

State Politics in India

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Politics in Goa Instability, Identity and Capitalist Transformation

PARAG D. PAROBO

Post-colonial Goa, a small state with an area of 3,072 sq. km. draws significant attention from the media and popular Indian imagination. The state is imagined as a space of difference, which has become its marker. What marks Goa as the other of India is not only its post-colonial identity where the entire discourse is on European culture, but also on the economic potential that has witnessed good infrastructure, high quality of life and high rate of literacy. These economic indicators are further substantiated by institutionalized government and media rankings as a state with 'difference', acknowledged as the best ranked state by the Eleventh Finance Commission, National Commission for Population, Credit Rating Information Services and *India Today's* best state from 2003 to 2015 for excelling in the fields of human development and one of the best states to live in India.¹

Post-colonial Goa in terms of popular imagination is remarkably colonial Goa. However, the difference being, in the colonial period while the colonial identity was contested largely by the nationalists, in post-colonial times, colonialism is deployed as a resource to celebrate Goa's distinct identity-- a demand for special status under the Constitution of India.² Today Goans are structurally engaged with colonial Goa within a framework through which they reflect their cultural and regional identities.³

Colonial Goa

Located about 600 km. south of Mumbai, Goa is surrounded by the Sindhudurg district of Maharashtra in the north, Karnataka's Belgaum district in the east and Uttar Kannad district in the south, and in the west by the Arabian Sea. The conquest of Goa by the Portuguese in 1510 not only laid the foundations of European rule over India, but also the cultural basis on which Goa was to be imagined. In the pre-colonial period, Goa did not exist as a political entity. The geographical location and port-based nature of Goa compelled the rulers based in Deccan to contest for political control over Goa. In pre-colonial times, the references to Goa were largely in terms of a region or port and not as a political kingdom with fixed boundaries.

Today, the state of Goa comprises of two districts of North Goa and South Goa which has twelve *talukas* of Tiswadi, Bardez, Pernem, Bicholim, Ponda and

Sattari in the North and Salcete, Mormugao, Sanquem, Quepem, Canacona, Dharbandora in the South.⁴ The conquest of Goa in terms of the present boundaries of the state of Goa was not accomplished at one point of time. The territorial extent of the Portuguese Goa in the sixteenth century consisted *talukas* of Tiswadi, captured in 1510 and Bardez and Salcete, annexed in 1543 from the Adilshah of Bijapur. The other *talukas* were annexed by the Portuguese from 1763 to 1788 and thus the present boundaries of the state of Goa were chalked out.⁵

The entire state of Goa did not undergo 450 years of Portuguese colonialism as it is usually remarked nor was the nature of colonialism the same throughout the Portuguese rule.⁶ The different periods of the Portuguese rule accompanied by changes in colonial policies across Goa has its impact on post-colonial Goa. The 'Old Conquests' consisting of coastal *talukas* of Tiswadi, Bardez, Salcete and Mormugao and captured by the Portuguese in the early half of the sixteenth century are predominantly Catholic, largely due to the Portuguese religious policy. While, the 'New Conquests' are predominantly Hindu and were acquired by the end of the eighteenth century when the state-sponsored conversions had ended.⁷ Apart from the cultural differences, the regions also reflect different land ownership patterns and economic disparities; 'Old Conquests' being urbanized, densely populated and developed.⁸

The landed property in Goa was dominated by Hindu and Catholic upper castes. D.D. Kosambi and T.R. de Souza argue that the Gauda Saraswat Brahmans (GSBs) usurped the most fertile lands in Goa.⁹ The *talukas* of the 'Old Conquests' has land primarily owned by the *Comunidades* (village community), while the *talukas* of 'New Conquests' have land owned by the *bhatkars* (landlords).¹⁰ The *Comunidades* had communal landholding, where village land was held in common by the *gaonkars* (village heads), usually upper castes, who divided the income of the village on the basis of shares.¹¹ The *Comunidades* auctioned land for cultivation and the most prosperous *Comunidades* were in 'Old Conquests'. Out of the total 225 *Comunidades* in early 1960s, 124 were in 'Old Conquests'.¹² *Comunidades* have been upheld as enduring institutions that survived Portuguese colonialism. However, the *Comunidades*' survival was largely driven by exploitation of peasantry and financial support to the colonial state in the form of rent contributions.¹³ Today the regional differences in terms of 'Old Conquests' and 'New Conquests' are only symbolic and there are no popular sentiments that privilege one region over the other.

The Portuguese colonialism was marked by the development of mercantile class, especially GSBs in Goa.¹⁴ The GSBs were owners of agency houses, insurers, traders, moneylenders, diplomats, revenue farmers and have noteworthy references in Portuguese and private records. In the seventeenth century, when Goa Inquisition was at its peak, 62 per cent of the listed tax farmers among Hindus were GSBs.¹⁵ There was nexus between colonial rulers and GSBs, and

they were the 'pillars of the Portuguese empire', dominating colonial economy.¹⁶ The remarkable feature of Goa's colonial economy was not only the failure of the colonial state to invest capital in production, but also of the local mercantile elites who did not invest in production, thus encouraging pre-capitalist modes of production. The transformation of Goa from colonial to post-colonial has not seen the development of industrial capitalism due to the continued dominance of mercantile capital.¹⁷

Contested Identity and Statehood, 1963-1987

The liberation of Goa on 19 December 1961 saw Goans celebrating the end of colonial rule and also raising apprehensions about their identity. The contestation on identity and the future status of Goa was in fact a discourse that had started since the 1940s. Many Goan nationalist organizations, feeling the divisive implications on the status of Goa in terms of a state within India or merging with the state of Maharashtra, distanced themselves by prioritizing liberation and reserving the decision for the day of liberation.¹⁸ Realizing the concerns on identity in post-Liberation Goa, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru began to console Goans that their individuality will be maintained and any change that might come will be made by them.¹⁹

The significant feature of post-liberation Goa was the immediate initiation of democratic process through Panchayat elections in October 1962 and elections to the union territory of Goa, Daman and Diu in 1963. In its very first elections, Goa surprised the country by bringing to power a government that, with the Bahujan Samaj as its political base, was the first of its kind.²⁰ Long before lower castes elsewhere in the nation had recognized as a group what their numerical strength could do for them in a democracy, Goa's Bahujan Samaj—a loose conglomeration of lower castes—rallied behind Dayanand Bhandodkar, a lower caste mine owner who eventually went on to become the first chief minister (CM) of the union territory of Goa, Daman and Diu.²¹

The first elections in Goa were strongly contested by the Indian National Congress (INC) and the two newly formed regional parties the United Goans Party (UGP) and Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP). The INC was overconfident of its victory and compromised and appeased GSBs and pro-colonial elements by giving them tickets.²² In the 1963 elections, INC was seen as a party of elites, while UGP was dominated by the Catholic elites and was perceived to be a Catholic party whose main concern was maintaining the unique identity of Goa.

