occasion, my question to the youngest girl, aged 10, on what she wanted to become when she grew up, evoked a puzzled look and silence. This is very different from the 'middle class' households, where parents would proudly talk

about their children, and even 8 year-olds would know whether they wanted to become doctors or policemen.

In terms of television viewing, the adults do not watch regularly or follow most serials. They are from Vasco itself and have a wide network of relatives, friends and neighbours. Social obligations take priority over television: there are always funerals, anniversary masses, marriages and saibins to attend, relatives to be looked after and neighbours to be helped.

The control of the television set usually lies with the children, who switch it on and off when they like, except during examination time, when Alba regulates their watching. At such times, there is negotiation between the eldest boy and his aunt, when it comes to serials that the children like and do not want to miss. The adults might occasionally talk about the serials to each other or to the neighbours, but never to the children. There is no attempt to use television for disciplining or moral training, or to interpret televisual messages for the children. The children might discuss programmes with each other or with me (I was in a different category from other adults, as I spent a lot of time talking and playing with them, and, over time, they became close to me).

To sum up, there appear to be distinct regimes of discipline for the children of Kamgar Nagar. 'Modern' parents, who are

articulate about not coercing their children, are likely to see themselves as mediators of the televisual discourse for their children, and to regard television as a resource for developing smartness in their children. While physical controls are less, demands in terms of good performance are more. 'Traditional' parents are less likely to see television as a resource, and more as a bad influence, and hence would try to control the duration of viewing, rather than attempt to mediate televisual messages. Provided children conform to the rules, they are left to their own devices. Paradoxically, children in such homes appear to have more 'freedom' to interpret the televisual discourse in their own way than children in 'modern' families, where viewing television is not just fun, but part of working at becoming 'smart'. However, the interpretative controls imposed by parents do not escape resistance from children :

They only pick up things like fighting and disco dancing. They are crazy about film heroes, that's all they're interested in. If I tell Pankaj: "Look at so-and-so in this serial. You should try to be like him", he answers back "So what? Let them be whatever they are". The other day, his father beat him for answering back (Maharashtra Hindu, 28, wife of skilled shipyard worker, 2 children).

Viewing Strategies of Children

The material in this section is based primarily on the experience of living with four children, 2 boys and 2 girls between the ages of ten and thirteen, in a Goan Catholic household, and spending time playing with them and their friends, talking to them, occasionally taking up their studies and, on one occasion, looking after them for two weeks when their aunt and uncle were away.

Initially, the family had no TV set. The children would go to their aunt's place next door to watch occasional serials, particularly Udaan, Adalat and Paramvir, the Sunday serials and sometimes, the Hindi film. Their daily routine consisted of going to school, coming home in the afternoon, then going for tuitions, returning in the evenings, when they would hang around at home, play carrom, chat with each other, do some domestic chores or their homework. The notion of going out to play was absent - the children spent most of their time at home, or next door with their cousins. In the late evenings, they would say the Rosary and on certain days, go to watch TV. Video watching at the neighbours was restricted to vacation time, when they would watch at least one film a day. The children did most of the domestic chores, except for the cooking and shopping. For instance, sweeping, tidying the house, looking after the two dogs, gardening, filling water, washing the dishes, feeding the

pigs were all chores handled by the children.

A month after I shifted in, their uncle Dominic arrived from the Gulf with a colour TV and a VCR. There was heavy viewing, initially, by all, including the neighbours and relatives dropping in to meet Dominic and see his new acquisitions. More than TV, the attraction was the VCR. A three hour cassette of Dominic's brother's wedding was screened repeatedly, for neighbours and relatives. For some time, there was open house for TV and video viewing. The neighbours would bring Hindi film cassettes almost everyday, which were watched late at night by everybody, the children sometimes falling asleep while watching. The children's examinations put a halt to this heavy watching ¹⁷.

The access to TV and video brought about changes in the children's conversation, giving them entry, as it were, into a new world of discourse peopled by television and film stars. They were now "up-to-date", and could discuss TV and films with their friends in school. Their conversations with me often referred to these discussions. The latest news picked up at school was that three new films starring Mithun and Govinda had been released, that Ram Lakhan was the "best picture" and that the 'Liril' girl ¹⁸ had died. It was a daily ritual for them to look at the film advertisements in my newspaper (a Bombay edition) and to count how many films they had already seen. They would feel proud that "we've already seen most of the pictures

that have just been released in Bombay". Their interactions with each other began to include popular catch phrases¹⁹ and gestures²⁰ from serials ("I say you chaps" from Fauji, Mungeri Lal's facial contortions) and parodies of advertisements.

The entry of TV and video thus enabled the children to constitute themselves as knowledgeable and "up-to-date" individuals. Given the familial context in which TV was watched, it also provided opportunities for self-assertion. For the most part, the children would watch TV on their own, without any adults (except myself) present, and would talk back to the TV, particularly during the advertisements, which they would never miss. They would sing the jingles, guess the advertisement to follow, anticipate the punch lines, identify TV stars and make critical and funny remarks. In a familial situation where children were discouraged from speaking before elders, TV opened up possibilities for voicing one's opinion, displaying one's memory, knowledge and sense of humour. The children could constitute themselves as powerful vis-a-vis TV, capable of criticizing and interrupting the televisual flow, for instance, J, a 10 year old girl, reacts to an advertisement for Babool tooth paste:²¹

J: They're showing rubbish.

Q: Why?

J: If they really sit on a tooth paste tube like that, it will break.

In a similar vein, a boy of 11 is critical about the Close-up tooth paste advertisements: " Only their teeth become white when they use that paste; ours remain the same".

The children's preference for advertisements and Chitrahaar (programme of film song clippings) over most serials is perhaps because the former allow for participation and game playing, unlike the latter that demand continual involvement in their narrative. As opposed to adult viewers, who tend to relate to TV in a referential way, using the yardsticks of naturalism/realism to evaluate serials, children appear to respond to TV in a metacritical, ludic fashion.

This curiosity and interest in the world of TV and films has to be understood in the context of their complete alienation from learning in school, which, unlike video and TV, offers no opportunities for exercising their creativity and curiosity. For most working class children, the world of formal learning is associated with fear, physical punishment, mechanical copying and rote memory. The children of Alba and Dominic's household could barely follow English, the medium of instruction. They were unable to compose a simple, grammatically correct sentence in English, and could not understand key words in the lessons they had to learn by heart. For them, studying was synonymous with memorizing questions and answers. On seeing a whole lot of books

in my room, one of the children asked me: "Auntie, do you have to by heart all these books?" It was little wonder, then, that without the fear of being beaten, the children would find it difficult to study. There appeared to be a shared belief among many working class adults of Kangar Nagar that children have to be frightened or beaten into studying. Thus books and general knowledge in no way engaged the children's curiosity and interest. Even the world of natural phenomena was reduced to the rote learning of geography. It was television and film that offered the possibility of a different kind of knowledge. To them, the serial was a construct and they were interested in knowing the way it is put together. They would sometimes want to discuss how a particular scene must have been shot, as in the following discussion on an episode from the serial Adalat, where a dead boy is found in a suitcase:

F: Was that a real boy inside?

L: No, it can't be. He would have suffocated.

Q: It could be that they put him in just for that shot
(Explains that a serial is made shot by shot).

L: You know how they make Adalat - have you seen them making it?

Q: No, not Adalat. But I've seen them making other serials.

L: That fellow who acts as a thief in this story - he sometimes also acts as a policeman; he is the director.

They would also try to figure out for themselves how a particular scene could have been shot:

C: You know last time they showed (in the serial Fauji) how that girl falls down and gets hurt - that's not real. Actually, you know what happens - after she falls, they show the car in between. During that time, they quickly put tomato sauce on her to look like blood. Then they show her.

Q: Who told you this?

C: They were talking about it in school.

The children's involvement with the formal aspects of serials make them read violence and bloodshed on the screen quite differently from adults. The following discussion between F and C on a 'ghost story' serial, Qile Ka Rahasya, illustrates this:

F: They show blood dripping from the coat.

C: Actually, it's not blood. It's red ink. Our teacher told us that even in the pictures, when they bleed, it's actually a box with sauce inside. Otherwise, where does blood come pouring out like that when you're hurt?

F: In 'tiatr', they put a tomato inside. We saw that in one - we were sitting right in front and could see the seeds (laughs).

Thus, violence on the screen, be it a boxing match telecast live or a film, would be read in terms of its game-like elements: a fight as a game between opposing sides, with potential for anticipation, surprise and comedy. The fight scenes in Hindi films would generate much applause, cheering and laughter and such scenes are not regarded as having anything to do with reality :

J (girl,10): How was yesterday's 9 O' clock programme? Was it nice? was there "fighting" in it?

Q: No. No fighting. Why, do you like fighting?

J: Yes

Q: Like in He Man?

J: And Spiderman. And Intezaar last time. I like to see fighting.

Q: Why? (No answer) Do you like to see real fighting?

J: No. Only in the pictures.

Children and male youth appear to resist involvement in the narrative, particularly at moments of high drama and tragedy. In the film Neevat on TV, Shashi Kapoor is running away from the site of a murder, and the police are chasing him. They run down 12 floors; it is a dramatic chase sequence. Rather than getting carried away, B (boy, 14) wonders with amused detachment: "What happened to the lift?" At the end of the same film, when Jeetendra, one of the heroes, lies dead, C (boy, 12) exclaims:

"Look, Look! His eyelids are moving". Such moments, when the children are able to 'see through' the narrative, are for them, assertions of their own identity.

The generic preferences of children and youth also bear out this resistance to reality. Children and male youth prefer detective and comedies to historicals. The detective genre, in particular, offers them opportunities for game playing and guessing.

L (boy,13) : What do you think will happen in Adalat today? I think they will find gold inside the boy's stomach.

Q: Why? How do you know?

L: No, it happened somewhere else. They hid diamonds in a boy's stomach.

Q: Who told you? Did it come on TV?

L: No, a boy was telling me that, in school today. But I don't think that will happen.

To sum up, there appear to be fundamental differences between the ways in which the adults and children of Kamgar Nagar make sense of television and film. While the relationship of adults is culture-specific, with Goan Catholics often being indifferent or hostile to television, this is not true of the children. There appears to be more of a common, media-related culture among children, regardless of ethnic background, the

makings of an urban, popular culture. Television and film offer, for these children, many possibilities for expressing their creativity and curiosity, for constituting themselves as knowledgeable, powerful, playful and adequate. This is in sharp contrast to the world of formal education which constructs them as inadequate, recalcitrant and unintelligent beings, who have to be coerced into learning. It is little wonder, then, that the former holds far more fascination for them than the latter. Further, the relationship of children to the media of film and television is, in many ways, more sophisticated than that of most adults of Kamgar Nagar, the children being engaged in metacritical readings, of questioning the reality of the small screen.

Gender-specific Dividing Practices

Identity is no fact; it is a construct. Specific taxonomies of objectivization are only extensions of dividing practices that impart to identity, an imaginary 'givenness'. The sane and the mad, the law-abiding and the criminal, the healthy and the sick, the male and the female all these bear witness to the underlying rationality of these dividing practices. The scientific discourse of classification, surveillance and control of the mad, the criminal, the sick and the female has always been permeated by the rationality of the sane, the law-abiding, the healthy, the

male; the former perpetually obliged to define itself normatively in relation to the latter.

Gender transcribed in biological terms betrays these very concerns of a presiding rationality. 'Nature' and 'natural distinctions' are invoked to construct distinct 'male' and 'female' identities. The specific forms of power and resistance that constitute these identities also reflect the discourses of the family and the State. Male power appears as the norm, extending to all spaces, public and private, yet not monolithic, having to contend with the dangers of female power and resistance. The construction of gender identities, in viewer and televisual discourses and the interface between the two, can be regarded as an attempt to contain these dangers, to reaffirm the male order. This section deals with the constitution of 'male' and 'female' identities, as viewers make sense of the televisual discourse; these identities encompassing distinct sets of generic preferences, viewing practices, watching routines and uses of television.

Within the family, the father/husband defines his gender identity vis-a-vis the televisual discourse in contradistinction to his wife, and vice-versa. In the process, husbands and wives define themselves as possessing distinct viewing preferences. These relate to the basic division made between the 'private' and 'public' spheres, the woman being seen as situated firmly within

the former, this in turn defining her interests and viewing patterns.

In Kamgar Nagar, women employed outside the home are a minuscule minority. The immurement of women is, by and large, regarded as indicative of the family's middle class status; the woman need not go outside the home to work, but can instead devote herself to her children's upbringing and education, armed with "the ideology of progressive motherhood" (Mascarenhas-Keyes, 1989).

In the middle class, if a girl goes out to work, it is seen as being inferior—because of poor conditions, she is forced to go. But among the rich, it is not so — they go to work for time pass (killing time) (male technician, 27, Goan Hindu, unmarried).

A married woman who takes up employment out of "interest" (as opposed to "necessity") is seen both as depriving men of a job, as well as neglecting her home:

A woman should work only if it is necessary to support the household. But not out of interest. Otherwise the children suffer. Look at how the children of working women have to suffer. I saw a serial — the woman goes to work, doesn't

care about her children. The children grow up and take to drugs (Maharashtrian Muslim, 28, wife of accountant, 3 children).

In fact, unemployment is sometimes seen as a consequence of women working:

Nowadays, women go to work and men have to sit at home. Everything is topsy-turvy. Because women work outside more than is necessary, men don't get jobs (retired dock worker, 59, Goan Catholic, 5 children).

Marital conflict is also often attributed to this factor:

Women go out to work. If the husband says something, she won't listen. She feels, "I too work". Also sometimes she may meet some other men at work. Nowadays, even if the husband has enough money, women go to work because they want more and more to keep up with others (retired driver, 57, Goan Catholic, 3 children).

The assertiveness of working women was mentioned as the single largest cause for marital breakdown (other important causes being 'dowry' and 'lack of mutual understanding' (refer to Table 3.4).

Table 3.4

Distribution of Respondents' Perception of Reasons for
Marital Breakdown

Reasons	Frequency	Percent
Working, educated wife	15	25.4
Lack of mutual understanding	14	23.7
Drinking/Womanizing	2	3.4
Dowry	14	23.7
Fights over Money	4	4.5
In-laws	3	5.1
Any other	6	10.2
Can't Say	1	1.7
Total	59	100.0

Note: This question was answered only by the respondents who saw the serial Kisse Miya Biwi Ke.

The immurement of women within the 'domestic' or 'private' space, with the entire responsibility of home making and child rearing being seen as theirs, has its implications for routines of television watching and viewing preferences. Firstly, for many women, television becomes a major source of exposure to the outside world: a window on the world, as it were. Many women,

particularly Hindu and Muslim migrants, experience an opening out of a claustrophobic domestic space to which they feel confined:

TV helps one to kill time. I would get bored sitting at home. And my husband doesn't allow me to go to other people's houses to watch TV. I like to watch, I am interested in it (Maharashtrian Muslim, 26, wife of carpenter, 3 children).

TV provides us with entertainment as well as knowledge about so many things. I don't go anywhere these days. Before my marriage, I was used to going out, travelling to different places. All that was curtailed after my son was born. So for me, TV became a substitute for going out (Maharashtrian Hindu, 28, wife of accountant, one son) .

Given this dependence on television for access to the outside world, women more than men are likely to be receptive to the discourses of television. This is borne out by Table 3.5 presenting overall receptivity to TV by gender: nearly two thirds of female respondents show acceptance, as opposed to less than a third of men, while a larger percentage of men than women would reject TV. Many women regard TV as a source of self-improvement for themselves and their children:

I've benefitted a lot. The afternoon programmes are very interesting. I stop working to watch them... cooking,

dowry... in the mornings, yoga... women can do that and look after the house also (...) even if women have not studied much and can't go out of the house, they can stay at home and get educated (Kannadiga Muslim, 36, wife of motor mechanic, 2 children).

Table 3.5

Percent Distribution of Overall Receptivity to TV by Gender

Response	Male	Female
Rejection and Indifference	27.5 (11)	8.3 (4)
Partial Acceptance	42.5 (17)	29.2 (14)
Acceptance	30.0 (12)	62.5 (30)
Total	45.5 (40)	54.5 (48)

$$\chi^2 = 10.63, D.F. = 2, P < .05$$

The 'knowledge' that women are expected to get from television and which they themselves identify as useful tends to be related to cooking, handicraft, health and child care, as well as models of familial behaviour.

When we got our TV, we were all happy and used to drop our work to sit and watch... upto 11 at night. There was an improvement in us. We came to know many things that we didn't know. Before, I was ignorant, but now, I am knowledgeable and keen to do many things... I have become clever... I've come to know more about cooking.. the masalas and all that come in the ads... I've learnt many things (Kannadiga Hindu, 24, divorced, no children).

My English has improved... come to know new words and phrases... there's a lot of new knowledge... about physical health, how to behave with others, fashions...(Goan Catholic, 20, daughter of driver, college student).

This 'knowledge' is regarded as helping them to fulfill their domestic role more adequately:

In the afternoon programmes, they show us how we should teach our children - how through play they can be taught... also what food to give them, what food contains what things... milk, vegetables... which make them strong (Kannadiga Muslim, 27, wife of tailor, 2 children).

Thus, the main sources of 'knowledge' for women are the serials, the afternoon chat show and the advertisements, the

inputs from which would make them better mothers and housewives. As opposed to this, men would define 'knowledge' for themselves more in terms of the news and other related programmes.

TV makes a man smart. One comes to know everything. I have travelled all over the country, to the South, the north. But not my son. He gets to see everything... information about all kinds of things... about factories, how things are made (shipyard vessel master, 45, Maharashtrian Muslim, 4 children).

By and large, women watch news much less than men and evince much less interest in the 'public' sphere. The domestic routines and division of labour contribute to these gender specific viewing practices. In many households, TV would be switched on either at 7.30 (for the Marathi news) or around 8.00 p.m. (for the Marathi serial). Dinner would generally be eaten between 8.30 and 9.00 p.m. The 9 o'clock serial would be watched by the whole family. Since women are the ones who cook, serve food and clean up, they have to fit in these domestic duties to coincide with the news, so that they would be free to watch serials. For the men, the separation between work and leisure time is very clear. Once they return home from their work place, they can sit back, relax and watch television. They do not have to make do with juggling of work routines and interrupted watching, which is the lot of most women, particularly those with young children:

I don't get time to watch programmes. There's work all the time, cooking, children...(sarcastically) In a woman's fate, there is everything... but not half an hour to sit and watch. Those who have domestic servants can watch (Maharashtrian Muslim, 26, wife of carpenter, 3 children) .

The fitting in of domestic work with watching television often becomes an area of negotiation, particularly between mothers and children:

The children don't do any work at home. They just sit and watch. So there's more work for me. On Sundays, they watch all day. I don't get to watch so much because of the water problem... I get so fed up. I have a great desire to watch... specially if there's a match. I'm very interested in sports... I lie down on my sofa and watch all day, when there's a cricket match (laughs) that day, there won't be any curry for lunch (Mangalorean Catholic, 45, wife of motor cycle taxi driver, 4 children) .

In terms of favourite genres, there appear to be distinct gender - related preferences, with 'historicals' being popular among females and detectives among males. (refer to Table 3.6).

Table 3.6:
Percent Distribution of Generic Preferences by Gender

Favourite Genre	Gender		
	Male	Female	
Family Story	30.8 (12)	59.6 (28)	
Detective	38.5 (15)	10.6 (5)	
Others	30.8 (12)	29.8 (14)	
Total	45.3 (39)	54.7 (47)	100 86

Note: 2 respondents did not answer this question

Even where both men and women indicate the detective as their favourite genre, the reasons given for this point to gender-specific ways of relating to the serial.

I like detectives because of the ideas I get from them, which maybe useful sometimes. For instance, suppose a detective has used his deductive skills to discover something - that can give us an idea of how to think, which can be of use in a different situation. One's mind gets stimu-

lated (marine fitter, 31, Maharashtrian Hindu).

The male readings of detectives emphasize a more rational, problem solving dimension, with the male viewer clearly identifying with the detective. For instance, in the detective serial Paramvir, the detective's unerring accuracy and his scientific method are seen to constitute his appeal:

In every case, he [Paramvir] observes things minutely. The last episode was about ghosts... about how people have misconceptions and beliefs about God, God men... and how people are fooled... how this Godman operates... he observes all this in detail. He undertakes a complete investigation and then he reveals his knowledge. That's why I like Paramvir(..) And the second thing is that his... prowess, his thinking ability... how without fail he catches criminals... when we see that, we feel... We should also do that, we should also be like that... sometimes we feel like that (marine fitter, 31, Maharashtrian Hindu).

In contrast to male readings of detectives, women often constitute themselves as victims or potential victims, who can get information from detectives which will enable them to cope with the outside world:

I like detectives because one can get ideas, for instance, about how to save yourself. Women and girls can get courage

and become bold after seeing such programmes. You come to know how the police catch people on suspicion, how they go about solving crimes (Kannadiga Muslim, 36, wife of motor mechanic, 2 children).

Differences in male and female readings of serials extend across a range of genres. For instance, women's more sensuous and intense involvement with family drama is reflected in their accounts of 'historicals'. Women generally retell stories with attention to the feelings and reactions of characters, recounting in great detail dialogues and situations. By contrast, men's accounts tend to be more terse, compressing the narrative and drawing out moral lessons or underlying principles. One can, for instance, compare the retelling of episodes from the serial Intezaar:

Yesterday, the episode was about that fellow... Keshav. Keshav and... what's her name? Ratna. He asks her to marry him. Her father has to face insults, even so he agrees with her. They show that one must take into account children's feelings. You can't just go ahead regardless. Now that father of Bakhey - Mukhiya. His reaction and this one's reaction are shown as different. That one goes against his son - they have shown both kinds (shipyard fitter, 38, Maharashtrian Hindu, 2 children)

The following excerpt is from the account of Mrs. M, who retells

the story of the episode prior to the one recounted above:

Last time (thinks) yes. Last time, what he does to Paro... Bakhey... he is supposed to marry her... The two of them are in 'love', isn't it? But he gets a good proposal for marriage. His parents tell him to marry this other girl, and he agrees because he will get a lot of money. But Paro has relations with him and gets pregnant. She tells him what has happened, and he tells her to abort it. She says: "No, I want the child. As a single mother, I will be on my own... he will take care of me, I will bring him up. That's all I want, nothing more. You get married don't bother about it"... (Goan Hindu, 36, wife of crane operator, 2 children).

Even though the episode was seen three days earlier, Mrs. M. could recount in vivid detail every nuance, without attempting to summarize or draw any lessons from it.

These differential retellings can perhaps be traced to differences in perception between men and women on the place and use of TV. Men often tend to emphasize the utilitarian aspects of television watching, evaluating the costs and benefits involved.

TV is not so bad. TV is good. But it depends on how we use it. If we keep watching, that's not good. If someone is

ill at home with nothing else to do, he can keep watching, to pass his time. But if you give up your other work... say, a student... and pay attention to TV only, then it's harmful (...) I have heard - in America, one hour is worth one lakh rupees. But in our India, so many hours are just wasted. If we use our time, maybe our country will progress. We should face reality, not live in a make-believe world (Goan Muslim clerk, 42, 5 children).

The wife of the respondent cited above resents this attitude, her account emphasizing the pleasure she derives from TV, and the male inability to comprehend this:

TV is good. We work all day in the kitchen... inside the house all the time. When we watch TV, we feel good, as if we have gone out somewhere. But he... he doesn't understand. Men are outside the house all day. They can't understand how we feel.

Within this family, given their differing perceptions of TV, watching television becomes a site of struggle. The family is a Goan Muslim joint family, of two brothers and their wives and children. The younger brother (cited above) is active in religious affairs and regards television as haraam. The older brother, a retired driver, is more tolerant. He bought the TV set, so that the children could watch at home. The conflict

between the prohibitions of the younger brother and the desires of the women and children make television watching in this household a constant negotiation:

When my husband is not at home, we sit and watch. When he comes, I jump up and go inside. Yesterday, it was time for Chitrahaar. We were longing to put on the TV. But he was sitting there, right in front, reading something. We didn't dare put it on. Then my brother-in-law came and switched it on, only the picture, not the sound. My husband got angry and walked off inside. He hates TV, says TV is a devilish thing. But I like TV very much. What can I do if I have a husband like this?

