Executive power and the system of checks and balances in modern government: A constitutional and comparative analysis with reference to India

Abstract

The doctrine of checks and balances constitutes a cornerstone of modern constitutional democracies, ensuring that political power is not concentrated in a single branch of government. Within the Indian constitutional framework, this principal manifests through a dynamic interaction between the executive, legislature, and judiciary, each entrusted with distinct powers and mechanisms of accountability. This research paper critically examines the scope, limits, and constitutional evolution of executive power within India's system of checks and balances. It contextualizes the Indian model within broader comparative frameworks drawn from the United States and the United Kingdom, exploring how judicial review, parliamentary oversight, and presidential discretion collectively preserve constitutional equilibrium. Through doctrinal and analytical methods, the paper evaluates the transformation of executive authority in light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, including Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, and Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India. It concludes that while India's separation of powers remains flexible, its checks and balances mechanisms continue to evolve as instruments of constitutional morality and democratic governance.