The MGP promised land reforms and raised emotional and cultural issues of merger with Maharashtra. The results of elections reflected the worst ever electoral performance by the INC with eighteen INC candidates losing their deposits. Bhandodkar understood the notion of freedom for the Bahujan Samaj

and formulated his policies around their feelings and aspirations. He raised the allocations to social sectors from 18 to 47 per cent.²³ His understanding on the class perception and social conditions in Goa gave him space to emerge as a leader of the masses. Tenancy was a prominent feature of agrarian relations in colonial Goa and 80 per cent of net sown area was cultivated by tenants.²⁴ The colonial state did not develop agriculture and imposed high rents on the lands of *Comunidades* and *bhatkars*. The enhancement of the rents was passed on to tenants and the *Comunidades* and *bhatkars* benefited from the situation. The Portuguese agricultural mission of the 1950s found that tenancy rates in Goa were extremely high.²⁵ At the cost of poor tenants, *Comunidades* distributed high dividends to its members.²⁶

The significance of Bandedkar's rule was that being a low caste mine owner and a capitalist, he was positioned to destroy the feudal structure of Goan society and land relations through the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964. The land reforms benefitted Goan peasantry not in terms of land as a productive unit, but in terms of perception of class status reflecting a shift from economic dependence on land. The dominance of post-colonial Goan economy by the mercantile capital and the limited opportunities conditioned the involvement of peasant households in tourism and mining.²⁷

The formation of the first MGP government had its contesting implications on Goan political and identity discourse. It was committed to the merger of Goa with the state of Maharashtra and Goans who were supportive towards merger argued against the Portuguese cultural influences, while the UGP and others who opposed were concerned about the unique identity of Goa. The MGP and its supporters put forth the claim that there are no cultural differences between Goa and Maharashtra and Konkani language began to be seen as a dialect of Marathi.²⁸ Understanding the seriousness of the merger issue that was polarizing Goan society and politics, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, following Nehru's previous assurances to Goans, made it clear that it is only the people of Goa who will decide about the future status of their territory. On 16 January 1967, in the first ever opinion poll in the country, Goans voted against the MGP's attempts to merge Goa with neighbouring state of Maharashtra. As the leader of the party, Bandedkar is often singled out by elites for aspiring to merge Goa with Maharashtra. However, aspirations for the merger pre-date the liberation of Goa, and unlike his party, Bandedkar himself was not a keen mergerist.²⁹

The opinion poll saw the democratic assertion of the unique identity of Goans with 54.20 per cent vote for the maintenance of union territory status.³⁰ The success was not only due to the unity of Hindu elites and Catholics, but also due to the significant shift of vote of the Bahujan Samaj from the stand of MGP. Apart from Bandedkar's charisma, where the Bahujan would not have liked to see loss of Bandedkar's leadership with merger, the factors that changed the potential merger vote were the liquor laws in Maharashtra that would have

affected toddy tappers, the status of a remote underdeveloped district and the anticipated expenditure on travel to accomplish official paperwork.³¹

In the 1977 elections, INC benefited from the merger of UGP and made its presence felt in Goa's politics by winning 10 seats and playing the role of the opposition. In the 1980 elections, INC(U) won 20 seats while the MGP was restricted to 7 seats. The significant feature of the 1980 elections was the peculiar last minute electoral understanding between INC(U) and INC(I), where it was agreed that the former would contest 22 seats and the later 6 seats.³² The INC(U) victory was broad-based and the party was able to break the dominance of MGP by winning 7 seats in MGP bastions.³³ The success of INC(U) was that it was seen as a party with a difference making commitments to statehood and official status for Konkani language.

The triumph in the opinion poll and its celebration as an identity strengthened the demand of statehood. As the states in post-colonial India were divided on linguistic lines, the demand for the official status for Konkani began to gain momentum. The language issue in Goa was not a post-colonial issue and the view of whether Konkani is an independent language or a dialect of Marathi was contested since the nineteenth century.³⁴ When the demands for the statehood were made, the idea of *Vishal Gomantak* (broader Goa) encompassing neighbouring Konkani-speaking territories in Maharashtra and Karnataka did not gain decisive support on account of the underdeveloped nature of these territories.

The factors that went against Goa's statehood were its economic viability, small size and contested political space on the status of Goa and its official language.³⁵ The recognition of Konkani as a language and not a dialect of Marathi language in 1975 set in motion the movement towards demand for an official status for Konkani. In 1986, language agitation was launched and it turned violent due to the clashes between Marathi and Konkani support groups. The agitation projected Goa's liberation to be an incomplete process which had to be realized with the accomplishment of Goa as a state with Konkani as its official language. In 1987, feeling intense pressure, political compromise was brought whereby Goa Assembly recognized Konkani, in Devanagari script, as the official language and also acknowledged the use of Marathi for official purposes. After sorting out the language issue, phenomenal economic performance surpassing some of the bigger Indian states, and the Centre's decision to confer statehood on small states like Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh whose density of population was less than Goa, it was clear that the status of statehood was about to be conferred.

On 30 May 1987, Goa was declared as the twenty-fifth state of India by separating the union territories of Daman and Diu. The attainment of statehood had a significant impact on the social, political and economic domains of Goa. The statehood was seen as an accomplishment of the unique Goan identity and

post-statehood, Goan society was structurally built around the psychology of loss. In the political and economic domains, it meant greater powers to state legislature, a bigger assembly from 30 to 40 seats and autonomy to take up decisions without the approval and interference of bureaucracy in Delhi.³⁶

Serial Governments: Defections, Instability and the High Command, 1990–2012

The pre-statehood Goa had three CMs from 1963 to 1987 where the electoral process was dominated by the regional parties (MGP and UGP) and since late 1977 by a regional party (MGP) against a national party (INC). The post-statehood Goa from 1990 to 2012 is marked by eighteen CMs, the emergence of numerous regional political parties towards the fulfilment of personal political aspirations, the political space being contested by national parties like INC and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the mergers of regional political parties with the INC through calculated bargain for power.

The political processes in post-statehood Goa have been marked by shifting loyalties, defections and the emergence of a political space that has questioned the very basis of the democratic process. Taking cognizance of the situation that Goa has become 'democracy's inconvenient fact', the present section analyses politics of power and looks at the 'tragicomedy' of serial elections from 1990 to 2012.³⁷

The 1989 elections saw the revival of MGP that had failed to win more than 8 seats in the last two assembly elections. The INC, after its marginal victory, had to accommodate aspirations of ministerial berths that included almost 9 first timers. The assembly was marked by the unpredictable loyalty based on ministerial berth and lust for power leading to 7 CMs. In the situation of constant defections, the MGP that was out of power for ten years could have bargained for the position of CM with rebels. However, their legislators were too anxious to share the powers, even at the cost of surrendering their numerical bargaining strength. Later many MGP legislators, some of whom belonged to Bahujan Samaj, defected to INC and legitimized their defections and formation of governments as a determined effort to carry forward and accomplish the social-political movement initiated by Bhandarkar.

The seventh assembly (1989–94) saw Churchill Alemao's defection from INC as an interim CM for 17 days. The assembly saw juggling of ministerial aspirants by creating a jumbo cabinet with 14 ministers in a house of 40 and absolute dependence on INC high command based in New Delhi. The astonishing achievement of the seventh assembly of Goa and the first after statehood was 7 CMs, 14 defections and 2 governors, one of whom had to lose office due to the partisan involvement in elevating Ravi Naik as CM who had earlier defected from MGP to become CM.³⁸

The 1994 elections were marked by a unified MGP-BJP-Shiv Sena alliance (25 seats, 12 seats and 2 seats, respectively) against the INC; whose dissidents were contesting as independents.³⁹ With the failure of the INC in readmitting Churchill, he not only contested elections by floating a new United Goans Democratic Party (UGDP), but also won 3 seats. Though INC formed the government, the biggest gains were for BJP which was led by Shripad Naik who belonged to Bahujan Samaj and making its mark for the first time since 1984 won 4 seats. In the 1998 parliamentary elections BJP showed an impressive performance in Catholic dominated South Goa while in North Goa they lost by a very thin margin. The eighth assembly was marked by 3 CMs one of whom had defected INC, 16 defections and President's Rule.

In the ninth assembly (1999–2002), MGP and BJP went alone for elections, while INC readmitted Churchill Alemao. The assembly saw 6 former CMs of which four were from INC. The aspirations for the CM's position were noticeable when sitting INC member of Parliament contested for assembly rather than eyeing for the parliamentary elections in 1999. The notable feature of this assembly was defection by former INC minister Francisco Sardinha from INC to form his government, followed by BJP government with Manohar Parrikar becoming its first CM of Goa. The ninth assembly was marked by 3 CMs and 20 defections and could not even continue its full term.

The tenth assembly (2002–7) was marked by two governments. First the BJP forming a government as the single largest party, followed by defections leading to INC government. The noteworthy feature was that Goa became the first state where a legislator defected after the 91st Amendment to Constitution and still managed to get re-elected. This was followed by a further 5 defections of BJP legislators, a notable example being of Digambar Kamat of BJP. Among these defectors, 1 legislator had defected for the third time, while three legislators had defected twice in an assembly term. Of these 5 defectors, 3 successfully gambled to win on INC, 1 on Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), while the other facing the electorate for the third time in an assembly term lost to BJP.