The foregoing discussion on gender-specific readings and practices should not be taken to imply that men and women constitute their identities in clearly distinct modes, with no blurring of roles or resistance to received norms. Power cannot be regarded as a monolithic force emanating from the man, impinging on the woman. The constitution of gender-specific identities takes place within networks of power and resistance. For instance, in many, perhaps most, Goan Catholic families, immured women play an important role in crucial family decisions regarding marriage of children, in managing family property, household finances and so on. This has been discussed by Ifeka, 1989, in relation to the active role played by Christian women in shaping "changing proc-

esses of stratification through their role in the 'marriage market', involving money-lending and negotiating suitable alliances" ²². This exercise of power by the woman within the family takes place within an explicitly articulated patriarchal perspective. Mrs. S. is a Catholic housewife, in her mid 40's, with 3 school and college-going children. Her husband, a shipyard supervisor, is a quiet, retiring man. She regards herself as a the capable, strong partner of the family.

He is soft, he gets upset soon... can't do any rough, heavy work. I can manage all that, even slaughtering pigs. When the children were young, I used to slaughter pigs myself and make sausages for sale... we needed the money.

In the community, Mrs. S. is regarded as a clever and powerful woman. According to a neighbour, the family lost their youngest son a few years ago, when he fell out of a school bus and died on the spot. Mr. S. was completely broken and depressed for a long time. It was Mrs. S. who took the initiative and responsibility of pursuing the case in court, which she finally won. With all the authority she exercises, Mrs. S's perception of familial relationships emphasizes the power of the husband/father:

Nobody respects a woman whose husband has left her. However bad the husband is, his presence makes her respectable. The

children need a father to grow up properly. The father should be strict, and the children should fear him. The mother should instill this fear in them. Both fear and love. Sometimes, the mother might feel like speaking ill of the father, but she should never do that. Whatever her husband says or does, she should always be virtuous. If the husband is worthless, the wife can change him, but not the other way around.

In Mrs. S's scheme of things, a woman should be active, courageous and righteous, her strategic acceptance of "the fear of the father" granting her the space to exercise her power both within and outside the family.

The theme of the powerful woman in television programming, often derived from the filmic formula of the avenging goddess meting out justice, is an evocative theme for most women, perhaps providing a symbolic resolution to the conflict they experience within patriarchal structures. Many women express approval of even bizarre forms of revenge, for instance, the castration of offending males in the film Zakhmi Aurat. The following discussion, with Mrs. C. is on the film Khoon Bhari Maang, where the wronged heroine returns to destroy her persecutors.

Mrs. C: Women should be like that, capable. They should take revenge, otherwise they can't survive. These kinds of

things keep on happening.

Q:What about you and me - do you think it's possible to be like that?

Mrs. C: We are stupid, we can't do that. In our time, we never did anything. Just stayed at home. I wanted to study, but could only complete first grade. I had to leave because of my mother's ill - health (Goan Catholic in her late 40's, wife of shipyard supervisor, 5 children).

The discourse on female 'power' is usually linked with the discourse on modernity, the 'modern woman' being seen as liberated and capable.

In a situation where gender inequalities are taken for granted, to account for the televisual pleasure and popularity evoked by the televisual discourse on the powerful woman one has to examine, firstly, how televisual discourse constructs the relationship between gender and power; secondly, how this relationship affirms culturally dominant gender identities and thirdly, to situate these concerns in the context of the modern State, its order and its forms of ordering. These aspects will be discussed in the next section, with reference to two popular serials, Aayhan and Udaan.

Flying Kites - Aavhan and Udaan

The Marathi serial Aavhan, was identified by viewers as a progressive serial, dealing with the issue of dowry and dowry deaths, a part of the campaign against dowry and for women's emancipation. Involvement in the serial was high; viewers discussed episodes, retold the story to others, predicted consequences and related the story to real life incidents of domestic violence and dowry deaths.

The plot (for a detailed account, see Appendix V) revolves around a powerful mother and a weak son under her influence. The father is a good man, untainted by the mother's evil. The mother-son duo harasses daughters-in-law for dowry. The first daughter-in-law is dead when the story opens; she has been driven to suicide. The narrative starts with the second daughter-in-law, her harassment and torture at the hands of the mother and son, the casual attempts of the father to rescue her, and her eventual suicide. The third daughter-in-law, however, is made of sterner stuff. Together with the father and the newly formed Sobti Sanghatana (an organization for women's equality), she teaches the mother and the son a lesson. In the end, the mother is destroyed and the son runs away.

The narrative is constructed around the polarity good-evil, the father and daughters-in-law representing the former, and the

mother and son the latter. Evil is associated with greed, obsession with material accumulation and hypocrisy. The full-throated song of Veena, (the second daughter-in-law) her love for nature, her affinity for the outdoors, stands in contradistinction to the claustrophobic space inhabited by the mother and the son, filled with images of Gods and muted religious chanting. Even the father continually escapes from this space, his favourite pastime being eating batatawadas under the open sky. In the conflict between (free, honest) nature and (unfree, hypocritical) culture, the latter wins the first round. Trapped by the forces of evil within the confining space of the house, deprived of her energizing relationship with nature and music, Veena, the embodiment of good, takes her own life. At this point of the narrative the entry of collective morality, in the form of Sobti Sanghatana, and the third daughter-in-law, changes the balance of power. It is eventually collective good that triumphs over individual greed. Schematically, the polarity within the narrative can be represented as follows:

Forces of Good

Forces of Evil

father, daughters-in-law

mother, son

selfish/unworldly

greedy/worldly-wise

honest

hypocritical

escape/freedom

entrapment/bondage

(full throated song,
 affinity for outdoors)
 relationship with nature
 (tending plants)
 collective godd

(muted religious chanting,
 affinity for indoors)
 relationship with money
 (keeping accounts)
 individual greed

The mother chooses to exercise power over her son. Her domination of her son and her belittling of her husband is in sharp conflict with culturally accepted familial roles. The exercise of power by the mother cannot but be noteworthy and evil, for power is accepted as man's domain, his condition, his natural prerogative. The exercise of power by a man remains beneath the discursive level. What becomes unnatural, a matter to be talked about, is the exercise of power by women. Some women wield power, by proxy, lying in wait to ensnare an unsuspecting male. Thus, Shree is a victim of his mother's will to power. He is portrayed as essentially weak, breaking down at crucial moments, perpetually bolstered by his mother. The construction of the narrative as well as viewers' implicit images of the mother-son relationship and of the bad/devouring mother make for a dominant reading that sees the mother as the source of evil. The son is merely an instrument of his mother's evil power (Refer to Table 3.7) .

Table 3.7

Distribution of Viewers' Perceptions of 'Who is the Most Culpable' in the serial Aavhan

Perception	Frequency	Percent
Mother	57	81.4
Son	8	11.4
Society	1	1.4
Both Mother and Son	1	1.4
Any other	1	1.4
Don't Know	2	2.9
Total	70	100.0

Note: Only those respondents who saw the serial answered this question.

Throughout the narrative, direct male exercise of power goes unquestioned. The father arranges and decides matters related to the daughter's marriage. Even Uma, the liberated karate expert, meekly acquiesces to her father's demand that she marry and free him from his responsibility. Uma, the strong woman, does not challenge the invisible, natural male order. In this context, it is necessary to make a distinction between female 'power' (domination) and female 'strength'. The latter is permissible, within circumscribed bounds, so long as it does not challenge the

natural male prerogative; the former is not. In Aavhan, evil female power is neutralized and destroyed when countered by female strength, with the backing of male power. Uma, the embodiment of righteous female strength is fully justified in her counter-attack' (her Aavhan): her main target is another woman. Even when she opposes her husband, she is only opposing the exercise of female power by proxy. The viewer feels one with her in her attack against evil unnatural female power, from a position of acceptance of the natural male order.

This male order has a place for 'women's emancipation' as well. Sobti Sanghatana is formed by a group of public-spirited young men to address itself to the question of women's oppression. Their premise is that in the cities, with education and economic independence, the status of women has improved. Women's oppression is a problem of the rural areas, where tradition is rampant and education low. In the last instance, women's oppression is attributed to lack of education. The modern, educated woman, epitomized by Uma, who situates herself within the male rationality, is both emancipated and emancipatory.

The serial constructs oppression and freedom in terms of the dichotomy between modernity and tradition and presents truth/liberation as a moment beyond power. Tradition is equated with oppression and falsehood, fraught with power equations. Modernity is egalitarian, emancipatory and represents truth. The

young men and women of Sobti Sanghatana embody this truth beyond power. They are not implicated in the oppression of women, yet they understand the truth of the problem and are willing to struggle to overcome it, to change oppressive tradition into liberating modernity. While dowry has become a generalized phenomenon in recent times, the serial views it as a traditional practice, which can be overcome if women are educated and economically independent.

Both education and wage-earning are markers that signify entry into the male space. Women's liberation from oppression is defined in terms of a movement away from the feminine (equated with weakness, backwardness, irrationality) towards the rational male discourse. The oppression of women is posed not as a political question, involving unequal power flows, but as a technological one, to be resolved through inputs (such as education, employment opportunities) following modernization. The markers of education and tradition, which define and divide women, do not hold good for men. All men, whether educated, illiterate, urban, rural, traditional or modern are, by their very gender, rational, except when tainted by female irrationality. In the portrayal of male/female roles within Sobti Sanghatana, it is the men who are more rational, advocating caution and good sense, while at times the women and children resort to aggression and violence. There are two instances of attempted violence, where Shree is attacked, by a young woman and

by a boy. In both cases, the men step in to arbitrate and restore peace.

The serial implicitly advocates the view that women are responsible for their own oppression, firstly, because 'women are women's worst enemies', fighting for control of the man within the household, and secondly because they are weak and uneducated. The men remain outside these equations of power, and are capable of objectively analyzing the problem of women's oppression. Although they are not responsible for it, they are committed to resolving it.

Aavhan has captured the popular imagination for, given the construction of the narrative, viewers can readily and unambiguously identify with 'good forces' of women's emancipation fighting against the 'evil forces' of dowry. At the same time, the serial reassuringly reaffirms the dominant patriarchal construction of gender identity and power relations. It is this dual character, which on the one hand allows the viewers to feel progressive, modern and in a self-righteous position vis-a-vis women's oppression, and, on the other, does not threaten his/her gender identity and conception of power relations, which makes for the popularity and pleasure evoked by the serial.

In the presentation of the good/bad, man/woman, 'female nature' and 'male nature' are delineated. Women are fraught with

contradictions, and are potentially irrational beings. Women can be devious. Women devour: they are consumers of money, jewellery, property, other women. Men are monolithic, purposive, rational entities, capable of analyzing contradictions. The father points out the contradiction when the mother, though she is a working woman, prevents her daughter-in-law from taking up a job. The only man who is greedy and devious is so because he is under a woman's influence.

One can represent the relationship between gender and power in the following terms:

Good man

Follows his natural rational path

Bad man

Falls into a woman's clutches. Forfeits his natural right to wield power.

Good woman

Acts rationally, with the support of the male. Does not attempt to ensnare the male.

Bad woman

Deviously wields power through the male, always to oppress - usually other women.

By the end of the narrative, Shree, used up by his mother, is reduced to a blubbering idiot. He can no longer be his mother's instrument. She then turns to her husband, appeals to his sympathy, but he avoids her. The last scene shows the mother

and son, both haunted by the ghosts of the dead daughters-in-law. The mother sets herself on fire, by accident, while Shree runs away. The last shot shows Shree running, stumbling down a long dark road, away from the camera, into the night. The woman is destroyed and the man freed from her clutches, escapes. Man as a position is indestructible. Shree is saved because he is only an instrument of evil and not the source of it. The serial can be read as a narrative of what happens when a man falls into the clutches of a woman. Order and equilibrium are restored only when he escapes the woman and she, the source of evil, is destroyed.

Udaan (The Flight) delineates two spaces: the feudal patriarchal joint family and the modern nuclear family. It represents a movement from the former to the latter, a flight from the shackles of the joint family to the freedom of the nuclear family. We will attempt to explore the delineation of these two spaces in Udaan, in particular the construction of gender and power relations within them.

The narrative (for a synopsis, refer to Appendix VI) opens with a portrayal of the feudal family: the celebrations marking the birth of a grandson. This particular family has at its head a traditional patriarch and his scheming second wife, who subtly wields power over the patriarch, in order to marginalize her step-son and promote her own son. The elder (step) son has his

own family - a daughter, Kalyani, and the son who has just been born. The feudal family is presented as one where the individual has no say. Everything and everyone is subject to the law of the patriarch, which extends beyond the boundaries of the household, oppressing tenants and servants. Kalyani's father is a misfit within this order and is so marginalized that he has been sent away to attend the property matters on the occasion of the celebrations marking the birth of his son. Also at the margin on this occasion are Kalyani, eclipsed by the birth of a brother and Bua, the father's sister, who lives out the stigmatized fate of a widow. The patriarch and his wife want Kalyani to be withdrawn from school and married, as all girls in the family have been. This is resisted by Kalyani's father. Finally he and his family have to leave the feudal household, all because he wants a better life for his daughter. The serial makes use of the cliched motif of a bird being released from a cage - Kalyani's last act before the family leaves the house.

The next episode presents the nuclear family, in sharp contrast to the feudal family from which it has escaped: the father working the barren land, with his bare hands, the close, comradely relationship between father and daughter, the camaraderie of the rural poor and their oppression at the hands of landlords, the mother's acceptance of this hard lot, yet her embarrassment when her prosperous brother and his wife come to visit them. In the course of the first two episodes, the two

spaces are defined in terms of a series of oppositions:

Feudal family

The oppressive law of the patriarch, manipulated by his wife.

The parent-child relationship as one of blind obedience, the child's interest subordinated to those of family prestige and duty.

False ideas of prestige and grandeur, sustained by the labour of others.

Oppression, of women, tenants and servants

Boys and girls as having distinct, preordained destinies

Nuclear family

The benevolent encouragement of the father, supported by his wife.

The parent-child relationship as one of communication and active interaction, the father winning the child's support, placing her interests as paramount.

Living within one's means, by one's own sweat.

Equality for women, and other marginal groups.

"Destiny" as a product of of one's labour, regardless of gender.

Udaan constructs, in opposition to the feudal family, a nuclear family which fits in with viewers' self-images and aspirations. It is the father-daughter relationship, at the core of the narrative, that viewers identify as the main thematic, a relationship that is 'progressive', yet reassuringly with room for 'traditional' values like sacrifice and obedience.

The injustice they show in that... Before, people were like that, their tradition about girls, not to teach them... In Udaan, they fight against it. This should happen. Girls should go out and do things. I like the father - he leaves his wealth and everything, all because of his daughter. In the future, she will pay him back - she will take revenge on her father's behalf (shipyard fitter, 38, Maharashtrian Hindu, 2 children).

I liked it - meaning, there was a lot to take from it... for us to teach our children. While watching it, we would tell the children - look how she listened to her father, did everything and became like this (Maharashtrian Hindu, 28, wife of skilled shipyard worker, 2 children).

Kalyani's struggle for success in a man's world becomes all the more acceptable to viewers because it is motivated not by self-interest but by the desire to restore self-respect and dignity to her father/family. The dominant formula identified by

a majority of viewers was Baap ka badla (revenge on behalf of her father) - an outcome anticipated early in the serial.

The narrative structure of the serial can be summarized as follows:

1. Kalyani's family (the good guys) leaves the feudal fold (the bad guys).
2. Against all odds, they manage to make a living.
3. The bad guys strike, depriving them of land and house.
4. The good guys move to the city and continue the struggle against the bad guys in court.
5. The bad guys strike again, crippling Kalyani's father.
6. Kalyani emerges as an avenging angel. She is successful in revenging her father's humiliation.
7. Kalyani faces a moment of realization: to live with dignity one cannot remain "common", one has to become "someone".
8. Kalyani joins the police, overcoming all obstacles of gender during training and after. Her superior remarks: "She is one of our best men".
9. Kalyani is sent on a difficult mission. She has to leave this half-way because of threats to her father from the bad guys.
10. Now in a position of power, she cracks down on the bad guys.
11. The bad guys seek a compromise. Her father advises her not to use her power to fight merely personal battles. The decision about the land grabbed from them should be left to the court. She should use her power to fight against social injustice.

Kalyani obeys her father.

While throughout the narrative, viewers could unambiguously relate to the struggle of Kalyani and her father against the feudal bad guys, the ending was seen as unsatisfactory, the main reason being that the narrative of family revenge and reconciliation was inconclusive:

They did not show a complete end. The revenge she had to take...that was not shown. I thought something more is going to happen. She holds him by the collar of his shirt, that's all. The end means the whole family should have come to know "We have made a mistake". They should have all started coming together again. Then we would have felt good about the end. But the complete end was not shown (shipyard fitter, Maharashtrian Hindu, 38, 2 children).

There were a couple of other reasons given for the feeling of incompleteness:

Where she was posted - there was some dacoity, I felt she will do something and show us. But they ended it before that, that's why it was incomplete. That would have been a good scene (Kannadiga Muslim school teacher, 50, 2 children).

The ending was incomplete. They should have shown about that fellow she likes - whether she gets married or not. They only showed about her taking revenge (Kannadiga Muslim, 20, unmarried, daughter of an electrician).

These feelings of incompleteness stem perhaps from viewers' generic expectations. For those viewers who regard Udaan as a family saga, the movement away from the joint family at the beginning of the narrative causes a disequilibrium. A restoration of the equilibrium calls for a return of the nuclear family to the joint family, but this time on the former's terms. A new familial order has to replace the old one. For those viewers who see the narrative primarily in terms of Kalyani's struggle for success, the narrative is incomplete, for there are unfinished tasks. Those who see marriage as the ultimate destiny of a woman also find the narrative incomplete, for the strand of romantic involvement, briefly introduced, is not followed through.

This expectation of narrative closure was remarked upon by those viewers who approached the serial metacritically:

The ending was good. They didn't exaggerate ... It was like an 'art film' ending. Some people didn't understand it. They felt the story was incomplete because they didn't show everyone living happily ever after. But many people have

improved after seeing regional films and all on TV. Their expectations have changed. They can understand that things can be left open. If it is a sad ending, people think about it. If it is a happy ending, people forget all about it (ITI student, 20, Maharashtrian Hindu).

To viewers, Udaan represents a demonstration of female power and competence, a presentation of the ideal modern father-daughter relationship, and the liberation of women from feudal oppression. One must examine the power relations and the construction of gender under this promise of liberation.

Firstly, in terms of gender, who exercises power and how is this exercise of power viewed? Within the feudal family, one finds the familiar pattern, also present in Aavhan: The evil woman (the stepmother) exercises power by proxy, through the patriarch. The apparently powerful patriarch can perhaps be exonerated. He is the victim of the machinations of his wife and her son. It is this evil power that engineers the attacks on the heroic nuclear family. There is a point when, on hearing about the attack on his elder son, the patriarch asks, "Was it necessary to get him beaten up?" The younger son, his mother's instrument, replies, "All is fair when it comes to status and money. You are old. Who will take care of mother and me?"

In contrast, the women in the nuclear family (Kalyani and

her mother) do not attempt to wield power over men. Kalyani, while apparently powerful, is an instrument of her father. He is responsible for making her what she is. Her courage and determination are but extensions of his own. When he is incapacitated, she reciprocates his encouragement and support, rising to the occasion to fight for her interests.

However, she can never be as good as him, despite all her striving. Kalyani is shown as breaking down at crucial points; only the inspiration and direction of her father pulls her through. During her training, when faced with an apparently insurmountable task, she nearly gives up. The memory of her father training her to ride the cycle spurs her to continue.

At another point, when on a new assignment in a dacoit-infested area, she sees the policemen treating complainants callously. She summons them and gives them a shrill dressing down, ending with "What do you people in position imagine us to be?" finally breaking down. In contrast, her father is always fully rational and in control of his emotions. He also has the ability to rise above petty self interest. This is evident from a significant dialogue sequence between Kalyani and her father, in the last episode, where he shows her the way. The sequence is summarized below.

Kalyani, standing on the terrace of the house, sees Hardyal

Singh (a feudal henchman) in his car. He has come to ask for a compromise. She is filled with bitter memories of how he attacked them and threw them out of their house. Her father comes up to look for her, and finds her standing in the rain:

Kalyani(K): Why are there people like Hardyal in this world?

Father(F): If there were no people like him, how would stories be made? If there is no struggle, what joy is there in life?

K: I want to teach Hardyal a lesson. I have initiated all these raids against him. Fellows like him understand only such language.

F: Are you happy?

K: No. I remember how we were thrown out (she recalls all the atrocities committed by Hardyal, including the attack on her father). I will never forgive him. He should suffer.

F: For what? Your traumas have not gone away.

K: What are you saying? That I should have let him go scotfree?

F: Fight without hatred and bitterness! Struggle against wrongdoing, but without taking sides. Don't think that I am not proud of you. But if you fight only for your family, that is not enough. Fight against corruption, greed for money, against slackness, against the judicial system, the bureaucracy. You were determined to come to this new house, so we came here. What for? In the court, people congratulate me (because of your success)... People are only interested in success!

K: So has my flight been in vain? I don't want to soar so high that I can't see the earth. I only want a handful of earth.

F: Play the game according to the rules. This matter will be settled by the court. You don't have to (mis)use your power (and your offices) to achieve this !

K: Father, you are way above (us)!

Masculinity is the gender norm against which both men and women are measured. What makes Kalyani extraordinary is that she is "as good a man". This emerges in the contrast set up between ordinary/extraordinary girls. Kalyani's extraordinariness is counterposed with ordinariness of her neighbours, young girls who are interested only in clothes, jewellery, film magazines and catching a husband. They are merely objects of decoration, burdens to be disposed of by their parents at the earliest opportunity. In the opposition between the world of women and men, the former appears frivolous, decorative, tradition-bound, while the latter is concerned with serious matters, with work, struggle and social justice. Women's work and contribution is seen as marginal and of little consequence. What matters is to work like a man, to be like a man.

The ultimate recognition for Kalyani comes when her superior officer says of her : "She is one of our best men!" Udaan's devaluation of women's domestic work is in keeping with the 'modern' notion that 'Girls should work'. Women viewers see in

the serial hope for their children, as well as a reaffirmation of their own marginal status.

Q: What do you feel - if your daughter wants to become like that, would you encourage her?

A: Yes, our children should do something good, each one feels... study well, make a name.

Q: You would like her to work outside the house?

A: Yes. That's what everyone is doing these days. Because if you stay at home, however much you do, nobody gives you any ...(recognition). If you do some good job outside, that has value. Now if you do some 'service' outside, people say she is serving. Housework - that everybody does, anybody can do, nobody values that. You can do any amount of work. Nobody sees that.

Q: Do you ever feel that you would have liked to work outside the house?

A: Yes. In the beginning... if from the beginning I had a job somewhere, it would have been good, I feel. Now, what happens - you get used to staying at home. Now if someone tells me - you do a job - I won't be able to manage (laughs).

Q: You are not used to it.

A: Yes, before - at that time I did think I would like to do a job - but... I didn't do it (sighs and laughs) (Goan Hindu, 36, wife of skilled worker, 2 children).

The identification of the extraordinary woman with masculinity has a two-fold implication. Firstly, only the extraordinary woman can be as good as a man. For a man, being a man comes naturally. For a woman, it is an uphill struggle where only the best can succeed. Secondly, the only way a woman can be extraordinary is to be like a man. There is nothing in the ordinary world of women worthy of recognition. It is only by negating the triviality of her world that a woman can achieve the extraordinary. Udaan posits the possibility that even when she does so, she is always in danger of lapsing back into her emotional, feminine ways. It is only the constant guidance and encouragement of a superior man that helps her to be rational and rise above petty, personal interests. Kalyani's 'Udaan' reminds one not so much of the flight of a bird, as of a kite, being held on course by the invisible strings of the male order.