In 2007, the elections to the eleventh assembly was marked by INC-NCP alliance. While, Churchill Alemao resigned as INC member of parliament from the South Goa parliamentary seat and formed Save Goa Front (SGF), Babush Monserrate left INC on the last day of filling nominations and contested successfully on UGDP. The SGF party defeated former CMs Luizinho Faleiro and Francisco Sardinha of INC. Churchill Alemao won by defeating Luizinho Faleiro in Navelim, a constituency that he had represented since 1980 to 2007 for six consecutive times to the extent of winning unopposed in 1989.

Digambar Kamat, enjoying goodwill of high command and local factions, formed INC government with the support of NCP, MGP and independents. He managed to stay in office by giving important portfolios to former CMs. The

INC government of Digambar Kamat survived two unsuccessful attempts to bring them down. The first attempt was made by MGP, BJP and SGF, while the second was by the group of 7 consisting of MGP, UGDP, NCP and an independent Vishwajit Rane. To come out from the constant threat of instability, Digambar Kamat strengthened his position by working out the merger of SGF in INC and disintegration of group of 7 in 2010 with Babush Monserrate of UGDP joining INC without resigning from his seat of Taleigao, while Vishwajit Rane resigned to successfully re-contest elections on INC ticket.

In the 2012 assembly elections, the BJP-MGP alliance won 24 seats; whereby BJP won 21 seats and has majority, MGP won 3, while INC was reduced to 9 seats. Manohar Parrikar formed the government with Francis D'Souza as the deputy CM.

The serial governments in Goa, from 1990 to 2010, have challenged the democratic process. The institutionalization of democracy with the winability around 9,000 vote mark has mobilized people to contest elections in order to gain access to the state's resources. During 1989–2012, there have been more than 200 candidates contesting each assembly elections. The personalized contests for the state's resources, coupled with Goa's phenomenal economic performance has further enhanced the growing crisis of instability. The defectors were rewarded with ministerial berths and 5 among them went on to become CM. The electoral process is marked by paradoxical situations where splits have blurred the difference between opposition and ruling parties, speakers of assembly are involved in political manoeuvrings and political space is being dominated by high command.

Political Demography: Electoral Process, Party Politics and Localization of Power

The political demography has considerably changed since 1961. According to census data, Goa's population was 13,47,668 in 2001.⁴⁰ The census years from 1960 to 1981 saw a drastic rise by 30 per cent. The Hindu population has gone up from 59.92 per cent in 1960 to 65.79 per cent in 2001, while the Muslim population has increased from 1.95 per cent to 6.84 per cent. The Catholic population has dropped from 38.07 per cent in 1960 to 26.68 per cent in 2001. In terms of census' last decadal population, the Muslim population has grown by 50 per cent, Hindu by 17 per cent and Catholic by 3 per cent. The district wise population for North Goa is Hindus, 76.04 per cent; Catholics, 17.98 per cent, while South Goa has a Hindu population of 52.57 per cent and Catholic of 38.88 per cent.

The population trends indicate rapid urbanization with almost 49.46 per cent of urban population. The growth of overall population and increase in terms of Hindus and Muslims is mainly centred on a large influx of people from

neighbouring states. Goa has managed to control its birth rate with the average natural growth of population for the last decade being 1.06 per cent.⁴¹ However, the population has grown by 15.21 per cent and migrants account for 16.98 per cent of the population. The four *talukas* of the 'Old Conquests' has more than 50 per cent of the total population, while its urban population is almost 70 per cent. Goa's democratic process has been structured around its political demography in terms of caste, religion and migrant population. The significance of caste towards democratic processes can be seen from the very fact that the first four elections from 1963 to 1977 were largely centred on the Bahujan Samaj. The transition of Goa, from colonial to post-colonial democratic, has made some scholars to believe that the institutionalization of democracy built in a natural tendency within Bahujan Samaj is to see the democratic process as a liberating process.⁴² However, the problem with this argument is that it fails to acknowledge the historical processes.

Caste-based mobilizations had started in Goa in the early twentieth century where GSBs began to mobilize their caste, feeling the pressures of urbanization.⁴³ The Bahujan Samaj was also engaged with caste-based organizations. However, the noteworthy feature of these mobilizations was negation of Brahmanical hegemony through Marathization of castes. Like the lower caste movements in western Maharashtra, lower castes in Goa emphasized positive identity through Marathahood and there was the democratization of the symbol of Maratha.⁴⁴ The liberation of Goa in 1961 saw multiple imaginations of the notion of liberation among Goans. The upper castes perceived it to be an occasion to formalize their dominance with elections. Thus, it was an opportunity to join INC and institutionalize its hegemony through democratic process. The Bahujan Samaj was caught between the GSBs, some of whom were supporting the Portuguese rule while the others were trying to overthrow the Portuguese.⁴⁵

The Catholic social structure in Goa is also based on caste. It is in fact similar to Hindu structure, where caste centred honours and codes are seen within Church, rituals and feasts.⁴⁶ The division of Goan society on the basis of caste and religion and its implication on the democratic process brings out three different phases of electoral process from 1963 to 2012. The first phase, 1963–80, shows MGP localizing its electoral strength in Bahujan Samaj largely in 'New Conquests'. The period 1980–9, is marked by INC's noticeable gains in 'New Conquests' and emergence as a major political party with the merger of UGP with INC in 1977. The third phase, 1989–2012, is marked by capitalist transformations in land, localization of power on the basis of caste and religious institutions that challenge INC party's dominant position, apprehensions on the influx of immigrants and MGP losing out on its vote base to BJP. In terms of political leadership, the first phase was of Bandodkar, second of Pratapsingh Rane and the third has seen the dominance of personalized political parties, localization of power and the emergence of BJP as a political force.

When one looks at the political engagement with caste, the political process in the first phase was marked by politics centred on Bahujan Samaj; the second phase was marked by the rise of INC. The 1989 elections saw caste considerations within INC with regards to the selection of candidates.⁴⁷ In comparison to national politics, where it was from class to caste, Goa showed a reverse trend in the second phase and it was primarily due to fragmentation of Bahujan Samaj after the death of Bandodkar. Interestingly in its third phase, Goa is back to its caste-based politics but here the shift in terms of power is towards upper castes.

The rise of BJP as a prominent national party was in terms of its upper caste vote base. However, when it comes to Goa, BJP has consolidated its position in terms of Bahujan Samaj vote. The BJP has grown beyond its upper caste vote base since 1984. In the 1989 elections, BJP had 0.39 per cent vote and MGP had 38 per cent. In the 1994 elections, MGP tried to build up its losing ground by aligning with BJP. The alliance strategy of MGP failed as it polled 22 per cent vote while BJP jumped to 9 per cent. The BJP showed a phenomenal rise in its vote in 1999, 2002, 2007 and 2012. In 2002, BJP became the largest party by winning 17 seats while INC won 16 and MGP 2. In the 1999 parliamentary elections, BJP won both the seats, while in 2012 elections the BJP won absolute majority.

The rise of BJP was attributed to the Vajpayee factor, organization of party structure and INC defections.⁴⁸ A remarkable feature of the BJP's growth is its consolidation of position in the erstwhile MGP bastion of 'New Conquests'. The rise of BJP also reflected its acceptance within Bahujan Samaj. The BJP, in the beginning, created its base around the leadership of Sripad Naik, a Bhandari (OBC) by caste. The BJP has been able to expand and appeal to a larger section of Hindu ST-OBC population. The BJP inroads in the Bahujan Samaj vote of North Goa district that has large share of Hindu OBC-ST-SC population can be seen from consecutive four terms parliamentary victory of Sripad Naik over North Goa.

The localization of power is structured on societal changes in terms of urbanization, immigration and religious aspirations of lower castes. The political voice with vote has opened new forms of dissent among the lower castes where honours in temples and churches are either being contested or new temples and churches are being constructed. This has its impact on the third phase of electoral process where a new formidable political leadership has grown through its patronage to new religious structures. The present 3 MGP legislators, of which 2 are Brahmins, have won by patronizing religious aspirations of lower caste Hindus and Catholics. The victory of MGP brothers is not based on party, but through localization of power. The localization of power is further accomplished at the cost of the state's resources by expanding the size of government bureaucracy. The state cabinet ministers have often performed as a regional entity to the extent that the appointments in state bureaucracy represent

localization rather than merit. The government employee-people ratio reflects that there is 1 employee for 47 people.

The immigrants clustering in urban centres have also helped some prominent INC leaders to localize power, while leaders like Churchill Alemao consolidated their position by raising the concerns of identity. The rise in population, principally due to the influx of people, is seen as a concern for Goan identity and resources. Churchill Alemao had localized his vote base in Salcete *taluka* by mobilizing Catholic Bahujan and projecting himself to be a defender of Goan identity.⁴⁹ Churchill Alemao's strong presence in Salcete can be seen from the fact that the political parties set up by him like the UGDP polled 8 per cent vote in the 1994 assembly elections, while SGF polled 7 per cent in 2007. In 2009, Churchill Alemao merged his SGF with INC for ministerial berth and was seen as a significant player towards the stability of INC government. However, the 2012 elections shattered the dream of Churchill Alemao to hold sway over Goa's political domain, as all 4 candidates from the family lost to first-time contestants and the major issue was 'family raj'.

The issue of Goan identity also reflects two phases, the first from 1961 to 1987 and second from 1987 to 2012. In the first phase, the issue of identity was to prevent Goa from being merged with Maharashtra and gain statehood, while in the second phase it is linked with the protection of resources and culture from the influx of immigrants. The present political space is being dominated by the concerns of identity and immigrants. The state INC is in flux over the issue of identity, while BJP is consolidating on the issue of immigrants. What is noteworthy about BJP is that it is engaged in regionalizing itself by taking up on INC on the issues of immigrants, identity and demand for special political status for Goa.

The INC, on the other hand, has reflected anxiety. The immigrants, most of whom are Muslims, are the deciding vote of INC leaders based in urban constituencies. The popular protests on the basis of identity have made the state INC to reach out to the sensibilities of the Goans on identity, but the level of engagement is paradoxical. On the one side, state INC made efforts to reach out to Goans by commitments to special status, while on the other hand was critical of the state political leadership in the 1960s for not demanding special status.⁵⁰ The resort to history is with the intention to reach out to the Goans in terms of possibilities then and impracticalities today.

Capitalist Transformation and Democracy

Goa's economy has dramatically transformed from colonial to an economy with the highest per capita income in the country.⁵¹ The economic performance of the state with an average growth rate of more than 10 per cent has led many to argue that Goa is a lesson for others.⁵² The colonial economy of Goa was

dominated by the mercantile capital.⁵³ In the early half of the twentieth century, Goa was an import based economy without an industry. The failure of colonial state to invest in industries led to migration of Goans to British India, Portuguese colonies and Middle East.⁵⁴ The remittances, mercantile capital and opening of mines in the 1940s were the noteworthy features of economy. The Portuguese did not invest capital in mines and issued mining leases that were taken by mercantile class.⁵⁵ The penetration of foreign capital transformed mining into a dominant industry, where Japan and West Germany together took 70 per cent of Goa's iron-ore production in 1960s.⁵⁶

The transformation from colonial to post-colonial economy was structurally linked to the colonial economy. The Associação Comercial da Índia Portuguesa founded in 1908, which later became Goa Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GCCCI) has played a significant role in consolidation of mercantile capitalism.⁵⁷ Like the Associação Comercial da Índia Portuguesa that could influence the colonial policies of imports and exports, its successor, GCCCI, has contributed towards influencing exports, especially of ore. The GCCCI, on various occasions has succeeded in influencing central government in reducing export duties on iron ore.⁵⁸

Economic processes are everywhere political. In order to operate they require political conditions, both at local level and from the state.⁵⁹ Likewise, the political conditions require, and are influenced by, economic conditions. Goa's political economy reflects three phases from 1961–1980, 1980–1989 and 1989–2012. These three phases are marked by the capitalist transformations in mining, tourism and land, and are emphasised in terms of the changes in political process through the penetration of capital. The first phase is marked by the noteworthy progress in Goan economy centred on mining that saw the integration of Goa's economy within Indian economy and the ascendancy of mining on the political domain.

The traditional mercantile families, who got mining leases from the Portuguese, transformed into industrial corporations. Aided by the foreign capital mostly from Japan, the mercantile families diversified into industries.⁶⁰ The period was also noteworthy for the development of labour market with the spread of capitalism and land reforms, which brought about changes in traditional social structure that was being dominated by *bhatkars*. The international migration of Goans that increased among the Catholics since the late nineteenth century broadened with the migration of Hindus since the 1960s, a process largely accelerated by the land reforms. It was a phase of disintegration of feudal social structure, the expansion of peasantry in the labour market and early tourist activities. The second phase also saw the dominance of mining, but what distinguishes it from the first is the capitalist penetration on sea.

The process of mechanization of fishing was introduced in India with the Indo-Norwegian project in Kerala. In 1953, the central ministry of food and agriculture appointed a team of fisheries, experts to examine the potential of

fishing activities in Goa.⁶¹ As a fall out of central government's exercise, fisheries department was set up in Goa in 1963. The state government aided penetration of capital in fishing through mechanization by providing financial aid and subsidies.⁶² The government efforts to support the foreign companies manufacturing trawlers and shipments failed to reach the traditional fisherfolk. As the loans were beyond the repaying capacity of fishermen, the benefits were availed by small businessmen and supporters of politicians.

The mechanized fishing in shallow waters and monsoon fishing affected subsistence of traditional fishermen. The 1970s were marked by protests of fisherfolk through their organization, Goanchea Ramponkarancha Ekvott against the MGP government, demanding a no fishing zone within 5 km. of the coast for trawlers and a total ban during monsoon.⁶³ The fisherfolk protests was one of the principal reasons that led to the fall of MGP government.⁶⁴ The paradox of this second phase is that while the fisherfolk were protesting against mechanized fishing, trawler owners entered assembly and began to influence government. The influence of trawler lobby is marked by the official declaration of fish famine during 1980–2, a strategy aimed to write off the loans taken by trawler owners.⁶⁵ The politics of fishing ban in monsoon has been going on from 1980s to today, where issues were contested in court and the ban period shifting from 3 months to almost 45 days.⁶⁶ The global economic forces, especially the heavy demand for fish in world market has further led to the conversion of agrarian lands into fishing grounds.⁶⁷

The political economy, in the third phase, is marked by capitalist penetration in land that is structured on tourism, real estates, land acquisitions, urbanization and the ensuing concerns of identity. At present, the political economy of Goa is constituted around the market in land. A new group of players has emerged in this market of land, the most significant of which is the political class of bureaucrats and elected representatives.⁶⁸ The argument that escalating costs of jumbo cabinets and the politics of instability hampered the economic growth of the state has not been substantiated by the decadal economic performance of the state.⁶⁹ The phenomenal growth is due to the integration of Goan economy with world economy in terms of mining, fishing and tourism.