The relationship between the State and the 'modern' family represented in Udaan emerges in stark contrast to the feudal family, which is a law unto itself. The feudal family, in its own self-interest, makes unscrupulous use of the modern institutions of the State, like the police, the judiciary and the political system; it does not obey the rules of the game and uses foul means to achieve its ends.

The nuclear family, though at times treated callously and unjustly by the police, judiciary and bureaucracy, continues to struggle for justice within the system. This is brought out most sharply at the end of the serial, when Kalyani's father tells her not to take the law into her own hands, but to play the game according to the rules, and to let the court decide the property matter. Thus, the ideal nuclear family accepts the State as the arbiter of justice and sees its task as one of fighting feudal aberrations within the system, like corruption and slackness. It does this by training its children to occupy positions of power, so that as good, responsible human beings, they can reform the system and make it more responsive to people's needs. In the final analysis, there is nothing really wrong with the system. The problem lies in faulty implementation. One finds this thematic being repeated across a range of programmes, particularly investigative exposes on various issues and current affairs.

In the father's attempt to make Kalyani a 'man' who plays the game according to the rules, one sees the two-fold process of subjection at work: the construction of a 'subject' with a conscience and free will, who is subject to the 'Subject'. Not for Kalyani is the anarchic, individualistic rebellion of the angry young (wo)men of the Hindi cinema; her objective, rational father ensures that the anger, revenge and love of family that motivated her to struggle for power is transformed into constructive, socially useful forms.

The dual connotation of "flying kites"²³ demarcates the boundaries of the space inhabited by the female construct: the good/modern/strong female - a kite that is flown, the bad/traditional/powerful female - a bird of prey. The traditional powerful woman (the mother in Aavhan, the stepmother in Udaan) is enmeshed in predation, procreation and self-preservation. She is committed to the clan, and not to any totalizing force outside. Ethical codes are restricted to the clan; the State enters her life only by default. Her world is a Darwinian 'woman eat woman' scenario; the only option available is to eat or to be eaten. The weak traditional woman (Veena in Aavhan, Bua in Udaan) is pitiable, yet noble, an ideal quarry for the male's (State's) intervention. Education, economic independence and urbanization are seen as windows to the outside world, bringing her within the ambit of the male/State order. This entry also signifies the channelling of primordial female energy, to be tamed in the first case, to be tapped in the second.

The ideal modern woman (Uma, Kalyani) situates herself within the rationality of male discourse, a kite tied to the invisible strings of the male norm. She internalizes this norm and strives to live up to it, constantly negating her inherent female lack (which finds expression in emotional outbursts).

At the level of structure, the transition from oppressive

tradition to liberating modernity is represented by the movement from the joint family to the nuclear family. Issues that threaten this transition are identified as 'women's issues': the domination of mothers over their sons and daughters-in-law; early marriages, where the couple is dependent on the extended family; the emphasis on producing a male heir, leading to uncontrolled procreation; excessive dowry demands which place a burden on fathers of girls - it is these that televisual discourse singles out as constituting the 'traditional oppression' of woman. One can think of other issues (which touch more directly on gender power relations) such as domestic violence and women's property rights, on which televisual discourse is resoundingly silent.

Dowry is projected as the most significant women's problem. This theme recurs in television programming, in serials, documentaries, social awareness advertisements and the afternoon chat show. Viewers recall the dramatic and the sensational: the hideously burnt dowry victim recounting her story, the Kanpur sisters dangling from the beams, the unfortunate Palghat sisters²⁴. All these images, real-life and fictional, interweave to construct a reality in which dowry becomes the most significant problem. For the average viewer, this problem, at least in its extreme form of life-threatening harassment, is a problem for 'others', a problem that happens elsewhere.

Even as it presents images of women's inequality, television

works towards concealing the inequality in everyday life. The televisual portrayal of women brings to the fore extremes that are remote from viewers' experience: on the one hand, women as pilots and Prime Ministers and, on the other, women as victims of dowry, sati and child marriage. The 'positive' images lend credence to the view that women have 'progressed' and can be 'as good as men'. The 'negative' images are seen as the problem of the 'other', of backward, illiterate, village people ("from Delhi, U.P., that side"). By contrast, everyday experience appears normal, natural and unproblematic: "We do not treat our women like that!"

In the delineation of power relations within the familial space, the man is generally absent or neutral, uninvolved in domestic struggles. 'Women are women's worst enemies' is a recurrent motif in television soap opera. Family dramas are often constructed around the mother-in-law/daughter-in-law polarity. One is good, the other bad, the husband being manipulated by the bad one. This also conforms to the way women tend to interpret their experience of domestic violence: the husband's violence is seen as instigated by the mother-in-law and/or sister-in-law. Soap opera and everyday experience both reaffirm the belief that women oppress each other. As opposed to this is the male, arbitrating the modes in which these women interact, specifying their legitimacy, their norms; and above all unobtrusive and invisible, a daguerreotype, not only candid and

objective, but from whose sole perspective all stories unfold.

The dividing practices and the technologies of the self, at the level of the familial, bring to bear a different set of concerns vis-a-vis television; the Kamgar Nagar respondents' negotiated acceptance of the pan-Indian identity, regarded by some as a cultural invasion, does not get reiterated in their relationship to the discourses of the family. The viewers saw these discourses as articulating their concerns and as a resource in self-transformation. This disjuncture between the modes in which viewers of Kamgar Nagar defined their ethnic and familial identities in relation to television can, perhaps, be ascribed to the fact that the former is seen as an operation of power that attempts to marginalize their specific cultural identity, whereas the latter has total coincidence with the flows of power within the family, reiterated as universal truths and hence, evoke identification and acceptance. Resistance to the pastoral power of the State is confined to moments when it is seen as impinging on the notion of familial propriety and morality. While for the adults of Kamgar Nagar, by and large, the televisual discourses on the familial represented 'real' relations of power with which they could identify, the children would use the same discourses to raise a metacritique of the 'reality' of these representations, showing a preference for genres that open out possibilities for game playing and 'talking back', rather than 'historicals'; this 'interaction' also offers possible ways of creating a space for themselves within the

confines of familial authority. The transformations that television helps to make possible, permeate the insertion of the familial subject in the larger public space, which the thesis takes up in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV
THE CITIZEN SPECTATOR

This chapter examines the relation of viewers to the televisual discourses of the public sphere, dividing them into three categories; those regarding the world 'out there', the State and the market. The first two emerge from viewers' reading of news and the third from their engagement with advertisements. The 'citizen spectator' is the product of the varied subject positions that viewers, encountering these discourses, might adopt. The first section, The Spectator and the World, delineates the subjectivity of the spectator who watches the world takes shape on the small screen with paradoxical feelings of power and powerlessness. The second section, 'Bad' Politicians/ 'Good' State, examines how viewers, placed in a situation of disillusionment with politics and a relative absence of civic fora, interpret in diverse ways the televisual discourses constructing the good State and the charismatic leader. The last section, The Consumption of Self-hood, explores how viewers, in consumption contexts distant from those constructed by advertising, are able, nevertheless, to negotiate their subjectivities in relation to it.

The Spectator and the World

The spectator is the product of a set of dividing practices,

operating both within and outside the familial space. In the first instance, the very act of purchasing a television puts viewers into a privileged class of those who can sit before their sets and witness events from all over the world, "as if (one) were there".

Mrs. M: Now yesterday was 15th August. We would not have known what was happening in Delhi. But we got a chance to see it with our own eyes... How they march, how they hoist the flag, we saw it all.

Q: You like to watch that?

Mrs. M: We like to watch. If we didn't have it (a TV), We wouldn't have known. We wouldn't have gone all the way to Delhi. If we didn't have a TV, we may have gone to someone else's house, but maybe not. In your own house, even while working, you can come in between and watch (Goan Hindu, 36, wife of crane operator, 2 children).

Having one's own TV thus puts the viewer in a category of "one who knows", and for whom this knowledge comes with ease.

You get complete information... you come to know the news about the whole world... the Iran-Iraq war, whatever is happening anywhere, we can sit at home and watch... now that Nelson Mandela... I didn't know before who he was (laughs)... Only through watching the news I came to know -

who he is, how many years he's in jail, why he's in jail... now I know (shipyard fitter, 38, Maharashtrian Hindu, 2 children).

This knowledge, also gives the viewer entry into a world of discourse, from which he would otherwise be excluded. A shipyard plumber, 45, Goan Catholic, who plans to buy a TV, talks of his reasons for doing so:

If you buy a TV, you have an idea of what's happening. And in the company, your status improves, your knowledge increases. That's why I want a TV. When Eduardo Faleiro speaks, they show it on TV. Other workers talk about it. If I have a TV, I too can join in.

This constitution of the self as knowledgeable is, for most workers in Kamgar Nagar, contingent on their acquisition of a TV. Their purchase of a TV has increased their interest in news.

Table 4.1 cross-tabulates the source of news of respondents before and after the acquisition of TV. Prior to TV, over a third had no regular source of news. A substantial majority of this group has begun watching television news, constituting nearly half of those who rely exclusively on television news. Moreover, there has been a marked switch from other sources to television, with nearly a third of newspaper readers, over two-

thirds of radio listeners and nearly a third of those who both read newspapers and listen to radio changing over to watching television to the exclusion of their prior sources. Even those who continue with their earlier sources place greater reliance on television news, regarding it as more comprehensive and credible than other sources.

Table 4.1

Percent Distribution of Respondents by Sources of News before and after Acquiring Television

Sources Before TV		Sources After TV					Row Total
TV	N	TV	N+TV	R+TV	N+R+TV	None	
N	10.0 100.0 (1)	30.0 6.0 (3)	60.0 35.3 (6)				12.0 (10)
R		69.2 36.0 (18)		30.8 100.0 (8)			31.3 (26)
N+R		29.4 10.0 (5)	64.7 64.7 (11)		5.9 100.0 (1)		20.5 (17)
TV		100.0 2.0 (1)					1.2 (1)
None		79.3 46.0 (23)				20.7 100.0 (6)	34.9 (29)
Column Total	1.2 (1)	60.2 (50)	20.5 (17)	9.6 (8)	1.2 (1)	7.2 (6)	100.0 (83)

Note:

1. N=Newspaper, R = radio, TV = Television,
None = no regular source
2. The first percent in each block indicates row percent, the second the column percent and the frequency is given in brackets
3. Of the 88 respondents 5 were non-owners of TV, and hence were not included for this item

One reason cited for this is the visual dimension of television news, which makes it easier to 'read':

If something happens somewhere and we just hear about it, we don't know where it is, the geographical location, the surrounding areas, what it looks like. From the news, we get a better idea, we come to know all this (clerical worker, Goan Catholic, 35, 2 children).

Television news is regarded by most viewers as more credible than other sources because it gives viewers a sense of being witness to events as they happen:

If a plane falls down, they actually show it happening. One feels eager to watch. Something happens accidentally and we can deliberately watch it. We feel as if we have seen it with our own eyes (carpenter, Goan Hindu, 37, 4 children).

This 'seeing for oneself' guarantees the objectivity and 'truth' of television news:

Now previously, in the news (on radio and in the papers) they could lie. If 2 died, then 10 deaths were reported and vice-versa. And the reporters are all different, each adding his own brand of spice. But that, doesn't happen on TV. You can see for yourself. They actually show what has happened (shipyard fitter, Maharashtrian Hindu, 38, 2 children).

Compared to newspaper accounts, where there could be different, conflicting versions, which are hence all suspect, the univocality and unambiguity of television news is seen as guaranteeing its credibility. Moreover, occurring as it does, as a continuum in time and space, drawing the viewer through a sequence of items, which does not permit retroactive reading, it gives the viewer a sense of having a detailed, up-to-date, easily accessible view of happenings all over the world. This bird's-eye view of the world is facilitated by devices such as slow motion replay.

If something happens somewhere, we come to know exactly how it happened. For instance, if there is a plane crash, they show the tape of it - how the planes collided, how they broke into pieces, how the pieces fell. They show it again and again, from different sides, slowly, so that we can see with our own eyes exactly what happened (shipyard fitter,

36, Maharashtrian Hindu, 3 children).

The interest in the visually spectacular, to the exclusion of all other news is evident from a practice in some families, generally Goan Catholic. When the news begins, the volume is turned down, allowing for conversation and music. In the course of conversation, visual sequences that catch the eye are speculated about, or commented on. For instance, once when I was watching in this fashion with my host family, my landlady remarked, on seeing Rajiv Gandhi on a tour: "Look at him, he goes all over the place and wastes money. Here, prices are rising. Ration oil has gone up from Rupees 38 to 46 a kilo. They have reduced the rice quota by one kilo", after which the conversation went on to the rising cost of living. If there is a spectacular visual sequence, like an accident, a calamity or a sports event, the volume is turned up, or the next news bulletin watched for details.

"We can see it with our own eyes" is a recurrent theme in viewers' accounts of television news. The spectator-subject experiences a sense of power vis-a-vis others who do not have TV sets, for television gives him the means to "recognize who's who", to experience a sense of "travelling all over the world", to verify for himself the truth, as he sees it unfold instantaneously before his gaze. He contrasts the cosy domesticity in which he watches with the tragedies occurring

before him, and constitutes himself as "better off" and fortunate:

We come to know how people in other places face problems and we pity them. People have to walk for miles to get a bucket of water. Then sometimes there are floods. We feel we're better off here. People here grumble about small discomforts. There for years people bear so much (retired driver, 57, Goan Catholic, 3 children).

Television transports the spectator-subject out of the monotony of his everyday world, as well as reaffirms his faith in its normality and comfort. The spectator-subject is thus a site of two sets of dividing practices: on the one hand, he constitutes himself as 'knowledgeable' vis-a-vis those who have no access to television and on the other, as better off in relation to the objects of suffering he sees on television. A third set of dividing practices operate within the familial space, in terms of gender.

The spectator-subject is male in a dual sense. Firstly, given the routines of domestic work and the division of labour in the family, many women are unable to sit before the TV and watch the news:

I don't watch much. There's cooking to be done, water to be

filled. No time at all. If an accident or plane crash takes place, the children call out to me, and I come running to see that (wife of shipyard welder, 35, Maharashtrian Hindu, 3 children).

For a man, the world of work is left behind when he leaves his workplace, whereas for a woman, there is constant negotiation between work and leisure as she struggles to make time for the programmes she enjoys, which would be generally the 9 p.m. Hindi serial and, occasionally, the 7.45 p.m. Marathi serial. The demarcation of 'public' and 'private' spaces, with the woman being expected to take greater interest in the latter, also influences women's choice of programmes to be watched. Table 4.2 crosstabulates news watching by gender, indicating a significant difference. While a fairly large number of women do watch the news regularly, this is much less than the corresponding figure for men. Moreover, of those who do not watch the news, the overwhelming majority are women. It should also be noted that many women who report that they watch the news are actually listening to the news as they do their domestic chores in the next room, stopping their work to watch attentively if there is an item of interest.

Table 4.2

Percent Distribution of Extent of Newswatching by Gender

Frequency of watching	Gender		
	Male	Female	
Always	87.5 (35)	60.4 (29)	
Sometimes	10.0 (4)	18.8 (9)	
Never	2.5 (1)	20.8 (10)	
Column Total	45.5 (40)	54.5 (48)	100.0 (88)

$$\chi^2 = 9.20, \text{ D.F.} = 2, P < .05$$

There is a second sense in which the spectator-subject is male. The gaze of the spectator, with its elements of voyeurism and fascination at the spectacle, is a predominantly male response, characteristic of young males.

Whatever happens anywhere in the world, we get to see it on TV. For instance, sometime back, three aeroplanes crashed. In the papers, they mentioned it, but didn't show an picture. When they showed it on TV (laughs) it was like fun to watch it. Like in the movies (shipyard apprentice, Maharastrian Hindu, 18).

In contrast, women usually express either sympathy or a mixture of sympathy and interest in the spectacle:

When we watch an accident, we feel ... what's left in this

world? What value does human life have? We feel sad. It disturbs us. If someone dies, a good man, we feel very disturbed (Goan Catholic, wife of motorcycle taxi driver, 45, 4 children).

When we see someone injured or killed, we feel bad. We say, "How terrible". At the same time, we feel like watching - how they got burnt, how they were taken to hospital. We get to see all that (wife of barge worker, 24, Maharashtrian Muslim, one child).

Confronted by a televisual world of sudden calamities and suffering, women (and, to some extent, older men) often adopt the stance not of powerful spectators, but of helpless bystanders, who become aware of their own finitude:

We saw ourselves - the Russian earthquake. What can happen in one second. Even if you are rich, you have everything, ultimately everything is in God's hands. In one second, everything can change. So much suffering in this world - fighting and wars. When man gets angry, he forgets himself (Goan Catholic, wife of shipyard supervisor, 45, 3 children).

The gaze of the spectator-subject does not stratify televisual discourse into 'information' and 'entertainment'. The

so-called 'entertainment programmes' (the soap operas) are regarded as sources of information, revealing what actually happens in homes, hospitals, police stations and courtrooms. Conversely, the news is regarded as containing elements of entertainment - this is the case when spectacular scenes (accidents, calamities, sports) are shown. However, even an apparently matter-of-fact account of the death of President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan could be constructed into a bizzare narrative that reads like a soap - opera plot, as the following account of a shipyard apprentice indicates:

He had died much earlier, but they only announced it on the 8.30 news. He was completely burnt, his body, so they could recognize that it was him only from the teeth. It was a good thing for India that he died (pause) He... what is the name of that wife... Bhutto... Benazir Bhutto. She was his opponent. So Zia used his cunning to make her his wife. And the Assembly she had got together, he banned it... And within 90 days he was to declare elections. But there was a dictatorship there - he was also an army general. So he didn't declare elections then... He waited till Benazir Bhutto was pregnant and in the 9th month... that's when he announced the elections. Because he knew she's pregnant, she won't be able to take part. But, in the meantime, there was this plane crash and he died. It ended there. From

India's point of view, it was good (Maharashtrian Hindu, 18) .

'Bad' Politicians/'Good' State

In Kamgar Nagar, there is a pervasive feeling of either cynicism or indifference towards political processes and institutions. Politicians are regarded as opportunists whose 'help' is contingent upon their capturing votes and who hence become visible only prior to the elections. This political event is taken as an opportunity for negotiating with politicians in order to obtain civic amenities for the area. This is the only occasion when people feel they have some power, a strategic advantage to exercise vis-a-vis the powers-that-be in order to elect a response from an otherwise unresponsive system:

When it's time for voting, they come and say-will give you a tap, a house, this, that and the other. After that, there are no signs of them. They leave the roads half done and go. We have to wait until the next election. That's the only time they do a little bit (wife of tailor, 27, Kannadiga Muslim, 2 children).

People conceive of politicians as individual power brokers who mediate between the government and the people. Discussion of politics is in terms of individuals, rather than parties.

I vote for whoever is good and works for people. But when they are elected, for a short while they are good. Then they stop taking interest - look at Simon - where does he bother? Now Herculano Dourado - he was good, did lots of work, built chawls and roads. If there are elections, he might come back (shipyard plumber, 45, Goan Catholic).

The power exercised by politicians and other government functionaries is regarded as corrupting. In fact, the word politics is synonymous with a breakdown of morality.

We are helpless, we can't do anything. We feel like doing something, but the government doesn't function at all. Everywhere, in every field there is politics. That's why we're helpless (pause) for everything, you need influence... job, admission... nothing without influence. So we are citizens, but we can't do anything (shipyard apprentice, 20, Maharashtrian Hindu).

Compounding the disillusionment with political processes is the absence of civic fora in which citizens could participate. The only forms of community organization that engage most viewers are activities related to the church, temple and mosque committees. These committees collect subscriptions, organize festivals, cultural events and, in some cases, religious education for

children. Other than these committees, there are youth clubs and a samiti which is almost defunct. Trade unions are by and large, regarded as confined to pragmatic, economic mediation between workers and management:

The Union stands between the workers and the management. They will go to whichever side gives them more benefit. The Union is just like an advocate in court (dock worker, 45, Tamilian Hindu).

There, thus, appear to be no mediating fora between the individual and the world of politics, exacerbating the feeling of being powerless and voiceless¹.

Confronted with a barrage of positive images of the State on television, in the context of their disillusionment with government functioning, viewers make sense of this discrepancy in various ways, responding with indifference, resistance, partial acceptance or acceptance. Table 4.3 indicates the frequency in each category.

Table 4.3

Distribution of Response to State portrayal on TV

Response	Frequency	Percent
Rejection	25	28.4
Indifference	26	29.5
Partial Acceptance	15	17.0
Acceptance	22	25.0
Total	88	100.0

Indifference to the State and to politics in general including its televisual portrayal is the most predominant response. Women are significantly more indifferent than men. Table 4.4 indicates that almost half of the women respondents express indifference, as opposed to a small section of men.

In terms of religious community, Table 4.5 indicates that Catholic and Muslim respondents of Kamgar Nagar are significantly more indifferent, with nearly a third of the former and nearly half of the latter falling into this category. The greater indifference of the Catholics can perhaps be accounted for in terms of their alienation from both television discourse and the political process. In the case of the Muslims, it is predominantly the women who express indifference, claiming that they

have little knowledge of or interest in what goes on in the area of politics.

Table 4.4
Percent Distribution of Response to State Portrayal
on TV by Gender

Response	Gender		
	Male	Female	
Rejection	37.5 (15)	20.8 (10)	
Indifference	10.0 (4)	45.8 (22)	
Partial Acceptance	30.0 (12)	6.3 (3)	
Acceptance	22.5 (8)	27.1 (13)	
Column Totals	45.5 (40)	54.5 (48)	100.0 (88)

$$\chi^2 = 9.20, \text{ D.F.} = 2, P < .05$$

Table 4.5

Percent Distribution of Response to State Portrayal
on TV by Religion

Response	Religion			
	Hindu	Catholic	Muslim	
Rejection	43.3 (13)	32.3 (10)	7.4 (2)	
Indifference	13.3 (4)	32.3 (10)	44.4 (12)	
Partial Acceptance	10.0 (3)	19.4 (6)	22.2 (6)	
Acceptance	33.3 (10)	16.1 (5)	25.9 (7)	
Column Total	31.1 (30)	35.2 (31)	30.7 (27)	100.0 (88)

$$\chi^2 = 14.69; \text{ D.F.} = 6, P < .05$$

Resistance, the second most prevalent response, takes various forms. Firstly, some viewers reject the televisual portrayal of the government as false:

The government does nothing. Prices are increasing. They show how he (Rajiv Gandhi) goes here and there? What's the use of that? It's all lies. If the government were doing

something, then why is there fighting and bloodshed? Why are there robberies? They don't take any action. Truth has no value and corruption is a way of life. We have to just Zwatch TV and keep our mouths shut (retired dock worker, 59, Goan Catholic, 5 children).

Some of those who question the government portrayal are able to point out how it might be 'rigged' to promote the State.

Rajiv Gandhi gives speeches about what the government has done. On radio too, the same thing. Not that we believe all that we see. For example, they show how Rajiv Gandhi goes to a slum and someone gives him a turban to wear. He picks up the little children and acts as if he has put an end to everyone's troubles. Not that everyone there loves him. Actually, it is a deliberate programme, rigged so that the government can show people how much they are doing (shipyard fitter, 36, Maharashtrian Hindu, 3 children).

In terms of gender, male respondents tend to be more critical than female, with over a third falling into this category, as opposed to only a fifth of women (Table 4.4). Both Hindu and Catholic respondents are significantly more critical than Muslims (Table 4.5). Perhaps, this can partly be explained in economic terms, as a significant number of the Muslims interviewed were small businessmen and there appears to be less

frustration, with their economic prospects, among the youth and male adults of this community than in the other communities.