The phase from 1989 to 2012 is also marked by the policies of the Central Government attempting to integrate the economy of Goa with the national economy. The process of political integration of Goan economy began with tourism and the construction of the Konkan Railway. In 1990s, the state government aided by Central Government funds began to carnivalize Goan culture, by promoting carnival parades in Goa.⁷⁰ The Central Government also roped in state tourism ministers for the promotion of tourism and star hotels. When the Goan society was grappling with the so called 'cultural shock' of tourism, the state governments were seen aggressively promoting the same.⁷¹ In fact, some ministers also went on record to say that they are following central government in promoting tourism in Goa.⁷²

Aided by the Central and state governments, foreign capital penetrated tourism and industry that was initially supported by the peasant households.⁷³ In 1990, Goa had 5 five-star deluxe hotels with 991 rooms, whereas by the end of 1990, the number had increased to 9 with 1,725 rooms.⁷⁴ In 2010, the figure was 83 star category hotels with 6,092 rooms.⁷⁵ The governments virtually gave beaches to five-star hotels, which almost privatized the access to coast.⁷⁶ The development of tourism was also at the cost of environmental concerns. With the penetration of foreign capital in tourism, land emerged as the most valued commodity of Goa. The capitalist transformation of tourism and commodification of Goan space saw the arrival of foreign tourists significantly jumping from 7 per cent in 1988 to 27.7 per cent in 2003.⁷⁷ Today there are more than 2,650 hotels including all categories that are registered and some of them are owned by people who have political interests.⁷⁸

Given the post-colonial reproduction of Goa that is structurally connected to colonial European space and the dominance of mercantile capital, the capitalistic transformation in tourism was structured on mercantile capitalism aligning with the foreign capital.⁷⁹ Post-statehood Goa saw the emergence of hotel lobby influencing the government policies and formation of governments. The period saw the governments defending the impact of tourism by arguing on economic gains. The tourism lobbies played an important role in replacing governments and their presence can be gauged from the attempts made by the governments to regularize hotel constructions within an ecologically sensitive 200 m. from the coast. The capitalist penetration in tourism assisted the rise of Churchill Alemao, who had been constantly promoting the interests of hotels in South Goa to the extent that in 1990 as a tourism minister, he claimed that, he would regularize constructions of hotels within 200 m. from sea.⁸⁰

In 1992, the government amended the Goa Public Gambling Act, 1976 to legalize the introduction of licensed slot machines in luxury hotels. The dominance of tourism lobby over tourism was remarkably clear when in 2009, the INC government in Goa amended a 114-year old Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to save a portion of a hotel, which was to be demolished as per Supreme Court order.⁸¹ While the traditional fisherfolk and toddy tappers received notices for the demolition of their houses for the violation of Coastal Regulatory Zone guidelines, the state government first rescued the hotel. The amendment to the act empowers state to overrule any authoritative order and validate any construction done by a company after reaching an agreement with the government and securing permissions from planning and development authorities. The ordinance is deemed to have come into effect from 15 October 1964.

The Central Government, relying on the tourist image of Goa, tried to further accelerate penetration of capital through the projects like free port, special economic zones (SEZs), Japanese holiday village and food, and IT parks. To accomplish the integration of political economy beyond tourism, the Central

Government initiated construction of Konkan Railway. The proposal of setting up Konkan Railway was not welcomed by Goans. Apart from the environmental concerns, it was argued that Konkan Railway would lead to slums and cultural pollution with the immigrants flocking to Goa.⁸² Catholic Church also protested against railway as it would have drastically altered the demographic profile of the state.⁸³

The Raunaq Singh Committee set up by the Government of India in 1992 to study the feasibility of setting up a free port, came up with the maximum points for Goa due to its tourist image. The Central Government tried to entice Goans saying that through a free port Goa would be transformed into Hong Kong and Singapore.⁸⁴ While the proposal on free port was almost supported by GCCI, Goans successfully protested against it understanding the quantum of foreign investments and its impact on Goan identity. In 1993-4, there was also successful protest against the US multinational company Du Pont, that wanted to set up Nylon 6,6 plant and had the backing of central and state governments.⁸⁵ In 2007, there was protest over Rajiv Gandhi IT Habitat at Dona Paula, the most expensive seaside residential area of Goa. The period further saw protests over IT parks and habitats, expansion of Mormugao Port, Fish Meal Project and Food Park. These projects are seen as attempts made by the governments and political class to grab land in the name of development.

The touristic image of Goa also contributed towards the construction boom. Before the 1990s, the real estate industry was centred on Goans investing their remittances from Gulf. Gulf boom laid the foundation for the building bonanza in Goa.⁸⁶ Today the real estate boom in Goa is sustained by the touristic image of Goa, where its own people have lost their buying power. There is a heavy demand for holiday homes in Goa. The major real estate developers like DLF, Ghera Developers, Parsvanath, Palacio Property Developers and Dynamix Group have entered Goa and have been able to influence government. The development of real estate has transformed Town and Country Planning into a most rewarding ministry. The politics is seen as an excess to 'land based scams', that has made it a lucrative and money spinning field.⁸⁷

The construction boom is concentrated in coastal Goa. In this construction boom, the coastal village of Calangute tops the list, where in 1991, the village had 826 new constructions, in 2006 it had 14,354 new structures.⁸⁸ The number of constructions has doubled in coastal Goa and the real estate is dominated by north Indians for whom it is just a convenience to own a house in a place they usually visit for a holiday. The tourist pressure and migrations has transformed coastal lands and ecosystems.⁸⁹ The rising value of land has also led to foreigners buying land and consequently violating the Foreign Exchange Management Act. The Russian mafia has acquired landed properties in North Goa, transforming the character of the villages. The Russian tourists are the second largest number of foreigners visiting Goa.⁹⁰ The dominance of the Russian mafia is so marked that CNN-IBN, national news channel carried news of the Russian mafia

usurping the land through fraudulent land deals and forcibly evacuating small landholders.⁹¹ The politics centred on land is so lucrative that there is a struggle to get ministry even at the cost of resigning and re-contesting.

The pressures of urbanization and concern of identity has made the people protest against the Central Government's move to expand Mormugao Port and also the regional plan of state. In 2007, Goans protested against the Regional Plan 2011. It was crafted on behest of the builders that would have led to phenomenal increase in settlement area.⁹² The plan increased the settlement zone by almost 6,802 ha. without doing environmental assessment.⁹³ The significant feature of the protests is that they are mobilized through village Panchayats. These protests are mobilized on the lines of anti-Nylon 6,6 movement where a small village thwarted the plans of US multinational to set up a industry in 1993.⁹⁴ Aided by the 73rd Constitutional Amendment and the Goa Panchayati Raj Act, 1993, that has empowered village Gram Sabhas to decide the developmental works, the village Panchayats passed resolution against the regional plan. The protests against the Regional Plan 2011 built by Panchayats was so widespread that the government withdrew the plan from retrospective date and also made a commitment that the new regional plan would be drafted with the people's consensus.

Church, State and Society

The post-colonial political processes and social trends brought radical changes in the organization of the Church in Goa. In colonial times, there was a nexus between Church and state. According to Bragança Cunha, the Church was an instrument of political domination, an important weapon of subjection that the Portuguese used.⁹⁵ The Church did not encourage nationalist feelings. Portugal used the Catholic Church to develop submissive loyalty, where Christian ethos of passive submission to authority was identified with virtue while dissent was identified with irreverence.⁹⁶

In post-colonial Goa, the Catholic Church had to reinvent itself from the position of being seen as a colonial institution to a localized one. In doing so it had to improve its weakening grip over the community. The post-colonial political and social trends provided a space for the Church to involve itself in socio-political-cultural issues to regain its hold. In colonial times, while the Church was seen as statist, in post-colonial Goa, the Church's involvement in socio-political and cultural issues has found itself to be perceived as anti-state in terms of opposition to the policies.

Church has been constantly involved in people's movements. In the 1960s when the Maharashtrian Catholics were campaigning for the merger of Goa with Maharashtra, the Catholic Church in Goa did play an important role in reaching out towards community against merger. In the 1970s, the Church protested

against the commercialization of carnival festival for promoting tourism in Goa. Carnival, during colonial period, was a festival where people threw colour at each other, dressed in fancy costumes and had street play performances. In late 1980s, state withdrew its patronage to carnival largely due to the protests by the Church. The 1970s also saw the Church supporting the Ramponkar agitation which was led primarily by the Catholic traditional fisherfolk.