All other factors aside, the sharpest critique came from those who are badly off, either in absolute terms, or relative to their aspirations. For instance, according to an illiterate Muslim woman, living in the most dilapidated area of Kamgar Nagar, the Housing Board Colony :

Rajiv Gandhi says: we'll do this, we'll do that. We have been complaining about our road and toilets. The road is like a swamp, full of mosquitoes... the toilets have been cleaned only once in five years. Because of the mosquitoes, we had to buy a fan and pay electricity bills. They promise a lot, but do nothing. If they promise something, they should do it, but only when voting time comes they show their faces. Last elections, they completed half the road. Now we'll see - the elections are coming - what they'll do (Kannadiga Muslim, 23, wife of a construction worker).

Table 4.6 presenting the response to State portrayal by age indicates that the youth (below 25) and the older generation (over 55) tend to be more critical than the intermediate age groups, with nearly a third of the youth and nearly half of the older group falling into this category. The difference, however, is not statistically significant.

Table 4.6
Percent Distribution of Response to State Portrayal
on TV by Age

Response	Age Group			
	< 25	26-55	>55	
Rejection	30.6 (11)	24.4 (11)	42.7 (3)	
Indifference	33.3 (12)	28.9 (13)	14.3 (1)	
Partial Acceptance	19.4 (7)	15.6 (7)	14.3 (1)	
Acceptance	16.7 (6)	31.1 (14)	28.6 (2)	
Column Total	40.9 (36)	51.1 (45)	8.0 (7)	100.0 (88)

$$\chi^2 = 3.47; \text{ D.F.} = 6, P > .05$$

Both these groups expressed the greatest degree of frustration with their economic prospects, as the youth faced unemployment and the older age group, redundancy. Among Catholics of the older age group, both men and women, there was often a harking back to the golden era of the Portuguese.

During Portuguese times, there was a dictatorship. But there was discipline and law and order. Not so much cheating and corruption. There is little honesty in India (Goan

Catholic, 45, wife of shipyard supervisor, 3 children).

Resistance also takes the form of accepting the reality of the televisual image, but interpreting these images of prosperity in terms of discrimination by the government against "our" region and community. This feeling was articulated predominantly by Goan Catholics:

In Delhi and those parts of the country, there are lots of improvements. But not here. No one bothers about us here. All the facilities are for Delhi (shipyard fitter, 35, Catholic Gaudi, father of 5).

They help ghantis. We watch Rajiv Gandhi on TV, going here and there, helping ghantis. He doesn't help us. These days, the mahars and chamars have become big people. And they crush us down. Prices are rising and my pay doesn't last even for 8 days. (shipyard carpenter, 43, Catholic, father of 4).

Partial acceptance (Table 4.3) is the stance adopted predominantly by the more middle class viewers, those with white collar jobs and greater access to education and sources of information other than television. This is the 'liberal' viewpoint, where there is interest in knowing what the government is doing, who's who, and so on, all of which is seen as information useful for

individual development, contributing to the general knowledge and social skills. Simultaneously, there is a matter-of-fact acceptance of the fact that the news is partial and pro-government; this realization does not appear to arouse anger or anti-government feelings;

Overall, it is difficult to come to a conclusion. We can't say that the Government is 100 % efficient. Government scandals can't be ruled out. For example, Bofors... the newspapers and the opposition exposed the government. But at the same time, one can't say that the opposition is 100 % correct. We don't really have a clear picture. Nothing can be proved (accounts clerk, 35, Goan Hindu).

Acceptance of the news as showing what actually happens, and hence, providing a correct portrayal of the State was the response of a fourth of respondents (Table 4.3). There were significantly more women than men (Table 4.4) and fewer Catholics than Hindus or Muslims (Table 4.5). Confronted with the reality of the good State on television, in contrast to their experience of politics, viewers make sense of this discrepancy by differentiating between the Centre and local government, between those at the top who plan and those below who implement. Their resistance is confined to the immediate modes of power that confront them, that is, to the smaller orders of the hierarchy. Thus, they would regard the Centre and those at the top as good,

honest and pro-people, while the local government and bureaucracy is seen as corrupt, self-seeking and anti-people.

The government is good. They can't keep an eye on everything. Those below are corrupt. It's our people who engage in such activities ... under-the-table deals. They take 5 months to do 5 minute's work, if you don't pay them. People at the top are good. Even if they are corrupt, they don't harass poor people (retired driver, Goan Catholic, 57).

In support of their belief that the Centre is good and the local government inefficient, people cite two instances. The first relates to a visit by Rajiv Gandhi (before he became Prime Minister) to the area, to lay the foundation stone of a new government school: "Even when Rajiv Gandhi came here to lay the stone, Rane told him it was illegal and stopped him" (retired winchman, 55, Goan Catholic). The people hold Rane, the Chief Minister at the time, responsible for this perfidy and insult to their area. The second instance was the lock-out declared by the management due to labour unrest in the Goa Shipyard in 1987-88.

If the company (shipyard) is closed, the (local) government doesn't come to our assistance. The government should not have allowed the shipyard lockout. We even took a delegation to Rane, but he didn't bother to respond. Finally, only after Eduardo Faleiro came from Delhi, only then the

matter was solved (shipyard vessel master, 45, Maharashtra Muslim, 4 children).

People's experience as well as the sense they make of the televisual discourse bear out the perception that all power and decision making comes from the Centre.

Here we have a lot of politics, this party, that party, so many parties. But they can't do anything. Everything comes from Delhi. Eduardo Faleiro, he does a lot - I've seen it in the news - he represents Goa. Not only Goa. He goes abroad, to Britain, America and speaks for the whole of India. They show it on TV. Whatever I'm telling you is all on the basis of what I've seen in the news (retired winchman, 55, Goan Catholic).

Viewers express faith in a core of power that rises above petty interests, acting as an arbiter of truth. This core is personified by the late Rajiv Gandhi (the then Prime Minister). News narratives that present Rajiv Gandhi as a crusader against corruption and non-implementation are invoked in this construction of a centre of "truth beyond power":

When Rajiv Gandhi goes to different places, he finds out about people there. The government gives people many facilities. He goes to find out whether all this really reaching people. Sometimes, those in between keep things for them-

selves, so he goes to investigate. If we read about this in the paper, we might think it's not true. Because we can see it with our own eyes, we know it is the truth (...). The other day, I saw it in the news. Rajiv Gandhi went to some place where there were fields. The person in charge, who was supposed to do some work showed big bills. Rajiv Gandhi himself went to see the work, and there was nothing there, only empty fields. So he started an inquiry and that fellow got caught. (Goan Catholic, 36, wife of Port Trust engine driver, 3 children).

Viewers make sense of the larger configurations of power in terms of power relations that are proximate. Thus, the notion of the patriarchal family is frequently invoked when discussing the relation of the Centre to the lower orders of the hierarchy. Power is seen as naturally emanating from the Centre, as from the patriarch:

The Centre should be strong. It is the Centre that gives power to others. The Centre is like a father. The states are children. The children can't teach the father what he should do. They must respect the father. Even if the opposition is in power in a state, the Centre should not discriminate. All children are the same (Goan Hindu, 45, electrician).

Notions of polity and statecraft draw on the familial in a dual sense - firstly, governing the country is equated with running a family; secondly, dynastic rule is taken for granted:

With one month's pay, we can't run our own household. And the Government has to run the whole country. It's difficult, you are answerable to everybody. Rajiv Gandhi is good, he tries his best. But who listens? It's his family business, he has to do it, and he does his best. He gives crores of rupees to the poor. But those in between finish it (Goan Muslim, customs clearing agent, 63).

There are several strands in the discourse of Rajiv Gandhi as benevolent power source, 'father' of the nation. The saviour/crusader myth has already been discussed earlier. Contributing to this is the physical appeal of Rajiv Gandhi and his family, the 'style' that they represent.

Sonia Gandhi always goes with him. She looks nice. Her hair is so soft and silky. Actually, she is old, but because of her makeup and all she looks young (Kannadiga Hindu, 24, divorcee, daughter of security guard).

The humility of a great man, which can provide a good example to others, is another recurrent theme:

He treats everyone the same... doesn't believe in caste and

all that. When we see him, we come to know - we too should try to be like that. (school teacher, 18, daughter of a carpenter, Goan Hindu).

He is a great man, but wherever he goes, he helps people. We also should do that. I like to see him, how he visits villages and talks to poor people (wife of shipyard supervisor, 45, Goan Catholic, 3 children).

Rajiv Gandhi is regarded as an embodiment and representative of the nation's pride, furthering the stature of India in the eyes of the world:

He is respected by the whole world. Everywhere, they garland him. Nobody criticizes him. I like to watch that (retired driver, 57, Goan Catholic, 3 children).

Under his leadership, they (the Congress) have brought progress in the country by introducing the latest, modern things. India is a world leader sending up satellites and all (shipyard fitter, 38, Maharashtrian Hindu, 2 children).

Rajiv Gandhi is seen as rising above the partisan world of politics, a leader whose exploits are of human interest as well as of national significance. The objections of opposition leaders to excessive coverage of the Prime Minister and the ruling

party are regarded as politically motivated ploys, •Doordarshan's definitions of newsworthiness being taken for granted as natural:

Since Rajiv Gandhi is the leader of the country, everyday he does something of importance, which they show on TV. That's the main news, so they are obliged to show it. The opposition parties keep complaining that Rajiv Gandhi is being shown on TV all the time. It's not as if they show him deliberately (shipyard fitter, 38, Maharashtrian Hindu).

The themes of the charismatic leader and a strong, stable Centre that viewers identify as significant within the televisual discourse, in the context of their general indifference/cynicism about politics and the local government, work towards the legitimation of an objective, rational and effective power centre. Thus, when asked to compare the central and local governments (Table 4.7) , over a fourth felt that the former was better, as opposed to a small section, whose preference was for the latter, while over a fourth said they did not know and over a fifth felt that both are equally bad.

Table 4.7

Distribution of Response to Comparison of
Centre and Local Government

Response	Frequency	Percent
Centre Better	24	27.3
No difference	5	5.7
Both bad	19	21.6
Local better	11	12.5
Any other	6	6.8
Don't know	23	26.1
Total	88	100.0

As Table 4.8 indicates, in response to the question of who should have more power, over a third felt that it should be the Centre, as opposed to a miniscule minority, who preferred the local government. Nearly a fifth felt that it made no difference and less than a third fell in the 'don't know' category.

Table 4.8

Distribution of Response to 'Who Should Have More Power?'

Response	Frequency	Percent
Centre	32	36.3
Local Government	6	6.8
Makes no difference	15	17.0
Any other	8	9.1
Don't know	27	30.7
Total	88	100.0

Thus, over a third of the respondents view political power as emanating legitimately from a strong Centre, in comparison to which the local government is impotent and ineffective. The acquisition of statehood is regarded by many as exacerbating an already bad situation; they feel they were better off with Union Territory status:

The local government made a 100 % mistake by acquiring statehood. A state should be independent, have its own resources and funds (accounts clerk, 35, Goan Hindu).

To hell with the Goan Government! Now Goa is a state, the ration quota of rice has reduced from 6 to 4 kg. There's no wheat available. We were better off under Delhi rule. (Kannadiga Muslim girl, 21, daughter of retired supervisor).

The indifference to the political process is nowhere more apparent than when respondents were asked about their opinion of the opposition. Table 4.9 indicates that while a fourth of the respondents felt that the opposition was necessary, a negligible few regarded the opposition as useless, while an overwhelming 39.7 % said that they did not know. This figure is on the higher side, when compared to the 29.5 % in the 'indifferent' category in Table 4.3 or with the percentages in the 'don't know' category for other questions on politics (generally between 25% and 30%).

Table 4.9

Distribution of Opinion on the Opposition

Response	Frequency	Percent
Necessary	22	25.0
Useless	8	9.1
All politicians bad	21	23.9
Any other	2	2.3
Don't know	35	39.7
Total	88	100.0

The reason for this could be two-fold: firstly, given that most viewers' information on national 'politics' is derived from television, the low televisual coverage to the opposition could account partly for their lack of information. As mentioned earlier, when it comes to local politics, by and large people do not think in categories such as "opposition" or "ruling party", but in terms of individuals and election symbols ("Simon", "Rane's man", "hand", "two leaves", etc.)². Secondly, as opposed to Rajiv Gandhi, who is regarded as beyond the realm of politics, the opposition is seen as situated squarely within the political field, often causing unnecessary disruption and interference. This can also be related to viewers' perception of the State as a patriarchal family, where any dissent would be regarded as disrespectful and disruptive. Their "opposition" to the core of power is regarded as stemming from vested interests:

They keep fighting among themselves. All they do is oppose that's all. The opposition party is for that (shipyard fitter, 38, Maharashtra Hindu).

They keep filling their own pockets. Only by criticizing the government they fill their stomachs. Why do they spend on paying people to shout and take morchas? Because when they come into power, they will recover their money (retired driver, 57, Goan Catholic).

Many viewers, particularly women and girls, were not sure what the opposition was. A few equated the opposition with terrorists:

They are terrorists. They tell lies and win over people to their side... cause disunity among people. We should not listen to them (Kannadiga Muslim, 36, wife of motor mechanic).

If one compares the figures for viewers' perceptions of the televisual coverage of the opposition and of Rajiv Gandhi, the point made earlier, regarding the equation of politics in a pejorative sense with the opposition seems to be borne out. Tables 4.10 and 4.11, when compared indicate that more respondents answered 'don't know' when asked about their opinion of opposition coverage than about Rajiv Gandhi. Additionally,

nearly two-thirds said that they were not interested in the opposition coverage and had no opinion on the issue. Less than a fifth felt that the opposition coverage was inadequate. In comparison, nearly half felt that the coverage of Rajiv Gandhi was either adequate or could be increased, while slightly over a third felt that it was excessive. Those who felt that the opposition coverage is inadequate and the coverage of Rajiv Gandhi excessive were largely those belonging to the 'partial acceptance' category (Table 4.3), many of them white-collar, relatively younger and more educated and accepting the function assigned to the opposition and the media within a parliamentary democracy: the opposition should ensure the accountability of the ruling party and the media should cover both sides.

Table 4.10

Distribution of Opinion on Televisual Coverage of Opposition

Response	Frequency	Percent
Inadequate	16	18.2
Not interested	54	61.3
Any other	2	2.3
Don't know	16	18.2
Total	88	100.0

Table 4.11

Distribution of Opinion on Televisual Coverage of Rajiv Gandhi

Response	Frequency	Percent
Inadequate	2	2.3
Adequate	40	45.5
Excessive	32	36.4
Any other	2	2.3
Don't Know	12	13.6
Total	88	100.0

To sum up, with the entry of the televisual discourses on the State in a situation where viewers are disillusioned with local politics and have no access to civic fora, a significant number of viewers (in the present study, around a fourth) constitute themselves as citizens in relation to a strong Centre and an uncorrupted, apolitical, benevolent core of power, personified by Rajiv Gandhi. Their resistance is confined to the modes of power adjacent to them, to the lower orders of the hierarchy, represented by local politicians and the bureaucracy. The higher orders of power are comprehended in terms of immediate relations of power, namely the familial; hence the conception of the State as family, with Rajiv Gandhi as father and a rejection of dissent as represented by the opposition. This notion of the State also works towards legitimizing the State intervention in the sphere of the familial, discussed in the previous chapter. However, there is also rejection and more global resistance to

the televisual discourses, particularly by those sections who feel economically deprived and culturally marginalized and hence beyond the pale of citizenship. In the present study, this group constituted nearly a third. For this group all politicians are essentially corrupt and exploitative and the televisual images of prosperity and plenty either an eyewash or a marker of regional/communal discrimination. A fair number (constituting less than a third) of viewers, the bulk of them women, continue to be indifferent to the political process and its televisual portrayal. However, even some of those who profess indifference to politics are able to relate to the news narratives of Rajiv Gandhi as a crusader against corruption and a saviour of the masses. The smallest section of viewers (less than a fifth) constitute themselves in liberal terms, accepting the framework of a parliamentary democracy, holding no strong political views, but seeing information about politics as useful to their individual development.

The Consumption of Self-hood

When considering the 'impact' of Doordarshan, many proponents of the communication approach to development tend to view the consumerism it promotes as inimical to the developmental objectives of the medium. This stance does not take into

account the intrinsic linkages between the market and the pattern of development adopted. Apart from the logic of the market economy and its requirements of expanding demand which underpins the notion of development, even at the level of strategy there are congruencies. Marketing strategies and models are increasingly used to 'sell' development on television, constituting the State as a provider of developmental goods, services and attitudes that have to be appropriately marketed to 'the masses'. As discussed in chapter III, the consumption of these holds forth the promise of a transformation of identity, the telos being the modern, educated, urban middle-class consumer. A further problem with moralistic evaluations of consumerism is that they fail to consider the cultural meaning of consumption.

Recent work in cultural theory in the First World⁴ accords centrality to consumption within post-industrial, post-modern society, looking at commodities as systems of signs, marking the constitution of identities and hierarchies. Douglas and Isherwood (1979:67), for instance, conceive of goods in terms of an information system, providing visible markers of processes of classification, ordering and exclusion:

(...) consumption activity is the joint production, with fellow consumers, of a universe of values. Consumption uses goods to make firm and visible a particular set of judgments

in the fluid processes of classifying persons and events.

Featherstone points to how advertising and marketing strategies seek to create new associations and meanings far displaced from the original use-values of commodities. In the process, consumption has become a crucial aspect of the practice of identity as consumers cultivate lifestyles to make possible statements about who they are. Current advertising campaigns on Doordarshan, particularly for up-market textiles and cosmetic products, recognize and play on this quest for identity through consumption. The formal exterior of the 'Vimal' man of a recent advertising campaign is juxtaposed with his capacity for the playful⁵. His aura of distinction, built up through his exclusive clothes, the settings he presides over, his demeanour of playful authority, the women he commands and surprises through his penchant for the unconventional, all these place him in the category of "(...) the new heroes of consumer (who) make life-style a life project and display their individuality and sense of style in the particularity of the assemblage of goods, clothes, practices, experiences, appearance and bodily dispositions they design together into a lifestyle" (Featherstone, 1991:86).

How do viewers, in consumption contexts far removed from the lifestyles and identities constructed by the televisual discourse, negotiate, their self-hood as they confront new structures of desire and consumption? In the Goan context, consumption has a definitive place in the constitution of communal

identities. In chapter II, we have traced the emergence of a Catholic Goan identity, marked by conspicuous consumption of 'foreign goods', facilitated by gifts and remittances from expatriate workers. Phrases such as 'Goenkar sossegado', 'Goenkar horrado' sum up this self-image.⁶ Today, these phrases are trotted out with a mixture of pride and regret: the general feeling among the Catholic community being that their hedonistic lifestyle and easy going ways have contributed to their marginalization by outsiders and Goan Hindus. The following discussion on the practice of identity through consumption draws largely on my experience of living within the Goan Catholic community in Kamgar Nagar.

In most Catholic homes in Kamgar Nagar, one would find the persistence of consumption rituals and patterns characteristic of a primary production based economy. Many families (both Hindus and Catholics) get a part or the whole of their requirement of rice, coconuts and seasonal fruit from their ancestral property, there being a symbiotic relationship with the relatives looking after the property. For instance, the family I lived with had the wife's brother's children living with them. The children's boarding expenses were not paid for in cash. However, every time either of the brothers visited the family, they would bring gifts of rice, coconuts, vinegar, mangoes or other produce.⁷

The food habits and modes of preparing food remained, by and

large, traditional. For instance, though my landlady had a mixer, she would use the grinding stone to laboriously grind the condiments for the coconut curry every day. The usual meal (both lunch and dinner) consisted of rice, fish curry, fried fish and occasionally a vegetable preparation with coconut. The purchase of fish constitutes a significant event in all Goan families, both Hindu and Catholic, the price and quality of fish forming a common topic for discussion. In fact, the local equivalent of the British conversation on the weather is initiated with the question Aiz nusteak kitem? (literally translated, 'what's for fish today?'). On festive occasions, depending on the significance of the occasions, a pig would be slaughtered by the members of the family and turned into traditional festive dishes, such as sorpatel, chouricos and roast pork. (Many Catholic families in Kamgar Nagar keep pigs and fowls for their own consumption and for sale). Celebrations (especially marriages and christenings) involve the preparation of elaborate sweets, such as doce de grao and bibinca. On such occasions, close women friends and relatives assemble to help in the preparations for the feast. The home takes on a convivial air, as the women laugh, joke and chat with each other while they work. A traditional feast would include a pulao, pork, fish and chicken preparations, a salad and sweetmeats. Aerated drinks, beer and wine (occasionally whisky) would be served prior to the meal. In the Goan Catholic context, food products such as aerated and alcoholic drinks and soup cubes, that are relatively new to the

Indian market, can be seen as 'traditional', having been a part of upper caste Catholic consumption during Portuguese rule and, in the last generation, making their entry into lower caste households. At the level of food and cooking habits, there thus appears to be little change in the past 30 years, except for the fact that the newly rich lower castes have been able to emulate the consumption patterns of the upper castes. This would not involve much change in food habits, as there is little castewise difference in cuisine among the Catholics. It would mean greater and more frequent expenditure on celebrations. The recent exposure of Sudra Catholics to foreign cultures and to the televisual advertising of food products and food preparation technologies appear to have brought about little change in food and cooking habits. This appears to be true in more general terms, for all commodities.

The usefulness of the information on new food products is regarded by some as limited because of existing food habits.

We get new information through the ads, about soaps and things to eat. But we're not used to readymade foods. We prefer things made at home, like shev-chiwda, to Maggi noodles and things like that. Moreover, things are not as good as they show in the ads (shipyard carpenter, 37, Goan Hindu, 4 children).

Table 4.12 deals with the impact of televisual advertising on the purchase of items of daily use: bath soap, washing powder, cooking oil, tea and toothpaste. With the exception of soap, where over half the respondents have tried out a new brand introduced through advertising, in other cases, a majority of consumers have stayed with their usual brand. This is especially the case for cooking oil and tea, where only a small number have tried out new brands.

Table 4.12

Percent Distribution of Change in Brand Consumption of Selected Items with TV Advertising

Change in Brand	Soap	Washing Soap/ Detergent	Cooking Oil	Tea	Tooth Paste
Yes	51.1	33.0	10.2	26.1	26.1
No	48.9	67.0	89.8	73.9	73.9
N = 88	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

As far as the consumption of non-essential food products is concerned (aerated drinks, nutrition beverages (eg. Horlicks), chocolates, beverage concentrates (eg. Rasna), instant coffee and instant noodles), Table 4.13 shows that only a small percentage consume these regularly, the lowest regular consumption being of instant coffee and noodles, with a majority having never consumed these products. Nutrition beverages and chocolates have never been consumed by over half and over 40% respectively.

Aerated drinks are consumed occasionally by over a third and beverage concentrates by a half of the respondents respectively.

Table 4.13

Percent Distribution of Consumption of Selected commodities

Consumption Frequency	Soft drinks	Nutrition beverages	Chocolates	Soft Drink Concentrate	Instant Coffee	Instant Noodles
Regularly	11.4	18.2	5.7	22.7	9.1	5.7
Occasionally	37.5	19.3	30.7	50.0	23.9	21.6
Rarely	43.2	11.4	22.7	13.6	4.5	15.9
Never	8.0	51.1	40.9	13.6	62.5	56.8
N = 88	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 4.14 presents the impact of TV advertising on the consumption of these commodities. The beverage concentrate 'Rasna', a product introduced by television advertising, that has caught on, with slightly over half the respondents having adopted the brand after seeing the television advertisement, and nearly three-fourths using the product either regularly or occasionally.

Table 4.14
Percent Distribution of Product Adoption/Brand Change with TV Advertising

Adoption/ Change	Aerated drinks	'Nutrition' beverages	Chocolates	Soft Drink Concentrate	Instant Coffee	Instant Noodles
Yes	33.0	21.6	17.0	51.1	14.8	37.5
No	67.0	78.4	83.0	48.9	85.2	65.5
N = 88	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Over a third of the respondents have tried out instant noodles after seeing the advertisement. However, unlike Rasna, it is strange to the local palate, with only around a quarter consuming it either regularly or occasionally. A third of the respondents have tried out new brands of aerated drinks seen in TV advertisements. However, only a small number consume these regularly. While advertising might have helped to generate a demand for the product, the brands consumed are generally not the ones advertised, but locally produced, cheap substitutes. This would be the case for many products such as icecream, confectionery, chocolates, cosmetics and clothing, to name a few. It thus appears that the direct impact of advertising on consumption patterns in Kamgar Nagar is limited, given the relatively low levels of income and the persistence of customary modes of consumption. What appears to be more significant is the acquaintance with lifestyles, fashions, new products and new identities that the televisual discourse makes possible.

In this context, the viewers' perception of their class is relevant. Of those who could relate to a question asking them to place themselves in a matrix of four options (rich, middle class, working class, poor) three-fourths saw themselves as middle class, a fifth as working class and a miniscule percentage as poor .

Table 4.15
Distribution of Respondents' Perception of Class

Response	Frequency	Percent
Middle Class	49	75.4
Working Class	13	20.0
Poor	3	4.6
Total	65	100.0

Note: Of the 88 respondents, 23 could not relate to the question, giving answers such as "we don't believe in class", or detailed descriptions of their financial problems.

Table 4.16 presents the respondents' perceptions of their present financial status, indicating that nearly half are more or less satisfied and over a third well satisfied with their situation. According to Table 4.17, the majority feel that their economic status has improved over the past decade. Only less than a fifth feel that their status has deteriorated. As regards their

perception of future prospects (Table 4.18), the majority are uncertain and less than a third feel that their situation will improve. The high degree of uncertainty could perhaps be attributed to rising levels of inflation and unemployment, which viewers feel is the major problem facing them today.

Table 4.16

Distribution of Respondents' Perception of Present
Financial Condition

Perception	Frequency	Percent
Not satisfied	12	13.6
Fairly satisfied	42	47.7
Well satisfied	32	36.4
Any other	1	1.1
Don't Know	1	1.1
Total	88	100.0

Table: 4.17

Distribution of Respondents' Perception of Change in
Financial Position in the Past Decade

Percent	Frequency	Percent
Worse	17	19.3
Same	14	15.9
Better	55	62.5
Don't know	2	2.3
Total	88	100.0

Table 4.18

Distribution of Respondents' Perception of Future Financial
Prospects

Perception	Frequency	Percent
Worse	7	8.0
Same	1	1.1
Better	26	29.5
Don't know	54	61.4
Total	88	100.0

Thus, the majority of viewers constitute themselves as middle-class, by and large satisfied with their economic status, which they see as having improved over time. This has implications for the way in which they relate to television advertising in particular and the growing market for consumer goods and durables in general. At the time of the study, there were no large department stores, of the kind one finds in urban centres, which lay out visual displays of commodities for the consumer, nor was there much recourse, in Kamgar Nagar, to other media such as magazines. Hence, television becomes the major source of information and exposure to the market for new mass-produced commodities. It is television that enables viewers to constitute themselves as consumer subjects in relation to a market that extends beyond the local. In this context, whether advertising actually works to persuade people is not the moot

point. What is more significant is the opportunity that it provides for the reconstitution of the self and the life space. Even viewers who claim to be unaffected by or indifferent to advertising are forced to define themselves vis-a-vis it, and to cope with the changes it might facilitate within the family, the workplace and the community. For instance, a few parents (Table 4.19) complain of their children asking for things that they cannot afford:

It's no use watching them (the ads). Our expenses just increase. The children pester us to buy this soap and that toothpaste and this chocolate... the foods they show... they are for the rich, not for the middle class... milk tins and Bournvita... those are for A-class people, not for us (Maharashtrian Muslim, 28, wife of accountant, 3 children).

Table 4.19

Distribution of Parents' Perception of Effects of
Advertising on Children

Perception	Frequency	Percent
Source of learning	31	50
Good-bad	13	4.8
Bad	8	12.9
No effect	11	17.7
Don't know	9	14.5
Total	62	100.0

Note: 'Good-bad' indicates those who felt that advertisements were a source of learning, but could also lead to unnecessary demands from children. 'Bad' indicates those who felt that advertisements only create false desires which parents cannot satisfy.

However, half of the parents feel that advertisements are useful sources of learning for their children (Table 4.19). The areas of learning mentioned include language skills, development of memory, good food habits and general 'smartness'. As already discussed in Chapter III, most parents encourage their children to identify with the 'Rasna' girl, the 'Complan' children and other characters from the advertisements. Thus, whether viewers like it or not, advertising is a resource for a redefinition of the familial space and this redefinition may not always be on the parents' terms. Similarly, there are changes in the workplace and the community, the intensification of a 'keeping up with the D'Souzas' thrust, that families have to come to terms with.

Television is more than a mere source of information about lifestyles and products. It becomes a totemic marker of the entry into a 'middle-class' culture, where ownership of consumer durables is tied up with family pride and status in the community; this entry is regarded by some viewers as a necessary evil and by others as beneficial:

Nowadays, fights within the family, physical violence and

all that has reduced. People are busy watching TV. The menfolk have improved...they are bothered about somehow raising the money to buy a TV. Everyone has a TV nowadays. So now, men spend less ... previously they would just waste money (Kannadiga Muslim , 23, wife of construction worker, 3 children).

The 'traditional' consumer durables that most families possess are a cupboard, a bed, a fan, a radio and (in Catholic families, where it is often given as part of the dowry) a sewing machine. It is only after the purchase of a television set that families generally invest in for other durables - refrigerators, two-wheelers, mixers and VCRs. Two factors appear to have accelerated the access to the consumer durable market. Firstly, there is a proliferation of loan and installment schemes at the work-¹³ place and in the market . Secondly, the influx of remittances from the Middle-East into Catholic and Muslim families in Kamgar Nagar has facilitated their access to a range of consumer durables. Both these factors, in conjunction with the proliferation of television, mark the entry into a consumer culture. Within such a culture, televisual advertising, along with other marketing strategies, sells not merely this product or that, but the notion that one's identity is tied to what one¹⁴ possesses and purchases .

The place that advertising might have in the constitution of

a desired self-image can be illustrated by the way adolescent girls talk about it:

I feel like buying the things I see.... fashionable clothes... those model girls... how they wear them and turn and walk... I like to watch... but I can't do anything about it. I won't be able to buy those things, but I imagine myself in them ... (Tamilian Catholic, 18, junior college student, daughter of a small businessman).

It is among adolescent girls (of all communities) that the place of advertising in self transformation is most apparent. For this section, awkward, in between stages and, in many cases, curtailed from going out, the world of advertising promises the possibility of reaching a more complete, self-assured state, through the acquaintance it provides with commodities and lifestyles:

From the ads we get to know more about things and also about daily living: how we should behave, how we should dress, what are the latest fashions (Goan Catholic, 20, college student, daughter of driver).

Watching advertisements, for this group comes close to work, the work of transforming oneself into a desirable object and an accomplished housewife:

If tomorrow I get married and go to my in-laws' place, I will know how to make so many things. I watch the ads showing how they prepare various foods and carefully memorize them. I try out the recipes more than once, until I have perfected them. Things like sakharbhat (sweet rice) and uridwada (lentil puffs). I drop my work to watch such ads (...) One gets knowledge. My hair used to fall. Then, after watching the ads, I tried Parachute coconut oil and shikakai soap. Now my hair falls less. It's only by watching ads that we learn new things and improve ourselves (Kannadiga Hindu, 24, divorcee, daughter of security guard) .

Those viewers who regard advertisements as a useful source of information about new products and lifestyles have been classified into the 'acceptance' category in a four-fold classificatory system. Table 4.20 indicates that over a third fall into this category.

Table 4.20
 Distribution of Respondents' Perception of the
 Usefulness of Advertising

Perception	Frequency	Percent
Rejection	25	28.4
Indifference	8	9.1
Partial Acceptance	23	26.1
Acceptance	32	36.4
Total	88	100.0

When crosstabulated with gender (Table 4.21) there are significant differences. 71.9 % of those in the 'acceptance' category are women, constituting nearly half of the women respondents, as opposed to 28.1% being men, constituting approximately a fifth of the male respondents. 75 % in the 'indifferent' category are men, constituting 15 % of male respondents, the corresponding figures for women being 25% and 4.2%.

Table 4.21
Percent Distribution of Respondents' Perception of
Advertising by Gender

Response	Gender		
	Male	Female	
Rejection	30.0 (12)	52.1 (13)	
Indifference	15.0 (6)	4.2 (2)	
Partial Acceptance	32.5 (13)	20.8 (10)	
Acceptance	22.5 (9)	47.9 (23)	
Column Total	45.5 (40)	54.5 (48)	100.0 (88)

Nightingale (1990: 25-36) points to how, in the developed countries, for women, television watching is 'work', given that it is women who shop for the family, and that it is from television advertising that they have to learn the life style connotations and meanings of brands. This may not hold entirely true in the Indian context, where household shopping is not necessarily a female prerogative, and the branding of products of daily use relatively restricted. However, the fact remains that it is

women and girls, more than men who see advertising as a productive source of information, to be used for self-improvement and in child-rearing:

We try the things we see in the ads. They also provide a good example to children. They learn to eat and drink properly (Kannadiga Hindu, 30, wife of shipyard electrician, 2 children).

The gender difference in the reception and use of advertisements is perhaps related to gender differences in self-perception. Adolescent girls tend to see themselves as malleable entities, who have to take the shape desired by their husband-to-be and in-laws. Their future status as wives and mothers forms the raison d'être of their lives; any other alternative is socially unacceptable, and hence, their energies are invested in acquiring the requisite skills, disposition and appearance. In contradistinction, adolescent boys would concentrate on acquiring the skills for wage-earning. Provided they possess the capacity to earn, they can be themselves ¹⁵.

The modes of resistance to advertising, demonstrated by those in the remaining three categories (partial acceptance, resistance, indifference) are varied. The most common is the identification of advertising with a vested interest to sell, which nullifies or qualifies the truth of the claims made by the advertisement. Some would see advertising as a means to sell an

inferior product, which would otherwise not sell: .

The things shown in ads are third class (of inferior quality). 75 % of the things are not good... useless... why don't they show ads for Bata shoes? Because they're good shoes, so there's no need to sell them. People know that they're good. But other things...they have to show ads to sell them (Malayali Hindu, unmarried male, 24, bakery supervisor).

Everything is shown as good. We come to know only after buying if it's good or bad. So there's no benefit for us. The government benefits, they get money from the advertisers. The shop keepers also, because their goods are sold (Maharashtrian Hindu, 34, shipyard welder, 4 children).

Some of those, who regard advertisements as unreliable sources of information, rank them high in terms of their entertainment value. This is particularly the case with young males, who would tend to look at advertisements metacritically, in terms of the techniques used. The following excerpts, from a discussion with a male youth group, bring out some of the themes that characterize the way this section tends to view advertising:

Q: What do you feel about ads?

X: About ads... I'll tell you what happens in my house. I

have a small daughter, three and a half years old. When she sees ads, she dances around so much... she doesn't watch any serial, but advertisements entertain her.

P: Ads should be seen that way, as just entertainment. And the techniques they have used and all that... one should concentrate on that. The rest is immaterial.

Z: Women watch ads more. Look at those saris, so beautiful, they say. Then there are disputes at home.

Q: What do you feel - are children, women affected by ads or do they see it as mere entertainment? A little while ago, S was saying - people want to buy more, even when they can't afford...

Z: People's wants have increased by leaps and bounds. They don't feel satisfied. Buy a fridge...buy this...buy that. If they can't afford it, they buy it on an installment basis.

V: But there's another side... if ads were not shown at all on Doordarshan, we would not come to know about new products.

S: I'm not saying they shouldn't be shown at all... but there should be some censorship... to what extent the truth is being shown (...)

Q: Do you like to watch ads?

Chorus: Yes, we do!

P: I like to watch ads, but not the way they want. Their expectation is to sell their goods, to increase demand. But

I don't think they'll benefit from viewers like me. I watch them only for enjoyment... the music... I hum the songs (laughs) But not more than that.

Youth and young males appear to constitute their identity in terms of critical viewers, who are not affected by the rhetoric and drama of television. Unlike women and children who are primordial, quintessential consumers, easily persuaded by the advertisements, they regard themselves as able to enjoy the advertisements, without being fooled by them. Further, they have the capacity to judge how and why others are affected by advertisements, and to understand how advertisements work. The ideal advertisement is one that tells the 'truth', and most, if not all, advertising is seen as falling short of this standard. However, they cannot escape a contradiction, pointed out by V - though advertisements might be 'false', they continue to remain a major source of information about new products. For the modern, young male, this information is important for daily living, indicating to them possible ways of shaping their identities. As V points out later in the discussion:

Take the example of clothes. In the ads on TV, you see loose clothes being worn.. and then you see clothes like that being worn on the streets.

The inescapable usefulness of advertisements is also borne out by

the way this group talk about advertisements and children, their perception that advertisements help children to become active and intelligent.

The group in question was composed of Hindu youth, both Goan and Maharashtrian. To them advertising offers a mode by which they constitute their cultural identity.

S: (a Shiv Sainik): Through this (watching ads) they move far from our culture. Because most of the ads are in English, not in our languages, Konkani or Marathi. They are either in English or Hindi. There's not a single ad related to our culture.

(everyone talking at once)

S: And their way of life, it's high standard.

P: (interrupting) I feel that teenagers... they're affected.

Q: They show motorcycles...

P: Motorcycles and all... it's too much. They exaggerate. They shouldn't do it.

Q: And soft drinks... Thums up...

P: Those are like ads from abroad. I have read somewhere that abroad they have competitions where they give prizes for the best ad. They make such ads for that purpose.

In relating to the alien lifestyle, as represented by motor-

cycle and aerated drinks advertisements, this group invokes a dual dividing practice: India vs. the West and middle class vs. the rich. This class distinction has been invoked by many viewers:

Ads are for rich people. Fair and Lovely (cream)... Cadbury... ice-cream... nobody advertises the things we poor people use - dal and rice. I'm against buying things on the basis of ads (Maharashtrian Hindu, 38, shipyard fitter, 2 children).

This gap, between the desirable world of TV advertisements and the limited means of viewers, evokes frustration, which is a measure of the extent to which definitions of the good life drawn from advertising are accepted as the norm:

Can we get to eat all that we see? Our mouths water, and we have to just swallow the saliva and keep watching (laughs). If even on one day we want to buy all those things, we'll have to go hungry for the rest of the month. Sometimes I feel, why did we buy a colour TV... every thing looks real in colour, and we watch and get tempted. My little fellow, when he sees those ice-cream ads, he touches the TV, and tries to take the ice-cream out (Mangalorean Catholic, 45, wife of motorcycle taxi driver, 4 children).

While viewers might laugh and joke about their distance from the good life that is being proposed by advertising, there is an element of despair as well:

When the ice-cream ads come, the children feel how delicious. They say, "Mummy buy it for us". I feel - if I can't at this stage, when will I be able? Will I ever be able to buy them what they want? (Goan Catholic, 30, widow, occasional employment as private nurse, 2 children)

Thus, in terms of constitutive strategies vis-a-vis the discourses of advertising, one can posit various subject positions: the adolescent girl who regards advertisements as a useful resource in self-improvement; the critical young male who sees himself uninfluenced by the persuasive power of advertisements, regarding them as entertainment; the middle class consumer, who relates to the structure of the desire in advertising, and feels constrained by his/her limited means; the 'traditional' parent, who regards advertisements as humbug and a bad influence on children; the 'modern' parent who feels that advertisements make children smart and active; the rational consumer who can sift the information from the rhetoric in the advertisements; the small town consumer who is confused by the plethora of products and claims in advertising. A given individual may adopt varied strategies, sometimes contradictory, in relation to the situation in which (s)he finds her/himself.

CHAPTER V
THE SPECTATOR-SUBJECT

The present work is an exploration into the ways of seeing and the modes of subjectivity attendant on the introduction and proliferation of television in India. Its prime concern is an engagement with the identities constituted by viewers in a field setting as they bring to bear specific interpretative strategies on the discourses of television.

At the outset, the thesis attempts to examine the discourse of development communication (with specific reference to television) as it emerges in the writings of experts, policy makers and media researchers. The framework informing this analysis draws on the work of Michael Foucault, specifically his conception of power. The relations of power/knowledge, the construction of subjectivities within local networks of power and resistance and the State's exercise of pastoral power are some of the notions invoked by this thesis in its attempt to situate and interrogate the development of Doordarshan. The concern of policymakers and experts in the initial period was to use television to transform indigenous, pre-modern subjects into rational, modern citizens who would be willing beneficiaries and agents of development. The crisis within the development paradigm, coupled with the widespread legitimacy of the norms of development and the econom-

ic necessity of creating new markets has made for a shift in the objectives and strategies of television in India towards a 'marketing' model that constitutes a normal, middle class, 'active' consumer, who has to be persuaded to 'buy' soap and development, models of family and images of the State. The focus in this thesis is not on the discourses of television per se, as they emerge from an analysis of programming, but rather on the processes by which specific groups of viewers relate to these discourses and constitute their identities.

The field setting chosen by the researcher was a multi-ethnic working class neighbourhood in a small town in Goa, a community that had experienced ethnic tensions (involving regional, linguistic and religious divides) in the recent past. This afforded the researcher an opportunity to explore the construction of ethnic identities vis-a-vis the pan-Indian identity being posited by Doordarshan. The resistance of minority groups to the mainstream, Hindi and Marathi dominated programming that gives token coverage to their own cultural representations and aspirations is situated in the context of a historical investigation into the emergence of distinct ethnic identities in the Goan context. The identities constructed are relational, in opposition to the threat constituted by the 'other'. Thus, at one level, there emerges a 'Catholic' identity versus a 'Hindu' identity, expressed in terms of a linguistic struggle (Konkani vs. Marathi), and at a second level, a 'Goan'.

identity defined in opposition to 'outsiders'. In terms of the relation to televisual discourses, however, the religious identity appears to be invoked more strongly than the regional one, with Goan Catholic respondents expressing a feeling of being marginalized by political processes and television programming, and the Goan and Maharashtrian Hindus of Kamgar Nagar ostensibly identifying with the languages, cultural representations and discourses of nation presented on television.

The family, and the self in relation to the family, appears to be a key site for the constitution of identities. As opposed to other sites of identity construction, such as ethnic community/nation, the political process and the State, and the market, where viewers appear to offer greater resistance to the dominant subject positions, the discourses on family evoke a fecundity of modes of incorporation in most viewers. Firstly, in relation to the 'normal' middle class family posited by television, many working class viewers invoke dividing practices to differentiate between 'us' and 'them', across a range of programming, from serials to social awareness advertising. Secondly, the televisual discourse on family offers viewers an opportunity to look at themselves, in the process of looking at others. This bird's-eye view into other families brings into play technologies of the self, as viewers seek to objectivize and mould their selves. Television becomes, as it were, a panopticon in reverse, where watching others becomes the means for

controlling oneself.

The models of childhood and parenthood as constructed by televisual discourse evoke strategies ranging from incorporation to negotiated acceptance to resistance, on the part of both parents and children. While some viewers of Kamgar Nagar look to television as a resource in their aspirations for self-improvement, others are indifferent, a few hostile. Ethnic background, gender and age mediate these relations of power between viewers and televisual discourse. In general, the Catholic community of Kamgar Nagar appear to be less receptive to the pastoral power of the State, there being a strong alternative structure (the Church) for the reproduction and control of moral and normative frameworks.

The entry of television, into the family matrix of power relations, alters the flows of power and resistance. 'Modern' parents invoke televisual models of 'smartness' and performance in disciplining and moulding their children. 'Traditional' parents, while indifferent to the aspect of mediating their children's interpretation of televisual discourse, would rely on direct control for instance, regulating the duration of watching. In such homes, where the norm is that children be seen and not heard, children would use television (particularly advertisements) as a resource in their resistance, constructing themselves as active, critical and powerful.

Television also has implications for gender relations of power. The thesis examines how the discourse of modernity, with its promise of gender equality and liberation, is incorporated within patriarchal structures, without fundamentally altering the power flows. An example of this is the theme of the powerful woman, a popular filmic and televisual formula. Looking at the construction of both televisual and viewer discourses in relation to two serials, the strategies used to contain the dangers of feminine power and the modes of resistance employed by women are explored. Thus, female power, when it is seen as controlling the male, is constructed as evil and unnatural (a mother who dominates her son and husband). As opposed to this is the 'strong' woman, who internalizes the male norm to achieve success, without threatening the 'natural' male order (a daughter who lives up to her father's expectations). Further, television works towards submerging below the discursive, the gender relations of power in everyday life through its presentation of both women's oppression and liberation in spectacular terms. Viewers invoke a dividing practice to construct themselves as normal and liberal in their treatment of women, as opposed to those who starve their girl children or burn their wives.

The gender relations of power and resistance are also manifest in the manner in which men and women constitute gender-specific identities in relation to a range of programming. This would involve distinct viewing patterns, generic preferences and

ways of retelling stories through which the male subject is constituted as rational, objective and concerned about the public sphere, in contradistinction to the female subject who is more 'emotional', concerned with trivia and detail, confined to the domestic sphere.

Television appears to many viewers as a window on the world, introducing a larger reality to which they previously had limited access. Viewers constitute themselves as spectators who can see things 'as they happen', from a privileged, ringside position, seated comfortably in their homes. Given the relatively recent entry of television, many viewers appear to luxuriate in this new found access to the world, constituting themselves as 'better off' in relation to the suffering millions they watch on their screens. The stances adopted vis-a-vis spectacular suffering (an air crash, an earthquake) vary from empathetic involvement to voyeuristic fascination, with age and gender appearing to mediate the stance taken. The identity of the spectator involves paradoxical feelings of power and powerlessness: the power that comes from knowledge, from constituting oneself as a seeing eye/I situated in the panopticon of television that surveys the entire world; the powerlessness that stems from the perception that one is merely a 'speck of dust' in this larger reality, unable to change the course of events, a mute witness.

Viewers relate to the discourse of politics and the State

from a position of widespread disillusionment with the local-level political process, a cynical bargaining with politicians for resources and an absence of any civic community organizations. The discrepancy between their experience of politics and the televisual presentation of the good Centre and the charismatic leader is justified through varying explanatory frameworks. While some would reject the televisual presentation as false or irrelevant, others would differentiate between the Centre and the local government or between those at the top who plan and those below, who implement. Accepting the myth of a benign, incorruptible centre of power, their resistance would be focused against the local orders of power, regarded as corrupt, inefficient and anti-people. The discourse on the State intersects with the discourse on family, as patriarchal images and norms are employed by viewers to construct images of Rajiv Gandhi as father, performing his hereditary duties, of the Centre as the head of a family of states, of the opposition as violating familial norms of decorum and harmony. Again, one finds that, in Kangar Nagar, gender, age and religious background have a bearing on the stance taken, with women being both more accepting and more indifferent than men, Catholics more critical and more indifferent than Hindus and younger and older age groups more critical than those in the middle.

Television introduces to viewers, for the first time, a visual display of a bewildering array of commodities and brands.

Given the relative absence of other forms of display (eg. the super market or department store, limited exposure to print media advertising), television becomes an important source of information about commodities and life styles. It would seem that, given the limited incomes of viewers and their traditional patterns of consumption, televisual advertising has less impact on patterns of consumption than on life styles and aspirations. The identities constituted in relation to the discourses of advertising are varied : the adolescent girl who regards advertisements as a resource in moulding herself into a desirable, marriageable woman; the male youth who constructs himself as critical and informed, regarding his interest in advertising as restricted to the formal level; the child, for whom advertisements offer an opportunity for playful interaction and learning; the parent who sees his limited resources stretched further by the desires created by advertising.

The wide array of identities and interpretative strategies that emerge from this study of a specific community cannot be subsumed under the rubric of many of the formulations of audience discussed in Chapter I. The Kamgar Nagar viewers do not construct themselves as the simple, traditional masses of the early development communication theories; nor can the televisual discourse be regarded as instrumentally geared to disseminating the knowledge, attitudes and practices conducive to modernization. The 'false consciousness' formulations appear to

be equally out of place, with their denial of agency and resistance to audiences, and their construction of the televisual discourse as monolithic and seamlessly oppressive. The 'marketing' development variant focuses narrowly on consumer choice and responses, disregarding the implications of this 'choice' for networks of power and ideological frameworks.