In the 1980s, Church was involved in opposing Marathi as the official language, language agitation demanding official status for Konkani and demand for statehood. The decade also saw the Church raising its concern on the impact of tourism. Since the 1990s, the Church has been actively involved in people's movements directly or indirectly through the association with the NGOs. The Church has been involved in agitations on realignment of Konkan Railway route, Carnival festival, Regional Plan and industrial projects like Meta Strip, SEZs and Mega Real Estate Projects.

In the last two decades, Church has projected itself as a major institution being concerned with the ecological, demographic and moral issues of the state. In the 1990s, the Church confronted the state on the Konkan Railway route and the organization of Carnival. The Church protested against the Konkan Railway on the grounds of destruction of environment and its impact on human settlement. Monsignor Alberto Luis, the Director of Diocesan Centre for Social Action was actively involved in the Konkan Railway realignment movement and Archbishop Raul Gonsalves even made a written request to Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1992 for a change in Konkan railway route.

In 1993, Monsignor Alberto Luis led a street protest at Margao against the revival of the carnival parade by the state. The Church, through its All Goa Citizen's Committee for Social Justice and Action, along with the other organizations like Jagrut Goemkaranchi Fauz and Bailancho Saad protested against carnival. The Church objected to it being depicted as a Catholic festival and the manner in which the Goan youths were exploited by the organizers and sponsors. The Church's protests against the impact of tourism failed to develop into a larger public protest as the major beneficiaries of tourism around coastal Goa were the Catholics.

The Council for Social Justice and Peace, a body of the Archdiocese of Goa had raised its voice against the Panchayat Raj Amendment Bill, 2009; Land Acquisition Ordinance 2009, police-politician-drug nexus, illegal mining, mega building projects in villages, impacts of tourism and the ecological imbalances. The Church is also concerned about the changing demographic profile of Goa and its probable impact on elections and governance. The Konkan Railway protest apart from being concerned with ecological issues, was also concerned with the apprehensions of the demographic changes.⁹⁷ It was argued that the Konkan Railway will lead to immigration, causing 'culture shock' and 'cultural pollution'.⁹⁸ The rising population of Goa through immigration, and escalating

demand for real estate have led the Church and other NGOs to take up issues of Goan identity.

In post-colonial times, the Church has also tried to influence the political domain. In the early decades of liberation, the Church was indirectly seen as supporting UGP and later the INC. In the 1990s, the Church was concerned with the politics of instability. In the 1994 state elections, the Church launched an attack on corrupt politicians.⁹⁹ In the 2002 state elections, the Church appealed for people to vote against corrupt candidates and communalism.¹⁰⁰

The confrontation of Church with the state has at times developed public debate on the relationship between the state and the Church and the probable nature of a healthy dialogue that could benefit democratic institutions. While the role of Church in setting up schools, charitable institutions and hospitals has been received favourably, however, its engagement with social activism has caused some to argue that this had blurred the lines between social justice and politics. The Church's stand can be seen from the words of Father Nicolau Pereira, the President of Diocesan Society for Education: 'Whatever affects human life is within the purview of the Church. Politics is also part of human life, so there is nothing wrong with the Church participating in social role.'¹⁰¹

The Church, through its involvement in socio-political movements, has succeeded in moving away from its colonial image. Its hold over the community is seen as a 'soft power' in electoral process especially in the *talukas* of Tiswadi, Bardez, Salcete and Mormugao. However, Church's commanding position is yet to be felt in the constituencies where the political power is localized through the state's resources.

Politics of Special Economic Zones

In 2006, Pratapsingh Rane government recommended fifteen SEZs for Goa to the Centre. The SEZs, perceived as a new face of globalization and development, are expected at enhancing direct foreign and large domestic investment, through its autonomous governance structures, offering privileged concessions in labour laws, taxes, duties and tariff regimes. SEZs are largely seen as high productive zones having a trade capacity development tool towards accelerated economic growth. Of the fifteen recommended, the centre approved seven and formal notification was issued for three SEZs. These included 123.2 ha. biotech SEZ of Cipla's Meditab Specialties in Keri-Ponda, 107.17 ha. services SEZ of K. Raheja Corporation Private Limited at Verna-Salcete and 20.36 ha. biotech SEZ of Peninsula Pharma Research Centre Private Limited at Sancoale-Mormugao.

The politics of the SEZs was that the Goa Industrial Development Corporation allocated land to SEZs even before the state government formulated policy. The land that was allocated to the companies was acquired by exercising

the powers under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Computer and Auditor General pointed out serious irregularities and illegalities in the allotment of lands in favour of the companies.¹⁰² It criticized the process of the allotment itself stating that the corporation had not publicized its intention of allotting the land and that the land allotment was not based on any selection process such as inviting any expressions of interest thereby lacking in transparency. The favoured companies had its lobbies within government and also outside including the president of GCCI.¹⁰³

The issue of developing SEZs in Goa and its impact on the socio-economic profile of the state led to the formation of SEZ Virodhi Manch and Goa's movement against SEZ. These organizations made efforts to go public by creating awareness and exposing the impact of SEZs on Goa. They criticized the government for acquiring large chunks of land in a state where land was a scarce resource. They also exposed the alliance between the government and real estate developers who were masquerading as promoters of SEZs. It was argued that promotion of SEZs would create backdoor entry to the real estate companies, which in turn would hamper the activities of the local real estate developers and adversely affect the state's socio-economic indicators. The movement against SEZs also expressed fears regarding an influx of non-Goans by almost 50 per cent of the present population and burden on the infrastructure and resources of state. On the government's enticement of development and employment, it was emphasized that the state government would have no control over the recruitment by the promoters of SEZs and eventually Goans would have no benefits.

The SEZ Virodhi Manch and Goa's movement against the SEZ's public campaign on the impact of SEZs and the concessions for the companies in the name of development was able to receive overwhelming support from a larger section of society, other NGOs and Church. These organizations demanded de-notification of notified SEZs and scrapping of the SEZ policy. While the opposition BJP criticized the government, CM Digambar Kamat who had seen temporary peace after protests on the regional plan found it difficult to take a stand, and the issue was complicated with the difference of opinion on the SEZ within INC. Eventually, an SEZ study committee set up by the INC's Goa unit, which in its interim report emphasized that SEZs in its form were not in Goa's interests. The Goa's movement Against SEZs, a body comprising of NGOs and political parties including main opposition BJP, decided to intensify the protest by warning the tourists to leave the state by 28 December 2007, as the agitation would be intensified and there were possibilities of it taking a violent turn.

Under attack from all quarters including INC leaders and party workers in Goa and other coalition partners like NCP and MGP, Digambar Kamat recommended scrapping of SEZs on 1 January 2008. However, the Centre

refused to denotify three SEZs in Goa that had already been approved and notified. The Commerce Secretary G.K. Pillai, who also headed the Board of Approval for SEZs, argued that the state government did not have the power to scrap notified SEZs. Reiterating that it was firm on its decision to scrap the SEZs, the government of Goa requested the central government to review its refusal to de-notify the zones. Understanding the mounting pressure, the Union Commerce Minister Kamal Nath assured Goa that the Centre would not impose SEZs. However, the denotification of the SEZs has been challenged by the promoters in the Goa branch of Mumbai High Court.

The INC, at the Centre was caught with SEZ policy, supporting the decision of Goa government could have meant the party's position on SEZs. The INC tried to distance itself by emphasizing it to be an issue between the state government and the commerce ministry. On 26 November 2010, the Goa Bench of Mumbai High Court upheld the decision of the government to scrap SEZs and deemed the allotment of land by the Goa Industrial Development Corporation to various companies as illegal. With the verdict, the Union Commerce Minister Anand Sharma initiated the process to denotify three notified SEZs and has thus put a stop to the SEZ issue that of late was developing into a Centre and state clash.

Civil Society and Political Economy

The concept of civil society has been revived in recent years and is highly popular in political discourses. Much weight is given to civil society as an instrument for the consolidation of democracy through its linkage to good governance and democratization. Civil society is primarily seen as a guard of citizen's rights and interests against the state, a sphere engaged in political and ideological struggle.¹⁰⁴ The idea of civil society is based on active citizenry, which is able to resist domination by state through accountability, to the extent of demands of its inclusion into political structure and governance.

The penetration of market mechanisms carried serious implications on the evolution of civil society in Goa. In the first phase of Goa's political economy, During 1961–80, the civil society was largely a bourgeois public sphere. The confinement of civil society to a certain section of society was due to the belief of masses in the nature of post-colonial illusion created by the state and elites.¹⁰⁵ The civil society in this phase was marked by the engagement of elites in the discourse of identity, where elitist cultural ideologies were reproduced as Goan culture. As the foreign capital penetrated through mercantile capitalism, the engagement of civil society with the state and its governance was not evident. In late 1970s, when Goa was on the way of integration into the world fish and tourism market, one can note the level of engagement of civil society in terms of development and rights.

The 1990s saw the engagement of civil society against developmental projects of state and central governments. The period is marked by phenomenal capital penetration in land and the emergence of organizations demanding inclusion in governance. With regard to India, where the cultural identities are politicized, a cultural identity in Goa is deployed as a resource by the civil society to take on state and central governments. The various protests launched since the 1990s have vigorously emphasized on the cultural issues of development.

The developmental projects in terms of special economic zones, expansion of port, free port, IT and food parks and regional plans are largely opposed on the basis of identity concerns. In recent times, the engagement of civil society has gone beyond cultural issues and the emphasis on ecology is gaining. The shift towards ecological issues is structured on the integration of Goan economy with the world economy. The heavy demand for Goa's iron ore from China in the early twenty-first century encouraged illegal mining. From 1990 to 2010, Goa exported almost 83 per cent of its ore to China, with the production of ore doubling.¹⁰⁶ While the production has increased, there is a phenomenal gap between production and export, where paradoxically, export in terms of quantity has superseded production. In 2007–8, the difference between ore mined and exported from Mormugao Port was 3 million tons, while in 2008–9 5.31 million tons and in 2009–10, 5.18 million tons.¹⁰⁷ The demand led to the emergence of new players, who within a short time span developed political clout.

The remarkable feature of Goa is the expanding active citizenry. Today, the protests are marked by the grassroots mobilizations. The Panchayat and the issues of identity are used to engage with the state. The protests are growing with most of the villages establishing organizations to protect villages from state developmental plans and mega projects. However, civil society in Goa is not trying to engage with the political process. Whenever people are mobilized and movements launched, the civil society attempts to distance itself from the political domain. In 2007, when Goa Bachao Andolan (Save Goa movement) was launched against Regional Plan 2001, it did not allow any political party or politician to formally associate with the protest.

Civil society in Goa is emerging as an independent domain and is being looked as a confrontation to the state. The state is refusing to go along with the pressures of civil society and is countering it through its legislative power. This relation is spelt out if one looks at the amendment of the Land Acquisition Act as discussed above and the 2010 Amendment to Goa Panchayati Raj Act. As per the amendment, the government nominated panchayat secretary is empowered to execute the orders passed by the government and government institutions. The amendment has given powers to bureaucracy instead of elected representatives of people.¹⁰⁸ Further, the dependence of members of civil society upon state authority and the inclination of some NGOs towards political parties have not brought desired success to civil society in bringing about changes in

electoral politics. The irony being that popular protests against political leaders have not always affected the outcome at elections and this success is on the part of political leaders is largely driven by hold over the resources of state and localization of power.

Conclusion

The Indian political space evolved from a national integrative politics of INC to the regional politics, while in Goa it is reverse. The electoral process in Goa is marked by its political economy and the political integration of Goan economy within Indian economy. The capitalist penetration of Goa through mining in the first phase, fishing in the second, and land in the third has influenced the formations of governments. The structural similarities in terms of colonial and post-colonial Goa are so marked that even a tax holiday by Central Government and 25 per cent subsidy to industries up to a maximum limit of Rs.25 lakh in the 1990s had failed to drive industrialization as compared to the exceptional growth in mining and tourism.

The democratic process in terms of party politics has seen shifts in the 50 years of liberation. In the first phase, MGP consolidated its political base around Hindu Bahujan Samaj, while later the INC emerged as the dominant political force through Hindu upper castes and Catholic vote base particularly with the merger of UGP. The second phase was marked by the INC attempting to reach out to all sections of society chiefly Bahujan Samaj. Here, the INC emerged as party welcoming MGP leaders who belonged to Bahujan Samaj. The third phase saw land becoming the prominent commodity with greater investment of capital in land and the political contests for states resources. Its an ongoing phase where political parties are set up as an arena of personalized interests contributing towards instability and defections, even at the extent of re-contest. The noteworthy trend with regards to the political process is that political parties established by the legislators have only succeeded, while parties floated by others have failed to win even a single seat. These legislator-based parties have succeeded in localization of power through state's resources, caste and religion.

The contest to gain access to the states resources, mathematics of numbers in terms of government formation and demand of ministerial berth, is driving Goa towards patrimonial democracy. While in other parts of the country, where the constituency has emerged as a family domain in terms of father and son, Goan constituencies are emerging as 'consolidator-expansionist' domain for political bargain. The political leaders are demanding parallel tickets for their kin in their neighbouring constituencies. This was the prominent feature of the 2007 and 2012 elections where tickets were claimed for son, brother, wife and daughter. In 2007, the INC finding it difficult to accommodate these claims used the strategy of one ticket per family. Dissatisfied with the INC, these aspirants contested as independents, floated new parties and made a re-entry in their

former party. Most of these family aspirants won, made a comeback in INC. However, in 2012 elections the INC-NCP alliance lost due to issues of corruption, illegal mining and family raj whereby five families contested 12 seats. By surrendering to five families, tickets were denied to party workers and in some cases there was import of candidates from INC to NCP.

The rise of BJP in the 1990s is indicated by the political demography, which had earlier supported MGP. The BJP has consolidated its position in Goa by taking over the vote base of MGP, seen in relation to Bahujan Samaj. The party has made efforts to transform itself from an ideologically Sanskrit Brahmanical party into a party with mass base of Bahujan Samaj. While INC is attempting to consolidate by bringing the rhetoric of class through its *aam admi* (common man) image, the BJP is consciously driving to consolidate vote base around the Bahujan Samaj. This is indicative of the fact that when INC has most of the former MGP legislators' belonging to Bahujan Samaj, the party is losing its vote base in 'New Conquests' to BJP. Since the disappearance of regional parties with regard to vote base, the BJP is trying to regionalize by taking up the issues of identity and immigration, with no other regional parties competing with its vote. In 2012 elections, the BJP was able to win absolute majority due to: its alliance with MGP, giving tickets to Christian candidates in constituencies with a sizeable Christian population, support to independents and prioritizing on winability by denying tickets to its legislators for candidates who were new to party but had financial clout to contest and run a campaign.

The INC, on the other side, is seen as a party that is finding it difficult to manage its own leaders. The dominant image of INC is leading to its factionalism. It is seen as a party by its leaders that has potentialities to personalize and localize electoral power. The dominant image has dialectically contributed to defections, where the contest is against INC and once accomplished there is bargained re-entry in INC. In this sense INC is emerging as a party that is contesting with itself rather than the BJP. The INC leaders in Goa are more inclined in state politics rather than participating in electoral process at Centre. The prominent INC legislators are not keen on contesting parliamentary elections, as with only 2 seats Goa lacks the potential to get space within central ministry. These prominent leaders fall back to the parliamentary elections only when they lose in state elections, do not show any intentions to re-contest and in some cases resign parliamentary seat to contest for assembly elections.

Notes

1. *Economic Survey 2003-4*, Panaji: Directorate of Planning Statistics and Evaluation, Government of Goa, 2005.
2. Parag D. Parobo, 'Tristão Bragança Cunha and Nationalism in Colonial Goa: Mediating Difference and Essentialising Nationhood', *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 50, no. 31, 1 August 2015, pp. 61-8.