The present study posits the notion of the 'spectator-subject', which is distinct from the 'target audience' of the development discourse or the 'sovereign consumer' of the marketing variant or the 'falsely conscious masses' of cultural dependency. Firstly, these notions of audience are based on two-dimensional models of power (Lukes, cited in Hall, 1982:64) where A exercises power over B, observed by C, the objective researcher. The present work has already amply demonstrated how its notion of power differs from this. Secondly, the instrumental view of the institution of television underpinning these formulations differs from the notion of television as a discursive field, in relation to which viewers situate themselves to generate meanings and identities that escape definition in instrumental terms (eg. intended message, targeted impact).

The notion of the 'spectator-subject' underlines the assertion that television offers for the first time a technology of power wherein the constitution of identity is so intimately bound up with the act of seeing, a technology that has become

enmeshed in the rhythms of everyday domesticity, emerging in viewers' accounts variously as a window on the world, a mirror for self-reflection, a resource for self-improvement and an alien cultural imposition. The 'spectator-subject' is a product of the dividing practices and technologies of the self invoked by viewers as they interpret televisual discourse. The constitutive strategies of viewers range from resistance, to negotiated acceptance, to complete incorporation of the subject positions posited by televisual discourse. Both resistance and incorporation tend to be local and sectoral. For instance, a Goan Catholic viewer from Kamgar Nagar, while resisting the ethnic and civic subject positions, might relate to familial identities with negotiated acceptance and might incorporate the consumer identity. A woman might relate to familial, consumer and ethnic identities, ignoring the discourses of citizenship and the State. This does not imply that ethnic/religious background, gender and age determine the identities constituted; it does mean, however, that these categories, enmeshed as they are within specific relations of power and cultural prescriptions, limit the range of interpretative and constitutive strategies available to a specific viewer.

A second aspect to the 'spectator-subject' is its emphasis on the contradictory tendencies inherent in the act of identity constitution. The 'subject' is both a 'subject-to-the-Subject', a spectator who feels powerless, and an agent who uses television

as a resource. The two tendencies are not separate positions that a specific viewer might adopt, but inextricably linked. An unemployed Goan Catholic father, who feels helpless in a system where everything, including television is controlled by 'them', constructs an ethnic identity premised on the superiority of his culture and language and a familial identity based on the exercise of power over his wife and children. A child, who is subject to the discipline of home and school and silenced by parental norms talks back to televisual advertisements, constituting him/herself as smart, active and humourous. A woman, circumscribed by the expectations of a patriarchal culture, wields power in covert ways and is drawn into televisual and cinematic narratives of the avenging angel. In other words, resistance is an essential feature of the exercise of power, which emanates not from some monolithic source, but is exercised at every level of the order. To a greater or lesser extent, every subject wields power and resists power.

Having discussed the insights that this study has to offer, it is appropriate to look at some of its limitations. This work borrows from the critical ontology of Foucault, which regards the task of the "specific intellectual" as "not to enlighten, but to work upon the particular regime of truth in which he operates. He is called upon neither to reveal the truth nor to represent others" (Sheridan, 1980:222). While this thesis has attempted this exercise, interrogating Doordarshan's regime of truth from

the standpoint of its constitution of subjectivity, there are moments where it treads warily on the terrain of power/knowledge, slipping into the mode of constituting the viewers of Kamgar Nagar as 'objects of inquiry'. This is perhaps a result of contradictory set of positions that define this thesis: on the one hand, it cannot escape constituting itself as a work that fulfills the requirements of a dissertation seeking recognition within an existing body of knowledge; and on the other, it questions the very ground on which it stands. The researcher, at this point of time, sees no way out of this contradiction, other than being aware of it and stating it.

A second difficulty which the researcher had to come to terms with was the use of the words 'Hindu', 'Catholic' and 'Muslim'. This study does not purport to arrive at generalizations on the basis of region or religion. Various conjunctural elements have to be considered when interpreting the constitutive strategies of different groups in Kamgar Nagar. Firstly, all the Catholics are Sudras or Gaudis and most of the Hindus too belong to the lower castes; this study has not been able to explore at any depth, the constitution of specific caste identities. Secondly, the groups are predominantly blue-collar workers, situated in a specific historical context: a region that was under colonial rule until three decades ago, a colonial regime that was quite distinct from that in the rest of India; a port town that has grown in an unplanned manner, at a spectacular

rate, where non-Goans outnumber Goans; a town that has witnessed attacks on 'outsiders' by 'locals' and riots between Hindus and Catholics; that has seen the premature retirement and retrenchment of many Goan dock workers. The constitution of identities should be regarded as specific practices, enmeshed in local relations of power and resistance rather than as trans-historical, trans-cultural processes.

The present work has not been able to explore in detail the discourses of Doordarshan, in the writings of various commissions and of media experts and practitioners, in its programming and in its professional practices and institutional structures. This would emerge as an important area for further study, that would contribute to a more rigorous critique of Doordarshan's regime of truth.

This study has attempted to construct an overall picture, with broad brush strokes, of the interpretative practices and constitutive strategies of a specific community in relation to various aspects of the televisual discourse. Each of these areas could become the focus of a more detailed study.

In the period since this study was conducted, the situation of television access has been rapidly changing. In all major cities and many towns, cable networks disseminating satellite transmission and commercial Hindi cinema are proliferating. The

changes from a single to multiple channels, from State control to unregulated satellite programming would have far-reaching implications for the constitutive strategies of viewers. Certain obvious questions arise. How does the feeling of freedom of choice affect viewers' relation to the medium? What does round-the-clock transmission do to watching patterns and leisure time activities? How is actual viewing negotiated within a family, given a choice of channels and divergent tastes? How do viewers relate to life styles, values and images that are alien, yet desirable and fascinating? How does the spectacularly amplified access to the 'news' of the world alter the relations of knowledge - power that mark the construction of subjectivities? These and other questions need to be explored in order to understand viewers' constitutive strategies at the present juncture and that would be the task this thesis sets up for further inquiries.

APPENDICES.

NOTES &

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX I

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. How many years ago did you buy your T.V.?
2. Why did you think of buying a T.V.?
3. In what way do you feel you and your family benefitted by buying a T.V.?
4. What made you buy this particular brand?
5. How did you raise the money to buy it?

Savings

Bank Loan

Personal Loan

Installment Scheme

Any other

6. Do you think there were any changes in your daily life after you bought a T.V.?

Yes

No. go to 8.

7. What kind of changes?

Going out of the house in the evenings reduced

Going out of the house on Sundays reduced

Going to see films in the theatre reduced

The children began to neglect their studies

We used to spend a lot of the time watching T.V.

Don't know

Any other (specify)

8. Can you tell the programmes which you always watch, which you watch sometimes and which you never watch?

Always Sometimes Never

- a. Breakfast T.V.
 - b. UGC countrywide classroom
 - c. Programmes before 7.30 p.m.
(specify)
 - d. 8.00 p.m. Marathi serial
 - e. 9.00 p.m. Hindi serial
- Sunday
Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday
Thursday
Friday
Saturday

- f. 10 p.m. Detective Serial
- g. Chayageet, Chitrahaar
- h. Batmya
- i. Samachar
- j. The News
- k. Current Affairs and documentaries
- l. Mahabharat
- m. Other Sunday morning serials
- n. Marathi film on Saturday
- o. Regional film on Sunday
- p. Hindi feature film on Sunday
- q. World of Sport
- r. Matches
 - Hockey
 - Cricket (One Day or tests)
 - Football
 - Other

s. Late night films

9. How many hours is T.V. on in your house? On week days? On Sundays?

10. Of the programmes going on at present, which ones do you like best (Rank 3 in order of preference).

1.

2.

3.

- Can't rank all are nice
- Can't rank all are bad
- Don't know

10a. Why do you like 1. the best?/What do they show in 1.?

11. Are there any programmes you dislike?

- Yes
- No (go to 12).

11a. Which programmes do you dislike?

11b. Why do you dislike them?

12. The serials shown on T.V. are of different types. Which type do you like the best?

12a. Why?

13. What kinds of things do you come to know from the news?

14. Before you bought a T.V., from where would you come to know the news?

- Newspaper
- Radio
- Any other (specify)

15. After getting a T.V., what are your main sources of news?

- Newspaper
- Radio
- Any other (specify)

16. What kinds of news items interest you?

17. Can you recall any interesting item you have seen recently?

18. What have you come to know about the government after watching T.V.?

19. What do you feel about what the government in Delhi is doing?

20. Do you feel that T.V. gives you a correct picture of what the government is doing or there are certain news items that are not shown on T.V. or shown only from the government's point of view?

21. What is your opinion of the Goa government?

22. Do you feel that the government at Delhi is more efficient and trustworthy than the local government?

23. Who do you think should have more power- the Central or the local Govt. ?

24. What is your opinion of the opposition?

25. Do you think the opposition should get more coverage on T.V.?

26. What do you feel about the coverage given to Rajiv Gandhi and the ruling party on T.V.?

27. What are the major problems we face these days?

27a. Do you feel the government is doing anything about these problems?

28. Do you feel that T.V. gives you information about the advances in science and technology in our country and abroad?

28a. Do you feel that through advances in Science and Technology we will be able to solve problems like poverty and unemployment?

29. Do you feel ads give you any new information?.

29a. If yes, has this information helped you in any way?

30. What products have you bought after seeing T.V ads?

31. What brands of the following items do you use?

- Soap
- Washing powder
- Cooking Oil
- Tea
- Tooth paste/tooth powder

31a. After seeing the ads, have you ever tried a new brand?

- Soap
- Washing powder
- Cooking oil
- Tea
- Tooth paste/tooth powder

32. What about the following products - do you buy them regularly, occasionally or never

Regularly Sometimes Never

Thums up/Limca/other drinks
 Horlicks/Boost
 Amul/Cadbury chocolate
 Rasna
 Nescafe
 Maggi Noodles

32a. Did you start using any of these products after watching T.V. ads?

Thums up/Limca/other drinks
 Horlicks/Boost
 Amul/Cadbury chocolate
 Rasna
 Nescafe
 Maggi Noodles

33. Do you like to watch ads?

33a. Can you think of any particular ad(s) that you like?

34. What do your children do while they watch ads?

35. What do you feel about the effect of ads on your children?

36. Do you ever feel when you see an ad that you would like to buy the product, but can't afford it?

37. In society, people are seen as belonging to different classes, for instance, the upper class, the middle class, the working class and the lower class. In which class do you place yourself?

- Upper class
- Middle class
- Working class
- Lower class
- Don't know
- Any other(specify)

38. As far as you and your family are concerned, are you well satisfied with your present financial situation, more or less satisfied or not satisfied?

- Well satisfied
- More or less satisfied
- Not satisfied
- Don't know

39. During the last few years, has your financial situation been getting better, worse or has it remained the same?

- Better
- Same
- Worse
- Don't know

40. In the future do you expect your financial situation to stay the same as it is now, get better or worse?

- Better
- Same
- Worse
- Don't know

41. Looking to your needs and the needs of your family, how much income per month do you think you must have to meet your needs?

42. What consumer durables do you own and in what order did you purchase them? How you decide on the brand of these items - after seeing an advertisement, asking someone else or in some other way?

- Fan
- Cupboard
- Radio
- Cassette Player
- Gas
- T.V.
- Refrigerator
- Scooter/motorcycle
- VCR
- Any other

43. How many children do you think a family should have?

44. What do you feel about the family planning ads on T.V.?

44a. Did you get any new information from them?

45. What do you think is the minimum age at which girls should be married?

45a. Why?

46. Do you think that in our society girls are given less importance than boys?

46a. If yes, in what ways?

46b. Do you feel they have been showing ads about this on T.V?

- Yes
- No (go to 47).

46c. What kinds of ads?

46d. What do you feel about these ads?

47. Would you like the girls in your house to take up a job?

- Yes
- No (go to 48).

47a. What kind of job?

48. What level of education would you like your son(s) to have?

- Professional degree
- Bachelor's degree
- Technical diploma
- Higher secondary
- S.S.C.
- Less than S.S.C.
- D.K.
- N.A.
- Any other

49. What level of education would you like your daughter(s) to have?

- Professional degree
- Bachelor's degree
- Technical diploma
- Higher Secondary
- S.S.C.
- Less than S.S.C.
- D.K.
- N.A.
- Any other

50. Are there any characters in present or recent serials that you like? (specify)

51. Do you feel that children pick up good values and habits from T.V.?

51a. If yes, can you name some serials which you feel have something good to teach?

52. Do you feel that children pick up any wrong things from watching T.V.?

53. Do you ever have discussions at home about what you see on T.V.?

- Yes
- No (go to 54).

53a. Describe these discussions

54. Do you ever discuss programmes with your friends?

- Yes
- No (go to 55).

54a. Which programmes are discussed the most?

55. Do you feel something can be learnt from the serial Ramayan?

- Yes

- No (go to 56).

55a. What do you feel is the main message?

56. Did you know the story of Ramayan previously?

- Yes

- No (go to 57).

56a. How did you come to know it?

56b. If you compare it to the story you know, do you think any changes were made in the serial?

57. Which character(s) did you like the best in Ramayan?

58. Some people feel Ram was unjust to Sita by sending her away. What do you feel?

59. Do you feel something can be learnt from the serial Mahabharat?

- Yes

- No (go to 60)

59a. What do you feel is its main message?

60. If you compare the two serials which one do you prefer?

60a. Why?

61. Did you know the story of Mahabharat previously?

- Yes

- No (go to 62).

61a. How did you come to know it?

61b. When you compare it to the story you know, do you think any changes were made in the serial?

62. Which character do you like the best in Mahabharat?

62a. Why?

63. Do you feel that what is shown in the Ramayan and Mahabharat actually happened in the past?

64. Some people feel that Ramayan and Mahabharat are programmes for Hindus, others feel it is not so. What do you feel?

65. Do you think programmes on the holy books of other religions should also be shown on T.V.?

66. Did you see the serial Tamas?

- Regularly
- Occasionally
- Never (go to 67).

66a. What do you feel about it?

67. Do you watch the serial Mirza Ghalib?

- Regularly
- Occasionally
- Never (go to 68).

67a. What do you feel about it?

68. Did you watch the serial Kisse Miya Biwi ke?

- Regularly
- Occasionally
- Never (go to 70).

68a. What kinds of problems did it take up?

68b. Do you remember any episode that you liked?

69. Do you feel problems between husband and wife are more common today than in the past?

69a. If yes, what are the reasons for this?

70. Do you watch the Marathi serial "Aavhan"?

- Regularly
- Occasionally
- Never (go to 72).

70a. What do you feel about Uma, the third daughter-in-law?

70b. Do you think the story is realistic?

71. Do you feel that women should fight back if ill-treated at home or should they try to adjust?

72. Did you watch the serial Udaan?

- Regularly
- Occasionally
- Never. (go to 73).

72a. Do you think that girls nowadays can do what Kalyani did?

72b. What about the girls in your family?

73. Do you have any suggestions to make about the kind of programmes that should be shown on T.V., the language that should be used etc?

BACKGROUND DATA

1. Age
2. Sex
3. Religion
4. Caste
5. Occupation
6. Husband/Wife's Occupation
7. Educational level
8. Husband/Wife's Educational Level
9. Father's Occupation
10. Father's Educational Level
11. Monthly Income of the Household
12. Number of People in the Household

Male Female

Adults
Children

13. Number of earning members
14. Number of unemployed adults
15. Staying in own or rented house
16. Native place
17. (If from outside Goa) Year of Migration to Goa
18. Interests

a. Reading Regularly Occasionally Never

Newspapers
Magazines
Novels
Any other (specify)

b. Watching Regularly Occasionally Never

Films
Video

c. Listening to the radio (hours per day)

d. Any other

19. (If regular watcher) which type of film do you like best?

20. Can you name any films seen recently that you liked?

CONTEXT OF THE INTERVIEW

No. of Sessions	Date	Time Taken	Remarks
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Language of the interview

Was there any one else present during the interview?

No one present (or only children under sixteen)

Others present but took no part

Others took part

Observations about the respondent's level of rapport with researcher etc.

Name:

House No:

Area:

APPENDIX II

A PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS

Table 1.5: Distribution of Respondents by Age

Age	Frequency	Percent
Below 25	36	40.9
26 - 40	36	40.9
40 - 55	9	10.2
Over 55	7	8.0
Total	88	100.0

82%

Table 1.6: Distribution of Respondents by Gender

Gender	Frequency	Percent
Male	40	45.5
Female	48	54.5
Total	88	100.0

Table 1.7: Distribution of Respondents by Religion

Religion	Frequency	Percent
Hindu	30	34.1
Catholic	31	35.2
Muslim	27	30.7
	88	100.0

Table 1.8 Distribution of Respondents by Occupation

Occupation	Frequency	Percent
Contract Worker	3	3.4
Blue Collar Worker	39	44.4
Clerical Worker	9	10.2
Self Employed/Business	3	3.4
Blue collar Apprentice	3	3.4
Student	18	20.5
Unemployed	3	3.4
Any Other	11	12.5
Total	88	100.0

Note: For housewives, the occupation noted is of the husband

Table 1.9 Distribution of Respondents by Educational Level

Level of Education	Frequency	Percent
Illiterate	7	8.0
Literate, no formal ed.	3	3.4
Primary Education	9	10.2
Secondary Education	20	22.7
High School (S.S.C.)	25	28.4
S.S.C. with I.T.I.	6	6.8
H.S.C.	10	11.4
Bachelor's Degree	8	9.1
Total	88	100.0

Table 1.10: Distribution of Respondents by Father's Occupation

Occupation	Frequency	Percent
Blue collar worker	35	39.7
Clerical worker	4	4.5
Shop keeper/businessmen	17	19.3
Farmer	10	11.4
Artisan/Craftsman	8	9.2
Any other	10	11.4
Don't Know	4	4.5
Total	88	100.0

Table 1.11: Distribution of Respondents by Father's Educational Level

Educational Level	Frequency	Percent
Illiterate	19	21.6
Literate, no for. ed.	20	22.7
Primary Edn.	25	17.0
Secondary Edn.	13	14.8
High School (S.S.C.)	6	6.8
H.S.C.	2	2.3
Bachelor's Degree	4	4.5
Don't Know	9	10.3
Total	88	100.0

Table 1.12: Distribution of Respondents by Household

Monthly Income

Income	Frequency	Percent
< 1000	9	10.2
1000 - 2000	34	38.6
2000 - 3000	16	18.2
3000 - 4000	10	11.4
4000 - 5000	3	3.4
> 5000	12	13.6
Total	88	100.0

Table 1.13: Distribution of Respondents by Number of Earning

Members in the Family

No. of earning members	Frequency	Percent
0	2	2.3
1	54	61.4
2	19	21.6
3	8	9.1
4	4	4.5
5	1	1.1
Total	88	100.0

Table 1.14: Distribution of Respondents by House Ownership

Status	Frequency	Percent
Owner	76	86.4
Tenant	12	13.6
Total	88	100.0

Table 1.15: Distribution of Respondents by Place of Origin

Place of Origin	Frequency	Percent
Within Goa	50	56.8
Outside Goa	38	43.2
Total	88	100.0

Table 1.16: Distribution of Migrant Respondents by Length of Residence

Length of residence(years)	Frequency	Percent
1 - 5	2	5.2
6 - 10	9	23.8
11 - 15	7	18.4
16 - 20	9	23.7
Over 20	11	29.0
Total	38	100.0

Table 1.17: Distribution of Respondents by Duration of TV Set Ownership

Length of ownership(years)	Frequency	Percent
< 1	23	26.1
1 - 3	20	22.7
3 - 5	19	21.6
5 - 7	11	12.5
> 7	8	9.1
D.K./No TV	7	8.0
Total	88	100.0

APPENDIX III

A Profile of Viewing Behaviour

Table 3.1: Distribution of Household Viewing Duration on Weekdays

No. of Hours	Frequency	Percent
0 - 2	6	7.2
2 - 4	39	47.0
4 - 6	33	39.8
Over 6	5	6.0
Total	83	100.0

Note: 1. Viewing time was defined in terms of hours per day when TV is kept on in the household.

2. 5 respondents who did not own TVs have been excluded

Table 3.2: Distribution of Household Viewing Duration on Sundays

No. of Hours	Frequency	Percent
0 - 4	2	2.4
4 - 8	19	22.9
Over 8	62	74.7
Total	83	100.0

Table 3.3: Percent Distribution of Extent of Watching Selected

Programme	TV Programmes			Total
	Always	Sometimes	Never	
Breakfast T.V.	12.5	35.2	52.3	100.0
UGC Countrywide Classroom	1.1	4.5	94.3	100.0
Afternoon Transmission	21.6	22.7	55.7	100.0
Marathi Edu. Programme	2.3	18.2	79.5	100.0
8.00 p.m. Marathi Serial	54.5	36.4	9.1	100.0
9.00 p.m. Hindi Serial	63.6	35.2	1.1	100.0
10.00 p.m. Serial	50.0	27.3	22.7	100.0
Chayageet	70.5	22.7	6.8	100.0
Marathi News	20.5	33.0	46.6	100.0
National News (Eng. or Hindi)	72.7	14.8	12.5	100.0
Current Affairs Programmes	9.1	38.6	52.3	100.0
Mahabharat	85.2	9.1	5.7	100.0
Other Sun. Morn. Serials	27.3	58.0	14.8	100.0
Marathi film (Saturday)	58.0	23.9	18.2	100.0
Regional Lang. film(Sun)	20.5	42.0	37.5	100.0
Hindi film (Sun)	92.0	5.7	2.3	100.0
World of Sport	33.0	31.8	35.2	100.0
Cricket Matches	48.9	33.0	18.2	100.0
Football Matches	37.5	31.8	30.7	100.0
Late night English film	6.8	50.0	43.2	100.0

N = 88

APPENDIX IV: DOORDARSHAN CHANNEL I
PROGRAMME SCHEDULE ON A TYPICAL WEEKDAY

TIMING	PROGRAMME
7.00 a.m.	Breakfast chat show interspersed with News in English and Hindi, short serials and interviews
1.00 - 2.00 p.m.	UGC Countrywide Classroom for college students
2.00 - 3.00 p.m.	Afternoon transmission - Chat show for women
5.45 - 7.30 p.m.	Regional telecast in Marathi for farmers, workers, parents, women, children (informative programmes)
7.30 - 7.45 p.m.	Regional news in Marathi
7.45 - 8.10 p.m.	Sponsored serial in Marathi
8.10 - 8.40 p.m.	Film songs (Chayageet/Chitrahaar) or Marathi plays
8.40 - 9.00 p.m.	News in Hindi
9.00 - 9.30 p.m.	Sponsored serial in Hindi

- 9.30 - 9.50 p.m. News in English
- 9.50 - 10.00 p.m. Parliament News in Hindi
- 10.00 - 10.30 p.m. Current Affairs programme/ Hindi Serial/
Documentary
- 10.30 - 10.40 p.m. Parliament News in English
- 10.40 - 11.00 p.m. Programme of Music/Dance/.Documentary
- 11.00 onwards Late night film (on specified days)

Note: This schedule was operational at the time of the study.
It gives approximate timings.

APPENDIX V: Aavhan (Marathi) - A Synopsis

Production : Video Vision

Direction : Atmaram Bhende

Screenplay : Jaywant Dalvi

Year of Telecast : 1988

Episode 1: Veena, a beautiful, talented girl is to be married to Shreedhar (Shree). Her father, Nana, returns from the marriage negotiations to say that everything is settled. The dowry demands are on the high side, but the devoted father somehow arranges to raise the amount, all for his daughter's happiness. The girl's mother has heard rumours about the bridegroom's first marriage and wife's death. The father dismisses the rumours and reassures her. Shree's neighbours, Sumatai and her son Jayant, come to know of the impending marriage. Jayant sends an anonymous letter to Nana, warning him of Shreedhar's family history.

Episode 2: Nana destroys the anonymous letter, thinking that someone with a vested interest has written it. The marriage takes place and Veena enters her new home. The mother-in-law, a school teacher, and the son are clearly on one side, and the father-in-law, Appa, on the other. The former are greedy, cruel and hypocritical, the latter selfless, kind and honest. Veena is a talented singer, fond of plants and close to nature. Their neighbour's son, Jayant, is also a singer, and the two become friends. Jayant's sister, Nimu, also becomes a friend and

confidant. The mother-in-law instigates the son to persuade the new bride to ask her father for a scooter. Veena is shocked and her dreams of a happy married life, shaken. From her, Veena comes to know that Shree's first wife was also harassed and committed suicide.

Episode 3: Shree and his mother continue their incessant demand for a scooter, while Veena insists that her father cannot afford it. Shree takes Veena for an outing, hoping to cajole her into writing to her father asking for a scooter. When Veena realizes his motive, she is hurt and refuses to write. Ultimately she relents under coercion. She is prevented from attending her younger sister, Vishu's marriage. Shree's father is disgusted by the behaviour of his wife and son.

Episode 4: Veena's family is sad that she is being harassed and cannot attend the marriage. Vishu feels that Veena should fight back, while her elder sister asserts that marriage involves adjustments. Shree tries to enter into a relationship with a rich colleague, Ranjana, complaining about his wife. Nimu sees Shree and Ranjana together in a restaurant. Meanwhile, Veena is forbidden from speaking to Jayant, who is like a brother to her.

Episode 5: Veena grows fond of Appa, who is kind to her and prevents his wife and son from harassing her whenever he is

around. He is continually marginalized by both of them, who blame him for not being financially successful. As a result, he spends most of his time away from home. In his absence, Veena is harassed. Veena seeks solace at her neighbours' who tell her that she should fight back. She comes to know about Shree's relationship with Ranjana and also that Shree's first wife was driven to suicide by Shree and his mother. Appa, Veena and Nimu confront Shree's girlfriend Ranjana, who then realizes that Shree was taking her for a ride. When Veena's mother-in-law discovers her absence from the house, she accuses her of infidelity and together with her son attempt to torture her. Appa comes to the rescue and warns his wife and son to leave Veena alone.

Episode 6: Shree proposes to Ranjana who rebuffs him, telling him that she knows the truth about his unsavoury past. Veena's father comes to meet Veena and is humiliated by Shree and his mother. They demand a scooter, rejecting the gifts he has brought for them. Veena's father feels helpless. The cruelty of the mother-son duo progressively increases. They accuse Veena of having an affair with Jayant, beat her, and brand her with red-hot metal. Veena quietly bears all this. Appa comes to know of the torture from Jayant, and sternly warns his wife and son.

Episode 7: Appa is supposed to go to Kashmir for a holiday. He decides not to go, for Veena's sake. She is now expecting a child. However, she persuades him to go and promises that she

will take care of herself. Jayant too promises to look after her. With the father out of the way, the mother and son cruelly torture Veena. They keep her locked up in the house all day, with all the windows and doors closed. They break the strings of her tanpura. Finally, driven to desperation, she tries to escape with the help of Jayant and his sister. She is unsuccessful and is trapped by her mother-in-law just as Jayant attempts to break the lock.

Episode 8: On seeing the mother-in-law, Jayant runs away. The mother-in-law accuses Veena of attempting to run away with Jayant. Shree and his mother taunt and torture her. Finally, they gag and tie her and lock her up in the bathroom. The next morning they find that she has committed suicide. As she has latched the door from the inside, the police treat it as a clear case of suicide and the matter is closed. Veena's maternal family is shocked at the course of events.

Episode 9: Nana is advised to take Shree and his mother to court, but he decides against it. Appa returns from Kashmir to find Veena dead. He is heartbroken and accuses his wife and son of murdering her. He feels guilty and responsible. Meanwhile, public anger at this second dowry death and leads to the formation of an organization, Sobti Sanghatana. Appa and Vishu become members. Sobti Sanghatana pickets Shree's house and their

aim is now to prevent Shree from getting married again, which he plans to do, with encouragement from his mother. Nāna comes to see Shree and his mother and curses them.

Episode 10: Appa manages to foil a couple of matches, but somehow, through trickery, Shree begins to arrange a third match. His wife-to-be, Uma, is the daughter of Ramdas, an eccentric religious - minded man from a small town who wants to get rid of his daughter and devote himself wholeheartedly to his religious pursuits. Shree's mother tells Ramdas that Appa is unsound of mind. She negotiates the marriage deal according to which all the parental property is transferred to Uma. Appa comes to know from Jayant of Shree's unscrupulous office dealings and his plans to marry Uma.

Episode 11: Appa tells Ramdas about Shree's past, but is not taken seriously. The marriage takes place. Uma, however, is unlike her predecessors. Against her mother-in-law's will, she takes up a job and refuses to do all the domestic chores.

Episode 12: Uma refuses to hand over her property to Shree and fights back when he tries to hit her. She joins up with her father-in-law and Sobti Sanghatana to teach the mother and son a lesson. At one point, they try to set her on fire, and she is rescued in the nick of time by Sobti Sanghatana. Both she and Appa leave the house.

Episode 13: With the public pressure mounted by Sobti Sanghatana, the mother and son are socially boycotted and picketed by the Sanghatana activists. They lose their jobs and are reduced to grovelling wrecks. The mother begs Appa for help, when he comes to retrieve the ornaments of the daughters-in-law, but he refuses and informs them that they have to vacate the house, which he has donated to the Sanghatana. In the last scene, they are haunted by hallucinations and visions of Veena. The mother accidentally drops a lantern and her clothes catch fire and she dies. The last shot shows the son running away in panic, down the road, into the night.

APPENDIX VI

Udaan (Hindi) : A Synopsis

Production : Kani Veri

Screenplay and Direction : Kavita Chowdhry

Year of Telecast : 1988 (A sequel to the serial was telecast in 1992; this falls outside the purview of the study)

Episode 1: A grandson is born into a joint family, consisting of a patriarch, his widowed sister, his second wife and son and his eldest son (by his first wife) and family. His eldest son already has a daughter, Kalyani, and this is his second child. At the celebrations marking the birth of the grandson, Kalyani is marginalized, and so is her father. The stepmother wants Kalyani to be withdrawn from school and married. Kalyani's father refuses and the family is forced to leave the joint family.

Episode 2: The family moves to a village, and the father struggles to make a barren plot of land productive. Kalyani goes to a village school, and the father-daughter relationship is shown to be a close one. The mother's brother and others come for a visit, and she is embarrassed because they see the poverty and poor conditions in which she and her family live. Kalyani's father develops cordial relations with the other villagers, who help him out with ploughing the land. The first rains bring hope, which is threatened when Kalyani's father's step-brother makes an appearance and demands that they vacate the land.

Episode 3: The land occupied by Kalyani's family is sold by her grandfather to Hardayal Singh, who comes with his men and throws them out, destroying their house and fields. Kalyani's father is taken to the police station, and eventually, the family leaves for the city in a bullock cart. Her father starts a handloom business and files a court case, while Kalyani goes to school. While her father loses in the lower court, Kalyani is successful and wins an elocution competition. Her father tells her not to lose heart.

Episode 4: The contrast between Kalyani and the neighbouring girls is brought out. Unlike them, she is serious minded and not concerned about clothes, jewellery and marriage. Her father is attacked and injured outside the court by Hardayal's henchman. He is taken to hospital. Kalyani approaches her mother's family for money and help. They advise Kalyani's father to give up the fight, as he has no son. Kalyani decides to take up the task of fighting for justice for her family. She handles all her father's work and goes to meet the police and other influential persons to petition them to help in the case.

Episode 5: Kalyani meets with frustration in her efforts to meet the Superintendent of Police. She keeps trying. Meanwhile, the neighbour's daughters are in the process of finding husbands, in contrast to Kalyani's more 'serious' preoccupations. With much

effort, she manages to get an appointment with the minister.

Episode 6: Kalyani meets the minister, but is afraid and tongue-tied and cannot explain her case properly. As she leaves, disheartened, she sees a woman IAS officer, smart and confident. Kalyani is harassed by a group of boys, who try to snatch her dupatta. The neighbour's daughter is getting married. Kalyani decides enough is enough. She storms into the minister's house and demands a hearing, which she gets. A proposal for marriage comes for her. She rejects it, telling her family that she has decided to strive to become important and successful, so that she and her family can win respect. Her father encourages her.

Episode 7: Kalyani joins the Police Academy and is subjected to a gruelling schedule of physical exercise. Most of her companions are males, some of whom make sexist remarks about the girls in the class. Kalyani has to climb a wall, but fails. She begins to write to her father that she wants to give up. The memory of her father training her, as a child, to ride the cycle spurs her to keep trying. She practices at night and succeeds. The episode ends with the passing out parade.

Episode 8: Kalyani reports for duty to her superior, who treats her like a 'lady'. She is detailed to a police station, where she resists attempts to treat her similarly. She tries to prove

that she is as good as a 'man' and asks her superior for tougher duties.

Episode 9: Kalyani is detailed for 'bandh' duty. She is sent to a sensitive area, where she successfully tackles a dangerous situation involving mob violence. Her superior is impressed and transfers her to a dacoit-infested area. He says of her, 'She is one of our best men'.

Episode 10: Kalyani arrives to take up her new appointment. She is unhappy at the way the policemen curry favour with the rich landlords and ill-treat poor complainants. She summons the entire staff and gives them a dressing-down. Later, she begins to realize that the rich landlords have links with the dacoits. In order to help villagers who have water problem, she goes to the local administration and shouts at someone who happens to be in the office; it turns out to be the wrong man.

Episode 11: Kalyani goes to meet the D.I.G. of Police with her boss (SSP). She discusses the strategy she has worked out to cope with the dacoits, but the DIG keeps putting her down. Back at duty, she attempts to discover the whereabouts of the dacoits, through an informer and conducts a raid. On her rounds, she has to pass a road block caused by a bullock cart. She is helped by the man she had shouted at in the earlier episode, who turns out to be the District Magistrate of Sitapur. The episode ends with

the news of two more murders committed by the dacoits.

Episode 12: Kalyani visits the families of the victims of dacoity. She receives a letter to say that her father's attackers are out on bail. She takes leave to go home. Her batch mate from the Academy is now the police officer in charge of the town where her parents live. She gets police protection for her father and gets her batch mate to start raids against Hardayal Singh, the man behind the attacks on her father, as he is also involved in various criminal activities.

Episode 13: The raids break Hardayal's back. He is now forced to meet Kalyani to compromise. Kalyani wants to take a strong stand, and settle all disputes, including the land case. Her father, persuades her to let the court settle the case, rather than taking the law into her hands. She meets Hardayal and makes him withdraw the criminal charges against her father and sign a bond of peace. Hardayal is happy that he is not forced to part with the land. Finally, Kalyani loses her temper and catches him by the collar. Her police colleague gets a medal for the operation against Hardayal, and Kalyani smiles and goes home.

NOTES

CHAPTER - I

1. The term "affective formations" is coined by Grossberg to recognize that "discursive fields are organized affectively as well as ideologically", pointing towards "a politics of feeling" and a focus on "empowerment which energizes and connects specific social moments, practices and subject positions" (Grossberg, 1986 a:73-74).

2. This incorporation of elite cultural artifacts into mass culture has been variously viewed. Some thinkers of the Frankfurt school, Adorno and Horkheimer (1977), for instance, employ the term "culture industry" to characterize the commodification of cultural forms, from art to folk culture, resulting in the shaping of individual consciousness in the interests of monopoly capital. They regard 'genuine' bourgeois art as containing elements of negation and subversion, which are destroyed by monopoly capital's ability to "harness to its purposes even use-values which are antithetical to it" (Open University, 1977(a):45). Walter Benjamin, also associated with the Frankfurt School, has a different position on this issue, pointing to the emancipatory potential of mechanical reproduction (Benjamin, 1977).

3. See Sontag (1982) for an interesting discussion of how photography alters one's relationship to the world.

4. The pilot "Experimental Television Services", funded by UNESCO and located in AIR, New Delhi, sought to produce and broadcast a series of educational programmes for urban and rural communities, to evaluate the possibility of using television for social education (Rao, 1992, Dua, 1979). It started off with a series of 20 programmes on the "responsibilities of citizenship", dealing with traffic and road sense, dangers to community health, food adulteration, encroachment of public property and manners of citizens. These programmes were broadcast through community television sets, around which teleclubs were organized. The experiment was extended to cover schools in 1960, later becoming a full fledged ETV project. In 1967, the Krishi Darshan programme was initiated, to popularize improved agricultural practices.

5. The term 'discourse' is used to connote "a network of possible ways of speaking or being spoken, being, belonging, empowering, and consequently socially and physically enforcing normalcy" (Brown, 1990:15). This definition is indebted to Foucault. The present work, however, does not purport to adopt a Foucauldian methodology for the analysis of discourse. It draws on Foucault's notion of power in order to explore the modes of subjectivity that emerge from viewers' accounts of their encounter with tele-

vision. The section 'Towards a Framework', later in this chapter, discusses the methodological underpinnings of this work.

6. Lerner, 1958, Schramm, 1964, Rogers, 1962 and Pye, 1972 are some examples of this discourse. Melkote, 1991 has a succinct summary and critique of these positions.

7. Escobar has drawn on the work of Michel Foucault, in his critique of the discourses of development.

8. 'Propaganda' is used in a wider sense than in common parlance, "to describe the influence of one person upon other persons when scientific knowledge and survival values are uncertain" (Doob, 1949:244). It is contrasted with 'education' which is "the imparting of knowledge or skill considered to be scientific or to have survival value in the society at a particular time" (Doob, 1949:237). Propaganda is seen as essential in a democracy, where there is no ultimate system of values, where competing opinions and beliefs struggle for recognition, using various media to further their cause.

9. See Open University, 1977 for a discussion.

10. Lasswell's concern is with the analysis of the message in order to predict its effect on the receiver. Within a behaviourist, stimulus-response framework, he draws on

psychoanalytic theory to study symbol manipulation by politicians, "to document how private deprivations and internalized conflict become attached to public (secondary) symbols" (Lang, 1989:320). The method of analysis adopted for this purpose is "content analysis". Lasswell starts from the premise that the media act on the "self". The personality structure of the "self" is classified according to "identifications" (the symbols it identifies with), "demands" (the values it seeks) and "acceptances" (the assumptions it makes regarding the past, present and future). Media effects on this "self" can thus be analyzed through a study of media statements in terms of three elements: "orientation" (the symbols associated with the statement) "direction" (whether it is "indulgent" or "deprivational" of the given symbol to the audience) and "intensity". Content analysis attempts to break down a meaningful whole into quantifiable units. The whole is seen as a summation of symbols, of specific direction and intensity, from which audience response can be inferred.

11. The following analysis of the SITE studies is based on Gore, 1979, which provides a detailed summary of all the studies.

12. SITE took place during the period of Emergency, and approximately 40 % of instructional programming covering areas other than SITE objectives was devoted to promoting the 20 point programme (Sinha, 1985:100).

13. In all the summative research, there is only one place where a question is raised about the sensitivity of the modernization indices of Inkeles. Mody (cited in Gore, 1979) suggests that the economically powerful sections do not see the modernization indicators as instrumental in improving one's position. She cites the example of large landlords, who, when asked what a villager should do to improve his position in life, reply "he should acquire land by fair means or foul, get elected to a political position and thus achieve power within the rural context".

14. Open University, 1977(b) and Boyd-Barrett, 1982 discuss the implications of this theory for a study of the mass media.

15. See Melkote, 1991, for a discussion of alternative development paradigms.

16. According to a recent MODE survey, cited in the Times of India, Sept. 28, 1992, p.7, 71% of the urban population own TVs, but do not have access to cable channels and only 4 % say they are likely to subscribe to cable in the near future. According to a National Television Survey, quoted in an Internews documentary on Doordarshan recently, the urban viewership figures are Doordarshan 82 %, video 10.5 %, cable 10.4 % and satellite 1.3 %

and 3 % of the entire Indian viewership has access to cable TV. However, these figures are rapidly changing in the urban context, where there is a flood of cable operators, and middle class audiences are getting hooked onto STAR TV soap operas (Times of India, Sept. 28, 1992, p1).

17. Lazarsfeld and Katz start out with the simple stimulus-response model of mass communication, modifying their formulation on the basis of their empirical work. In a study of the impact of the mass media on voting (Lazarsfeld et al, 1948), they come to the conclusion that, firstly, attitudes to voting are relatively stable, changing only under specific conditions; secondly, in every group, there are "opinion leaders", individuals who are distinguished from the rest by their capacity to articulate ideas and opinion and their media receptivity and exposure. The opinion leader becomes an important mediating element in the process of communication. The resultant "two-step flow model" (Lazarsfeld and Katz, 1955) thus accords a primacy to interpersonal relationships. It sees small groups as "anchorage points for individuals' opinions, attitudes, habits and values" as well as performing both a relay function and a reinforcement function. (Lazarsfeld and Katz, 1955:44).

18. The positivist version of science can be defined as:

(...) an attempt to gain predictive and explanatory

knowledge of the external world. To do this, one must construct theories, which consist of highly general statements, expressing the regular relationships that are found to exist in that world. These general statements, or laws, enable us both to predict and explain the phenomena that we discover by means of systematic observation and experiment (Keat and Urry, 1975:4).

19. This critique of positivism has been made by phenomenologists, such as Husserl, as well as by the Frankfurt School theorists, who point to the instrumental character of modern science:

(...) this character implies that modern science has, when viewed from a positivist self-understanding, an inner core which it cannot account for or master. It is intrinsically impossible for this science to assess its own objectives, or the purposes for which it is employed. Since it regards the world as a domain of neutral objects, as one such object itself it cannot even comprehend or assess itself; for it cannot reflect upon itself (Held, 1980:167).

20. As opposed to the empiricist notion of language as a tool used by a speaking subject to name things that exist in an external reality, Saussure posits two levels within language: langue and parole. Langue is the system of signs that manifests in parole, the concrete speech act. The sign does not purport to name things, but involves a relationship between the signifier

(the acoustic image) and the signified (the concept). Moreover, signs are constituted in their difference from each other, rather than in terms of their materiality. This system of differences restructures reality for the speaking subject, who merely complies with the system. Thus, language for Saussure is a system without terms, without a speaking subject and without things (Jayasankar, 1989:15). ?

21. Barthes' conception of 'myth' involves a "second-order semiological system" (Barthes, 1972). The first level is that of denotation, where meaning is constituted by the relationship of the signifier to the signified. The sign constituted in this first order system becomes the signified in a second order system, where the signified is a "fragment of ideology" - this is at the level of connotation. To illustrate, an advertisement for a brand of cigarette might show a man smoking, while a woman in the background looks on admiringly. At the level of denotation, one might say that the elements of the picture and the copy are signifiers, the compelling presence of the smoker being the signified. However, at the level of connotation, the advertisement itself becomes the signifier, related to a larger signified, that connotes a certain construction of gender relationships, perhaps what Berger sums up as "men act and women appear" (Berger, 1972:47). It is in this manner that myths appropriate meaning and, in so doing, transform culture into nature.

22. Semiotic approaches to television and film have undergone considerable metamorphosis since the early work of Barthes. The application of linguistic categories to cinema, for instance, as demonstrated by the work of Christian Metz, has brought out the problems inherent in attempting to identify a rigid and specific set of rules, a langue, underlying a particular cinematic text. Instead, Metz employs the category of a "code", which is an analytical construct enabling a consideration of the syntagmatic (for instance, the narrative) and paradigmatic relations within a text (Heath, 1981(a):130).

(In Metz' work) cinema and the cinematic text were treated as fields of signification in which a heterogeneity of codes, some specific to the cinema, others not, interacted with one another in ways which were specific, systematic and determinate at certain specified levels of cinematic discourse (individual films, particular genres and so on)... (Eaton and Neale, 1981:viii).

23. Hall, 1980(a) identifies three elements in the 'Screen' project to fill out the absent subject of early semiotics. Firstly, it draws on the Lacanian re-reading of Freud, which conceives of the subject as constituted in the moment of entry into the "symbolic", into language. Lacan traces the formation of the subject through various stages, beginning with a "splitting": "(...) first from its sense of continuum with the

mother's body, then with the illusory identity or totality of the ideal ego of the mirror stage; and finally a separation by which the subject finds itself a place in symbolization" (Coward and Ellis, 1977:66). This notion of the subject as an eternally fragmented self, constituted by unconscious processes in relation to knowledge and language is a radical departure from the unified Cartesian subject.

Secondly, the Lacanian notion of the subject invoked by 'Screen theory' is supported by Althusser's work on ideology, which regards the subject as an effect of ideology (Althusser, 1971). Ideology "interpellates" or hails the subject, establishing its apparent facticity, in the process concealing its constructed nature and, in so doing, ensuring the reproduction of the existing relations of production.

Thirdly, Screen theory attempts "(...)to forge a connection between the 'primary' psychoanalytic processes through which subjects-as-such as constituted and the related processes of representation and identification in visual discourse and texts... (Hall, 1980(a):158).

The Screen project thus views cinema as a signifying practice involving specific relations of subjectivity, with several ideological and institutional forms, sites and boundaries.

24. Analyses of popular cultural texts using this approach have attempted to identify processes within the filmic/televisual discourse through which pleasure is created and the viewer constituted (Heath, 1981(b), Heath and Skirrow 1977, Mulvey 1981, Modleski 1982).

25. British cultural studies, encompasses a diversity of approaches, drawing on structuralism, Marxism, post-structuralism, hermeneutics and feminism, among others. The intellectual traditions of Richard Hoggart and Raymond Williams form the starting point of this body of work, one of the basic concerns of which has been to explore the relevance of Marxist categories (including the work of Althusser and Gramsci) for the study of culture and media in the British context. While there is no unitary theoretical position, the general project of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) has involved "(...) the elaboration of a non-reductionist theory of culture and social formations - and a defined 'universe of discourse' within whose framework different positions and emphases are exposed to mutual critique (Hall, 1980(b): 39-40).

Areas of research have included ethnographies of popular and working class culture, research on the state, education and family, 'cultural history' and work on language and the media.

26. Hall occupies the middle ground between the economic/textual determinism of Marxism and structuralism and the 'culturalist' privileging of human agency and experience. By conceiving of social formation and culture as a contested terrain, he accords a centrality to the notion of struggle. The relationships between the various elements of a social formation (e.g. ideology and social forces, different ideological discourses) are conceived in terms of the category of "articulation" (drawn from Laclau) which regards these connections as contingent and non-necessary, rather than, predetermined and eternal.

(...) a theory of articulation is both a way of understanding how ideological elements come, under certain conditions to cohere together within a discourse, and a way of asking how they do or do not become articulated, at specific conjunctures, to certain political subjects (...) The theory of articulation asks how an ideology discovers its subject rather than how the subject thinks the necessary and inevitable thoughts which belong to it; it enables us to think how a ideology empowers people, enabling them to begin to make some sense or intelligibility of their historical situation, without reducing those forms of intelligibility to their socio-economic class location or social position (Hall, in Grossberg, 1986:53).

27. Morley (1980), for instance, draws on Pecheux's concept of interdiscourse which makes a distinction between the constitution of the subject-in-general and its interpellation by specific discourses:

The constitution of subjects is always specific in respect of each subject.... and this can be conceived in terms of a single, original (and mythic) interpellation - the entry into language and the symbolic - which constitutes a space wherein a complex of continually interpellated subject forms interrelate, each subject form being a determinate formation of discursive processes. The discursive subject is therefore an interdiscourse, the product of the effects of discursive practices traversing the subject through its history (Pecheux, cited in Morley, 1980:163 - 164, emphasis in original).

Texts are also regarded, in this interpretation, as situated within a discursive field, and hence to be understood in terms of their historical conditions of production and consumption, their insertion into discursive formations, articulated with other, non-discursive practices. The encounter between text and subject is hence a complex moment, involving the interplay of many elements:

Both the text and the subject are constituted in the space

of the interdiscursive; and both are traversed, and intersected by contradictory discourses - contradictions which arise not only from the subject positions which these different discourses propose, but also from the conjuncture and institutional sites in which they are articulated and transformed (Morley, 1980:171).