3. Alexander Henn, 'The Becoming of Goa: Space and Culture in the Emergence of a Multicultural Lifeworld', *Lusotopie*, 2000, pp. 333-9.
4. In 1510 Portuguese captured Tiswadi taluka and in 1543 Bardez and Salcete and together were referred as 'Old Conquests'. Later the taluka of Mormugao was carved from Salcete.
5. Pratima Kamat, *Farar Far: Local Resistance to Colonial Hegemony in Goa, 1510-1912*, Panaji: Institute Menezes Bragança, 1999, pp. 24-5.
6. The Portuguese Goa witnessed absolute monarchy from 1510 to 1820, constitutional monarchy from 1820 to 1910, the republican government from 1910 to 1926 and dictatorship from 1926 to 1961. Under the constitutional monarchy political consciousness developed among Goan Catholics who were given the right to elect representatives for Goa in the Portuguese parliament. The Republican government provided religious freedom and the dictatorship of Salazar denied civil liberties.
7. The Portuguese designated territories captured in sixteenth century as *Velhas Conquistas* (Old Conquests) and the territories captured in late eighteenth century were referred as *Novas Conquistas* (New Conquests).
8. Government of India, *Census of India, 1971, Series 28: Goa, Daman and Diu, Part-IA*. Panaji: Registrar General of India, 1971.
9. D.D. Kosambi, *Myth and Reality*, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1962, p. 169; T.R. deSouza, *Medieval Goa: A Socio-Economic History*, New Delhi: Concept Publishing Co., 1979, chapter 3.
10. Goa had village communities in pre-colonial times and were known as *Gaonkari*. The village communities were headed by *gaonkars* and had their own rules and regulations. The institution of *Gaonkari* supervised agrarian production and distribution of surplus in village and the Portuguese referred them as *Comunidades*.
11. Gomes Rui Pereira, *Goa Vol II. Gaunkari: The Old Village Associations*, Panaji: A. Gomes Pereira, 1981.
12. A.L. Dias, *Report of the Land Reforms Commission*, Panaji: Government of Goa, 1964, p. 16.
13. Parag D. Parobo, *India's First Democratic Revolution: Dayanand Bandodkar and the Rise of Bahujan in Goa (New Perspectives in South Asian History 2)*, New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan, 2015, pp. 152-4.
14. The reference to mercantile class or mercantile capital is used in Marxian framework. According to Marx, merchant capital has the ability to mediate between pre-capitalist and capitalist mode of production. Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. III, New York: Vintage Books, 1981, p. 332.
15. Holy office of the Inquisition was the religious tribunal set up at Old Goa in 1560. It was set up to persecute Catholics who after conversions were following Hindu religious practices. However, later the tribunal was also used to propagate new faith with the use of force. For details see A.K. Priolkar, *The Goa Inquisition*, Bombay: By author, 1961. For details on GSBs as tax farmers see M.N. Pearson, *Coastal Western India*, New Delhi: Concept Publishing Co., 1981, p. 98.
16. G.V. Scammell, 'The Pillars of Empire: Indigenous Assistance and the Survival of the "Estado da India" c.1600-1700', *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 22, no. 3, 1988,

- pp. 473–89; T.R. deSouza, 'Glimpses of Hindu Dominance of the Goan Economy in the 17th century', *Indica*, vol. 12, no. I, March 1975, pp. 27–35.
17. Trichur Raghuraman, *Refiguring Goa: From Trading Post to Tourism Destination*, Saligao, Goa, 1556, 2013.
 18. Seema Risbud, 'Goa's Struggle for Freedom 1949–1961: The Contributions of National Congress (Goa) and Azad Gomantak Dal', Ph.D. dissertation, Goa University, 2003. See appendices in the work containing the manifestos by nationalist organizations like the National Congress Goa and Azad Gomantak Dal that bring out this dilemma.
 19. Chandrakant Keni, 'Nehru and Goa', *Nave Goem* (Konkani), 15 June 1964, p. 18
 20. Parag D. Parobo, *India's First Democratic Revolution: Dayanand Bhandodkar and the Rise of Bahujan in Goa (New Perspectives in South Asian History 2)*, New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan, 2015.
 21. In the 1960s, with the coming of democracy, the Bahujan Samaj in Goa consolidated largely as a loose conglomeration of lower caste *jātis* such as Bhandharis (toddy tappers), Gaudas (tribals), Kharvis (fisherpersons) and Gomantak Maratha (stereotyped popularly as devadāsis, a caste consolidating social groups skilled in poetry, song and dance, serving patrons/temples, and women intimately related to temple rituals). In 1960s, the Catholic lower castes would not have identified as Bahujan, the process of seeing as the Catholic Bahujan started in 1990s.
 22. Sarto Esteves, *Goa and Its Future*, Bombay: Manaktala and Sons, 1966, pp. 97–100.
 23. Vishvanath Pai Panandiker, 'Impact of Democracy and Federalism on Goa', *Seminar*, no. 543, November 2004, p. 23.
 24. *Techno-Economic Survey of Goa, Daman and Diu*, New Delhi: National Council of Applied Economic Research, 1964, p. 38.
 25. Jose C. Almeida, *Aspects of Agricultural Activity in Goa, Daman and Diu*, Panaji: Government Printing Press, 1967, pp. 39–48.
 26. T.B. Cunha, *Goa's Freedom Struggle (Selected Writings of T.B. Cunha)*, Bombay: Dr. T.B. Cunha Memorial Committee, 1961, p. 123.
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 28. A.K. Priolkar, *Gomantalatil Maarathi Bhasha Ani Konkani Boli* (in Marathi), Poona: Pune Vidyapith, 1966.
 29. Parobo, *India's First Democratic Revolution*, pp. 130–2.
 30. Suresh G. Amonkar, *Goa Opinion Poll 1967*, Panaji: Amokar, 1967.
 31. Parobo, *India's First Democratic Revolution*, pp. 130–2.
 32. Aureliano Fernandes, *Cabinet Government in Goa 1961–1993*, Panaji: Maureen and Camvet Publishers, 1997, p. 82.
 33. The INC(U) was merged with INC(I) within a month from the elections.
 34. Rochelle Pinto, *Between Empires: Print and Politics in Goa*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 95–116.
 35. Arthur G. Rubinoff, 'Goa's Attainment of Statehood', *Asian Survey*, vol. 32, no. 5, May 1992, pp. 471–87.
 36. Under union territory status, Goa needed approval from central bureaucracy towards utilization of central funds. Bhandodkar, most of the time, returned the central funds and constantly argued that the decisions on economic development could not be executed to the possible extent as a result of the time consuming

- procedural bureaucratic formalities. For details see: A Brief Report of the Business Transacted during January-March 1965 Session of the legislative assembly of Goa, Daman and Diu. Panaji: Legislature Department, 1965; A Brief Report of the Business Transacted during January-March 1966 Session of the Legislative Assembly of Goa, Daman and Diu. Panaji: Legislature Department, 1966.
37. Peter Ronald deSouza, 'Democracy's Inconvenient Fact', *Seminar*, vol. 543, November 2004, pp. 14–19.
 38. Ravi Naik, defected from MGP, became the CM after a brief President's Rule. He was replaced by Wilfred D'Souza. Governor Bhanu Pratap Singh had to resign due to his dismissal of Wilfred D'Souza and elevating Ravi Naik as the chief minister for two days without consulting President or the majority group within assembly there by violating Article 16(4) of the Constitution.
 39. There were 154 independents contesting elections contesting for 40 seats. The INC legislators and leaders who were denied tickets contested as independents.
 40. Government of India, *Census of India, 2001: Series 30 Goa*, Panaji: Registrar General of India, 2004.
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 42. Sarto Esteves, *Goa and Its Future*, Bombay: Manaktala & Sons, 1966; B.G. D'Souza, *Goan Society in Transition: A Study in Social Change*, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1975; S.R. Phal, *Society in Goa: Some Aspects of Traditions and Modern Trend*, Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation, 1982; R.N. Saksena, *Goa: Into the Mainstream*, New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1974.
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62. V.T. Gune, ed., *Gazetteer of the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu*, vol. I, Panaji: Gazetteer Department, 1979, pp. 312–16.
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