28. Like Althusser, Foucault also invokes the notion of the subject as a construct, constituted through mechanisms of domination. However, unlike Althusser, Foucault's concern is not with formulating categories (like ideology or mode of production) to explain the reproduction of the social totality within a general theoretical framework, but with specific modes of objectification.

The individual is not a pre-given entity which is seized on by the exercise of power. The individual, with its identity and characteristics, is the product of a relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, forces (Foucault, 1980:73-74).

29. This conception of knowledge/power is particularly relevant to present day global information society. Poster, 1984 coins the term "mode of information" to draw attention to the fact that at the present juncture "technologies of power", from electronic surveillance to the mass media, to psychoanalysis take the form of linguistic experiences, thus constituting "(...)the historical

conditions for a method of analysis that gives due recognition to the discursive nature of practice, that conceptualizes truth in relation to power, that detotalizes the historical-social field and that sets strict limits to the scope of reason..." (Poster, 1984:168).

30. The reasons for the choice of this method are three-fold. Firstly, the focus of this thesis is on specific local networks of power and resistance in viewers' encounter with televisual discourses. Participant observation, as opposed to textual analysis or survey methods, appears to be suited to such an inquiry. Secondly, this thesis sees itself as contributing to a growing body of audience "reception studies", represented, for instance, by the work of Morley, 1980, Hobson, 1982, Jensen, 1986, Radway, 1987 and Lull, 1988. Thirdly, while ethnographic methods have been employed before in development communication research in India (SITE, for instance), the present study approaches these methods with different conceptual underpinnings, hoping to demonstrate, in the process, their potential for generating new formulations of audience reception.

31. The census figures for Goa, Daman and Diu indicate that in the first 60 years of the century, average annual population growth rate was less than half a percent. In the first decade after liberation (1961-1971) the growth rate rose to 36.88 percent, i.e., an annual growth rate of 3.7 percent (Census of

India, 1981:20). For the decade 1971-81, the growth rate was 26.69 percent. A large part of this growth is accounted for by migration. Migrants from other states constituted 15.14 percent of the total population, as per the 1981 census (Census of India, 1981:104).

32. The proportion of population of Hindus, Catholics and Muslims to the total population of Goa District in 1981 was 64.20, 31.35 and 4.10 respectively (Census of India, 1981:70).

33. Migrants from Karnataka and Maharashtra constitute 69.43 and 76.58 percent of the total migrant population from other states, in 1971 and 1981 respectively (Census of India, 1981:104).

34. The 'comunidade' or village council is the Portuguese codification of an indigenous institution for the collective ownership of landholdings of the village and collective governance of village affairs. It was reduced to a village body collectively owning certain lands, generally given to share-croppers, the resultant income being distributed to members as dividends. For further details, see D'Souza, 1975, Gomes, 1987 and Baden-Powell, 1900.

35. The Centre of India Trade Unions is affiliated to the Communist Party of India (Marxist), and at one time was a powerful force in the Mormugao docks.

36. The interviews with respondents were conducted mainly in Konkani, Marathi and Hindi, translated into English. 'Phukat' is a colloquial term in Marathi, meaning 'free of cost'.

37. Much of this information, regarding the growth of Kamgar Nagar, has been obtained from an interview with the local municipal counsellor and cross-checked with other local sources. The rest of the information has been obtained through interviews with early settlers.

38. This is a 'guesstimate' that is widely accepted, there being no data available from any source.

39. At the time of the study, in 1988, the market price of land in the area was Rs.350/- to Rs.400/- per square metre (conversation with municipal counsellor).

CHAPTER - II

1. In these studies, ethnic identity is seen variously as:

a) "(...) the ready made set of endowments and identifications which every individual shares with others from the moment of birth by the chance of the family into which he is born at that given time in that given place" (Isaacs, 1975 (a): 31).

b) "(...) an enclosing device which carves out a recognizable social collectivity based on certain shared perceptions of distinctive commonness often augmented by diachronic continuity" (Dasgupta, 1975:467).

c) "(...) those feelings and values in respect of a sense of continuity, shared memories and a sense of common destiny of a given unit of population which has had common experiences and cultural attributes" (Smith, 1990: 179).

While these definitions of ethnic identity enumerate aspects of what constitutes it, they appear to be lacking in some aspects. Specifically, they elide the constructed nature of ethnic identity.

2. We have already discussed our notion of 'subject', drawing on Foucault, in Chapter I.

3. Anderson sees the ideology of nationalism as arising at a particular juncture, when fundamental religious and monarchic cultural conceptions are being undermined, and the emergence of print capitalism makes possible a particular form of community, imagined through language.

4. Smith (1986:71) points to the key role played by science in reimagining the nation:

(...) the ancient experiences are no longer simply retold as in the epics of former times; they are subjected to 'interpretation' and scrutiny, using present-day assumptions and the new scientific approaches and disciplines of philology, archaeology, anthropology, sociology and history. These disciplines are necessary tools of modern social solidarity and citizenship, for they enable us to 'make sense' of our collective location in space and time, the limited space and calendrical time of the new era of nationhood. Without such 'science' there can, in a very literal sense, be no nation.

5. The ideology of nationalism is framed in cultural terms :

To create a nation, therefore, it is not enough simply to mobilize compatriots. They must be taught who they are, where they came from and whither they are going ... The former culture of a community which had no other end beyond

itself now becomes the talisman and legitimation for all manner of national policies (Smith, 1990:184).

6. With the western secularized notions of time and space that have undermined traditional myths of belongingness and identity, ethnic nationalism becomes a "surrogate" religion, providing both a sense of the past and the future destiny. To do this, it must use both landscape and history: "The one roots the community in its distinctive terrain; the other charts its origin and flowering in the age of heroes. Both together provide a history and metaphysic of the individuality of the community, from which an ethic of regeneration issues to lead it forward" (Smith 1986: 183).

7. See Chatterjee (1986) for a discussion of the contradictory elements in the nationalist discourse in the Indian context. He points out that "nowhere in the world has nationalism qua nationalism challenged the legitimacy of the marriage between Reason and Capital. Nationalist thought (...) does not possess the ideological means to make this challenge. The conflict between metropolitan capital and the people-nation it resolves by absorbing the political life of the nation into the body of the state" (Chatterjee, 1986:168).

8. Chatterjee (1986:169) underlines the "false resolution" that nationalist discourse attempts to achieve, through "modern

statecraft" and technology, which, however, cannot suppress the tensions between the "people-nation" and the "state-as-representing-nation". These tensions often take the form of separatist ethnic movements, sometimes "anti-modern" and "anti-western".

9. The Old Conquests are densely populated, having a density of between 604 and 931 persons per square km, while the New Conquests have a density of population varying between 82 and 375 persons per square km (Census of India, 1981).

10. The 'Catholic' and 'Hindu' identities were not monolithic, for caste has always been, and continues to be, an important element of identity construction in both communities. It is interesting to see how the caste system adapted to the entry of Catholicism, albeit taking a simplified form.

11. Translated, this reads: "One must no doubt congratulate the Holy Office for the remarkable quality of their ethnography..."

12. The extent of penetration of everyday life is remarkable. For instance, the edict (clause 40) proscribes the cooking of rice without salt. To this day, one finds that Catholics cook rice with salt, and Hindus without it.

13. It was the Ranes and those who drew inspiration from them

who represented the stand of militant anti-colonial protest within Goan society: "Those who kept the torch of the freedom struggle burning in spite of all harassment by the Portuguese police and denial of any freedom were mostly the Ranes or their descendants whether in the New Conquests or elsewhere.... If the Portuguese were constantly kept on their toes and made to realize that the Goans wanted to be masters of their own household, it was mostly due to this section of Goans" (Esteves, 1986:27).

14. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, a section of the Goan intelligentsia began using the press and constitutional means to put forward a plea for the freedom of Goa (D'Souza, 1975:284). After 1926, with a dictatorship being established in Portugal, the repression on this section increased. The Portuguese government also used the Church to appeal to Goans, resulting in large Christian support for Portuguese rule and in a narrow base, for the freedom struggle. From 1946 onwards, Goan Nationalists and Indian freedom fighters launched a civil disobedience movement, which was brutally crushed. The liberation of Goa came, finally, in December 1961, through a military operation by the Indian Government, with little resistance from the Portuguese. Thus, one finds that the Liberation struggle was confined to a small section of elite; given the repressive and closed nature of Goan society, there was little communication between this elite and the populace.

(...) the average Goan (...) was unconcerned about ideologies, political philosophies, democracy and freedom. He wanted to know whether he could have enough to keep the pot boiling at the end of the day and a life free from constant and undue interference by government, bureaucrats and politicians. Having had that, he was not worried as to who ruled Goa. It was for the leaders to tell him that under freedom he would have all that and much more (...) This was not done and to that extent it was a failure of leadership among Goans during the liberation period (Esteves, 1986:59-60).

15. In the process of conversion, the jati system was simplified into a five-fold classification : The Bamonns (Brahmin), consisting of jatis such as Saraswat, Karade, Chitpavan, Padhve and so on; the Chaddo/Chardos who were the previous Kshatriyas, the Sudirs or Sudras, the Gauddos who were Vaishya-Vani remanents and the Gaudis or Kunbis, the aboriginal or the tribal elements.

16. The mando is a syncretic musical dance form, drawing on the European minuet, with Konkani verses and a blend of music and instruments from the East and the West.

17. Kale, 1986, identifies three historical factors leading to a distinct Goan Christian ethos (with all its stratifications of caste and class), the first being "the traditional Hindu social

order with its belief in a strict hierarchy for the family and the society", the second, the entire ensemble of Roman Catholic beliefs, practices and rituals, and the third the acceptance of colonial rule as "a beneficial one because of the material benefits and rewards associated with it" (Kale, 1986:2057).

18. A rough translation of this would be:

"Where did you go, Regina, early in the morning ?

I went to the jungle, mother, for firewood.

Who saw you, Regina, when you went for firewood?

That landlord, mother, he called me.

What was the landlord telling you Regina?

That landlord, mother, he showed me a flower.

19. "In the deep of the night,

roam white men, with beards"...

20. "At the carpenter's, in Margao,

A round table is made,

A girl dances, swaying her hips,

A white man watches her,

Poking his snout through a hole,

O white man, don't look at her,

For she is a widow".

21. "There is firing and firing, in the jungle,

The Ranes are killing the white men,

The white men are killing the Ranes".

22. The first few lines are:

"Sir, I want to go across the river to Damu's marriage pandal

Please show me the way

Sir, I don't know the way..."

23. Newman, 1984, points to the key role played by religious festivals in the construction of cultural identities. The saints' days of the Catholics and the zattras (festivals) of the Hindus are "(...) occasions (which) create an atmosphere of excitement, even fervor, in which people have a chance to approach their gods and their inner selves, to learn something about their own society through the festival "text" " (Newman, 1984:46).

24. Nelson, 1973, points out that unlike other overseas Indian communities in East Africa, Goans have reproduced their caste hierarchy, and that the relations between castes are characterized by political competition.

25. According to D'Souza, 1975, the mining boom was a result of Portuguese policy to stimulate the Goan economy, following India's independence. The Portuguese were afraid of the repercussions that this might have for Goa, and hence made an all out

effort to woo the populace.

26. Salaries were increased by as much as 5 times; for instance from Rs.60/- per month to Rs.300/- per month, a similar position in India having a salary of Rs.100/- (D'Souza, 1975:277).

27. The mass media too, played a role in the reproduction of a Lusitanian culture and a colonial Catholic identity. The access to newspapers was limited to upper caste, elite sections of Goan society, the circulation of a number of Portuguese papers, a couple of Konkani ones and one in Marathi varying from 800 to 6,200 copies (D'Souza, 1975:224). With the establishment of radio broadcasting in 1946, the Portuguese government was provided with an opportunity to counter, with political propaganda and cultural interventions, the influences of a newly independent India across the border. They particularly played on the religious sentiments of the Catholics to link the Goan Catholic identity to colonial Portugal. Relative to India, radio was more accessible in Goa, given the availability of cheap foreign imports, and "a substantial section of the middle class", in addition to the upper class, owned radio sets (D'Souza, 1975:235).

28. The Catholic elite were not equivocally pro-colonial. A significant section participated in the liberation struggle, though they were unable to confront the Portuguese in a militant, unified manner (Esteves, 1986). However, the 'Indian' identity

of this section was vaguely defined and instrumental, the underlying image remaining a version of 'Goa Dourada' (Newman, 1989:7).

29. This pattern continued till 1980, when, for the first time a national party, Congress (U), came into power. However, even the 'national' parties were basically realignments of elements from the regional parties. Infighting in the Congress, for instance often took on a communal dimension, particularly on the language issue.

30. The Opinion Poll was on the issue of merger with Maharashtra versus retaining Union Territory status. During the campaigning for the Opinion Poll, the MGP played on religious sentiments to make a case for merger with Maharashtra: "(...) their main slogan in their posters was: 'After 450 years, Goddess Shanta Durga (the family deity of most Hindus in Goa) is going to meet Goddess Bhavani (the family of Shivaji). So vote for merger'" (Esteves, 1986:131). However, an analysis of the poll results shows that it cut across communal lines, with Union Territory status garnering support even in the so-called 'pro-merger' areas in the New Conquests (Esteves, 1986:139).

31. In fact, it is said that the language issue came into prominence as a result of infighting within the Congress, with one group asserting its dominance by getting the September 1985 resolution passed.

32. The information on the riots was provided by the municipal counsellor and corroborated by other sources.

33. These statements about various religious communities may only be treated as specific to this study (specific to Kamgar Nagar) and not as generalizations or typologies with universal validity; there is a need to underline this, lest such work be enlisted in support of generalizations that perpetuate communal stereotypes.

34. The shrine of Our Lady of Vailankanni is near Madras, a journey of over 24 hours from Goa. Nevertheless, many Catholics have been there, sometimes hiring a bus or tempo for the journey. For many, it might be their first trip outside Goa.

35. The local cultural form that is closest to the heart of most Sudra Catholics is the Tiatr, a theatrical form with elements of drama, music, and improvisation, dealing generally with familial themes, interspersed with songs, often referring to the political scenario." The plays work within a strictly Goan Christian moral context and reflect a complex set of attitudes which include, amongst others, an intense regional/national pride for Goa and things Goan, a strong belief in the sanctity of family life and an abiding faith in God and his Church" (Kale, 1986: 2054). In recent times, video copies of tiatr performance are also avail-

able, and popular particularly among the migrant Catholics from the Gulf, who have access to video cassette players.

36. Once a 10 year old child from the household remarked to me , "I think Catholics die more than other people", so much is the emphasis on honouring the dead !

37. The Lamanis or Lambadas belong to the nomadic tribes; they have come from Karnataka and many of them work on construction sites or in other unskilled, low-paid jobs.

38. A 'sanna' is a steamed cake made from fermented rice (similar to the south Indian 'idli') and eaten on festive occasions.

39. The attempt here is not to shortcircuit the many debates pertaining to the relation between polity and religion, between the Church and the State. It is beyond the scope of this work to go into these debates, though they appear to have a direct bearing on the constitution of ethnic identities and ethnic politics; the recent upheavals and the growth of communalism and religious intolerance in the country bear witness to this.

40. The serial 'Ramayan' based on the epic story was telecast prior to the field work. The serial ended with the return of Ram to Ayodhya. A sequel, entitled 'Uttar Ramayan', was being tele-

cast at the time of the study. This deals with the subsequent events, including Sita's exile, the birth of her twin sons, Lav and Kush, and so on. Uttar Ramayan was not as popular as the earlier serial. Most viewers found it very 'slow', with nothing much happening in each episode, which was designed for a half-hour slot, unlike the previous one hour slot for Ramayan.

41. At the same time, there was a tendency to regard the televisual version as more valid because it claimed that it was based on a number of versions of the Ramayan, in different languages.

42. These were serials that had a strong element of Urdu language and culture. The first two dealt with the lives of the poets Amir Khusro and Mirza Ghalib and the third was a series on different poets. The serial Amir Khusro, in particular, placed heavy emphasis on communal harmony. It is noteworthy that a serial on communal harmony ends up reinforcing communal differences.

43. The reference is a derogatory one, to the scheduled castes, some of whom are 'chamars' or leather workers.

CHAPTER III

1. Studies of television watching and use within the family, in the Indian context, are few. Surveys on the Impact of television on urban families include Narayanan, 1983 and Yadava and Reddi, 1988. Behl, 1988 is an ethnography of the entry of television into rural life, and its implications for the rhythms of everyday life and familial relations. Some of the studies mentioned above are included in Lull, 1988, a cross-cultural collection of essays on the family and television. The approach which comes closest to that of the present work is that of David Morley (in Lull, 1988) with its focus on the patriarchal relations of power within which viewing takes place.

2. This can be related to a wider trend towards the transfer of leisure activity from outside the home to within it, with the entry of television and video. See Morley, 1988:23, Yadava and Reddi, 1988:130 for a corroboration of this trend.

3. Please refer to Appendix III for a presentation of television viewing behaviour of the respondents.

4. 'Historicals' on Doordarshan cannot be strictly called 'soap operas', with exception of a few ('Hum Log', 'Khandaan'), the reason being that most historicals have a limited time (generally 13 episodes) in which to end their 'story' and hence, there is a

strong movement towards a resolution at the end. As opposed to this, soap operas are characterized by an "excessive plot structure" and "lack of narrative progress" (Ang, 1990: 81-82).

5. This 'reality' may not be 'real', in terms of being proximate to everyday experience. The presentation of fantasy situations that are read as "real" are part of the process by which viewers are given an opportunity to take up subject positions which they might not be able to do in real life. See Ang, 1990:83-84, for a discussion of the pleasures of fantasizing in terms of "the imaginary occupation of other subject positions".

6. The social awareness advertisements on TV are short spots that appear in between prime-time programmes. They deal with information and attitudes relating to issues such as contraception, immunization, nutrition, ante-natal care, hygiene, status of women and the girl child, dowry and national integration.

7. For a detailed discussion of this, refer to Du Bois, 1991.

8. For a discussion of the relationship between the family and the welfare state in Britain, refer to Morgan, 1985 and Wilson, 1977. Both trace the growing role of the state in defining and constructing the normal family and in creating a site for the intervention of experts.

9. 'Rasna' is a soft drink concentrate that acquired popularity partly through its TV advertisement campaign. For a further discussion, see note 10, Chapter IV.

10. 'Adalat' was a detective serial, episodic in nature. The specific episode referred to involves the adventures of two children who confront a gang of criminals. One of the lead characters is the child model who appears in the Rasna advertisement.

11. 'Complan' is a nutritional supplement beverage. The advertisement referred to has two children, who assert, "I am a Complan Boy" and "I am a Complan Girl".

12. This is a social awareness advertisement on Vitamin A deficiency that leads to night-blindness.

13. This was an advertisement brought out by Colgate toothpaste, selling a repackaged version (toothpaste in a plastic packet) of their product, using child models and children singing the jingle.

14. Prashna Manch is a quiz show in Hindi, focussing on a different topic in each episode.

15. Paramvir and Karamchand are both detective serials, named

after the private detective characters around which they revolve.

16. Literally translated, it means "Half Truth - Half Falsehood". This was an episodic serial on family situations.

17. It is interesting to see how the place of the TV set in the house changed with time. At first, it was in the sitting room, a smallish room where guests were entertained. When films were screened, it would be pulled out into the entrance hall. After a couple of months, it was shifted from the sitting room to the sewing room, another small room, where the sewing machine was kept, so that it could be watched without disturbing the ongoing household activities. In fact, by this time, the adults in the house would watch it only sporadically, if they had nothing else to do.

18. The reference is to the girl who models wearing a bikini, under a waterfall, in the advertisement for Liril soap.

19. Fauji was a popular serial revolving around a group of army 'buddies', who go through training and face war.

20. Mungeri Lal, the titular hero, is a Walter Mitty-like character, who lives in a make-believe world, where he is spectacularly successful, in contrast to his humble status in everyday life.

21. The advertisement shows a family sliding down a gigantic slide-like toothpaste tube.

22. See also Das, 1976, for a discussion of the decision making role of women in forging marriage alliances within Punjabi communities.

23. Flying: (Present participle of) to fly v.t. to make (something) float or move through the air: to fly a kite. :adj. that flies, makes flight or passing through the air.

Kite: n.1. a light frame covered with some thin material, to be flown in the wind at the end of a long string. 2. any of several small birds of the hawk family Accipitridae that have long pointed wings, that feed on insects, carrion, small reptiles, rodents and birds, and that are noted for their graceful gliding flight. Obs. a person who preys on others, a sharper (Random House Dictionary of English Language).

24. The Kanpur sisters committed suicide to spare their parents the burden of dowry. A similar case occurred in Palghat, Kerala, after the Kanpur incident.

Chapter IV

1. The only sense of community that viewers experience is perhaps in participating in events relating to shared religious symbols. It is in this context, that one must understand the 'spontaneous' assertions of communal identities, during the 1982 and 1986 riots. These have already been discussed in Chapter II.
2. 'Simon' refers to a local politician, 'Rane' to a former Chief Minister belonging to Congress I, 'hand' to the Congress election symbol and 'two leaves' to the Goa Congress election symbol.
3. This stance is represented, for instance, by the Joshi Committee Report, discussed in Chapter I.
4. In addition to the works discussed below, there is an extensive body of work done by theorists such as Baudrillard and Bourdieu. Keeping the scope of this thesis in mind, a discussion of their work has not been attempted.
5. The advertising campaign, for Vimal textiles, consists of small narrative slices delineating the actions of the 'Vimal man', each with a title (for instance, 'His Passion', 'His Perfection'), generally ending with 'His Suiting'.
6. Goenkar horrado refers to the self-image of respectability

that some Goan Catholics feel compelled to maintain, irrespective of their financial status.

7. The bonds between brothers and sisters within the extended family were very close, so much so that unstinting help of all kinds in times of need and crisis was taken for granted.

8. In Goa, fish is consumed by most Hindus, including those Brahmins who consider themselves 'vegetarian'. Only meat is regarded as 'non-vegetarian'.

9. 'Doce de grao' is a sweet made of gram flour and 'bibinca' is a rich cake baked layer by layer.

10. The success of the Rasna advertising campaign should be seen in the context of Rasna providing a cheap, easily prepared substitute to home-made 'soft drinks'. The appeal of the advertisement itself and the familial relationships it posits have been discussed in chapter III.

11. See Nightingale, 1990: 32 for a discussion of the role of the department store as a marketing strategy in the West.

12. This information is at times professionally useful: a small shopkeeper spoke of how he keeps track of new soaps and other items, because customers ask for these; a tailor's wife said that

her husband watched the advertisements for new styles and patterns, which he would duplicate.

13. The perception of a Union activist in this regard is relevant. His opposition to the introduction, by the Union, of an installment scheme for TV purchase stemmed from his belief that it would make workers more susceptible to management coercion. With the burden of loan repayment, workers would become dependent on overtime wages. Since overtime work is to be authorized by the supervisor, this would mean placating him. Their militancy would be effectively curbed.

14. Berger's observation on 'publicity' (1972:133-134) is pertinent: "(...) publicity as a system only makes a single proposal. It proposes to each of us that we transform ourselves, or our lives by buying something more. This more, it proposes, will make us in some way richer even though we will be poorer by having spent our money. Publicity persuades us of such a transformation by showing us people who have apparently been transformed and are, as a result, enviable (...) The spectator-buyer is meant to envy herself as she will become if she buys the product. She is meant to imagine herself transformed by the product into an object of envy for others, an envy which will then justify her loving herself.

15. Even in adulthood, the kind of sensitivity and ability to

adjust demanded of women makes them more liable to self-scrutiny and to working on themselves.

16. 'Shiv Sena' is a Hindu communal organization, which originated in Maharashtra, with a sons-of-the-soil agenda. Over time, it has modified this agenda, to concentrate on 'Hindutva' ('the Hindu cause') and has spread to other states.

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